Theories Strategiques

by

Castex

Volume II

CHAPTERS I TO IV

CHARTS II TO V

(Chapters V to IX and Charts VI to IX bound separately)

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by

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Volume II

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VOLUME II, PART I

CHAPTER I

THE STRATEGIC MANEUVER

General

The strategic maneuver is an interesting feature in the conduct of naval operations. It is a procedure or an expedient available to improve to advantage the conditions of the struggle in order to increase the yield from effort, and to secure best results either in connection with the struggle between the main forces themselves or to assist extra-naval services considered of special importance. *

Consequently it will be necessary to devote special study to this mode of action.

Military writers have characterized this art of maneuvering in various ways. "To maneuver," say some, "is to harmonize (faire le nombre)". "It is to act from strength on to weakness" say others. According to another maxim it is "to operate in force on the decisive point." "It is to organize effort", says yet another.

I believe the following formula could be advantageously retained:- To maneuver is to move intelligently for the purpose of creating a favorable situation.

This definition unites those preding by going beyond them. Its import is absolutely general. It applies not only to strategy but also to tactics and, in addition, to politics, commerce, industry, business, even to every day life itself, in a word, to all forms of activity in which a struggle must be made to attain a goal by overcoming obstacles.

Thus presented, the maneuver appears as the apogee of art. It is the spiritual part of the profession. This creative work

*The function of strategy is to draw success from feeble resources or, at the very least, to oblige these resources to surrender thrir maximum yield." (Daveluy, Study in Modern Strategy, p.4)

par excellence appeals to all the faculties of the mind, to the imagination, and to the will.

It remains to be seen to what extent it can be conceived and what are its constitutive elements.

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In practice an instinctive impulse does not terminate in a strategic maneuver; rather the opposite. Offensively the first move is to attack the enemy everywhere where he has forces and interests, distributing the effectives at our disposal proportionally to his strength. On the defensive we are likewise induced to surrender to the same desire. To protect everything menaced by the enemy we dole out our resources bit by bit corresponding to those which our adversary devotes to his undertakings. Many wars of the past offer a long series of examples of this method of fighting. In general they were those in which results obtained were very mediocre.

This must be clearly understood. For these results to have been otherwise there would have been necessary a simultaneous superiority of forces at all points, which would have implied a superiority inttoto such as is very rarely achieved. In the more normal case of equality of resources, nothing decisive can result a priori from this mode of procedure. The solution will supervene after a brutal algebraical summation of results obtained in each place and this, moreover, in accordance with chance, the valor of the participants and the conditions under which they operate. Reverses suffered at one place frequently find compensation by successes secured elsewhere. In a case of general inferiority the effect of an equitable distribution quite evidently means defeat everywhere.

If then we aspire even to pretension to a decision while operating on the offensive we must find a factor other than this homogeneous distribution of forces, this dispersion into an im-

potent cordon of which the symmetry and even density of depth precisely characterize an absence of inspiration, creative faculties and intelligence in the commander.

Some progress will be made if it is observed how extremely rare it is that all points available to the enemy have for him equal importance and that, more often, there exists one (point) with special interest for this enemy either because it is the center of his strength or of his wealth, or because its loss would place him in a state of great inferiority, jeopardizing for him the issue of the campaign. The result is that every victorious action at this point will promptly place the adversary in a critical position and, moreover, it is from here that a rupture of the entire state of equilibrium can ensue. This point overshadows all the rest. It is here he must be attacked. It is here above all that victory is necessary. Attentively considering the diverse aspects of the initial, and in general very complex situation, we therefore see revealed a principal objective which forcibly strikes our attention.

Meanwhile, its judicious evaluation--so important because the outcome of the war depends on it--is not always easy. It results from multiple factors which must be weighed with care. First, is the enemy's strongest point, or his weakest, to be attacked? There are good arguments for attacking the strongest. It is probable, if he give way, that all the rest of the hostile system will collapse whereas, if this point be left untouched, and the effort carried elsewhere, everything will still need to be done. It is certain that this procedure entails a most violent stroke, so violent indeed that one often hesitates to undertake it, but all the same it leads to the greatest result and to maximum yield. Here is recognized the theory of rendering the main armed force of the enemy unfit for further action about which we have elsewhere spoken. The theory is justified in itself although partisans of an attack at the weakest point object to it because the art of war generally consists, on the contrary, in

bringing the greatest force to bear on the point of least resistance. At bottom, choice in the matter is one of circumstance depending on the concrete case to be solved. There is no general rule. It is a matter of indifference whether the principal objective be the strongest point or the weakest, but primarily it will be the point of which the fall will lead to the most important result. There is no other criterion save that of decisive direction to determine choice among a number of objectives between which there might be hesitation.

In this determination consideration of organized forces will, moreover, not be alone worthy of attention. Generally one will be lead to examine other factors such as the political, geographical, economic, moral aspects, etc. . . which will direct the maximum action against some one place rather than against another. Besides a principal objective derived from the idea of organized force, or superimposed on it, a principal theatre of operations will have to be envisaged, that is to say, a fixed zone at the same time as a mobile point. The objective will then be either the principal organized force or the organized force in the principal theatre, which may not be identical. Into all this there will enter elements related to various forces, to places and also to interests which are not exclusively maritime. The services already indicated will reveal themselves momentarily at least. Having completed the summary one will seek to create a favorable situation in the sense of our definition of the maneuver, but in accordance with the end sought. This may not be purely naval but also political, or military (combined operations, transportation of armies), or economic (recruitment, communications, etc. . .) or psychological (moral effect on friend or foe).

Whatever it may be, the touchstone of the principal objective is not solely the value of the objective considered from the point of view of the war in general--and also not merely from that of naval war--but also the time at the end of which a result

in the direction selected may be discounted. Idea wholly relative, in any case. It is not a question of a period of time taken at its absolute value, but in comparison with another period. The point is to secure a decisive effect before the enemy obtains it in a contrary sense at some other point.

Let it be understood the principal objective is not geographically or militarily immovable during the entire course of the war. The essential interest is not constantly attached to the same region or to the same force. It is displaced first with the evolution of the general situation, then too at the will of the one who is conducting the maneuver. The latter, after having disposed of one adversary, can turn against another, then against a third, and so on. He can operate in this manner by successive pressure against many forces or in many places. This is the supreme art, not always realizable however.

The preceding observations, which have to do with the offensive, are valid, at least in general, for the defensive. Here equally it is necessary to have a principal objective or incur the penalty of wasting efforts and resources, and of coming to final checkmate.

In the one case as in the other there will appear beside the principal objective secondary objectives which will be either forces considered of less importance in themselves or forces in secondary theatres, the regional idea entering also in connection with this point of view. But contrary to the principal objective, which at a determined instant of time is necessarily unique, secondary objectives may be more or less numerous.

In the case of an offensive plan those of our forces which will be affected in the secondary theatres can also be entrusted with defensive missions in their theatres. But their main role will be always to contain opposite themselves enemies greater in numbers than their own effectives. This is indispensable, for otherwise the fixation we cound upon effecting would become the opposite of that desired; it is we who should suffer by it. As

much as possible defensive missions ought to be accomplished within the frame of the entire maneuver.

Finally, it may happen that operations in secondary theatres go beyond our hopes and bring a success followed by a loud echo in the principal theatre, where everything remains in suspense, and this while our plan of maneuver foresaw exactly the reverse. Sometimes these surprises which are so agreeable in certain ways occur. They emphasize the frequent interdependence between various theatres which one would do well never to lose from view.

* * *

It is necessary to create a favorable situation with respect to the principal objective. It is not the enemy who will be answerable for this; quite the reverse. This creative action can be only our move. It is for us to establish the conditions desired. This demands imperatively that we should possess and that we should exercise the initiative in operations.

To attack the principal objective in a good situation the necessary means are required. We must then put strength in the group which will be entrusted with this attack and give mass to this effort. With this aim in view we shall bring together as many forces as possible. "Too much strength has never failed", runs an old seaman's saying. And this concentration of effectives comprises not merely the grouping of fighting elements themselves but also that of resources intended to provide for all their needs (supply, repairs, communications, etc. .). An action is conditioned by its maintenance; past experience has proved that. This demands supervision over the theatre of operations in question. This supervision consists in its final stage in permanent or temporary bases, which are in the region or which can be established there; the value of these bases moreover depends on their sites, hence their geographical positions.

But we shall soon be arrested on this path of augmentation so desirable for our main fighting mass. We haven't an indef-

initely elastic quantity of effectives; the sum total of our forces is strictly limited. Consequently those forces with which we sish to enlarge the principal mass formation must be levied elsewhere. But where? From whom? Evidently from our groups placed opposite secondary objectives. We shall have to economize in these to strengthen our shock formation. The maximum must be here, the minimum elsewhere. In order to arrive at a satisfactory apportionment we shall have to practice economy in forces. This we shall do with prudence and calculation however, not exaggerating anywhere. The minimum left to our secondary forces must suffice to enable them to fulfill their mission conveniently, which has, as we shall see further on, a direct bearing on the safety of our principal force. If this mission be jeopardized, the whole will collapse. In this regard the effectives to be left to our secondary forces depend on a multiplicity of factors--on the nature of the operations proposed for them, the positions on which they must rest, on the strength of the enemy they have before them, etc. . . This problem of applying forces in accordance with various missions requires all the competency and all the perspicacity of the commander.

To summarize, in place of the original homogeneous and symmetrical distribution, we finish with an arrangement that is dissymetrical, out of axis and pointing in a preconceived direction. Following the recognized formula, our forces are set up by system. The maneuver begins to be sketched in. Creation takes form. The work of art assumes shape.

Gathering the forces affected to the principal mass is evidently to be accomplished with greatest urgency. So long as this remains undone we shall not be in possession of our full power and can undertake nothing. We shall pass through a difficult period which may develop into a veritable crisis if it be too prolonged. The collecting process can be seriously thwarted by the enemy from the very start. It may be necessary to exec-

ute the operation at great distance from him. It may be facilitated, or conversely, very much impeded by geographic conditions.

It will be noted that fundamentally the whole business is a question of movement. "It is necessary to move intelligently", said our definition. First there is movement between principal force and secondary forces to effect the desired disposition, then movement of these forces, each by itself, to exploit the situation thus created and to execute the maneuver. This may come to pass quite simply through a sudden shift of forces. Favorable geographic conditions such as easy communications between the various bases where the forces are operating, as well as possession of interior lines permitting a convenient going and coming between the various theatres, can aid these movements. Adverse geographic conditions may entirely prevent them.

Movement demands ample space. It is useless to expect great results from a strategic maneuver if there is lacking the favorable element of space, which also by nature is geographic. Space plays a great role notably in point of security. At a time when, owing to lack of resources, one cannot apply secondary forces to the task of "fixation", security, then quite temporary, rests in space. This must be such that by the simple play of distances, space prolongs the duration of a favorable situation obtained initially by postponing the moment when the enemy can come up to disturb and modify it to his own advantage. Space must furnish therefore the time necessary for a decision or an operation projected in the principal theatre. Many a maneuver has been constructed on that single basis.

By all means it will be necessary not to squander precious time; rather must it be well employed. Time clamors for us to act with celerity. It is a factor, function not only of the speed which forces can maintain during the course of a long strategic action, but also of the activity which we develop in the operations and in the precautions we take to avoid all unjustifi-

able and detrimental cessations of action.

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For successful accomplishment of a strategic maneuver, freedom of action is paramount. It is the possibility of acting as desired, at leisure, with all chances in favor for bringing plans to fruition if possible despite the enemy. Freedom of action depends on a multiplicity of elements. In order to enjoy it, it is necessary first that the principal mass be not overloaded with impediments in the guise of objectives eccentric to the mission undertaken, such as defensive duties in connection with the lines of communication, with its wings, with geographical positions, useless bases and so on. These are all charges that must be left to other forces. Disposibility of units is essential, as of their endurance,* radius of action; these modest but solid qualities mean more for freedom of action than others of a more spectacular nature. The forces moreover must be provided to the degree required with indepensable reserve stores of every kind from fuel to provisions and ammunition. The health situation is likewise of great importance. Many belligerents have been paralyzed by these side-issues of maintenance. To act with freedom it is necessary also not to fear too much the manifold dangers from submarines and from the air which menace surface units in our day and age; they must be rendered endurable by means of submarine and aerial protection as well as by a certain division of tonnage. The instruments must be adapted to the proposed maneuver.** For movement disposition must be had over a

*Endurance of material and also of personnel, thus élan, professional worth, morale, etc. . There are maneuvers which can be attempted only with certain implements and which will miscarry if elementary factors are defective.

**Hence in the name of strategic maneuvering one is grought to occupy oneself very closely with factors of a technical and material nature. The same remark is valid evidently with regard to the art of tactics. Maneuvering does not exist in the realm of abstraction.

field passably disengaged,not too much encumbered with mines and diverse obstructions. It must be possible to gather forces as has been said. It is necessary to have suppleness in disposition permitting a facile dealing with surprises. Finally, and above all, in the case of counter-initiative on the part of the enemy, there must be at disposal a certain minimum of information.

It may be seen now the problem of freedom of action includes a number of others.

Also most important is the idea of security of the force charged with the principal objective. This security is the very soul of the maneuver and is directly connected with freedom of action. To ensure it, it is necessary that the favorable conditions acquired for the work of our principal force are maintained for a certain length of time, that they are not disturbed by intervention on the part of hostile forces which garrison secondary points, and which must be kept at a distance from the decisive action at least for the period during which this action takes place. Hence it is a matter of containing these enemy forces by keeping them fixed where they are. This task falls to our own secondary forces opposing them and which are to them inferior as a result of the economy in forces which we are employing. Their role is not easy. In our case it will not be possible, as on land, to trust in a utilization of topographical features as obstacles. Here topography in a tactical sense does not exist. Our secondary forces can take advantage of certain geographical features represented by bases or local positions on which they rest and which the enemy must blockade or watch with superior effectives. But above all our forces will have to avoid being caught in the open. With their numerical inferiority such an encounter would terminate in disaster. Our secondary forces must conduct an offensive of a peculiar nature, with agility and mobility in refusing actual combat, in threatening important interests of the adversary such as his flanks or communications in

order to oblige him to ensure their defense in an efficacious manner. Our forces will produce diversions the value of which will be measured by the number of enemy craft they will keep engaged.* Our forces will have to "bluff" to the limit. In this respect, failing action on the part of our secondary forces, one can use false information to raise imaginary fears in the mind of the enemy and lead him to deviate important parts of his strength to a false course thus removing them from the real scene of operations during a time when this is most necessary for us. Let us note further that initiative in these operations, by means of the disorder it creates in the adversary, already provides a certain degree of security. Finally, if materially speaking there is lacking the wherewithal to hold the enemy forces to one side (i.e., in a state of dispersion), it will be necessary at least to be forewarned in time of their arrival. Security requires information above all else, information alone or in combination with space, the role of which we have already discussed.

The advantage of surprise is too considerable to be neglected. It is a factor of the first order for success of the maneuver. Surprise rests above all on secrecy in operations. The latter necessitates not only the classical and obligatory "keeping secrecy" with respect to projects and dispositions, but also with respect to a number of accessories. Among these may be cited the neutral and amorphous character of initial disposition when dividing forces, which must reveal nothing of the plan selected and must foster in the enemy up to the last minute a feeling of uncertitude and irresolution. Diversions are indicated here, likewise misleading information, especially when such information is supported by sham movements appearing to confirm it. In this domain possibilities will wax greater with geographical dispersion of enemy interests. Speed and movement also are ex-

*The essential aim of diversions, principal agent of security, is, in a word, to maintain dispersion of the enemy if it does not exist.

cellent elements of surprise. Rapid and unmarked concentrations, unexpected removals of forces, are particularly suited to obtain surprise in maneuver which is often the beginning of great events.

Finally, it is especially desirable to benefit by "liaison of arms", by making all branches participate in the decisive operations undertaken by the principal force. This sometimes implies, for these operations, conditions of time and place not always easily fulfilled in so far as they concern submarine and aerial equipment. It goes without saying that the solution is then dictated in great part by geographical considerations.

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Such is the scheme of the maneuver for the general case. But it embraces an infinite number of variations according to different situations.

In particular, we have assumed that the extent and variety of interests on both sides from the beginning of hostilities induced both to disperse, the one and the other, for the purpose of covering their own possessions and attacking those of the opponent. The maneuver imagined has from then on consisted of a play of forces having for point of departure, and basic feature, this very dispersion and aiming at a system superior to the enemy system at the point where a decision is sought. Division of forces has engendered combination; it has facilitated it; it has brought about it's conception; it has served the art.

Sometimes it can be entirely different, notably when the conditions of the war impose a previous concentration on the belligerents. Then they are found in one and the same region one bloc facing another. Determination of the principal objective and principal theatre is extremely simplified. There is but one objective and but one theatre in such a case. But even if the situation seems childishly easy, its solution is singularly arduous. How is the favorable situation, to which all maneuver should point, to be obtained with respect to the organized enemy force--

and this in particular if our effectives are inferior to the enemy's? What can be done by means of skill under these conditions: For this there is no other procedure but to set our wits to work to effect a return to the initial liquid position we have just studied, by making a new dispersion and endeavoring to substitute for it that initial concentration which was driving us into an impasse. By means of diversions we may induce the enemy to detach from his main bloc more important forces than those we shall ourselves have devoted to those operations. Thus we shall ameliorate conditions of the struggle with regard to the principal block and it may be attacked with some prospect of success.* Again, we shall be able to direct our decisive effort not towards the main enemy bloc itself but towards the fractions it may be possible to detach from it. In this manner will be put out of action the main enemy formation either in its entirety, or in detail, as circumstances dictate. This would appear to be the sole maneuvering solution in this difficult case.

Finally, whatever may be the situation and the dispositions envisaged to deal with it, the logical aim of the strategic maneuver can only be the application of superiority at the chosen point. When the maneuver is directed against the organized forces at the first onset, the goal is none other than battle which is the crown of the entire edifice. When the maneuver is destined to satisfy one object,(service), it is still battle that must be kept in mind, even if not sought immediately, and it is with that idea that compromise must be organized. In sum, there should be no maneuver without a battle at the end, either immediate or deferred. Every maneuver which fails in this obligation is in vain and without import. War is not a pretext for cinematographic display. It demands forceful action. This remark may appear singular and superfluous but past

*Also (following the same line of thought), a policy may be pursued of weakening the main formation of the enemy by the action of special arms such as submarines and airplanes.

experience shows its value to the contrary. Many maneuvers of former times, otherwise well conceived and propitious in their execution, were in reality and geographically speaking mere tilts on a grand scale and void of all sanction and power.

But here is enough of theory and abstraction! We shall better explain ourselves in study of some concrete and vital cases.

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Volume II

Chapter 2

SOME MANEUVERS OF OTHER DAYS

A Maneuver of Tourville, 1693.

We shall analyze below, as an example of project for a strategical maneuver, "the memoir given to the King by M. de Tourville as a plan of campaign against England in 1693". We will cut it however into fragments without respecting the order of the text, in order to study it more fruitfully in grouping together ideas of the same nature.

The general situation at the beginning of 1693 was as follows: Tourville was at Brest at the head of the fleet comprising about 70 ships, for, contrary to a certain legent, the losses suffered in the preceding year, after the battle of La Hougue, had been largely compensated for by new construction and new commissioning. In face of us the enemy was also considerably strengthened. In the estimation of Tourville, set down in the course of the memoirs, the Anglo-Dutch possessed about 30 ships more than the French, that is to say about 100.

In the Mediterranean there were 17 French ships under the command of d'Estrees which were supporting by sea the operations of Marshal Noailles in Catalonia, and that without any difficulty, the enemy having no other naval force in the Mediterranean than that of the Spaniards, very weak and inert.

From the point of view of the organized force the principal objective was found in the Channel-Atlantic area, where the principal and only enemy force was stationed. Nor from any other consideration did anything intervene to modify the choice of this direction of the maximum effort. It was equally in the Channel-Atlantic that our communications were most exposed and that we could better menace those of the enemy (considerations of economic warfare). The same reasoning applies to the coasts.

From the point of view of the army (considerations of land warfare), the Mediterranean was interesting because of the operations in Catalonia. But these were in no way troubled by the enemy afloat. The principal theatre was thus clearly in the Channel-Atlantic. There is the decisive direction.

Tourville doubtless judged it that way, for he sought first of all to constitute our principal mass in that region by calling d'Estrees there. And the first problem that preoccupied him was that of uniting his forces, the basis of the maneuver.

"The affair which seems to him* the most important is to effect the junction."

But this junction will not happen by itself.

"The diligence with which the enemies set about preparing their fleet persuades him that their first design is to prevent the junction of the Toulon ships with those at Brest, and it seems to him that it will not be difficult for them to succeed therein by taking suitable measures, either by sending 20 ships into the Strait (Gibraltar) to join Spanish ships, or in sending their fleet out of the Channel on April 15th, to place it off the Iroise and by this means to prevent the entrance of M. the Comte d'Estrees into the harbor of Brest."

One sees how much the junction of forces may be hindered by an unfavorable geography. This division of forces between west and east and the obligatory passage through the Strait of Gibraltar represent the heavy handicap which has weighed on us all throughout our maritime history each time we have wished to solve this problem of a reunion. It has disappeared only in the cases, rare enough, in which Spain has been our ally (Wars of America, Revolution and Empire). This disposition of our littoral astride two separated seas would be of advantage only if we had to fight none but a Mediterranean enemy. We will return later to these

*(In the memoir in question, to be analyzed the expressions <u>He</u> and <u>Him</u> refer to Tourville himself).

questions.

It is to be remarked how difficult it is to effect the union of forces in advance, too near the enemy, who may easily upset it. The duration of the crisis which precedes the reunion would be notably lengthened. Tourville, nevertheless, attempted to shorten it.

"In order to effect this reunion a great diligence will be necessary in the sailing of the ships from Toulon. And when they come to make their landfall on coasts of Brittany it is desirable that they place themselves in the Latitude of Penmarch in order to be able to avoid the enemy fleet which probably would be off Ushant, and as there are nearly 12 leagues north to south from this vicinity to Penmarch, it would be difficult for the enemy to have knowledge of the arrival of His Majesty's ships. It would be necessary to try to enter, if it could be done, by the Raz and in case they are unable to do so, to round the Point de Saints (Chauseses de Sein) and to skirt the Basse Jaune as close as they can in order to keep as far as possible from Ushant.".

There is there, along with a reminder of the notion of activity, an intelligent exploitation of geography in form of local hydrographic difficulties, capable, when one is alone in knowing how to overcome them, of facilitating certain movements. It was in effect probable that the enemy would avoid the delicate vicinities of the Raz and the Isle de Sein, strewn with dangers and swept by violent currents, to maintain himself in the relatively more healthy neighborhood of Ushant.

It remains to provide for the method of employing the forces:

"If the junction of the ships can be effected, it is necessary that His Majesty make known: Whether he wishes to oppose the descents that the enemies might attempt on the coasts of the King-

dom, or if he wishes that, somewhat superior in force though they may be, his fleet fight them rather than suffer descents."

In other words one would await until after the union had been made to draw up a plan of action whereas this should have been done before the union. There is thus no plan for the whole preliminary to action of which the union marks the first step. And this is extremely annoying.

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Tourville after this studied a more interesting situation, which was that in which the enemy would send a portion of his forces into the Mediterranean. He formed a new plan with this as an eventuality.

"If His Majesty does not wish to hazard a combat with forces inferior to those of the enemies, and if they should have a plan of sending 20 ships into the Mediterranean to join the Spaniards with their gallies, one might, after the junction with the Comte d'Estrees, sail with the whole fleet....".

When the fleet should have cleared the harbor of Brest it would be necessary for him (Tourville) to proceed with "all possible diligence with 50 ships of war and fire ships, into the Mediterranean, there to fight and destroy the ships which the enemy might have there. One might arrange a rendezvous with the gallies if desirable."

This passage calles for a number of remarks.

First a change has come into the mind of Tourville relative to the principal theatre. If this continued to be the north, the French admiral could not but falicitate himself on this movement of the enemy, which would dimish his numerical inferiority, and he would not dream of undertaking a similar movement. But he probably thought of our interests in the Mediterranean, and particularly of the land operations in Catalonia, and he knew that

we would no longer have a single ship in this region, d'Estrees being supposed to have joined up in the north. This lead Tourville to carry his maximum effort into the Mediterranean.

Besides which a victory over the enemy detachment would be equivalent to beating the organized Anglo-Dutch force in the north in detail. The two objectives are in no way irreconcilable.

Tourville was thus going to profit by the enemy separation in order to maneuver and to create a favorable situation in re-establishing numerical superiority on his side in the principal theatre. He formed a mass to this effect; with 50 ships against 20 he could hope for a decisive success.

Certainly Tourville was obliged to purchase this superiority in the Mediterranean by a heavy inferiority in the north. His economy of force, without doubt somewhat excessive, may be approximately expressed by the following table:

	Before		After	
	North	Medit.	North	Medit.
French	85	0	35	50
Enemy	100	0	80	20

It is to be noted that Tourville sought to have all arms participate in his principal attack. He counted on taking the fire ships with him and if possible to rendezvous with the gallies. He was not absolutely sure of having the help of these last. This would depend on meteorological and geographical conditions. The arm requires it so.

It was not necessary to assure the safety of the principal mass and to arrange matters so that the operations should not be disturbed by the enemy forces in the north. These must be fixed in the Channel or in the Atlantic. This task will be encumbent on such of our vessels as have remained in these waters, which should, to that end, effect the necessary diversions in threat-

ening the interests of the adversary and in particular his communications.

"From the rest of the ships which remained in the ocean, one may detach the fastest sailers in little squadrons of threes to maintain themselves in different areas trying to interrupt the commerce of the enemy..... one could also detach several for the American islands and Canada, and thus, in taking the necessary precautions to cover the detaching of the 50 vessels which would be under his command, he (Tourville) could enter the Straits."

But it would be necessary to add other means to these, notably to send off the enemy northern forces in a false direction by means of erroneous and misleading information. This direction would be that of Ireland.

"We should have two corvettes commanded by officers in whom confidence may be placed, with orders to let themselves be taken without the crews knowing about it, and recommending to them to leave the orders which will be sent them attached to a bullet, as is the custom without throwing them overboard, in order that the enemy should give added credit to them. In these orders they should be told to proceed with diligence to Ireland. The reason which would cause him (Tourville) to put into the orders which would be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy, to proceed to Ireland to the vicinity of Galway is to draw the enemy far from their coast and to gain time, becuase before they could make the crossing to Ireland to hunt him (Tourville) and before they could notify the Prince of Orange of their return from the voyage, considerable time would pass, which would put them out of a state to undertake anything."

Everything in this affair is, in effect, a question of time. It is necessary that the Northern enemy forces be unable to intervene before our principal Mediterranean mass had finished its task. At any cost the time necessary for the decision must be

gained.

It remains to keep the secret of the operations as to the flank movement of the 50 ships which could be disclosed for example, by neutral ships encountered:

"By means of fast sailing frigates which will be with him he will stop all vessels which may see him and take them with him."

Also to guarantee the liberty of action of the principal mass it will be necessary that it be not troubled in its operation by consideration of supply. The plan should be completed by logistic measures:

"The 50 vessels which are to pass into the Mediterranean will take provisions for four months or for five if possible."

As to what could be done after the operations in the Mediterranean, where one could hope for great success, Tourville had an idea equally concerning maneuvers:

"One will hunt the enemy in the Mediterranean during July and August to fight them, and after that one will be in state to return 30 ships into the ocean, leaving only 20 ships in the Mediterranean."

It is to be seen that this is concerned with a maneuver on interior lines between the two enemy groups in the Mediterranean and in the North. After the complete defeat that one could count on inflicting the adversary in the Mediterranean, with 50 sail against 20, it will be wholly sufficient to leave 20 ships there to contain the enemy debris which might have escaped from the battle. It would even be too much, for Tourville's combination would finally give us in the ocean only 65 ships against 80 which would in no way have modified our original inferiority. The result of the battle in the Mediterranean would be but incompletely fruitful as to the defeat of the enemy principal organized force

which is and remains in the North and which is despite everything, the key to the adverse resistance.

For the rest the play of interior lines once more poses the problem of the reunion of forces, which meets the same geographical obstacles as previously. It is therefore not always easy to practice the said play. Tourville counted on overcoming this difficulty by a strategem:

"It is necessary that most of the ships which should return into the Ocean should be from the department of Rochefort in order that there might only be a small number obliged to go to Brest. All these ships should make the landfall at Belle Isle to proceed thereafter into the harbor of La Rochelle."

This is judicious utilization of geography, of meteorological conditions and of the technique of the epoch. It is well known in effect that during the wars of the sailing navies the English always had a certain repugnance to go too deeply into the Bay of Biscay when on their surveillance cruises along our coasts, because with the winds generally blowing from the west, they were not always sure of getting out safely. It is partly for this reason that during the wars of the Revolution and Empire the blockade of Rochefort was ordinarily less strictly maintained than that of Brest, and that numerous French forces managed to get out of there easily enough. Tourville counted on this particularity to make his second successive reunion by the aid of an intermediate call in the Pertuis.

To sum up, the memoir of Tourville contains many good ideas still valuable in our day, with reservations made as to their possibilities of realization which we shall examine later.

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How was the campaign of 1693 accomplished in reality? Was Tourville able to put his plan of maneuver into execution?

This plan was singularly altered in practice because the government, personified by Pontchartrain, substituted for Tourville's idea his own, which consisted, doubtless for economic reasons, in assigning to our fleet as principal objective, an offensive against enemy communications. It was especially concerned with attacking and destroying the convoy which every year left England at a time fairly well known bound for Cadiz, Italy and the Levant. It was the famous Smyrna convoy, the same that had been missed in 1691 on returning to the Channel and which one hoped to surprise this time outward bound in the vicinity of Cape Saint Vincent.

On May 27, 1693 Tourville left Brest, not with 50 vessels as he had planned but with his whole force comprising 71 ships, two frigates, two galliots and 35 fire ships. Elsewhere d'Estrees had been left in the Mediterranean. Besides that the movement of Tourville preceded the enemy's movement towards the South instead of following it as the original plan had contemplated. Tourville ambushed himself in the vicinity of Lagos. On June 27, the enemy convoy appeared composed of a considerable number of merchant vessels, escorted by the 25 ships of Rooke. All the French fleet fell upon the merchantmen, capturing a great number, and inflicting the enemy merchant marine immense losses. Unhappily Rooke's 25 ships mostly escaped from the unskillful pursuit of Gabaret.

Thereafter the French fleet went into the Mediterranean. On July 18 near Malaga Tourville joined d'Estrees. The reunion of these forces which had promised such difficulties was in the end, peacefully accomplished. A formidable mass was found there comprising 94 ships, 28 frigates or corvettes, 4 galliots, 30 fire ships, 3 hospital ships and 31 transports, a total of 190 sail, 7,654 guns, and 44,710 men. This mass found in these waters no adversary of its own size. It fell back on an attack on

ships anchored in Malaga. With their boats they succeeded in capturing or setting on fire three ships, three frigates, one caravel, one transport and two barks. After this mediocre and easy victory which no way resembled that which Tourville thought to obtain, the Brest fleet went back into the Ocean.

The enemy's mass in the north, although not fixed had not troubled these operations. It did not start south until July 27 on receipt of the news of Lagos. Tourville had thus enjoyed, in view of his maneuver, two months of unhoped for tranquility. Anyhow the Anglo-Dutch did not penetrate into the Mediterranean and the two grand fleets did not meet.

Finally the results of the maneuver actually accomplished were good as far as economic and land warfare were concerned, in the sense that we had obtained a very great success against the enemy communications and that we had remained absolute masters in the Mediterranean where Rooke's fleet would have been troublesome. These ends had been served to the queen's taste. But nothing had been done against the enemy's organized force. The northern force remained intact and had begun its enterprises against our ocean coast: Rooke himself had gotten off practically undamaged from the affray off Lagos. The maneuver had been crowned by no decisive combat against the fraction aimed at while the plan expressly provided for this fight. The maneuver lacked the sanction of battle and one could no longer aim at it because, with the following year, 1694, the voluntary decline of squadron warfare commenced and in the Mediterranean Tourville was always obliged to retreat on Toulon before Rooke, superior in force.

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The Second Project of the Comte de Broglie

The Comte de Broglie, in his capacity as Chief of Informa-

tion, ("Secret du Roi"), drew up, as is well known, two projects for operations against England, the first in 1765 and the second in December, 1777, on the eve of the War of American Independence. The second, which is none other than the first brought into focus and very much improved as to inspiration, is infinitely more interesting from the point of view of strategic ideas. It is this one that we shall study.

The Comte de Broglie considered that the war against England which was imminent would, if properly carried on, furnish the means of putting this power out of the running before other necessities of general politics would require from us an effort oriented in a different direction, in the course of which, if England had not been previously beaten, we would have to do with a coalition of that nation with a continental power as happened in all the preceding wars. He explained it thusly:

"An important reason drawn from the actual political situation of Europe is an argument in favor of this expedition and that it be in our war plan, the object of our first campaign. It is the necessity to get clear of the war with England as quickly as possible in order to watch over what goes on in Germany. Everything points to a war there. If it takes place England will seek to make us take part in it..... it seems advisable to profit by this precious interval. Returning thereafter to take part in the affairs of the continent, with all the weight of our forces, we can pacify and conciliate everything, maintain the existence of the Empire, that barrier so important to us, and give peace to Europe."

De Broglie thus thinks to arrange the objectives in order in beating, one after the other, the adversaries of France, the maritime and the continental, before they had entered into coalition and that by proceeding with regards to them by successive concentrations, by two campaigns following each other in point

of time. Earlier we have said that the unity of war required the coordination of naval and land action in the course of the same conflict. Here it is a question of a more elevated and extended idea. This coordination of the two actions takes place between two successive conflicts, tied together by a preesixting political will; which implies in effect, a long range war plan which is essentially governmental in order, and which one finds very rarely realized in the course of history. It is a comprehensive view wholly worthy of the eminent spirit of its author. It is the maneuver transported into the political field to guard against the habitual and classic stroke of British policy.

De Broglie developed thereafter certain ideas relative to the division of forces.

"It seems, he said, that we should avoid all operations which will break up our forces, which will divide them, which will compromise them..... the experience of the last two wars has only too well confirmed this principle. One wished to make face everywhere, to convoy everything, to cover everything, and everywhere weak, everywhere inferior in forces as well as maneuvers and perhaps in capacity we were everywhere beaten..... no small squadrons, no convoys, no distant expedition. Great fleets, all our forces in a single sea, a naval battle at the beginning, a lively and short war, this is the system that is proposed to our navy in the actual state of affairs. In assembling the greater part of forces in Brest we shall much more efficiently protect our colonies for we shall oblige the English to keep in the Ocean and in the Channel forces, not only equal but also superior."

This passage, at first, might raise fears that Broglie was systematically opposed to all division of forces and that he was partisan of a simple system which consisted in operating one concentration in one single mass, which would provoke a parallel con-

centration on the part of the enemy and which would in no way ameliorate the conditions of the struggle. Beside which the last phrase seems to let it be supposed that the recommended concentration is but a feint designed to protect commerce and the colonies by a preventive immobilisation of the enemy. However the strategic maneuver demands more finesse and necessitates precisely a certain dispersion of forces.

There is in this but a slight ambiguity easily dissipated. The dispersion that Broglie would not have was that which proposes effective and similar results everywhere by means of multiple offensives undertaken at all points in the hope of obtaining successes in every quarter. This kind of dispersion leads, in effect, to impotence. The offensive cordon is worth no more than the defensive cordon. In reality the rest of the project shows that Broglie himself envisaged a division of forces, but in expecting the decisive result only from the principal amongst them, that one which he placed in the Channel and which he destined to the great idea of his whole life, the invasion of England.

"At all times but above all in the circumstances in which England finds herself now, that is the grand operation which should be the base of the war plan of France and Spain against her. By that expedition one may deal her a blow from which she will never recover..... by making a successful expedition into England the war will be decided at one blow. The British navy will have its ports destroyed, its arsenals and magazines, that is to say its source and its means of reproduction. We shall dictate to England such conditions of peace as we judge proper to impose on her, and this dictation will cover the four corners of the world. What several wars of the same sort could not accomplish, this single expedition will accomplish in a moment and without fail."

The principal objective of the general strategy, land and sea, appears here sharply, standing out in full light; it is the invasion of England. For naval strategy the principal theatre will thus be the Channel and the principal objective will be the organized force in this theatre. It must be put out of action and the most effective means which one may employ to this effect is to beat it in a decisive battle. The search for this battle is to be classed as of prime urgency.

"Some, said Broglie, believe that, in order to carry out an expedition into England, it is necessary to be master of the Channel by means of a superior or victorious fleet; some others ..... we are absolutely of the opinion of the first. No expedition unless one can cover the passage and the landing by a very decided superiority or by a victorious naval battle. Thus it is necessary to be absolute masters of the Channel and consequently to have won so complete a battle that it should have absolutely removed from the English the possibility of coming up to deliver a second. If there is one operation which we should and must attempt it is that battle."

It remains to form the mass which will be charged with this operations, and for that to arrange the means. Those which the Franco-Spanish coalition possessed were numerically inferior to those of the English, at least Broglie thought so. Thus the struggle in the principal theatre would be favorably undertaken only if, over the whole field, a proper economy of forces was practiced, one that would permit utilizing the maximum in this theatre while retaining elsewhere the largest possible number of enemies. And this problem must be solved at the same time that that other particularly delicate one of the cooperation of two allied forces, when that cooperation has always been the stumbling block in the way of alliances on land and sea.

Broglie found the following solution which very happily

settles everything at once:

"It is for France to charge herself with the principal role. The preponderance of her power, of her means and her proximity to the point of attack all impose it. The role of Spain should be to support her.....

In speaking of combining the dispositions of the two nations in the general plan, it is not intended to mean for that that their forces should be united at the same points. On the contrary, they should always be made to ace separately but towards the same object, and with a view to cooperating with the general plan. Thus to develop this idea, when the Spaniards with a portion of their navy charged themselves with the defense of American waters, they will cooperate, in effect, in our offensive plans because they will thus permit us to assemble all our own forces in the Ocean."

The maneuver begins to outline itself. There will be a division of forces which will act in accordance with a general plan. There will be a principal attack which will be conducted by the majority of French forces acting in the Channel and the Ocean and which will seek the battle of which we have spoken. There will be secondary attacks intended to assist the principal attack, which will be conducted mostly by the Spaniards and also a little by the French. There will be condordance of efforts even though these may be exercised in very different and distant reasons.

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The Comte de Broglie then examined the detail of the "offensive operations which may enter, either simulated or real, into the combination of the general plan." He indicated his system of forces.

He considered first the secondary actions which in his thought, met the necessity of his mobilizing, of fixing notable enemy fractions thus assuring the safety of the principal mass.

Spain will attack Gibraltar, for one may count on "the diversion which will result from it when it appears as but a false attack in another and more direct offensive project..... if it (the British relief fleet) was too strong, the diversion which had been brought about would help along the grand operation of France against England herself by diminishing the number of vessels which the latter would have to oppose us."

Spain would use 12 ships in this attack and it was counted on that they would immobilize 15 English vessels.

Similarly, our ally would attack Jamaica for "it is there that she can, in her turn, give check to the commerce in the Antilles and divert them from their offensive projects and turn them to our own." Broglie estimated that the 15 ships which Spain would apply to this enterprise would retain 20 English ships in the Antilles.

Finally the Spanish would simulate a descent on Ireland, by preparing for this end 15 vessels in Farrol which almost certainly would lead the English to maintain an equal number in the region of Cape Finnisterre to block those of our ally.

France on her account, in the first place, will take up the attack on Minorca to the same ends of fixation. "In no case should one think seriously of this. Mahon is to be considered only as a point which is to be menaced in order to increase the embarrassment of England and turn away a portion of her forces and her attention from the points at which one really wishes to strike. This feint would also become an object of alarm to the English nation and might always a favorable diversion." Only 10 vessels would be applied to this maneuver and de Broglie does not indicate here the importance which he lends to the enemy reaction.

He is of the opinion to attempt nothing in the Indies because of the insufficiency of the equipment on the Isle de France and in our factories in India as points of support, for the double

reason of defense and supply. "It would be necessary, he said, to send to the Indies not only a squadron of 8 or 10 vessels and 6,000 or 7,000 regular troops but also a prodigious quantity of rigging and equipment, everything being lacking there for defense as well as attack. Such an effort could not be made without retarding us or weakening us for more important and decisive operations. We must thus abandon our colonies in Asia to their destiny. It is by other successes that they must be defended." One finds here, in effect, a lack of organization of the theatre of operations and this lack is of such a nature as totally to paralyze any maneuver that one might want to take there, a condition which has been many times produced elsewhere in the course of history. The material equipment of the zone of action is a condition absolutely necessary to the execution of operations and the indispensable complement of plans relative thereto. It is well known how much Suffren suffered in the reality from these grave defects in his campaign in India, and what prodigies of activity and ingenuity he had to show to make up for them.

A little farther on the Comte de Broglie considers it possible however to send finally into the Indian Ocean the 10 ships which were to participate in the attack on Minorca. He figures that the English had only 6 ships in that region.

France will also make an attack on Scotland but with a few frigates only.

These secondary operations consented to with a view to diversion fixation and security, there will remain 40 ships, all French, to conduct the principal attack that is to say the Battle in the Channel preceding the landing in England. The Comte de Broglie thought that the enemy could not bring out more than 45 vessels against them.

The economy of forces realized can be expressed finally by

the following table which mentions the number of vessels employed in each operation:

	Franco-Spanish	English
Secondary Operations		
Gibraltar	12	15
Jamaica	15	20
Ferrol-C.Finnisterre	15	15
Minorca	10	--
Indies	--	6
Principal Operation		
Channel	40	45
Total	92	101

The benefits obtained by these secondary operations are in no way exaggerated while the contrary is sometimes seen under the influence of enthusiastic maneuvering. Here it is prudent and rational. These secondary operations are suitably endowed. The forces which are employed therein have sufficient effectives to accomplish their mission. And also to appreciate these figures justly one must take into account the inferiority of the Spanish ships to those of the English in combat value. This particularity makes larger, on the one hand the difference in the totals and on the other the importance of the fixation brought about by the secondary operations. It increases by contrast the gain which results from it in favor of the decisive attack. In these conditions, with so marked a numerical and potential inferiority, it is remarkable to be able to bring 40 vessels, the best, to the principal operation. It is also probable that they would not have to do with 45 enemy ships for the English could not but react to the attack on Minorca. Broglie did not count on it in order to be more sure. He cannot be accused of systematic optimism as to the results of his diversions, although he

enhanced somewhat the returns from his combination by neglecting certain necessities as we shall see later on.

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The attitude of Broglie towards problems of defensive servitudes which appear in every plan even offensive ones, is in effect, interesting to consider.

Concerning communications, he has only this penchant formula: "No convoys". This is a debatable point, and in reality so absolute a point of view would, without doubt, have brought great disappointments and provoked a reaction.

Broglie was fully reassured as to the possibilities that England would have to undertake serious attacks against the home coasts and territories of France and Spain. Chances of success of such attacks seemed almost nil, the two allied powers having the great superiority in land means and having no continental enemy to fear. The skillful policy of Vergennes which here placed us for the first time in facing an isolated England, found here its just recompense.

"At no time has England had enough land forces to hazard a decisive expedition against States which are so superior to her in this matter. She could, at the most, undertake a few descents for the purpose of destroying what she could, miserable expeditions..... In the actual situation, engaged in a ruinous war with America and having sent there almost all her forces, this kind of expedition is not even to be feared. Even supposing that she had all her means, in order to take away from her the possibility (of coastal raids) it would suffice for France and Spain to form different observation camps on their coasts.

If England cannot, and even dare not, undertake anything against the coasts of France and Spain, when they shall be garnished with several defensive camps, it will be agreed that she

could perhaps hazard a few coups de main from the sea against some of our maritime cities or our river mouths.... Therefore in the general plan we shall consider the defensive measures that should be taken in our harbors and on the points of our coasts which might be exposed to maritime attack."

The larger part of the servitude of coast defense would thus be supported as can be seen, by the land army, and Broglie did not judge it necessary to modify his distribution of forces in any way in order to meet it.

The situation appeared to him infinitely less brilliant where our colonies were concerned. He expected that the English would attack them and seize them quickly enough. According to him Martinique could defend itself for a few months only. San Domingo could not hold out against a vigorous attack. Guadalupe would offer only a mediocre resistance. Guiana, Saint Lucia and the other minor establishments would surrender at the first demand.

But this prospect did not trouble Broglie, and he did not change because of this, as much as a line in the execution of the plan which he had conceived.

"In the present situation France should send neither squadrons nor troop reinforcements for the defense of her islands. She should abandon them to their own proper forces, for to wish to be defensively powerful at all points, is to remove the means of acting offensively in one's own turn. It is not the same with Spain. As she should not be, in the general plan, charged with the principal offensive role, she may divide her forces and oppose herself to the projects of the English in America. But to accomplish this she should unite all her forces at a central point whence she may protect all her establishments and in turn make the English fear an offensive.

It is only in occupying the English elsehwere that we may

save our colonies in the two worlds. The base of our war plan ought to be a vigorous offensive in England."

Similarly Broglie did not assign any naval force to the operations on the coasts of the United States. This would be contrary to his plan and would diminish the strength of his principal mass. He left the Americans to get themselves out of their own difficulties. He would not even admit political necessities in this region and on this occasion.

The basis of his reasoning is easily seen. He hoped that his principal attack would promptly be crowned with success, and that he would very soon be in a position to dictate peace to the British in London. From then on the colonies which had been taken would evidently be restored. Reimbursement would be made for commercial losses, and the Americans would obtain their independence had they been beaten a thousand times elsewhere. He figured that his maneuver would prevail over that of the adversary, because it united two well known qualities. First because it would attain its goal in much less time than the enemy would need to attain his elsewhere. Secondly because the objective aimed at has a much greater value and is much more vital and decisive than that which the enemy considers at the same moment. All this by reason of the direction which Broglie had assigned to his principal effort. It is the preponderance obtained by a "Superiority of orientation", after the term adopted by several authors to characterize a maneuvering operation of thie sort.

It was on such a superiority of orientation that the plan of operation prepared against Frnace by General Von Schlieffen from 1901 to 1906, was essentially based. This plan was applied against us in 1914 with, it is true, the regrettable modifications which had been brought to it by his successor General Von Moltke. Schlieffen left only weak forces in Alsace-Loraine, trusting to the fortifications in this region. He more or less

abandoned the eastern frontier to its fate. Little did it matter to him that his adversaries obtained some success in these directions; little did it matter to him that the French gained, at the price of slow and costly efforts, a little ground in Lorraine or in the Belgian Ardennes where everything hindered their movements; little mattered to him the probable invasion of East Prussia by the Russians. To all of this he replied by his vast and rapid turning movement across Belgium where the going was easy, by his crushing eruption into the valley of the Oise, by the envelopment and the throwing back to the south of the French armies, finally by the taking of Paris, the decisive objective at least in his mind, a moral thunderclap resounding in the whole world. Long before the French could trouble his own communications left open in the north, he was on theirs. Schlieffen had the superiority of orientation. Time and the value of the objective were on his side.

The Comte de Broglie thought as he did. Is the proceeding to be recommended? It is a matter of suitability. Reason indicates that one can rarely flatter one's self to obtain, in a sure manner, the great advantage that one hoped for from the principal effort. The Germans found this out. Evidently the unfortunate retouches made by Moltke in the Schlieffen plan altered it in its very principle and strongly compromised its success. But were they not inevitable for moral reasons, given the unfortunate effect of a French advance into Lorraine on public opinion? Besides which there were the unavoidable accidents along the way, all of this "domain of friction" as Freytag-Loringhoven said, which appears in practice. At Antwerp, Neubeuga and elsewhere in Belgium, a total of 13 divisions were delayed or immobilized by these operations during the battle of the Marne. The Russian threat in East Prussia became intolerable. On August 25, 1914 there had to be sent to this region two army corps and a cavalry

division. There were brain storms and unfortunate initiatives down the line. Then the enemy took hold of himself. He maneuvered and regrouped his forces, at the price of abandoning much territory. The overwhelming success was not obtained, and in the end a heavy defeat was met on the Marne.

Similarly nothing assured to Broglie the obtaining of the great victory in the Channel to which he looked forward. The balance of forces, notably, could guarantee nothing.

Certainly it must not be deduced from this doubt of a sure success that it is inopportune to try chances or that it is proper not to maneuver. Such a conclusion would be singular. Nothing ventured, nothing gained, and one would undertake no operation whatever in war if one waited for a superterrestrial power to guarantee success. Therefore one must dare and maneuver. But one may simply think, from examination of events and plans quoted above, that faith in the rapid success of the principal attack should not be blind to the point of neglecting, by absolute system, certain hazards or servitudes and measures destined to guard against them. These impose themselves sooner or later and one then finds out that the plan was not viable because it was too ambitious.

The other method is that of double or nothing. It is and always will be favored by those who have a gambling spirit and who meet obstacles with it. Such was the case with the Comte de Broglie. The Comte de Saint Germaine, Minister of War under Louis XVI, said of him in his memoirs, "He is a man of much spirit. He has a decided character, a strong mind." The Intendant Malouet addes in his: "His passionate character, without doubt, had its inconveniences, but he was the only public man whose firmness, activity and the vision could have impressed on the government of Louis XVI the vigor which it had always lacked."

In resume, the second project of the Comte de Broglie pre-

sents itself to us as a magnificent work in the order of the strategical maneuver and it is so much the more remarkable that it saw the light in full eighteenth century, in a period particularly indigent in the matter of military ideas, and in which these notions were entirely ignored by most people. It has not aged at all in its principles and we may still draw profit from it. At most it may be reproached with a certain excess in its conception scorn for contingencies which, in reality, often weigh heavily on execution.

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INVOLUNTARY MANEUVERS IN THE WAR IN AMERICA

During the War of American Independence the notion of strategical maneuvers shone by its absence, and that on both sides. On our side the central Direction was closed to such a comprehension. To see this it suffices to read the operation plans drawn up by Fleurieu for the whole of our forces in May, 1778, in December, 1778 and in November, 1790. If the spirit of the offensive reigns incontestably there. It concerns offensives undertaken pretty nearly everywhere at the same time, haphazard, without combination, without preconceived system, without the interplay of principal and secondary attacks. The despatch of squadrons into diverse exterior theatres perhaps replied to some vague intention of maneuvers in the political order or in the order of land operations, but never were they aimed at the organized naval force placed in these theatres. The subordinate chiefs with the exception of Suffren, manifested the same lack of understanding of maneuvering.

However in the field of effective realization there was sometimes somewhat of an exterior appearance of maneuvering. The available space helping, there were movements of forces from one region to another, evidently without any high creative plan,

but resulting, just the same, in giving birth to a favorable situation always indifferently exploited or not exploited at all. These movements had a false air of maneuver. They had this semblance from certain sides, those from which the maneuver is visibly concrete. It is from this heading that it is interesting to study them to draw from then instruction relative, if not to the conception of a maneuver, because this conception is here absent, at least to the execution of the maneuver. This study will permit the appreciation of the conditions of such execution, and certain difficulties against which it ran in practice.

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The first important movement of this sort was that which resulted from the despatch of the squadron of d'Estaing to America. We have shown elsewhere that this decision was inspired entirely by political motives. Its military realization however, holds more than one lesson.

D'Estaing left Toulon on April 13, 1778, with 12 vessels, to wit: 1 ninety gun ship, 1 eighty, 6 seventy fours, 3 sixty fours and 1 fifty, accompanied by a certain number of light vessels. It was not until May 16 in the evening that he passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, having taken more than a month to get out of the Mediterranean. In the Ocean the progress of the squadron was retarded by two ships of very slow speed and by the evolutions that its Chief made it continually execute as a matter of drill. Finally d'Estaing anchored in the Delaware on July 8. His crossing, which remained celebrated by its slowness, took exactly 86 days. His maneuver was deprived from the start of the prime factor which conditions its results, namely speed, fruit of activity in the conduct of operations.

Upon his arrival he had to do with Howe's squadron, which

was very much inferior to his own. In effect it was composed of only 9 ships, 6 sixty fours and 3 fifties.

The slowness of the first movement of d'Estaing had caused him, to begin with, to miss the opportunity of intercepting Clinton's corps retreating from Philadelphia to New York. This retreat was effected partly by sea from June 22 to the 30th, thanks to the support of Howe's squadron which carried the provisions, the munitions and the baggage of the troops.

After this was d'Estaing going to be able to gain the great success over Howe that his superiority permitted him to hope for? After the repartiating of Clinton's corps Howe had retired to New York on the news of the arrival of the French. Thereafter he worked actively to strengthen his position by improving the defenses of the place. He filled up his crews with seamen taken from merchant ships and with soldiers taken from Clinton's troops. He anchored his ships broadside on in a very close line the extremities of which were defended by batteries. Outside of these military obstacles hydrographic difficulties militated against any attack in force on our part. Our ships drew too much water to get through the channel at Sandy Hook. D'Estaing, after passing twelve days off New York, from July 10 to 22, abandoned his project and fell back upon an attack on Rhode Island, anchoring off this place on July 29. At no time did he seem to consider the necessity and the possibility of maintaining a blockade off New York.

Thus in the case where a maneuver has for its objective the enemy organized force, found in the theatre aimed at, it may happen that this force will escape by refusing battle and by shutting itself up in a fortified base. Then instead of the complete success that one hoped for, there is only a half result which is the relative placing out of action by blockade of the enemy forces. The maneuver falls half into space. That is a particular-

ity of naval action which it is well never to lose from sight. In land warfare a similar phenomenon may also be produced. But there, if the enemy, struck by the maneuver may sometimes retire and escape destruction, he does it by means of abandoning a sizable area of ground, which may have grave inconveniences for him.

The superiority from which d'Estaing benefitted from the start was not however to be maintained indefinitely. The reaction of the enemy to his maneuver was not slow in manifesting itself. Between July 22 and 30 Howe received his reinforcements, the Cornwall, seventy four, belonging to Byron's squadron, which had been separated from it during a storm, the Reasonable, sixty four, and the Centurion, fifty, from Halifax, and finally the Renown coming from the West Indies. D'Estaing occupied with the attack on Rhode Island and having abandoned the blockade of New York, could not prevent these junctions. On August 9 Howe appeared off Rhode Island with 13 ships, to wit: 1 seventy four, 7 sixty fours and 5 fifties accompanied by seven frigates. He now had equality in numbers. D'Estaing got underway on August 10 to fight him but a gale soon separated the two fleets and the French on August 20 returned to Rhode Island.

Thus the situation favorable to d'Estaing where means are considered, a situation created by a strategic maneuver, was maintained only from July 8 to 30, that is to say, 28 days. Even supposing that d'Estaing had been able to gain a month in his crossing, he would still have had only a month and a half about, to utilize his preponderance of strength. This detail shows how much superiorities thus obtained are fugitive, how much they were even at that epoch and how much it is necessary to busy oneself in exploiting them actively.

More serious modifications in this situation were yet to be produced. The British admiralty, informed in May of the move-

ment of d'Estaing, was justly concerned by this situation of Howe and decided to ward off the blow in reinforcing him by Byron's squadron, 13 ships strong that sailed from Plymouth on June 12. And it was able to do this because the English were insufficiently fixed in the Channel. Byron started two months behind d'Estaing and this gives an approximate idea of the time advantage in the attack that a maneuvering assailant could hope for in this epoch. But a portion of this delay was to be made up because of the slowness of d'Estaing's crossing. Byron's squadron had been dispersed by a gale and several of his units, amongst which the flagship, put into Halifax. But most of them arrived in New York a little before August 20. In the face of this important reinforcement brought to Howe, and of the arrival of which he had been warned when he was off Sandy Hook, d'Estaing could not become stubborn in his attack on Rhode Island. He abandoned this point to seek refuge in Boston where he barricaded himself on August 28. It was in good time. On August 31 Howe appeared off the port with 16 ships. He now had the freedom of his movements and the control of the sea and he took advantage of it to relieve Rhode Island. On September 16 Byron reached New York and took command of the United English forces.

The superiority of forces and the initiative in operation passed into the hands of the enemy. The maneuver attempted on the coast of the United States had failed. The English, by parallel transfer of forces, had annulled the initial advantage that the maneuver had created. Fortunate in the order of policy it had produced nothing in a military way.

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It became necessary to attempt a similar maneuver in another theatre of operations. The instructions given by Sartines to d'Estaing had forseen the case, in ordering the Admiral, if the

superiority of the English prevented any undertaking, to take refuge in Boston to provision his ships and to go from there to the West Indies. On November 4 d'Estaing made sail in that direction.

He did not entirely have the initiative of operation in the movement which he thus accomplished. To begin with he was forced to it by reasons of upkeep, Boston no longer being able to furnish provisions to his squadron. In the second place he was actuated more or less by a defensive reflex, for the British government which was concerned about the West Indies, and which estimated that winter would interrupt interesting hostilities in the United States, had already given orders to General Clinton to send 5,000 men down there. D'Estaing mistrusted this project and intended to oppose it. Byron sailed from New York on October 16 with 16 ships to cover the operation and appeared off Boston at the end of the month. D'Estaing was about to be blockaded there. Very fortunately a violent blow dispersed the English squadron and permitted the French to sail. But at the same time, protected by this offensive raid by his chief, Commodore Hotham left New York this same November 4 with 5 ships and 59 transports carrying troops and headed for the West Indies.

D'Estaing, if not lead towards these waters, was at least accompanied, for Hotham and himself were to proceed toward this destination with a remarkable parallelism, so close to one another that the capture on November 25 of 3 transports, strayed from Hotham, gave d'Estaing assurance of the sailing of the English detachment and at the same time precise information as to its force. After a passage just as slow as that of his adversary who was encumbered with transports, d'Estaing, on December 6th, arrived in the latitude of Desirade. Believing that Hotham was headed for Antigus, he cruised about there hoping to intercept him but in vain. On December 9 d'Estaing anchored at Fort de

France and on the 10th Hotham reached Barbados.

As devoid ashe was of intention in this matter, as well as deprived of initiative in addition, nevertheless the movement of d'Estaing may be called a maneuver because it resulted in creating a favorable situation in the new theatre of operations. In effect, if Hotham had joined Barrington, who held the West Indies station with 2 ships only, this junction would have given the two English Admirals only 7 ships as compared with the 12 of d'Estaing.

Nevertheless they left Barbados almost immediately (December 11), to attack Saint Lucia on December 13. On the 14th d'Estaing ran down from Fort de France and undertook, around Saint Lucia, that unlucky series of operations of which we have already spoken (Vol. I, Part III, Chapter 2), without profiting by his numerical superiority and missing a magnificent opportunity of crushing Barrington. On December 30 he was back in Fort de France. Saint Lucia was lost and something much more serious, Barrington remained intact.

The situation thereafter was to change rapidly in a very unfavorable manner. Byron, no more fixed in the United States than he had previously been in the Channel, arrived from North America. And one feared as much. In his famous letter to d'Estaing of December 18, Suffren, commanding the Fantasque, notably remarked:

"What shall we do if the squadron of Admiral Byron should arrive?....Let us destroy this squadron (Barrington)....etc. Let Byron come afterwards, it will give us great pleasure." On December 28 d'Estaing had confirmation of the approaching arrival of Byron. Instead of profiting by the little time which remained to him to attack Barrington with chances of success, he went back to Martinique thus committing an inexcusable mistake.

After having touched at Barbados, Byron, on January 6, 1779,

made his junction with Barrington at Saint Lucia, bringing the British forces to a total of 17 ships. On the 11th there were 15 ships at Saint Lucia. Numerical superiority had not passed to the side of the enemy. The favorable situation created by the involuntary maneuver of d'Estaing had thus lasted from December 9 to January 6, that is to say 28 days, scarcely more than on the coast of the United States.

Thereafter the two adversaries each received reinforcements which changed but little the balance of forces. D'Estaing was joined on February 19 by deGrasse with 4 ships, on April 25 by the Fier, on April 26 by Vaudreuil with 2 ships and finally on June 27 by Lamotte-Picquet with 5 ships. On his side Byron was joined by Raleigh with 6 ships and later by other detachments coming from England. D'Estaing did not recover his excellent position of the start. The maneuver finished abortively in a state of quasi equilibrium. D'Estaing succeeded in taking Saint Vincent and Grenada, but on July 6 off Grenada, with 25 ships against 21, he contented himself with repulsing Byron without inflicting a decisive defeat on him, once more letting escape an opportunity of redressing the situation which had been compromised by the successive accretions of force by which the enemy had benefited. In the West Indies as in the United States the check to the maneuver was definite.

The sending out of the third French detachment, that of Lamotte-Picquet, far from following the idea of maintaining the ascendency in a strategic maneuver, was of purely defensive inspiration and was intended to remedy the situation created by the serious failure at Saint Lucia. It is interesting to figure out the time table of this reaction to the initial event. Saint Lucia was taken on January 1st. It was known in Paris on February 22 and it was decided to send the division of Lamotte-Picquet to the Antilles. They left Brest on May 1st and arrived at Fort

de France on June 27, that is about six months after the event which had motivated this reply. Evidently this had been very slow. First more than two months passed between the decision to send Lamotte-Picquet and its execution (February 22 to May 1). Secondly the crossing of this group was very slow. Taking account of the particularities of this kind in this case one may estimate that there would pass in general, after a sudden change in the situation in the West Indies, a delay from two and a half to three months between this change and the complete accomplishment of the reply ordered by one or the other of the home governments, France or England as the case may be. Such was the margin of time, on the average, at the disposal of a strategic maneuver at this epoch and in this theatre of operations.

After the affair of Grenada d'Estaing left the island on July 15, 1779. He touched at Guadalupe on July 19 and paraded twice, July 22 and 24, off the anchorage of Saint Christopher where Byron had taken refuge. The English squadron was protected by forts and solidly moored broadside to. D'Estaing therefore did not attack and undertook no blockade. He continued his course and anchored on July 31 at Cape Francais, San Domingo.

His views were now directed to another theatre of operations and he thought of returning to the United States. In this region the affairs of the insurgents were not brilliant. Georgia had been invaded by the English in December, 1778, and in January, 1779 the Americans had solicited help from d'EStaing. At San Domingo this latter found the new call for help addressed to him by the Governor of South Carolina, an area seriously menaced by the English. Notwithstanding the very precise instructions of Sartines enjoining him to bring back to France the Toulon ships and to leave the others in the Antilles, d'Estaing took it on himself to lead all of his squadron to the United States. He attempted thus, all unwittingly, for this notion was intell-

ectually beyond him, a last strategic maneuver. However on August 16, in leaving San Domingo, he had no precise project in mind. He did not know whether he would go to Georgia or New York, and waited to communicate with the shore before making his decision. He seemed above all, preoccupied with cooperating in operations on shore and did not appear even to suspect that his maneuver could have for objective, as in the preceding year, the British organized force in these waters. These would nevertheless, find themselves isolated before him and inferior, as Byron could not help being surprised and disturbed by the unexpected movement of his adversary toward New York.

The facts are know. On August 31 d'Estaing anchored in the entrance to the Savannah River and decided to operate against that city. He stayed there two months, on an inhospitable coast of which the blow on September 2 was to make him appreciate the insecurity. Beside which the squadron was divided into several sections, which gave witness to a dangerous disregard of the enemy afloat. "I hope, Suffren justly wrote on September 18, that a prompt success will bring to an end an operation which is not without its inconveniences." It was in effect to end but not with a success. The troops, put on shore on September 13, were reembarked on October 20 after a bloody defeat before Savannah. At the end of October the squadron broke up, part to return to France and part to the West Indies.

The maneuver had made available a favorable situation lasting two months. Byron had not troubled it at all as in the two preceding attempts. He had not followed the movement of d'Estaing. As to results, they were nil as regards the British organized force in North American waters and also with regard to the American territories in the South. In the North some secondary effects had been obtained. Clinton, in ignorance of our projects and fearing for New York, had concentrated his strength in that

city and given orders to evacuate Rhode Island which the Americans occupied. That was all the benefit of the third foray of d'Estaing.

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The year 1780 was to see the most magnificent example that one could imagine of a movement, successful as to execution and completely lacking in effect because of the absence of any strategical ideas in its conception.

In the course of this year Guichen had operated in the West Indies and had there fought with Rodney his three classic battles. In June the Spanish squadron of Solano arrived at Martinique escorting a large convoy of troops and material destined for Havana. Guichen sailed with the Spaniards on July 5 to accompany them to their destination, anchoring afterwards at Cape Francais, San Domingo.

Letters from Lafayette and from La Luzerne, French minister to the American Congress, reached him in this port. They urged him to come to the coast of the United States as d'Estaing had done the previous year. Guichen refused quoting the instructions of the minister which required him to return to Europe escorting a merchant fleet. On August 16 he sailed for this destination with 19 ships and a convoy of 95 sail. Once out of the Bahama Channel he opened a sealed despatch and learned that he was to go to Cadiz.

One might fear that the enemy would effect a similar movement and that Rodney would come back to Europe. He did nothing of the kind. Rodney was disturbed by the arrival of Solano and feared a Spanish expedition against Jamaica. On the other hand, from Commodore Cornwallis, one of his subordinates who on June 20 near Bermuda had met the squadron of de Ternay bound for the United States with Rochambeau's troops, he had learned the des-

tination of this group and of our projects in that region. Finally Rodney very probably knew of the invitations made to Guichen by the Americans asking him to come into their waters, and the proceeding of the French Admiral to San Domingo must have seemed to him the beginning of a movement towards the United States.

The result of the Franco-Spanish operations and the involuntary diversions that they brought about, was that Rodney split his force in two. He sent 10 ships to Jamaica, which in reality was not attacked, and set sail with the rest towards New York where he arrived at the end of September. There he joined Graves coming from England, as well as Arbuthnot, and found himself at the head of 21 ships. But he could not force the entrance to Narragansett Bay where Ternay had successfully landed Rochambeau's army. The superiority of the enemy at this point did not have unfortunate consequences for us. In December Rodney returned to the West Indies and retired to Saint Lucia.

These goings and comings, leading his force into secondary theatres, had the effect of keeping Rodney on the other side of the Atlantic, fixing him there and keeping him out of the way of what was going on in Europe. And this was precisely the advantage which had been lacking in the preceding maneuvers. Until then the adversary, abandoned on the theatre of operations which we were leaving, refused to remain planted there and followed on our heels.

In Europe, by a singular concourse of circumstances, the Franco-Spanish forces were to assemble at Cadiz. To gegin with a score of ships from Toulon had been sent there to strengthen the squadron of Cordova who persisted in remaining in the vicinity of Gibraltar. On October 1 Breugnon brought in two more ships. On September 25 d'Estaing arrived in Cadiz to take command of the French forces, without having been able to persuade the Spanish court, on his passage through Madrid, to undertake

any operation which would take their ships away from the Strait. On October 23 Guichen entered Cadiz with his 19 ships and the convoy. The minister had sent him there, not with any desire to unite him with the other forces with intention of maneuvering, but simply because the sending of reinforcements to Cadiz had had the effect of stripping the North, whereby a landfall at Brest was not considered very sure.

However that may be the result of all this, and of the sudden return of Guichen to Europe, was that of a formidable concentration, such as had never been seen before, was effected at Cadiz. Two score French ships were there and all the Spanish fleet as well. In the face of such strength, that which the English had in the Channel no longer counted. This maneuver totally lacking in intention and conception, had been crowned in its execution by a success worthy of a better cause. Deduction being made of the Spaniards, determined not to leave the columns of Hercules, and of Suffren sent with 5 ships to convoy merchantmen into the Mediterranean, there remained to d'Estaing 38 ships with which and in conformity with the instructions of the minister, he left Cadiz on November 7 to return to Brest. He arrived there on January 3, 1781 without having accomplished anything.

This concentration at Cadiz will remain in history as an imperishable monument to a maneuver as unconscious as successful, as strong in its means as nil in its results. The absence of exploitation of a favorable situation here passes the bounds of the imagination. No example shows better the lack of strategic sense of the man of the eighteenth century.

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The meneuver carried out on the coast of the United States in 1781 which resulted in the surrender of Yorktown is a last

case interesting to consider.

The Maneuver this time was formally planned by the French government with the intention of bringing about a grand result in the theatre of operations in which it was to be exercised. The fleet which sailed from Brest on March 22, 1781, under the orders of de Grasse, was indeed bound for the West Indies but its falling back to the shores of the United States was decided in advance. The Minister of War informed Rochambeau of this telling him that de Grasse would go up to North America during the hurricane season in the West Indies, that is to say, August, September and October, and inviting him to draw up a plan of campaign in agreement with him. These instructions were sent by the frigate Concorde which left Brest with de Grasse and separated from him on March 29.

On this Frigate was embarked Barras who was going to take command of the squadron in the United States. de Grasse profited by the occasion to send to this vessel on March 29 a letter for Rochambeau and another for Barras himself. The first did nothing but refer to the instructions of the government and it announced the arrival of the French fleet at San Domingo about the end of June. The second asked Barras at this time to send good pilots for the coast of the United States.

The Concorde arrived with Barras and these letters, in Rhode Island on May 10. In view of this news Washington and Rochambeau met on May 20 at Wethersfield, Connecticut and drew up the plans for the Virginia campaign which was to end by the taking of Yorktown.

The maneuver of de Grasse was thus planned by the French government six months ahead its execution.

After two months of unimportant operations in the Antilles, de Grasse set out for his final objective. On July 5 he left Martinique for San Domingo arriving the 16th at Cape Francais.

There he found the Concorde which had left Boston on June 20 and arrived at the Cape on July 8. This frigate brought him letters from Rochambeau and Barras and the requested pilots. de Grasse learned that the military situation in the United States was grave. He decided to head for his prescribed destination, but in taking with him all his forces, without sending back to Europe the ten ships that the minister had ordered him to send back with a convoy. He could thus carry out his maneuver with 28 ships. After having picked up in San Domingo troops, artillery and materiel, and sent a frigate to Havana to get money, de gresse sailed from San Domingo on August 5 and on the 30th anchored in the entrance to the Chesapeake Bay. Earlier, on July 28, he sent the Concorde back to the United States with letters to Barras which she delivered on August 15.

How was the enemy to act in the face of this movement? At once preventively and insufficiently. Rodney who commanded in the Antilles, was informed of our projects but had not exactly gauged their importance. After the departure of de Grasse he returned to Europe for reasons of health, leaving a portion of his forces in Jamaica and sending the rest, 14 ships under Hood, to join Graves at New York. This reinforcement appeared sufficient to Rodney, for he thought that de Grasse would take only a portion of his ships with him, the others returning to France. The initiative of the French Admiral of keeping all his forces with him was thus to have the effect of guaranteeing to him superiority of strength in the theatre where he intended to act, and that notwithstanding the reaction of an enemy who remained as always not fixed elsewhere.

On August 28, two days before de Gresse, Hood arrived in the United States and joined Graves in New York. He informed the latter of the intentions of the French, at least such as he imagined them, that is to say, less threatening than they were

in reality. Having estimated that the first care of de Grasse would be to effect a junction with the 8 ships of Barras, and having learned this same August 28 that Barras had left Rhode Island on the 25th, Graves resolved to prevent this union and took the sea at once with Hood. From Hood's information he believed himself superior to each of the two French factions.

On September 5, in the entrance to the Chesapeake Bay, Graves ran upon de Grasse's whole fleet, less four ships occupied in the land operations, which were going at the same time in the Bay. He had then the disappointment of finding out, against all expectations, that he had to join battle with 21 ships against 24. This was the fight of September 5 and the subsequent maneuvers which lasted from the 6th to the 10th, after which Graves, little damaged but repulsed, went back to New York on September 20. On his de Grasse went back into the Chesapeake on September 11 and there found Barras who had entered the preceding night with his 8 ships. The junction was made. We could thereafter oppose 36 ships to the 21 of Graves and Hood.

These operations call for a few observations.

The first concerns the junction of de Grasse and Barras. It is a general principle that the reunion of forces ought to precede an operation or, at the worst, ought to take place in the course of the maneuver if it had not been possible to do it earlier. But de Grasse, not knowing of Rodney's action, thought that with his 28 ships, he had more than enough to face the 7 vessels of Graves and on July 28 he had written to Barras from San Domingo, that he left him free to join him or to act on his own for the good of the common cause, requesting him only to inform him of the part that he intended to play. Grasse did not know of Hood's movement and was not to know it until September 5. He sinned by underestimating the enemy forces as did his

opponents for that matter, Rodney and Hood. His numerical superiority was not the considerable one that he had counted on. On September 5 finding themselves face to face, the French and English commanders both suffered a surprise of the same nature. They could meditate on the old proverb: "Trop fort n'a jamais manque" (Too strong has never failed), by which one should be inspired in any maneuver when one constitutes the principal mass.

Strong in the assurance of de Grasse and of the libeerty he left him, Barras did not concern himself with the junction with his colleague, "regarded as unnecessary by that general himself", and he considered making an expedition to Newfoundland, that is to say, in a diametrically opposite direction. But this lack of concern over the junction was much more incomprehensible on Barras' part than on that of de Grasse, for he had been informed by Washington that Graves might be reinforced by Digby from England and that also Rodney was shortly to come up from the West Indies. It is curious that Barras did not comprehend that, in these circumstances, his junction with de Grasse was the most important thing of all. Evidently this junction would have delicate in the presence of superior British forces. It was however, necessary to attempt it. It took place, thanks to another issue. Barras, in effect, gave in to the instances of Washington and Rochambeau who were absolutely opposed to an enterprise to Newfoundland, and who requested him rather to bring into the Chesapeake the army artillery and troops remaining in Rhode Island. Barras sailed from that port on August 25 heading first south and then west, turning thus by the east and south, the region where de Grasse and Graves were at this moment engaged. On September 11 he arrived in the Chesapeake without incident and without having met anybody.

On the other hand the maneuver thought up by the French and realized by de Grasse was intended first of all to contribute to

American land operations. It was directed 'a priori' thereto. The principal objective was territorial. de Grasse wrote from San Domingo on July 28 to Barras: "I will leave here on August 3 and will proceed with all diligence into the Chesapeake Bay, a place which seems to me indicated by you, my dear Barras, and by MM. Rochambeau, Washington and de la Luzerne, as the most certain to bring about the proposed good result". The enemy organized force was at this moment far from the thoughts of de Grasse. Nevertheless, when it brought itself to his attention, on September 5, six days after his arrival, he understood that he must fight it. He did it without great vigor. The engagement was limited to a lively enough cannonade between the two vans, as a result of which the English lost one ship burned by themselves. Then de Grasse followed Graves very slowly, happy enough to have repulsed him from the Chesapeake, where he hastened to return after the encounter. Nevertheless a decisive defeat inflicted on Graves would have settled everything for a long time in those waters. It would have put the seal of success on the maneuver. de Grasse, like a military man of the eighteenth century, did not perceive this truth. He did not conceive that this objective was in no way irreconcilable with the execution of the operations which were unfolding in the Chesapeake, and which second rate ships sufficed to protect. Nevertheless it is only fair to say that when he learned, on September 25, that Graves was to be reinforced by Digby from England, he thought that his adversary would come to attack him again and he considered going after him. His captains dissuaded him. While he came to their opinion and remained in the Chesapeake, Grasse had his ships take up a position permitting them getting under sail rapidly in case of need.

But these operations against the enemy organized force, even if incomplete, just the same had the result of keeping him away

from the Chesapeake and of isolating Cornwallis at Yorktown. On October 19 the place capitulated with consequences that are well known. On October 25 Graves, who had been reinforced by six ships, appeared off the Bay with 27 of these units and the help which Clinton had sent from New York. He finally had numerical equality. But learning of the fall of Yorktown he retired to New York.

The French maneuver had thus, from the territorial point of view at least, fully succeeded.

On land an action of the same order had taken place contrasting with the usual methods of that epoch. A true spirit of maneuver had conducted the operations. There was maneuvering, not only in fact but also in intention. Washington and Rochambeau first showed themselves before New York making Clinton, who was there, fear to be seriously attacked, to such a point that this general ordered Cornwallis to hold himself ready to come to his help. Then the two Allied Chiefs, leaving only weak forces before New York, moved rapidly toward the Chesapeake there to join Lafayette, and passed suddenly by interior lines from the diversion at a secondary point to the attack on the principal point, in Virginia. All forces converged thus towards the Chesapeake including the 3,000 soldiers that Grasse brought up in his ships. In these conditions the decision was certain.

Volume II, Chapter 3

THE CAMPAIGN OF BRUIX IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1799.

The Birth of the Idea of the Maneuver.

The idea of the campaign of Bruix in the Mediterranean came from the intention of the Directory to reestablish our situation in that sea, annihilated so to speak, since the defeat at Aboukir, and to attempt a supreme effort to succor the French army isolated in Egypt because of that event.

In truth the thoughts of the French Government on the subject of naval action to be taken against England, had varied little. If the Directory had first thought to assemble new forces at Toulon, and even to draw there almost all the Spanish ships, its plan was not to utilize them immediately. In September 1798 it wished above all to carry through an attack on Ireland already begun in the attempt of General Humbert. This was also the project of the Spanish Court. The Directory, notwithstanding the overthrow and surrender of Humberts first echelon at Ballinamuck, still held, in October, to this combination. Following the disaster of the Division of Bompard, and before the second and unsuccessful attempt at a landing of Savary's division, it abandoned this plan. On October 29 the order was given to stop the preparations being made at Brest.

It was not that the Directory had decided to act in the Mediterranean in preference to the Ocean. On November 4 it wrote a letter to Bonaparte, then in Egypt, telling him that it would be thereafter impossible to establish communications with him or to send him reinforcements and that he was free to adopt any plan that suited him to utilize the army of Egypt. Bruix, Minister of Marine, pointed out on November 19 the insignificant strength of our naval forces in the Mediterranean, which included only two French ships and several Maltese and Venetian craft of mediocre value, which it was better to leave separated in order

to oblige the English to divide their forces. He was of the opinion that it sufficed, in that region, to limit oneself to relieving Malta, where Vaubois was besieged by the enemy, and that one should retain the greater part of the French squadrons to act in the Ocean. Bruix himself, in reality, favored a return to the operations previously undertaken against Ireland.

However, at this time, at the end of the year 1798 and at the beginning of 1799, the second coalition was formed, including at the beginning England, Russia, Turkey and the Kingdom of Naples. This last took the initiative in hostilities against France, Turkey herself had declared war against France from the 14th of September and allied herself with Russia. A Russo-Turkish fleet, commanded by Admiral Ouchakoff, now proceeded against the Ionian Islands, occupied by the French, to seize them and then to act in the Adriatic. The English naval forces under Jervis, occupied the Mediterranean from one end to the other, blockading Cadiz and Malta, seizing Minorca and Gozzo in November 1798, protecting Sicily with Nelson's squadron brought back from the Levant after Aboukir, and isolating the army of Egypt with the forces of Sidney Smith. If it wished to break this circle of enemies, our navy would be constrained to widespread action in the Mediterranean. This was one reason the more why the Directory should hesitate to engage itself in that sea.

Such was, nevertheless, the goal which was to be assigned to our squadron. For the Directory was influenced towards this by a long letter from Bonaparte, written on October 7 and received on Dec. 13, in which this General, particularly listened to by the Government in this critical hour, implored an effort to succor the Army of Egypt and to furnish him with reinforcements and supplies. Particularly he wrote: "You will take (sic) all the measures that I ask of you in order to have a large squadron in these waters ....Perhaps it would be suitable to bring the

naval war into the Mediterranean .... I do not believe that it is good policy to remain in the Mediterranean with so few ships". He demanded the collection of a dozen ships which, based on the positions which we held at Malta, Corfu, in Italy and in Egypt, could accomplish much, while the other forces, French, Spanish and Dutch create a diversion in the Ocean.

This suggestion gained the approval of the Directory. In the name of the necessities of the general war, the Mediterranean was to be considered as the principal theatre for the navy, and it was towards this region that the contemplated maneuver would be oriented. The decisive direction was thus settled.

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The Preparation of the Maneuver.

It was first necessary to form the mass which was to be charged with the execution of the principal attack. It was to be formed by a naval force collected at Brest and which would pass from there into the Mediterranean. The Directory, on the proposal of Bruix, prescribed by its decree of December 19 that the Ocean Fleet should be put in condition to go to sea with the least possible delay. On December 27 instructions were sent to the port of Brest to prepare 24 ships. The port made an immense effort to this end. Supplies were lacking, Particularly cordage. The deficit in personnel amounted to 6,000 men. They brought the material either by coastal convoys from the ocean ports or by land from the channel ports, the English paralyzing all coastal trade in that region. They filled the vacancies existing in the crews by means of drafts on other ships found at Dunkirk, Dieppe, Havre, etc., in laying up many of these units and in taking away a portion of the personnel from craft intended for raiding. Notwithstanding unheard of difficulties, which well

show how much the realization of any maneuver is conditioned by questions of upkeep, the port of Brest succeeded in getting ready for sea, by March 19, the 24 ships and the ten frigates which were to compose the fleet and to supply the major portion of their needs, amongst which four months provisions. The effort continued under the personal direction of Bruix, who reached Brest on March 23. He had still to overcome tremendous obstacles as to the seembly of the necessary personnel. Finally on April 24 he succeeded in raising the fleet to a figure of 25 ships, 6 frigates and 7 corvettes.

Spain was requested at the end of March, to speed the preparation of the Cadiz squadron, which was placed under the command of Mazarredo, and which was to participate in the projected operation. Admiral Lacrosse was sent to Cadiz to this end. The Spanish squadron was brought to the figure of 18 ships, ten others not being outfitted for lack of crews. At Ferrol was located the division of Melgarejo, five ships strong.

On April 3 Bruix, promoted Vice-Admiral on March 13, was appointed to the Command in Chief of the Brest fleet. On him will depend the execution of the maneuver.

As early as March 15 the Directory had given him secretely the instructions which constituted the plan for this maneuver.

We reproduce below the essential passages.

"The goal of his mission is to penetrate into the Mediterranean and there to destroy or at least to drive out the enemy naval forces which may be found there".

The objective of the maneuver is sharply and judiciously definite in theory at least. It is the enemy organized force in the principal theatre. Bruix was to endeavor to put it out of the way.

He was to attempt nothing in the ocean: "The executive Directory enjoins him to avoid any battle which might stop or

retard his progress either in leaving Brest or in making a landfall in the Strait of Gibraltar".

This already greatly alters the paragraph which precedes. The Directory, in effect, should know that a portion of the English Mediterranean forces was occupied in the blockade of Cadiz. Bruix would have, without a doubt, an excellent opportunity to attack him unexpectedly with superiority of numbers, and of brilliantly inaugurating his campaign. Why prohibit him from it?

But the Directory, above all, was concerned with the entrance into the Mediterranean.

"If nevertheless the enemy should be stationed in such manner as to make the passage through the Strait impossible without being obliged to fight in line then only will Admiral Bruix attack him ..... Admiral Bruix will not forget, even in battle, and whatever its issue, that as soon as the entrance to the Mediterranean is free he must take advantage of it for the execution of the mission which was confided to him".

As to the junction with Mazarredo, that is to say the uniting of forces so important to the maneuver, they seemd to consider that quite secondary. "In this case (of battle) he is authorized to require the Spanish Squadron to sail immediately, either to make a diversion or to put the enemy between two fires or finally to add the ships which composed it to his fleet.... It is to be observed that if the Spaniards do not get under sail as soon as requested the French Admiral should immediately force the passage with his own means."

In case of injuries after battle or of pursuit by a superior enemy, Bruix was authorized to enter a port, Toulon by preference. This latitude was later to have an unfortunate influence in his mind.

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But here is the essential part of his mission: "In the contrary case of his entry into the Mediterranean without injury and without pursuit, he will proceed to the Italian coast, will embark three or four thousand troops and will take under his escort the vessels necessary for the provisioning of Corfu, Malta and Alexandria, or he will embark on some of his own ships these same provisions. He will proceed first to Corfu and then to Malta and Alexandria where he will distribute the troops and munitions necessary for their conservation."

"Admiral Bruix will detach one or more frigates to give notice at Ancona of his arrival at Corfu and to take in the former a convoy which will be prepared there for the supply of the fleet".

At the same time the Directory gave the necessary orders to the Commander in Chief of the Armies of Italy and Naples.

Thus appear the servitudes relative to land war which, at the bottom, motivated the sending of Bruix into the Mediterranean. They have an undeniable value and imperious demand satisfaction. Agreed. But nevertheless they should not cause one to forget the preeminent importance of the organized force, which the beginning of the instructions placed clearly in evidence. Only the destruction of this force could bring about a stable and permanent advantage. We must therefore find, in the principal theatre, a compromise analagous to that of which we spoke in another chapter for the general case.

The Directory seems to have an intuition of this:

"The Directory believes it unnecessary to remind the Citizen Bruix that, in the course of this operation, he should neglect none of the combinations which might place in his power the enemy divisions or squadrons occupied with the blockade of Corfu and Malta, or cruising in the various areas through which he will have to pass".

This is an invitation to compromise, but the enemy afloat seems to have in it only a place of second rank. His destruction seems to be but an accessory benefit. Thus, here, it will not be possible to prepare a compromise in the classic manner which we have already described, consisting in satisfying the servitudes with the customary security disposition, and then to turn immediately against the enemy organized force. There will not be time for it because the favorable situation created by the maneuver will be ephemeral, because the enemy will react and will be found in force at the moment when one comes back against him after having satisfied the servitudes. In the present case hours are worth gold. The surprise resulting from the maneuver must be exploited as quickly as possible, and everything pushed ahead in seeking battle sooner and with greater haste than in other situations. The thing is in no wise impossible. The two sorts of objectives may be attained at the same time. Bruix would find the enemy disposed and dispersed along his route. The English were scattered in little groups before Cadiz, at Minorca, in Sicily, at Malta and in Egype. The Turko-Russian group was isolated in the Ionian Islands. While accomplishing his mission of supplying reinforcements, Bruix could, along the way, pick them off one by one. The circumstances were eminently propitious for this vast cast of the net. But it seemed not to be understood.

Thus this plan of operations which started with the remarkably creative idea of the sudden transfer of our Ocean forces

into the Mediterranean, contained defects which singularly diminished its value. It headlined action against the enemy organized force but it departed greatly therefrom in what followed. It rejected it off Gibraltar or admitted it only in cases of necessities. It placed the servitudes before all else and conceived a compromise, insufficiently explicit at that, in which battle against the enemy afloat appears as a supplementary objective interesting, but nothing more. The joining of forces entering the Mediterranean was neglected. * foot-note; "Bruix remedied this lack by sending, on April 13, orders to Mazarredo to hold himself ready to join him when he should appear off Cadiz) If one adds to these great imperfections, the loss of time which would result from waiting at Corfu for the Ancona convoy, a veiled attraction towards a call at Toulon and finally an exhortation to "conserve the fleet", one can readily understand that Bruix was in no way oriented toward battle and that the maneuver was vitiated in its principle and in its essential sanction.

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Whatever it might be, it was necessary to assure the security of the principal mass by preventing the English Forces in the Channel and Ocean from following its movement into the Mediterranean and troubling its operation in that region. It is necessary to fix these enemy forces in the North. As there was very little strength left to devote to this secondary theatre, one will seek this fixation in diverting this portion of the enemy in an eccentric direction.

This diversion will be obtained:

1. By strict secrecy as to the true destination of the Brest Fleet.

2. By spreading false information on this subject.

3. By the obvious preparation of several diversions.

This part of the execution was excellently carried out.

In the way of diversions however, the Directory did nothing important. The forces to be devoted to this secondary objective were lacking. The Directory, instructed by Bruix, limited itself to recommending to the Dutch to show the greatest possible naval activity in the Texal, and to carrying out various movements of French troops in the vicinity of the ports. Later, in May, the Directory thought of using to the same and the Spanish division of Melgarejo, which had left Ferrol on April 26 and arrived at the Ile d'Aix on May 7. But here, as before, there were ohly ideas without great effect.

As to the secret of the operations relative to the maneuver in project, the Directory began by keeping it strictly from their own Allies, the Spanish. As early as January they began by pushing the Madrid Government toward the preparations in Cadiz, but without telling them a word of the plans, notwithstanding the astonishment that this government manifested to be thus held in ignorance of current projects. The Directory, without giving any explanations, requested that Spain send to Rochefort or Brest the ships from Ferrol, and to Toulon, those at Cartagena. "One cannot say everything about the operations", Tallyrand wrote to d'Azara, the Spanish ambassador, on the 17th of January, "secrecy is necessary". Distrust toward them irritated the Spanish Government and even brought serious difficulties between them and the Directory. Admiral Lacrosse was sent on a mission to Cadiz to inform the French Government directly on the state of Mazarredo's squadron and to speed up its preparations. Again, on April 13, Bruix sent him instructions from Brest on the subject of the junction of the French and Spanish forces, but without letting him know anything as to the objective assigned to these forces. At the end of February, in a letter to Talleyrand, intended to be shown, Bruix made semblance of quitting

his reserve in regard to the Spanish government, and of confiding to them the plan which that government desired to know. He spoke of resuming the attempts on Ireland where it was necessary "to seek to wear down misfortune by perseverance". Spain would be informed of the plan as soon as it had been completely drawn up; meanwhile they should make every effort toward the preparation of the Cadiz squadron and they should send the Ferrol Division to the Ile d'Aix. On March 19 Talleyrand wrote to Guillemardet, our ambassador in Madrid, that activity of the Cadiz Squadron and its eventual sortie were indispensable to assist the projected expedition against Ireland.

Also Bruix requested Talleyrand, who, after the former's departure for Brest acted as ad interim Minister of Marine, not to give instructions to the port of Toulon for the supply of the fleet until after it had sailed from Brest.

Finally the Directory made us of the press to propagate false information. The Moniteur, of April 9, 12 and 25 and of May 1 made allusion to an expedition to Ireland by the ships at Brest and in the Texel.

These diverse dispositions did not succeed however in completely misleading French or Allied opinion. At Brest it was thought that the expedition was intended to succor the Army of Egypt. Mazarredo had the intuition of an action in the Mediterranean. D'Azara pronosticated the Levant. But at least the Directory had done everything humanly possible to assure secrecy, and consequently surprise, for the maneuver.

What did the enemy think about all this? As to the armament in Brest, they had much information furnished by their spies. From January this information gave Ireland as the goal of the fleet. Later information confirmed this hypothesis. News obtained from neutrals by the English ships, maintaining the blockade at Brest, corroborated it. The British Government finally

gave faith to this version. Windham so wrote to Castlereach on January 11. Further, news from Ireland gave assurance that the "United Irish" were to rise at Easter, the date on which the French ought to arrive in the Island.

In March other information noted the unusual activity displayed by the Dutch in the Texel and the probability of embarking of French troops there.

On March 13 the Admiralty decided to send three extra ships to the squadron on the Irish coast. It recalled Lord Bridport to Portsmouth and notified him of its fears regarding Ireland. It ordered that all vessels at Portsmouth be ready to put to sea the first signal. It reinforced the blockade at Brest. It even received rumors of an attack on Portsmouth.

In this quarter certainly, the measures taken to mislead the enemy seemed to have been crowned with success.

In addition to all this, the English Government and its military direction showed themselves disturbed, uncertain and irresolute in face of the French preparations, and this state of mind lasted throughout the whole of Bruix's enterprise. This detail well shows the moral advantage which results from the initiative in operations. This initiative, even when taken by a weak belligerent, having only mediocre possibilities and little esteemed by the adversary, provokes in his mind, ordinarily sire of itself, long moments of unrest and anxiety which led him to unfortunate decisions and which take away from him a large portion of his means. And this is, in the end, the great lesson of all this affair.

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Launching The Maneuver

The initial phase of the execution of the maneuver consisted in assuring its good start by launching the principal mass in the direction in which it would have to operate, and in making the English forces in the Channel lose all trace of it. To succeed in such a coup has always been difficult in the presence of an enemy in contact. Here the problem bristled with difficulties from the fact that one was blockaded by the enemy in the port of departure itself.

In January 1799 the blockade of Brest was held by a squadron of 9 ships, detached from the Channel Fleet of Lord Bridport. These ships were commanded by Gardner and later by Thompson. In February the Admiralty, in order to conserve its units, reduced the squadron to 7 vessels, commanded by Seymour and accompanied by several frigates ordinarily employed in intercepting the French coastal trade. The blockade was interrupted from time to time by storms which forced the English to seek shelter in Torbay or Plymouth. At the beginning of April the blockade was held by 9 ships, later by 14. On April 14 the strength was not more than 6 ships. On April 17 Bridport arrived with seven other units; on April 26 he had 16 ships under his command. The reconnaissances that he had made in the entrance to Brest on April 22, 24 and 25 showed him that the French were on the point of putting to sea and that a portion of their ships were already anchored in the outer harbor.

It was certain that, under these conditions, it would be difficult to make the English lose contact. One could hope for bad weather but that would be as troublesome for us as it would for them. Accordingly Bruix, on April 18, came logically to think of assuring his departure by means of combat, by the aid of a heavy blow preceding and facilitating that departure. On

April 11 the enemy had only 12 ships; one could engage him thus with a ratio of two to one. Bruix explained subsequently to the Directory: "From the persistance of the enemy in remaining off Ushant, it appeared that their plan was to follow our fleet..... I thought that the best means of disconcerting this combination would be to fight an inferior fleet off Brest if the latter showed any resolution to follow us." But the Directory, conforming to its own plan, would not have that solution at any price and Bruix refrained. The idea nevertheless, was not bad. Executed with such a numerical superiority, it had great chances of success. Anyway this situation carries the lesson that one is not always able to proceed at will with the movement of forces to set up and start the maneuver, if the enemy is at all keen and persistent.

But this critical phase was to be fortunately resolved by an untraordinary piece of good luck.

On April 25 the French fleet, profiting by a northeast wind, left Brest and went to anchor at Bertheaume in order more easily to be able to form line of battle upon getting underway, if circumstances imposed battle upon departure. On April 26 it left Bertheaume for its destination.

The weather was propitious: wind NNE, rain, frequent squalls, overcast horizon, very poor visibility.

Bridport was a little to the west of Ushant. On the 25th, at evening, he had placed the frigate "Nymph" on watch at the entrance of the Iroise, supported in the rear by the ships, "Superb" and "Dragon". On the 26th at 9 A.M. the "Nymph" made contact with the light squadron of the French fleet, but lost it at 12:30 because of fog. The "Dragon" did not understand her signals. Bridport, not notified until 1315 in any event, at 1500,

signalled a general chase toward the southeast to find the French. Suddenly the "Nymph", fearing to see her admiral go off on a false trail and supposing the enemy to have returned to anchorage, annulled her first signal. A_{+}^{-} 1522 Bridport ordered the chase abandoned and returned toward Ushant.

During this time the French had got underway from Bertheaume, the light squadron at 0700 and the main body at 1030. The light squadron chased off the "Nymph". At 1300 Bruix doubled the Parquette. A^{+} 1500 he passed the Raz de Sein. Aided by a good breeze from the north on the next day, April 27 at noon, he was sixty miles at sea. The departure had been effected with signal by good fortune. It was done. The enemy was left behind. The maneuver was finally well underway.

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All of what followed depended however on the reaction of Bridport and the Admiralty to this event, and that is why a study thereof is of absorbing interest.

Bridport thought at first that Bruix had gone gack to his anchorage. The reconnaissance of April 27 showed that he had done nothing of the sort. The French fleet had disappeared. And then, fortified with all the information previously received, with the general opinion and with his own impression, of which he had informed the Admiralty the evening before, Bridport, on the evening of the 27th, threw himself on the road to Ireland, while Bruix sailed toward the Mediterranean.

On April 29th Bridport was joined by a light vessel which two days earlier had captured off Ushant, the French despatch boat Rebecca, carrying despatches to Ireland, notifying the insurgents of that country of the approaching arrival of the French and Dutch. Of course these despatches were intentionally false. It was the

classic trick. Bridport let himself be taken in and continued as fast as possible toward Ireland.

The Admiralty approved his decision. They immediately took the necessary measures to reinforce him and to bring his fleet to the figure of 21 ships. Besides which they proceeded to concentrate at Plymouth a second fleet under the command of Gardner.

At the same time the doubts, uncertainties, and hesitations on the subject of the destination of Bruix cropped again in the minds of the British government and the Admiralty which did not know what to decide upon. Notices from Brest said that the French had perhaps gone to Cadiz. And then suddenly Pitt and Dundas opined that it was the Mediterranean, in view of the small number of troops that Bruix was taking with him. On May 5 Admiral Whitshed, with five ships was sent in that direction to join Jervis. Admiral Young, a member of the Admiralty believed that an attack on Ireland ought not be dismissed, in case that Bruix should pick up troops at Rochefort, but that the hypothesis of the Mediterranean was equally plausible because of the situation of the French armies in Italy. He warned Nelson, by way of Vienna and Trieste. The Admiralty decided to keep Bridport on the coast of Ireland. In its uncertainty, it sought to provide against all eventualities.

Then the British Government, Pitt at the head, returned to its fears for Ireland. They sent Gardner to join Bridport. Grenville, Secretary of State, Admiral Young, decidedly clairvoyant, scented trickery in the seizure of the famous despatches from the Rebecca, while Pitt attributed to them complete authenticity. Young leaned more and more to the Mediterranean without disregarding the English Channel coast. Nevertheless four more ships were sent to Bridport enjoining him to come closer to the Channel.

On May 9 the uncertainty was somewhat dissipated, and the struggle that the Government and the British Admiralty had undertaken in order to pierce the enemy secret, appeared to be considerably lightened. Bruix had been seen on April 28 by a Danish vessel in the middle of the Bay of Biscay and on May 1 by a Jersey corsair off Cape Finisterre heading South. Grenville and Pitt were now alone in fearing for Ireland.

On May 14th however, nothing having happened in Ireland, the Admiralty finally saw clearly into the situation. For them Bruix had gone into the Mediterranean. In consequence, Bridport was directed to send 20 ships toward Cadiz, under the command of Gardner with Cotton and Collingwood as subordinates. This detachment was to operate in different ways according to different eventualities which were set out at great length. On May 21st it was reduced from 21 to 16.

Thus was practically ended, the crisis of anxiety, hesitation and confusion which had, for more than fifteen days, shaken the English Directing Head, mislead as always in such cases by the loss of initiative in operations against an adversary who had acquired ascendancy in manouver.

As to Bridport, during this time he continued his route toward the Irish Coast. The strong northeast winds that he suffered blew him far to the westward. It was not until May 8 that he arrived off Cape Fear. On May 6 he learned from a frigate that Bruix's fleet had been seen on April 28 by a Prussian Brig in the middle of the Bay of Biscay, heading south, but this very important piece of news in no way shook his conviction of an approaching attack on Ireland, and changed nothing in his dispositions. At Cape Clear Bridport was joined by the Irish squadron, giving him now 21 ships under his command. He estab-

lished himself on a patrol on the west coast of Ireland and he remained in the region of Achill Head from May 13 to 20. Gardner joined him here with two ships, four others joining a little later.

Bridport then received the Admiralty instructions of May 14, mentioned above, relative to the detachment to be formed under Gardner. He went into Bantry Bay with all his forces to take on supplies. On May 30 Bridport and Gardner sailed together from that place separating on June 1. Bridport, with ten ships, proceeded to the Ile d'Aix where he arrived on June 5. On June 8 he left Berkely there with six ships and returned to Plymouth on the 13th. Gardner went on south. On June 4 he was off Cape Finisterre and on June 7 at Cape Saint Vincent. From there, in accordance with orders received, he sent Cotton into the Mediterranean with 12 ships.

Thus the judicious measures taken by the Directory to insure the secret of the operations, and by means of false information to spread belief in an attack on Ireland, had had the remarkable result of fixing Bridport and 27 ships for more than a month in the vicinity of this island, ti mislead them and to put them beyond the range of interesting events (*foot-note - This resulted in Bridport being relieved of his command on June 24. But in reality the Admiralty had been just as credulous and almost as much at fault as he.) The security of the principal mass was thus assured, and this in unhoped for manner, considering the lack of secondary forces capable of being devoted to this task of fixation. If one considers the dates of the passage of Bruix and Gardner off the same points, Finisterre and Saint Vincent, it is seen that the former was 38 days ahead of the latter, and that the maneuver can thus, in the principal theatre of the Mediterranean, count on a favorable situation lasting about a month.

And Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, was obliged to admit it without ambiguity to Jervis in acquainting him with the danger that threatened him "The enemy has succeeded, notwithstanding all our precautions, in changing the theatre of the war in such a manner as to render our situation very critical during some little time."

It was the finest elegy that could have been made of the brilliant beginning of the maneuver.

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THE CHECK TO THE MANEUVER

The English forces in the Mediterranean were, in effect, spread about in a disposition well calculated to justify all fears. Hervis, sick and living ashore at Gibraltar, held the Chief Command in this theatre of operations. Under his orders:

1. Keith, who was blockading Cadiz with 16 ships.

2. Duckworth, at Minorca with 4 ships.

3. Nelson, who protected Sicily with his squadron of 9 ships, and from which was taken Ball's division charged with blockading Malta.

4. Sidney Smith, who was operating on the coast of Egypt and Syria with a few units.

To these groups was added tht Russo-Turkish Squadron of Admiral Ouchakoff, based in the Ionian Islands, which was besieging Corfu and pushing into the Adriatic.

Into this eminently fragile system of forces spread over a considerable distance from Cape Saint Vincent to the delta of the Nile, and not in position mutually to support each other, Brüix was to erupt like a bomb shell, with a great superiority of strength which would be still further increased by the 17 or

18 vessels which Mazarredo held in Cadiz ready to sail. He was in a position to pulverize all of them.

The principal mass had a strength of 24 ships, 7 frigates and 6 cornettes. After leaving the Bay of Biscay they headed for their first rendezvous, ninety miles to the westward of Cape Finisterre, where they arrive April 30, then toward the second, situated at the same distance to the westward of Cape Saint Vincent, which they reached on May 3. They had thus remained well out to sea, and the surprise which Keith was to be the first to suffer, with 15 ships against 24, appeared complete.

It was, nevertheless, avoided. On May 3 the despatch boat Childers, sent by Bridport found Keith and announced to him the sortie of the Brest Fleet. The same day the frigate success informed him that she had met the said fleet at sea off Oporto. Keith, warned, sailed immediately. Jervis, also notified, advised Nelson and Duckworth.

On May 4 at 0900, the French fleet was sighted by Keith. The two fleets formed in line of battle and maneuvered in face of each other. Bruix remained fifteen miles from his adversary and did nothing to engage him rapidly although he had the wind with him and the English squadron was in a critical situation. At 1500 things were still in the same state but the southwest breeze was increasing rapidly and a terrible tempest unleased itself and lasted until,the evening of the 5th.

Keith rode it out successfully and maintained his position before Cadiz. Bruix, impressed by damage to his sails, the disorder of his fleet and the separation of three ships which occurred in the night of May 4-5, recoiled before the prospect of the second night of this kind (which did not occur at that, because the wind fell before the evening of the 5th). He gave

up the idea of engaging Keith after the return of good weather. He gave up the junction with Mazarredo. He let all these magnificent opportunities escape him, and, on the evening of May 5, he passed through the Strait of Gibraltar and entered the Mediterranean.

Bruix was certainly influenced by the letter of his instructions, but it is equally probable that the tempest of May 4 and the spectacle of the mediocre resistance of his ships to bad weather, reacted on his decisions. It may thus be seen what weight the endurance and seaworthiness of the units, in personnel and materiel, have on liberty of action and consequently on strategy. The certainty of execution of the maneuver depends closely upon it. Here, this maneuver is gravely compromised from its very beginning by reasons of this order.

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But nothing was yet lost, because Bruix, even though he had not effected his junction with Mazarredo and proceeded to the expected reunion of forces, nevertheless still disposed of 24 ships. Keith having remained before Cadiz, the principal mass retained an enormous numerical superiority over the other enemy groups in the Mediterranean which Bruix could easily have crushed in detail. "The squadron had such a fine role to play in Malta and in Sicily", Jervis later wrote, "that I trembled for the fate of our ships stationed there and for the latter island."

It was important to exploit what remained of the favorable situation with the greatest possible speed, but just the contrary was what occurred.

On the evening of May 6 the fleet rounded Cape DeGate. Bruix's intention was to proceed to Cape Palos to reliece Malta (and not to attack Nelson) and to return from there to Toulon. He thought, in effect, that he would have time to carry out this operation before Jervis and Nelson joined up, which he estimated probable and soon. But in the night of May 6 and 7 three ships were in collision and damaged themselves. It needed nothing more than that to wreck Bruix's plans. Instead of simply sending these ships to Cartagena he set course for Toulon with all of his forces. Even better, on May 10-11, he passed between the Balearic Islands and the Spanish coast, about two steps, consequently, from Duckworth who was at Minorca with 4 ships, and he did not attack him.

He gave in to the attraction of the bases, which the scheme of the maneuver had held too much before his eyes.

After these immense faults, committed in the short space of a week, Bruix arrived at Toulon on May 13. Before entering the port he sent to the Directory a new plan of operation, destined to replace the maneuver which he had just spoiled as at his pleasure.

The situation which had given birth to the original plan seemed to him to have been changed entirely by the fall of Corfu to the Russo-Turks. The French fleet had no longer any base in the eastern Mediterranean. Corful had been taken; Malta, bombarded by the besiegers, was untenable; Alexandria had not supplies and the only thing found there at the moment was the plague. On the other hand it is to be feared, always according to Bruix, that Jervis would go to join Nelson and that the two, united, perhaps even reinforced by Bridport (?), would occupy the passage between Sicily and Africa and thus cut off the retreat of the French fleet toward the west.

It is to be remarked that Bruix, haunted by servitudes, came to neglect, almost totally, the enemy's organized force, and not to take any account of the considerable successes which he might achieve against them, against this same Nelson, against Ball, against Sidney Smith, successes which would be of a nature to disorganize the enemy completely. He speaks of them but as something quite accessory and unimportant: "The fleet will momentarily drive off the enemy division which is blockading Malta and may even seize some of the ships which compose this division.... the division which is stationed on this coast (of Egypt) would be at least driven away, if it succeeded in avoiding unequal combat."

Bruix then made up a plan of his own. It was not urgent, according to him, to relieve Malta and Egypt. Before engaging oneself in the Eastern Mediterranean one must be sure of his entrance and of his line of retreat, that is to say, one must seize Sicily. The admiral proposed to throw into the island the troops aboard his ships plus 4,000 men to be taken to Naples. As to the Spaniards, they could be assigned an enterprise against Minorca.

Thus Bruix was dominated a priori, by the pure geographical objective which must not be confused with that resulting from unavoidable and temporary servitudes. He accepted it at once. The enemy's organized force interested him only from a defensive point of view. In these conditions all the fine cards that he had in his hand, material strength, splendid occasions, favorable situations remained unproductive and without employment.

Mazarredo, at Cadiz, had at first no knowledge of the arrival of Bruix, who had never appeared in sight of the port.

Keith had sailed on May 4 and did not return before the place until the morning of the 6th, but his absence was attributed to the desire to get sea room in which to ride out the storm of those two days. On May 8 however, it was learned that the lookouts at Algeciras had seen a large fleet pass through the straits on the evening of May 5. This could be nothing but the French fleet. On May 10 the captain of the corvette Berceau, who had touched at Malaga, arrived at Cadiz with despatches from Bruix. Everything cleared up. Lacrosse had orders to request Mazarredo to leave immediately to join the French fleet. In the absence of a rendezvous Lacrosse urged Mazarredo to enter the Mediterranean and to go to a Spanish port in that sea. Mazarredo hesitated at first. It seemed to him, rightly or wrongly, more judicious to remain at Cadiz in order to immobilize off the port the greatest possible enemy strength and by that much, to aid Bruix. But the Spanish Government saw the situation as did Bruix and Lacrosse. On May 10 they ordered Mazarredo to proceed to Cartagena. Mazarredo, freed from the presence of Keith, as will be seen later, sailed from Cadiz on May 14 with 17 ships and on the 15th reached the Cape deGata. In the night of May 16-17 he suffered a terrible blow from NNE which caused very serious damage to the rigging of nine of his vessels. The Spanish arrived at Cartagena on May 20, completely disabled and with repairs lasting a month in prospect.

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How would the enemy react to the entrance of Bruix into the Mediterranean?

As early as the evening of May 5, Jervis warned Ball and Sidney Smith of the event. On the 6th he ordered Keith to proceed immediately to Gibraltar, and he notified Nelson, telling him that he must not count on any reinforcements from the Channel. On the 7th he apprised Duckworth, notifying him of his intention to join him off Minorca.

Keith received none of these orders of recall that Jervis sent him. He did not know whether he should go into the Mediterranean or to continue to blockade the Spaniards in Cadiz. "I am very much disturbed in this difficult situation and do not know what to resolve upon", he wrote. Finally he decided, on his own, to proceed to Gibraltar, where he arrived on May 10. On the 11th the fleet left again, this time under the command of Jervis in person. They headed for Minorca to join Duckworth there. "All that I can say," wrote Jervis to Spencer, "is that we will employ every means to protest Minorca and to oppose the enterprises of the enemy, whatever they may be. Having no information to guide me nor any means of tracing the route of the Brest Squadron, I must feel my way blindly as best I can."

Disorder continued in the English camp. It extended itself to the leaders and to the most solid amongst them. It was the result of the loss of the initiative in operations aggravated by lack of freedom of action, caused by defensive preoccupations, essentially geographic.

Jervis set sail for Minorca with 16 ships. He learned of the passage of Bruix by the Cape deGata, and of the presence in Cartagena of the vessels only. He also learned from a neutral that the Brest fleet had been seen on May 10 between Iviza and the Spanish coast heading north. On May 15 Jervis passed between Iviza and the Spanish coast heading north. On May 15 Jervis

passed between Iviza and Majorca where on May 16-17 he suffered the same blow that Mazarredo went through in the vicinity of Cartagena. But while the Spanish came out of it disabled, the English remained undamaged. And one may, on this occasion, repeat the observation previously made as to Keith and Bruix.

On May 19 Jervis passed between Minorca and Majorca. On the 20th, at Minorca, he was joined by Duckworth's 4 ships. The latter informed him that Bruix had passed off Rosas Bay on May 12, heading for Toulon.

Jervis could thus think that Bruix was at Toulon. What he did not yet know was that he had just passed at a short distance from Mazarredo before the latter had reached Cartagena. It was not until that he learned of the entrance of the Spanish into the Mediterranean. Jervis thought then that Mazarredo would go to Toulon if he did not attack Minorca. He made efforts than to thwart the two operations and maneuvered to this effect. He sailed from Minorca on May 22 with 20 ships, after having sent frigates toward the Spanish coast. The English fleet arrived on the 28th at Cape de Creus and remained there until the 31st. On that day he was joined by the 5 ships of Admiral Whitshed, which had left Plymouth on May 5, as we have already seen, and passed Gibraltar on the 19th.

On June 1 Jervis, still sick, returned to Minorca and handed over the command at sea to Keith. He ordered the latter to maneuver in such a manner as to cover Minorca and to prevent Mazarredo from joining Bruix. To this end, after having made a reconnaissance on Toulon, he returned and established himself on patrol between the Balearics and the Spanish coast.

As to Nelson, he had decided to take station off Marittimo Island at the western point of Sicily. He made all his diverse units join him there, including Ball's division, which was maintaining the blockade of Malta. He remained at this place from

May 23 to May 28. Not only did he not join Jervis' principal group but he demanded reinforcements on his own account. Jervis gave them to his spoiled child. On May 31 he sent him Duckworth's division of 4 ships which he detached as soon as Whitshed had joined up.

On the whole, the English reaction was awkward and unskillful. One does not find there the British dash of the great days, that which presses to the vigorous hunt of the enemy's principal force, leaving all else aside and with all means united. The English let themselves be paralyzed by defensive considerations concerning Minorca and Sicily. They had no freedom of action. They accomplished only a semi-reunion of their forces; Nelson remained out of the play and drew people to him to the detriment of the strength of the principal group. A partial dispersion existed, inspired by geography in its worst aspects.

On the other hand the French maneuver had completely broken down. It was dead and completely dead. Bruix had abandoned all the promising objectives that were offered him. He was at Toulon and Mazarredo at Cartagena and their junction was very problematical. The favorable situation was not exploited and every day that passed hastened its end, for Gardner and Cotton were now on their way to the Mediterranean. One fell from the highest hopes into a complete nothingness, for lack of having before all else, aimed at the junction of forces, the enemy afloat, and battle.

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Unexpected Servitudes.

Oddity of destiny. While Bruix's stop at Toulon ruined the projected maneuver as far as it concerned the enemy's organized force as well as the servitudes originally admitted (Corfu, Malta and Alexandria), it came providentially at a time to meet other servitudes, grave, imperious and at first, wholly unexpected.

The military situation in Italy had become very serious. Schere and then Moreau had been thrown back on the Adda. Moreau had been beaten on April 28 at Cassano and had to fall back behind the Tessin and on Turin. The Directory, in consequence, ordered Moreau to call up to him the Army of Naples under MacDonald and had prescribed the evacuation of Naples, of Ancona, of Civita-Vecchia and of Leghorn. By two letters of May 4 and 6 the Directory apprised Bruix of this new state of affairs inviting him not to follow the plan of campaign specified in his instructions but to proceed directly to Toulon to receive other orders. This was just precisely the movement which Bru effected at the same time on his own account. Finding these new directions on his arrival at Toulon, he "Thanked fortune for the event which earlier afflicted him and which had forced the fleet to put into Toulon".

At Toulon Bruix had repairs made to the three ships which had collided in the night of May 6-7 and a considerable amount of various work on other ships. He was exceedingly troubled by the lack of money and supplies available in the arsenal. Once more the difficulties of maintenance hindered the operation of the mobile force.

Bruix occupied himself also in getting food supplies to the Ligurian Republic whose situation was difficult in this regard. He sent four wheat convoys to Genoa.

By new instructions, dated May 17 and 20, drawn up after the advice of the "Committee of Generals", the Directory acquainted Bruix with the military situation in Italy. They ordered him to leave Toulon as soon as possible, to proceed to the vicinity of Genoa and to assist with all his means, the junction of Moreau and

MacDonald transporting the latter by sea as necessary. It was estimated that the English, very much behind, would not interfere for some time. The Directory expressly recommended to Bruix to insure after this, his junction with the Spaniards, and, this done, "To profit from this advantage to Sweep the Mediterranean". They believed that he could not only effect the revictualling of Ligura and Tuscany, but even relieve Malta afterwards. The expedition proposed against Sicily was postponed.

At the same time the Directory made efforts to persuade the Spaniards to give up the attempt to retake Minorca and to send Mazarredo to join Bruix at Toulon.

On the other hand Bruix received at the same time three letters from the Army of Italy, the two first of May 20 and 21 from General Dessole, Moreau's Chief of Staff and the third, of May 23, from Generals Perignon, Victor and Dessole. All three presented to him the extremely critical situation of the Army of Italy, thrown back against the Apennines facing north and backed up against the River of Genoa. They requested Bruix to proceed immediately to Genoa and then to Spezzia to aid in MacDonald's retreat. They required wheat and subsistence for the army and for Liguria. "It depends on you in this moment to save the armies of Italy and Italy itself", wrote Dessole.

In obedience to this moving appeal, Bruix sailed from Toulon on May 27 with 22 ships and arrived off Geboa on June 2. The junction with the Army of Naples now appeared better assured. The action towards Spezzia was no longer necessary. On the other hand the enemy seemed likely to make dangerous attempt on Savona, so there is where one ought to go. Bruix carried out this movement requested by General Dessole and anchored at Vado on June 4. He immediately disembarked the 5,000 troops belonging to the fleet as well as munitions and food supplies. On June 6 Moreau went aboard the flagship and consulted with Bruix.

Thus the presence of our fleet on the Riviera and the mastery of the sea which resulted therefrom, even though local and temporary, had the happiest influence on land operations.

But Bruix learned from Toulon that an English squadron of 24 ships had appeared off the port on June 3 and that it was headed east along the coast. On June 7 and in the night of 7-8 the landing of provisions for the Army of Italy was expedited. The fleet, at present free from servitudes, sailed on the morning of the 8th and headed west following the coast. The intention of Bruix was to go to meet the enemy if combat was inevitable, if he succeeded in getting rid of him, to head for Cartagena to join Mazarredo.

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The meeting with the enemy did not take place, notwithstanding the proximity of the two adversaries, and this extraordinary occurence merits some explanation.

Left at the head of the English fleet by Jervis on June 1, Keith, who was then at the Cape de Creus, undertook the reconnaissance of Toulon directed by his chief. On June 3 he was off the port. He discovered the absence of Bruix's fleet. Captured coasters told him that it had left the harbor some days ago heading east. Even though his instructions contemplated only a reconnaissance of Toulon, Keith decided to continue on beyond. On June 5 in the afternoon, he was off the Gulf of Juan and there he received information from a Danish brig concerning the presence of the French fleet in the Gulf of Genoa. The same evening Keith was nine miles south of Villefranche. On the 6th, the wind having shifted to the east, the English squadron tacked in order to progress in that direction. At noon it was 30 miles from Cape della Mele.

It was then that Keith made the astounding decision to abandon pursuit of the enemy afloat and to turn back. One finds the motives in a letter of the same date to Nelson. Keith knew that the enemy was very near. "I am convinced that the French are not more than 30 leagues from here at this moment." But he was paralyzed by defensive preoccupations which sufficed to take away from him his freedom of action. He went ahead while looking behind him. "The fact that Minorca is without defense, without a fleet, and that a large fleet is getting ready to attack it, together with the fact that I have already so much exceeded my instructions, will oblige me to abandon the pursuit and to return to the aid of that island". He did not see that if the Spaniards should happen to attack Minorca, a decisive defeat inflicted on the French fleet would permit an easy return against them and a rapid check to their projects. And indeed the battle against Bruix presents itself under favorable conditions with approximate equality in numbers (20 ships against

22), if one takes into account the individual superiority of the English units.

Nevertheless, on June 7 at 1100, when he was not more than 45 miles from the anchorage of Vado, where Bruix was, Keith changed course and turned to the southwest. At the same time he sent the Bellerophon and the Powerful to Nelson. In the same moment he gives up attacking the enemy and compromises the power of the English principal mass.

While running to the southwest on the evening of the 7th, he spoke a Swedish brig from whom he learned of the presence of Bruix the day before in the anchorage of Vado. Here Keith was taken with remorse. He hesitated. He tacked between southeast and North not knowing much what to do. Finally on the 8th at 1430, he again abandoned the pursuit, this time definitely, and resumed his course towards Minorca. He thought of nothing but the risk that that island appeared to run, as he wrote for a second time to Nelson. On June 12 he was back in Minorca.

Jervis found all this satisfactory. The conduct of Keith was quite in conformity with his intentions. On June 6 he had written him a letter which clearly showed his singular preoccupations: "If, he said, "the assurance which was given you by the Genoese skippers that the enemy fleet is in the Gulf of Juan is true, I will be freed from a great anxiety for that will insure the Junction of Duckworth with Nelson and will permit the latter to cover Sicily, and if he is joined by the Russian and Turkish ships, he will be in force enough to fight the Brest squadron.

"I shall be happy to know that you have returned off Aloudia (Majorca) to watch the movements of the enemy for it is not to be doubted that he is making formidable preparations for a descent on this island (Minorca).

"I approve that you should go to reconnoiter the Gulf of Juan and I count that you will return thereafter".

Thus Jervis thought only of geographical positions, of Sicily and Minorca and the importance of putting the enemy's organized force out of business escaped him totally.

On June 10, after having learned of the strange retreat of his Lieutenant, Jervis said to him again: "I entirely approve of what you have done and in similar circumstances I would certainly have acted in the same manner.... It is a great consolation for me to have at the head of the squadron an officer of such activity and judgement(sic)."

On the other hand, in Keith's squadron, people were very indignant with the Chief. The subordinate admirals, Whitehed and Parker, did not refrain from criticising him openly. There was good reason.

As to the dear Nelson, about whom everybody concerned himself and who concerned himself very little about his comrades, he gave no thought of moving from where he was. "In remaining in Sicily," he wrote on May 28 to Jervis, "I cover the blockade of Naples and preserve this island from attack". He might have added that he would not separate himself from Lady Hamilton. (*foot-note; That is a "fixing" for you. Unfortunately, in war, one can rarely use means of this sort with regard to the enemy.) He made a first cruise to Marittimo from May 23 to May 28. Thereafter he returned to Palermo to revictual. On June 6 he was joined by Duckworth's division and thereupon set out for Naples with an expedition. On June 13 he was joined by the Bellerophon and Powerful, sent by Keith. In view of the news which they brought, Nelson decided to return to Palermo, to land his troops and to establish himself for the second time on patro at Marittimo from June 17 to June 20. He went back to Palermo on June 21. "I can consider", he said, "that the best defence of the possessions of His Sicilian Majesty consists in placing my squadron alongside the French squadron". In awaiting however, he did not take the road which led to it.

Observe that 18 ships (15 English and 3 Portugese) were thus immobilized in that region far from the interesting struggles, and that by benevolent consent.

On the whole, and this said once and for all, the English command showed itself mediocre and not equal to the situation. Jervis, man of duty, rigid, but of limited comprehension, lacking wide views, was 64 years old and sick to boot. His health, worn down by three years of the hardest possible command, was broken. Keith was worse than any of them; what follows will show it better than ever. Nelson, the only leader capable of comprehending the situation and of applying energetic remedies to it was in a subordinate position. Moreover, at the same time, he was going through an intense moral crisis which made him, for unavowable motives, neglect his most elementary duties and see things with a very special strategic glass.

The incomparable quality of the ships themselves in a large measure compensated for the weaknesses of the command. And it will often be thus. Inversely, without this quality, made up of the internal organization, of the training, and of the morale of the units, the finest strategical combinations will come to nothing.

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ATTEMPTS AT TAKING UP THE MANEUVER AGAIN.

We have seen that the Directory, in its instructions of May 17 and 20, ordered Bruix to effect his junction with the Spanish and then to sweep the Mediterranean; to revictual Liguria, Tuscany and even Malta. This came a little late to unscramble the rational objectives and the sensible course to pursue.

On May 25 the Directory insisted again on these new instructions, which in truth, amounted to an attempt to take up again the Mediterranean maneuver which had so miserably aborted.

In reply to these orders Bruix, on June 3, observed to the Directory that it was difficult for him to accomplish his junction with Mazarredo and at the same time to revictual Malta, so much the more so that he did not know exactly where the Spaniards were. He decided to return towards Toulon after having succored the Army of Italy and before going to Malta, in order, in case he should get precise information on the position of Mazarredo, to effect his junction with him before undertaking anything. The reunion of the forces was in effect most pressing. Bruix should have been able to perceive this upon his passage off Cadiz.

On June 5, in another letter to the Directory, Bruix remarked again on the incompatibility of the two missions that had recently been prescribed for him and he insisted anew on the urgency of the junction which rightly seemed to him of prime importance.

Finally on June 6, at the anchorage of Vado, Bruix received the last instructions from the Directory, dated May 26. These were particularly simple, clear and well drawn. They spoke in a language unknown until then. It was therein said: "The Directory orders you to take the most prompt steps to effect your junction with the Spanish fleet. When that has been done you will seek the English fleet and if, as is probable, you are then in superior force to the enemy, you will fight him. As soon as you have put the English out of condition successfully to oppose your operations, you will set sail towards Egypt in order to embark the army there." We are

here concerned, in effect, with bringing back Bonaparte.

This is the way to talk. The organized force is here brought into the foreground, with the servitudes, nevertheless, not neglected. If the plan of March 15 had been drawmup with this inspiration, with this notion of battle, it is probable that affairs would have taken quite a different turn.

On June 8, after sailing from Vado, Bruix headed west following the coast at one or two miles only. He escaped Keith, and for cause. On the 9th he passed off Toulon, well at large and out of sight. He sent a corvette to carry in despatches and to order the ship "Batave" to join him at Cartagena. On June 10 the French fleet, always sailing with an easterly wind, arrived off the coast of Catalonia. On the 13th, held back by calms, it was still off Barcelona. They hugged the Spanish coast. On June 19 it was off Alicante, and on the 20th, off Cape Palos. On the 22nd it arrived at Cartagena. The junction of the forces had been effected with signally good fortune, in large part due to the blundering of Keith.

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As to the English, Keith, as has been seen, was at Minorca on June 12, or at least in the immediate vicinity, for, held back by calms, he could not communicate with Jervis until the 14th.

Jervis was now more at ease and less disturbed for this geographical ball and chain which was Minorca. First, on June 5 he had learned a great and happy piece of news; that of the impending arrival of Gardner with 16 ships. (Actually it was to be Cotton with 12 ships Moreover, he had confirmation of the presence of Bruix at Vado on June 6. Finally the English troops at Lisbon were to be sent to Minorca to strengthen the defence.

Jervis thought therefore that he could, without risking Minorca, do without Keith, and that he could send him again into the Gulf of Genoa to try to seize Bruix whom he had so senselessly missed the first time. Keith left Minorca on June 16 with 19 ships steering for the coast of Provence.

Cotton, detached by Gardner off Cape Saint Vincent on June 7, arrived with his 12 ships at Minorca on June 17, that is to say the day after the departure of Keith. And that arrival calls up two observations.

First it marks the realization of the reply of the Admiralty to the French offensive in the Mediterranean, and the end of the favorable situation created in that sea by the initial maneuver. Bruix was off the Balearics on May 10 and Cotton on June 17. The favorable situation had lasted for 37 days, which is very nearly the figure at which we had previously arrived.

Second, Jervis showed the greatest disregard for the concentration of his own strength. He sent off Keith towards the Gulf of Genoa with his 19 ships against Bruix's 24, without waiting for the arrival of Cotton's 12. Even more, he kept the latter in the south around the Balearics, giving him as mission the circling of Majorca and the pushing of a reconnaissance towards Cartagena, and then to watch the Spanish fleet which was shut up there, bearing always in

mind that the principal task of his squadron is the defense of Minorca. Cotton sailed for Minorca on June 22 to carry out his mission. Thus Jervis, far from taking care to augment as much as possible the power of his principal mass before sending it against the enemy, divided his forces, and this just at the moment when the enemy was uniting his at Cartagena. He sent Keith alone to the north with insufficient effectives even against Bruix alone, and he placed Cotton in the south where he risked finding himself in the presence of the combined French and Spanish fleets. Truly one could not possibly make worse use of such magnificent resources, and all this by neglecting a concentration which, from all evidence was indispensable.

But the true situation came to light little by little. On June 23 Jervis learned that a large fleet had been seen on June 14 between the Baleares and Spain heading west. He advised Keith, telling him not to prolong his absence more than three weeks and to think of Minorca. The same day Jervis was informed that the frigate Mermaid had seen below Cape Palos, a fleet of 24 men of war heading to the NW. No further doubt; it was Bruix making his junction with the Spanish. The news was of singular gravity. Jervis ordered Cotton not to proceed beyond the eastern point of Majorca, and he sent the frigate Caroline to Keith to warn him and say, "I hope with all my heart that you will arrive in time to join Sir Charles Cotton and frustrate the designs of the combined fleets on Minorca".

It was a little late now, if the enemy were active, to think of this reunion. Furthermore the important thing was the enemy's organized force and not Minorca.

During this time Keith, who had left Minorca and headed for Toulon, on June 18 captured the little division of Rear Admiral Perree which was returning from Syria. But of Bruix, nothing. Evidently, because at the same time the French fleet was proceeding south hugging the Spanish coast. After this Keith explored the coast

of Liguria without finding anything and without again meeting with the opportunity which he had so unskillfully let escape him at the time of his first cruise. From June 24 to June 27 he cruised off Genoa. On June 28 he was joined by the Caroline. Keith immediately turned about. On June 29 he was off Gorgona Island; July 1 and 2 he was off Calvi. On July 6 he effected his junction with Cotton and on July 7 he anchored at Minorca.

Nelson, who had returned to Palermo on June 21, left there almost at once to operate against Naples. Here, on July 13, he received Keith's order of June 27 directing him to send to Minorca the ships that were not indispensable to him. Nelson, good comrade and disciplined subordinate, replied by his famous refusal, based on the security of the kingdom of Naples. There we have yet another factor of supplementary dispersion. It completes the picture. Keith in the north with 19 ships; Cotton in the Balearics with 12; Nelson at Naples with 18, not forgetting the forces at Malta and Egypt.

Jervis, sicker than ever, disappeared after these goings on, turning over to Keith and leaving him this situation which was in a large part, his own work. He left the Balearics on June 28 and arrived in Gibraltar on July 4 and settled himself on shore once more to guard his health.

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On his entrance into Cartagena on June 22, Bruix received from Mazarredo an extremely cordial welcome, impressed with a desire to establish complete collaboration between them.

Several days earlier however certain sniping had been going on between the French and Spanish governments. The Directory, all for continuing its maneuver in the Mediterranean, had though to effect a diversion or at least a threat, in the Atlantic, by uniting to the several ships that they still possessed at Brest, the Spanish division of Melgarejo then at Rochefort. The government at Madrid, wishing to recall this division to Spain, the Directory had to go directly to the King of Spain himself who gave in to their request on June 11. There had nevertheless, followed a sort of crisis, happily adjusted, in the Franco-Spanish alliance. This is current change in coalitions. But, a few days later they were again to have the painful experience of the difficulties which one meets in these cases in reaching a decision and putting it into execution in full accord.

In this atmosphere it would have been awkward to take up again, according to the intentions of the Directory, the aborted maneuver.

Mazarredo, strong in the orders of his government, saw nothing else to do in the Mediterranean than to retake Minorca and at the most, to relieve Malta. He did not wish to go into the eastern Mediterranean for fear of getting into war with Turkey. Also he exaggerated the English strength in the Mediterranean, supposing them to have 60 ships. He was of the opinion that they should go back into the Ocean.

On June 23 Bruix, replying to his colleague, acquiesced in principle to this return. But he was of the opinion that the prospects of a success in the Mediterranean ought not to be disregarded. Without questioning the considerable increase in the British forces, he thought, in accord with an hypothesis of Lacrosse (and which agreed well with reality), that the English were divided into three

major groups. He proposed in consequence to proceed towards Italy, scouting as thoroughly as possible, and if the hypothesis of the English dispersion were confirmed, to attack the separated fractions of the enemy in order to destroy them.

The idea was sound, and this resumption of the Mediterranean maneuver presented itself then, as we have just seen, under very favorable conditions as a result of the very unfortunate measures taken by the British command which had resulted in the dispersion of their forces.

Mazarredo was not seduced by this project and he persisted in his original idea.

Bruix was naturally very much embarrassed. Not knowing what to do, he thought for a moment, June 24, of an expedient which he presented to the Directory. They would make a turn into the Ocean without touching at Cadiz and standing well out to sea. The English, believing the Franco-Spanish to have departed towards Brest, would send a large part of their Mediterranean forces in that direction. Bruix and Mazarredo, warned of the movement after this feint into the Ocean, would return to the Mediterranean and would execute their original plans with definitely superior forces. One would thus take a new departure, following a method identical with that of the original maneuver.

And in this letter to the Directory, pleading extenuating circumstances regarding the failure of the maneuver, Bruix came to write this unfortunate phrase: "Up until now the fleet of the Republic has been neither inactive nor hidden. It has vanquished the enemy by combinations of routes and speed in maneuvering". On the contrary, exactly there lay the defect in the earlier conduct of operations and in the inspiration which conducted it. It lay in not having foreseen and wished battle as the crowning episode of the maneuver, and to have reduced it to fruitless kinematics, to an uninteresting promenade, to a merry-go-round without any excuse for

being. That was the reason why no decision had been reached and why everything had to be done over again.

On June 26, the Spanish government and Mazarredo showed themselves more decided than ever to execute their project against Minorca. After that operation the combined fleet would proceed to Brest and resume the Irish operations.

The same day, Bruix wrote to Mazarredo to insist further in favor of his preceding design to attack the enemy dispersed in the Mediterranean. Then, on Mazarredo's firmly expressed intention of going to Cadiz, he disclosed to him the plan of a feint in the Ocean and a return into the Mediterranean, which until then he had disclosed only to the Directory. Mazarredo did not care much for it. It seemed to him impossible to fool the English to this extent, and he thought that the latter would very probably remain in the vicinity of Cadiz. He proposed to Bruix as an extreme concession, to go to Cadiz and thereafter to act according to developments. Bruix was obliged to accept in order not to separate from the Spanish, who showed themselves adamant.

The combined fleets sailed from Cartagena on June 29 for Cadiz. Notwithstanding its imposing figure of 42 vessels (24 French and 18 Spanish) it was reduced to impotence by these sterile discussions between Allies. It could no longer be question of resuming the maneuver in the Mediterranean. As to proceeding into the Ocean, the stop at Cadiz compromised this plan from the beginning.

It was nevertheless, about this new plan that the Directory thought. In France the personnel of the executive power had just been almost entirely changed by the crisis of June 16. The new government did not have the same ideas that the old one had. On June 21 they invited Bruix to be prudent. On July 1st and 4th they took up the project that the Spanish government had gratuitously lent to Bruix, that of a widespread action in the Ocean which the French admiral had no intention of undertaking. The Directory

talked to him of the "fatal blows" that could be dealt the enemy in the Ocean and of the "great anxiety" that might be caused to the English. They suggested to him to relieve the Spanish division of Melgarejo which was being blockaded. Everything remained in a nebulous state. It was an adherence, anticipated but vague, a wish briefly expressed, in regard to a new direction for the offensive. It was not a plan of operation, and it was not on that fragile base that one could build, in the Ocean, an advantageous resumption of the maneuver that had previously failed in the Mediterranean.

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THE FINAL CHECK.

The British Admiralty suspected the return of the combined fleets into the Ocean, thanks to a note appearing on June 21 in a Paris newspaper, The Publicist, which announced that the Spanish had received orders to proceed from Cartagena to Cadiz. The movement to return into the Ocean disturbed them; at first because of Ireland, a sort of permanent objective for the enemy, and also because of the expedition into Holland projected by the English which would carry with it numerous transports laden with Russian troops. June 29 the Admiralty wrote to Jervis to watch any passage of Franco-Spanish forces from the Mediterranean into the Atlantic.

Keith, upon whom the direction of operations was now incumbent, had returned to Minorca on July 7 and there had made his junction with Cotton. He did not know a great deal of the intentions of the enemy fleet in Cartagena: information on this subject was contradictory and gave as its destination sometimes Toulon and sometimes the Ocean. It spoke also of the preparations being made at Barcelona against Minorca. Keith did not know what to decide upon. He remained at the anchorage at Port Mahon until July 11, and his subordinates, enervated by this inaction were more and more disgusted with him. "The French go where they please and we guard Minorca", said Collingwood. "All of us in this fleet are convinced that we have been led either by a traitor or a poltroon", wrote some unknown, to Spencer. On July 8 Keith learned nevertheless that the Franco-Spanish fleet had left Cartagena on June 29 and headed west. On July 12 he finally got underway for Minorca with his 31 ships, not knowing particularly where to go. On July 13 he wrote to Jervis: "I am at this moment quite undecided. The information which comes to me from Spain and which shows that preparations are continuing at Barcelona, is contradicted by the news that Allied fleets are heading West. Thus, I can only make conjectures." He decided nevertheless to go to Cartagena to see what was going on there.

Fortunately Jervis, at Gibraltar, had seen the Spanish fleet arrive on July 6 within range of the place and remain two days tacking in the vicinity. On the 7th he sent a despatch boat to Keith which reached him on the 14th near Formentera Island south of Iviza. Keith thereupon determined to head for the Strait. In his letter to Keith, Jervis showed a mental disarray quite equal to his own: "I cannot form any judgment on the destination of this formidable force, their conduct having upset all my calculations. If I dare hazard a guess, it is that they will go north and that they have never lost from sight the projected invasion of Ireland".

At the bottom Jervis and Keith were in this state of mind because, once more, they had lost the initiative in the operations. It is the classic psychological phenomenon. And it sufficed here to create a crude and sourse semblance of a meneuver badly conceived and badly begun and which had in reality no chance of success.

Meanwhile Keith had written to Nelson on July 9 to give him orders to come to cover Minorca and, Nelson had replied from Naples on July 19 with a refusal even sharper than the first. One knows this celebrated story. It was not until after two other letters from Keith of July 14 and 15, that the hero of Aboukir, who had found his Circe in the Tyrrhenian Sea, decided on the 23rd of July to send Duckworth to Minorca with 4 ships. And Jervis himself on July 16 came to find that his favorite lieutenant had overstepped the limits: "It seems," he said to Keith, "that Lord Nelson has greater forces with him than can be left to him when the fate of Ireland and England is at stake." He should have been roused a little bit sooner by this state of affairs and at least to have required, two months earlier, that Nelson join the principal mass with the major part of his forces.

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On the evening of July 8 and the morning of the 9th the Franco-Spanish fleet passed through the Strait. On July 10 it reached Cadiz. The difficulties which had arisen between Bruix and Mazarredo at Cartagena as to the objective of the operations, began all over again. Mazarredo wished to remain at Cadiz; Bruix endeavored to bring him back to action, thinking always of the resumption of the maneuver in the Mediterranean and of the help to take to Malta. He sent a courier to Madrid to obtain the intervention of the Spanish government to this effect.

When he received, on the evening of July 16, the instructions of the Directory dated July 1 and 4 which pointed him towards an operation in the Ocean, Bruix began again his efforts with his colleague to bring him to hasten the general departure with a view towards operating in the north. He met the same resistance. Mazarredo objected that the English would always oppose the Allies with superior forces in the Channel and that it was better to remain at Cadiz whence one could threaten several directions at the same time. He added that he could not possibly sail within eight days. But Bruix held firm and on July 17 took all his dispositions for departure. He learned the same day that the English fleet, 36 ships strong, had been seen off Malaga. On July 18 he wrote a last letter to Mazarredo to let him know that he was sailing, that he would await him off Cadiz, and that, if the English came up, he would proceed north alone if need be, to avoid being attacked or blockaded in Cadiz.

In view of this firm decision Mazarredo gave way and decided to follow his ally. On July 19 the Spanish squadron began to move. On July 21 all of the combined fleet was at sea and heading towards Cape saint Vincent with a total effective of 42 ships. (25 French and 17 Spanish).

The Franco-Spanish fleet spent several days beating against contrary winds between Cape Saint Vincent and the parallel of Lisbon. On July 28 it was joined by the frigate "Fraternite", left by Bruix

at Cadiz with orders to come out two days after the fleet sailed to bring the latest news. This frigate which had left Cadiz on the 23rd, made it known that the English fleet had been seen in the Strait of Gibraltar and that it did not comprise more than 31 ships. Bruix and Mazarredo thought that it had passed through the Strait on the 24th. In any case the strength that this important information assigned to them was greatly inferior to the figure that the French and Spanish admirals had credited them with since Catagena. From then on it is astonishing that the Franco-Spanish did not immediately turn about and profit by their numerical superiority to put the English out of the running. It would have been an excellent prelude, either to a renewal of the maneuver in the Mediterranean, or to a new maneuver in the north. Why run away when you have 42 against their 31? This withdrawal in the face of battle, the original vice of all the Allied conceptions since leaving Brest, appears here more than ever. In the correspondence of Bruix no explanation or justification of this strange fact appears, a veritable mystery of history.

On August 3 the combined fleets were in the latitude of the Berlingues Islands. In the night of August 4-5 they rounded Cape Finisterre and headed into the Bay of Biscay. Bruix first intended to proceed towards Rochefort in order to surprise the English ships on blockade there and to join the Spanish division of Melgarejo. In the face of bad weather from the west and the prospect of being caught to leeward in that region, he hesitated, gave up the project and steered for Brest where the combined fleets finally moored on August 8. They included 40 ships at this time (two damaged Spanish ships having returned to Cadiz) 22 frigates and smaller craft.

On August 9 and 11 the Minister of the Marine sent Bruix two particularly edifying telegrams showing the absence of ideas which existed at this time in the bosom of the French government on the

subject of the utilization of our naval forces. Here are some extracts:

"What do you intend to do? Have you any projects for the end of the campaign? Let me know them. What do you think of an expedition to Ireland? Do you consider yourself strong enough to undertake one? How many troops would you need for the landing? ... Would you prefer to an Irish expedition, the honor of going to break up the blockade of the Texel and the hope of bringing the Dutch squadron back into our ocean ports?"

To this morsel of a lamentable poverty Bruix replied:

"I cannot reply in positive manner to the questions you have asked me. In order to do that it would be necessary that I know the strength of the enemy and your plans on Ireland and the Texel."

But this correspondence unveils in all its nudity the immense congenital weakness of this pretense of maneuver that had been tried in the Ocean. To what intention did this maneuver correspond? What was it aimed at? Was it the enemy organized force? Was it an objective concerning the general war, as for example the resumption of operations against Ireland? Nobody knows, because no one posed those questions before ordering the return of our forces to the Atlantic, as should have been done. The cart had been placed before the horse. The maneuver was without object.

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Had there been one it would have been deprived of the favorable conditions necessary to its accomplishment.

It is so from a comparison of forces. The original maneuver oriented towards the Mediterranean was in some ways centrifugal in the sense that it turned its back on the principal mass of the English strength, to its center of gravity, in order to attack less powerful groups situated on the periphery, and widely dispersed to boot. The second maneuver, directed towards the Ocean and the Channel was centripetal; it brought the Franco-Spanish back into a region where they would run into notable resistance, because a good part of the enemy's strength was permanently stationed there, and was fairly well concentrated.

The Admiralty was notified on July 19 of the return of the Allied fleet into the Ocean. While proceeding with the execution of the Anglo-Russian operation on Holland, they set about gathering sufficient strength to insure its security against the Franco-Spanish fleet. Pole, who was maintaining the blockade of Rochefort, returned on his own account to Torbay with his five ships. The Admiralty decided on the general concentration of forces in this port. Borlase Warren was sent there with 7 ships. Fifteen others were brought there from different places, and particularly from the North Sea where Duncan, reinforced by Russian ships, was to keep with him only seven English vessels to continue to blockade the Dutch squadron in the Texel. The Admiralty thus succeeded, with great effort, in collecting 27 or 28 ships in Torbay, and they recalled Bridport from his disgrace to take command.

This was still insufficient to face the 40 Franco-Spanish vessels; but on August 12 the Admiralty very happily learned that Keith, coming from the Mediterranean, had passed Gibraltar on July 30 with 31 ships.

The arrival of Keith in the Ocean was to make the position of Bruix and Mazarredo still more precarious. They had the English

Channel forces ahead of them and Keith at their heels. The pincers were closing on them.

Their only chance of success would have been to beat Bridport separately.

Well, as we have previously seen, they had let escape the opportunity to beat Keith in the south before he had rounded Cape Saint Vincent.

As for beating Bridport before the arrival of Keith in the Channel, everything depended on the available margin of time, that is to say the duration of the favorable situation in the newly chosen theatre, or further the lead that they had on Keith.

Thus examination of his movements is of particular interest.

After having received on July 14, near Formentera, notice of the presence near Gibraltar of the Allied fleet, Keith headed towards this point. On July 17 he learned that the enemy had gone through the Strait on the 9th. On the 19th he learned, from information furnished by scouts sent westward by Jervis, that the Allies had entered Cadiz. Keith arrived near Gibraltar on the 21st and was held there by calms and then by a westerly blow which obliged him to seek refuge at Tetuan from July 23 to 28. There he learned of the sailing of the Franco-Spanish from Cadiz and of their presence in the vicinity of Cape Saint Vincent. Finally on July 30, the wind having gone into the east, Keith traversed the Strait in pursuit of his adversary.

The latter having passed Gibraltar on July 9, had thus a lead of 21 days if his stop of 12 days at Cadiz had not reduced it to 9.

Keith continued to the north. On August 10 he was off Ferrol, that is, six days after Bruix. He reached Ushant on August 14 still six days after the entry of the Franco-Spanish into Brest.

Thus the lead of the Allied fleet on Keith, in other words the duration of the favorable situation in the Ocean, was being constantly diminished. It would have been twenty eight days if

Mazarredo had left Cartagena upon the arrival of Bruix. In the Strait of Gibraltar it was no more than twenty one days. Because of the stop at Cadiz, it fell to nine days. Finally the contrarities of navigation were to reduce it to six days. In these conditions any tentative of attacking the English forces isolated in the Channel would evidently have been in vain. The maneuver in the Ocean, even if any inspiration had existed, was doomed to failure. It was still-born.

Incidently this shows the interest which, in similar cases, is attached to bringing all possible activity to the operation. It can be seen how much the unjustified duration of the stops at Cartagena and at Cadiz were contrary to this fundamental principle.

On August 14, passing about 30 miles to the westward of Ushant, Keith was rejoined by Pellew whom he had sent ahead to make a reconnaissance of the harbor of Brest and who told him that 45 to 50 large enemy ships were found there. Keith understood that the combined fleets had taken refuge there. Reassured on this point, he headed towards Torbay where he arrived on August 16 and made his junction with Bridport.

Thus the final end of Bruix's odyssey was the establishment of two concentrations: that of the Franco-Spanish comprising about 45 vessels at Brest and that of the English, nearly 60 strong at Torbay. The second blocked the first and completely paralyzed it. Future possibilities of maneuvering and prospects of the future as to combinations which might require certain dispersion of forces were now reduced to a minimum. The situation was infinitely less favorable than in April. Upon this return to the point of departure one may easily measure its aggravation.

Of the great objectives brought forward in the beginning: relief of Corfu and Malta, help to the Army of Egypt, eventual destruction of isolated enemy groups, etc....; none had been attained. Only by a fortuitous concatenation of circumstances was Bruix effectively

able to help the Army of Italy. The junction with the Spanish was accomplished but no profit whatever had been drawn from this formidable union of forces. No blow had been struck at the enemy.

It is said of certain thermodynamic cycles that no work has been done when the motive power returns idly to its point of departure. This is somewhat the case here. And this work is even negative as we have just seen. All it accomplished was to destroy great hopes and to prohibit others for the future.

This is the fated outcome of all maneuvers which relegate too much to the background, the idea of battle and of the decisive shock, which should be the crowning event of all enterprises of this sort.

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Chapter IV

The Campaign of 1805 (*)

The Plan of Maneuver.

When one treats of the strategic maneuver, the example of the campaign of 1805 comes of itself to mind. If, in dimensions, that campaign has had analogues, such as the campaigns of the American War of Independence or that of Druix in the Mediterranean it surpasses them infinitely in that its foundation and prime mover is a true conception of maneuver. In that regard, never has been seen and never perhaps will be seen an action of such geographical and intellectual scope. Never has spirit played with space with such mastery in the attempt to build art.

But first of all, Napoleon's plan of maneuver possesses this quality in particular, that in parting from a virgin situation it is not elaborated. It is conditioned by some previous events which require it to be conceived in a certain manner, forces to be engaged in a certain direction, with freedom of action already considerably reduced. Moreover, the author of the plan has but the more merit in having known how to adapt it so rapidly to circumstances which had momentarily passed beyond control of his will.

The supreme objective of the Emperor was, as in the preceding year, to effect the invasion of England by assuring passage of the army carried by the flotilla at Boulogne, and by covering that passage by the action of the high seas forces having acquired local and temporary control of the area.

In his plan of 25 May 1804, contained in a letter to Latouche-Treville, and in his instructions of 2 July 1804, Napoleon envisaged the operation in the following fashion: Latouche-Treville, leaving from Toulon, was to lift the blockade of Rochefort, then, after junction with the French squadron stationed in that port,

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*For detailed history of facts see the classic work of Chief of Squadrons Desbriere, entitled Trafalgar (Paris, Chapelot, 1907). In our personal commentaries we are at all times notably influenced by the opinions of that author.

was to penetrate into the Channel, evading Cornwallis immobilized by his blockade of Brest, and to protect the passage of the flotilla before all without risking battle.

At the end of 1804, the situation appearing threatening on the continent, projects of descent upon England are suddenly abandoned. The flotilla of Boulogne is partially disarmed. The plans of 29 September and 12 December 1804 do not provide for anything but colonial operations, strangely mixed with a vague project of descent upon Ireland. Villeneuve, leaving Toulon, and Missiessy, leaving Rochefort, are to go to ravage the British Antilles. The former gets underway on 18 January 1805 but, as is known, only to return soon after. Missiessy, more fortunate, quits Rochefort on 11 January and heads for the Antilles.

Meanwhile, at the end of February, the continental situation appearing to improve, Napoleon returns to his project of invasion of Great Britain. The flotilla of Boulogne is rearmed. As to the high seas forces, they are at that moment divided between Brest, where the squadron of Ganteaume is blockaded by superior forces; Ferrol, where Gourdon is in the same situation with four vessels and some Spanish ships; Cadiz and Cartagena, where the Spanish are not in a position to participate in active operations; Toulon, where Villeneuve is paralyzed by repair of the injuries sustained in his first sortie. Missiessy alone is out, in the Antilles.

The new plan must therefore take account of these details. Napoleon is obliged to construct the new upon the debris of the old. To turn in a new direction he can not, in particular, neglect the situation of Missiessy. The latter involves the affair, geographically and strategically, in a manner which does not leave the Emperor entirely free. Hence the idea of concentration in the Antilles, not at all conceived to begin with, but having, to the contrary, all the character of being fished up, of being a "genial expedient" as Captain Desbriere so correctly says.

And thus the plan of 2 March 1805 by which the maneuver is baited, is reached.

His essential dispositions are as follows:

Ganteaume, with 21 vessels is to sortie from Brest, steer for Ferrol, disperse the British cruisers found before that port, and to join Gourdon and the Spanish. Thence it will go to the Antilles where it will join Villeneuve and Missiessy. Then, having grouped a force of about 40 ships, it will head back for Ushant, "will attack the British ships which might be awaiting it and will proceed directly to Boulogne." If it does not succeed in joining Villeneuve, it will effect the same movement with Missiessy alone.

Villeneuve is to quit Toulon with 11 ships, make passage to Cadiz, there rally the AIGLE and the Spanish ships which will be prepared, then shape course for the Antilles and there to await Ganteaume for forty days. If this junction has not been possible up to the end of that delay, Villeneuve is to come to the Canaries to attack the British convoys arriving from India. From there, if he remains always without news of Ganteaume, he will return to Cadiz.

Missiessy is to await in the Antilles, until the end of June, the French forces "which should be able to reach that area". In fact that order never reached him and he returned to Rochefort 20 May without having encountered anyone.

Gourdon, who is at Ferrol with four ships, is to hold himself ready to join any forces coming to lift his blockade, and to that end to establish himself in the anchorage of Corogne.

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This plan gives substance to several interesting observations.

It is inspired to the highest degree by the necessities of the general war, for it is uniquely constructed to satisfy a service deriving from the war on lands -- transport of an army into England before which the particular ends of the naval war are effaced. In consequence, the plan aims before all at a principal theatre, which is the Channel, or even more exactly, the Pas-de-Calais.

It is there he wishes to create a favorable situation of which he accepts the short duration. Several days of local control suffice him.

But from that peculiarity results the fact that the party desiring to maneuver is himself maneuvered from the outset, for a priori he fixes a direction for the offensive which is perfectly known to the British and on which the latter are in very good position to prepare a very strong riposte at leisure. The British are in very good position to practice the offensive on geographical basis, defined in another part of this study, against our high seas forces by awaiting our squadrons in the Channel and massing their own there. It is the famous plan of general concentration at Ushant, in force since 1803, and used in case of strategic crisis and of incertitude regarding French movements. This mode of parade has been very much admired by several historians who have praised its imperturbable application. In reality it was not always so done, and we shall see that two particularly sensational infractions of the British plan were committed by its executors. But it is no less true that geography here notably favored the British game and handicapped Napoleon's whose maneuvering combinations stood grave chances of wrecking themselves on a riposte simple, easy, and applicable in every case.

Assembling the mass, the union of forces, is to take place in the Antilles. It won't be easy. Given the technical conditions of the epoch, the distances, the lack of rapid communication the slowness and uncertainty of movements, it will be extremely difficult to insure synchronizing changes of position and junction of the squadrons of Ganteaume, Villeneuve and Missiessy on the specified day. If the maneuver of other days profited by certain facilities or possibilities unknown in our own, to offset, it suffered with regard to certainty of length of time required to run through many hazards which are spared us today. Napoleon seeks to parry them by introducing extensions of time by waiting, "battements", as we say now. Villeneuve will await Ganteaume for forty days. But nevertheless these are shackles, losses of time;

squandering of precious hours and a continual violation of the principle of activity.

Moreover, is the despatch of Ganteaume to the Antilles quite necessary? Do not Villeneuve and Missiessy suffice to constitute the body of maneuver, Ganteaume playing however a very important role, as in the plans of May and July 1804, by immobilizing before Brest the great forces which blockade him? To include Ganteaume in the concentration, to cause everything to depend upon the movements of his squadron, is to worship false gods, for the group he commands is the one most strictly watched by the British and it is very probable that he can escape.

As to the security of the principal mass, it must be noted that Napoleon, contrary to one of his favorite ideas, does not cause it to result from fixation of several British forces off the ports which they habitually blockade. In effect, if the opening of the affair succeeds, Brest, Ferrol and Toulon are going to be found empty, and the ships blockading them freed. Only Cadiz and Cartagena will have to be watched. To insure security, Napoleon counts most of all on the effect of distance, of space, of lack of knowledge of French movements, finally of the initiative in operations. He counts on the confusion which, to his notion, cannot fail to hinder the British in the face of unforeseen movements of our forces and above all in the face of the unexpected raid in the Antilles. He thinks that the enemy squadrons will follow our's everywhere, somewhat at fault in the passage, maintaining a disperson which will prolong duration of the favorable situation and which will permit striking the decisive blow. Is such a calculation well founded? Yes -- if the adversary loses his head and reacts without reason. No -- if he puts in operation the parade of which we have just spoken. But finally, it is worth trying: the stake is worth the play, and events are going to show moreover that Napoleon was not wrong to count on the mistakes of the enemy and upon his nervousness.

The plan naturally aims at maximum surprise, which will be obtained by irruption into the Channel of forces which the British

are not expecting, at least theoretically. But there are nevertheless grave chances that they may avoid that surprise, knowing perfectly what to expect as to the objective which we visualize and to the direction of our action. Here for surprise can be repeated what we have just said with regard to security.

Napoleon wishes moreover to assure the benefit of that surprise by rigorous secrecy with respect to his project. And here he went beyond discretion. That secret he kept even from its principal executors. Ganteaume alone among them is informed and knows that the vast movement of concentration in the Antilles is the prelude to returning upon the Channel and that it has a direct connection with invasion of England. Nothing of the sort has been told to Villeneuve, nor to Missiessy, nor to Gourdon. One and all operate in the dark, and the sequel will show in evidence the dire effects of that disastrous method of command. And a sort of cruel irony will ordain that Ganteaume, alone informed, be precisely the one who cannot budge!

Finally it must be noted that Napoleon plainly admits the necessity of battle to cap the maneuver. The body under orders of Ganteaume is to "attack the British ships which may be awaiting it", and that, very likely at the Channel entrance. It is a very neat progress over former conceptions of the Emperor. Up to then he had not grasped the necessity of combat between high seas forces, an indispensable condition for the local control he was seeking. In 1803 he thought the flotilla would be able to get through the strait, thanks to its own fighting value, without a clash of squadrons. In 1804 he admitted the necessity but thought he could carry out his project on the same lines still avoiding an encounter with hostile forces. In 1805 he takes account that nothing is possible unless the Channel has been secured by an act of force, which will almost certainly require fighting it out before arrival at Boulogne, and in consequence it results in foreseeing and desiring this shock, just as he did on land. A tardy conversion, moreover incomplete.

On 24 March Napoleon refuses Ganteaume what he requests, auth-

orization to fight the British cruisers with twenty-one ships against fifteen, and so to open a way for himself by main force. He thus condemns the Brest squadron to immobility which, if it does not forcibly indicate the ruin of the plan of maneuver, is nevertheless in contradiction with his primary dispositions.

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Launching the Maneuver.

Villeneuve gets under way from Toulon 30 March 1805 at 1600 with 11 ships, 3 frigates and 2 brigs. If he is able to sortie so easily it is because Nelson, faithful to his system of distant blockade, is at the moment in the Gulf of Cagliari south of Sardinia.

Villeneuve first shapes course to the south, then to the south west. He is seen by two British frigates which commit the mistake of both abandoning the contact to go to advise Nelson.

Villeneuve, who through a neutral has learned of the presence of Nelson south of Sardinia, profits by an east wind to follow the coast of Spain while the enemy believes he is continuing course to the south. On 7 April he is off Cartagena. The 6 Spanish ships of Salcedo, which are not ready, cannot join him, which is extremely regrettable.

On 9 April at 0900 the French squadron passes the Strait of Gibraltar. For a while it chases Orde's division, blockading Cadiz, which is inferior to it. But it leaves off chase at nightfall to anchor off the port. Villeneuve does nothing the next day to regain contact with Orde and force combat. An excellent opportunity to fight the enemy in detail is thus lost, and the maneuver launched with signal good fortune is thus deprived of the brilliant effect of initial surprise which ought logically to be its first fruit. It is the re-enacting of the case of Bruix and Keith in 1799.

But Villeneuve is pressed above all to make his junction with the Spanish at Cadiz and to continue towards his destination. So

pressed that he leaves again 10 April at 0200 and that only 6 Spanish ships are able to get underway with him. Of them but two succeed in joining him; the four others can join only at Martinique. The concentration of forces is incomplete, too neglected by the French commander who fears to see Nelson arrive upon his heels and who, ignorant of the plan of maneuver adopted, sees only the punctual and rapid execution of his prescribed movement towards the Antilles. His forces will therefore be finally increased only by 7 ships (the AIGLE and the six Spanish).

Villeneuve then starts across the Atlantic. His passage, as is known, is particularly slow, retarded by the very mediocre speed of certain of his ships, the FORMIDABLE, the INTREPIDE and most of all the ATLAS. Villeneuve loses thus all the time which his haste in the beginning had appeared to gain for him. He does not anchor at Martinique until 14 May, more than a month after his departure from Cadiz. So slowness of movement appears as a first cause to rob the maneuver of the indispensable characteristic of activity. There will be others.

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It is absorbingly interesting to examine the British reaction, in particular that of Nelson.

Nelson receives advice of Villeneuve's sortie on 4 April, five days after the event. He is in the vicinity of the Island of Toro southwest of Sardinia. Because of the initiative of operations seized by the enemy he is immediately thrown into the greatest uncertainty, as always in such a case. And that uncertainty, that confusion even, aggravates in him a single preconceived idea: that the French are going to the east, the Levant, as in 1798. That state of mind is going to immobilize him for a long time in the region where he now is. And when the most illustrious of British commanders is seen taken in that manner, one cannot help thinking that Napoleon was not mistaken to reckon on such a psychological factor to assure the security of the principal body.

From 5 to 9 April Nelson remains between Sardinia and the coast of Africa, there awaiting the passage of Villeneuve and sending his frigates in all directions to discover him. On 10 April he is off Palermo; he dreams always only of the necessity of protecting Naples and Sicily. Then, finding always nothing, he commences to doubt the value of his first hypothesis. He wishes to return before Toulon but contrary winds now hold him south of Sardinia. On 16 April he finally learns that Villeneuve was seen on 7 April at Cape Gata on the coast of Spain. On 19 April he knows from Gibraltar that the French passed the strait on the 9th. Everything becomes clear, after fifteen days lost in obscurity. Nelson throws himself towards the west but even at this point his spirit is so obsessed by his preconceived idea that he leaves his frigates between Sardinia and the coast of Africa to parry a movement of the French towards the east.

On 20 April, being still 50 miles west of Toro (southwest of Sardinia), Nelson examines a disturbing train of hypotheses. They are those which ordinarily assail the spirit of a commander who has lost control of a maneuver. Among the destinations which Nelson considers likely attributable to Villeneuve, there are the Antilles, Brazil, raising the blockade of Ferrol, Brest, and Ireland. The British Admiral has therefore already considered the eventuality of the Antilles. Nevertheless he discards the first two suppositions; the last two, which really form but one, seem to him more probable. But the routes which lead towards these different regions separate in the neighborhood of Cape St.Vincent. There it is that Nelson will go to put himself in the way of news. If he does not obtain it, he will go, he says to himself, "to 50 leagues west of the Scilly Isles . . . . . From there I can equally well rally the fleet which is off Brest or go to Ireland."

As may be seen, though his project is inspired to a certain degree by the general plan of concentration at the Channel entrance in a measure he discards the latter. To join the British blockading squadron, which habitually remains in the lee of Ushant, and to place himself 150 miles west of the Scillys are two sufficient-

ly different things. Nelson conducts himself according to his own personal views and takes some liberties with the Admiralty instructions.

On 5 May Nelson anchors at Tetuan. He has still no information of the enemy.

In fact, Orde, surprised off Cadiz, has followed the general plan and joined the Channel squadron with his six ships. At the same time he has left Captain Sutton at Cape St. Vincent with three frigates to observe the enemy movements. Now Sutton has completely lost contact with the Franco-Spanish, and he even announces that on 22 April they were still at Cadiz!

On his side, Gardner, who commands the Channel squadron, is anxious on account of the great initiative of the enemy of which he sees the unfolding. He strengthens the blockade of Brest to nip any sortie by Ganteaume. He asks for reinforcements lest Villeneuve show himself in the north.

Nelson passes the Strait of Gibraltar on 7 May. He is therefore almost a month behind Villeneuve and, whatever activity he may show, this serious delay, first result of the maneuver, can be cause of grave consequences to the British. It accomplishes, in effect, placing out of reach a notable part of their forces. It is precisely the result aimed at by the maneuver, to create a favorable situation, but here fortune wills that winds contrary to the Britain movements, coupled with the system of blockade practiced by Nelson, and also with his preconceived idea with respect to Villeneuve's navigation, have considerably increased the duration of that situation and open a prospect full of promise.

The simplest procedure at Nelson's disposal to correct this unfortunate beginning as far as possible is evidently to return to the offensive in geographic form by rallying, as provided, with the British Channel forces. He is however going to decide on an offensive on the basis of movement.

In fact many pieces of information coming in show that Villeneuve has taken course for the Antilles. The HALCYON apprises him on 6 May at Tetuan that up to 28 April there had been no news of

Villeneuve at Lisbon. On 10 May at Cape St. Vincent the AMAZON makes known to him that information obtained from an American ship indicates that the Franco-Spanish have headed for the Antilles. The same day, at the anchorage of Lagos, Rear Admiral Campbell, who is serving in the Portuguese navy, confirms this information. Finally the expedition of Knight and Craig, coming from the north, has encountered nothing.

It is in view of these pieces of news that Nelson takes his celebrated decision to throw himself across the Atlantic and to pursue Villeneuve to the Antilles. Ardent reflex, all impulse, gripping, if considered from the passionate point of view, admirable as far as a model of vigorous pursuit of the organized force. But if regarded with sang-froid it cannot but be considered that he risked aggravating terribly the situation of the British Admiral, and of thus playing into the enemy maneuver. In effect, as certain authors have remarked, the fact that no trace of Villeneuve had been found on the coasts of Europe between Gibraltar and Ushant in no way signified that he was on the other side of the ocean. He could have been cruising off shore, as provided in the plan of 25 May 1804, later to turn towards the Channel. In that case, by going to the Antilles, Nelson locked himself still farther away, and prevented himself for the space of two months from participating in decisive events which were going to supervene in British waters. If, on the contrary, Villeneuve had really taken course for the West Indies, Nelson, in following him there, was liable to be able to recoup his initial delay only in part. Further, he could wreck himself there against very superior forces. In every way he went into the snare which the enemy held for him. His procedure therefore offered immense danger, and though the facts have brought out nothing of all that, the resolution so disputable taken by the conqueror of Aboukir, a resolution, however much admired, ordinarily should be considered not too well founded.

It is equally interesting to consider the state of mind prevalent in England during the initial phase of the French maneuver and

to see what the decisions of the central direction of operations have been, especially in the Admiralty.

In England, quite early, there are doubts that Villeneuve is to go to the Antilles. A notice from Paris, dated 23 April and arriving in London at the beginning of May, makes it clearly understood. In that moment, in most of the environs of the English capital, an attack on Jamaica is envisaged. The newspapers currently speak of it. More serious detail, some people seem to have perceived that the movement of Villeneuve has a direct connection with landing in Great Britain the army which is to be transported by the flotilla at Boulogne, and that the expedition to the Antilles is therefore but a feint. Thus the Morning Chronicle of 9 May writes: "Of all the conjectures which have been made on the destination of the Toulon fleet, that which has made the greatest impression and caused the most anxiety is that that fleet after having freed the squadrons of Cadiz and Ferrol and swept away all the blockades, would be able to unite with the Brest fleet, then to come to occupy the Channel, while the Boulogne flotilla would carry into England an army of 100,000 men." The Sun of 15 May sees the same hypothesis. In other terms, the French plan of maneuver was detected and partly brought to light.

But in the end British opinion is sure of nothing. It is reduced to suppositions. Does the principal attack aim at the Antilles? At England? No one knows. What is certain is that something serious is in preparation. A grave strategic crisis is opened, in which England has lost control of the conduct of affairs. It profoundly disturbs the tranquil routine of blockade. Then public opinion becomes nervous, anxious, maddened, accuses its leaders and its military chiefs. There -- let us repeat at the risk of being tiresome -- therein is the principal and classic benefit of the initiative in operations for the party who maneuvers. He acquires moral ascendancy, not alone over the armed forces of the adversary, but also over the body of the nation.

In the same article of the Morning Chronicle this affirmation

is raised: "During the eight days which have just passed no one has slept tranquilly. Consider the situation in which our ministers have placed us, when we are reduced to hoping that the French will be content with conquering our colonial possessions." On 13 May Lord Radstock writes, "I fear greatly for Nelson; popular clamor rises against him, and if we lose Jamaica that will be enough to cause all the services he has rendered to be forgot."

It is in such disturbed environment, heavy with fears at the same time for the Antilles and for the metropolis, in contact with that agitated and irritated opinion, that the Admiralty must organize its counter movements.

On 25 April it orders Gibraltar to send the ships QUEEN and DRAGON to the Antilles to re-inforce Cochrane, if Nelson has not followed Villeneuve.

On 27 April it prescribes that Collingwood and Orde are to join forces at Madeira and to take up pursuit of Villeneuve. Gardner, commanding the Channel squadron which keeps blockade of Brest, takes it upon himself to cancel departure of these two divisions, at that moment under his flag and to suspend execution of the Admiralty order.

On 9 May the latter enjoins Nelson to come to Ushant and join the Channel Squadron.

On 10 May the Admiralty renews its order to Collingwood to come to Cawsand to prepare for the expedition to the Antilles. This time Gardner submits. On 17 May Collingwood receives instructions to follow Villeneuve as far as the Antilles if Nelson has not done it, or, in the contrary case, to bear himself ready to re-inforce his colleague by a certain number of vessels.

On 5 June the preceding orders are annulled when it is learned at London that Nelson has taken course for the Antilles. The Admiralty writes him that it approves his decision.

This brief resumé of the diverse reactions of the central organ in the face of the disrupting effect of the French maneuver brings several points into evidence.

First of all, the general plan of rallying on Ushant, supposedly imperturbable, has not been applied with the rigor and serenity that were ascribed to it. The principle has flexed. It has tolerated some variations. There have been accommodations. Along with the offensive on a geographical basis has been attempted an offensive on a basis of movement. Nelson admittedly has received the order to rally at the Channel entrance, but at the same time there has been an intention to launch Collingwood, and even Orde, into pursuit of Villeneuve. Gardner, partisan of the traditional formula, and to boot exposed to the principal attack because of his situation, has attempted vainly to prevent this detachment.

It is apparent that the Admiralty has tried, even at the price of a division of forces, to guard at the same time against two prospective eventualities: the Antilles and the Channel. That manner of action being in opposition to its ordinary rule of conduct, it is not out of question to perceive therein the effect of the pressure of public opinion, which it has had to satisfy, cost what it might.

Finally, it will be remarked that the gesture of Nelson in following the enemy to the Antilles was not uniquely his own, and that others envisaged a similar solution. If he had not crossed the ocean, Collingwood would have done it in his place, and by orders. The pursuit of the organized force, ardent, voluntary and fierce, is therefore admittedly a general doctrine with the British of that epoch, when they do not practice an offensive in geographic form or even conjunctively with that offensive. In every way, whatever opinion is taken of the value of the double course followed by the Admiralty, there must be recognized in it the wish to recapture as soon as possible the initiative in operations which the brilliant commencement of the French maneuver has just dangerously snatched from the British Fleet.

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Trend of the Maneuver

Villeneuve arrives at Fort-de-France on 14 May. He concerns himself first of all with re-provisioning. Then he lingers in expectation, losing precious time without knowing it. It is not his fault. Actually, he is informed of nothing. Inconceivable though it may be, Napoleon has not put him au courant with the plan of maneuver adopted, and that, without doubt, voluntarily. Villeneuve does not know that he is to cooperate in a great project to invade England. The only order he has is to await Ganteaume for forty days, which holds him until 22 June. That order he punctually executes, that is to say, in immobility. After 22 June, if Ganteaume has not appeared, he will steer for the Island of Santiago, which Décrès places in the Canaries (!!), when it is really in the Cape Verdes, where Villeneuve, who has corrected it for himself, counts on arriving.

While waiting, not knowing what to do, he sends three frigates to windward of the islands, and sacrificing the geographic objective, chases the British from Diamant by an operation which lasts from 30 May to 2 June.

This wait for Ganteaume deprives the maneuver of the benefit of activity. It is the price which must be paid for a union of forces executed under such difficult conditions.

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Meanwhile Napoleon modifies his primitive plan and adopts another which will have the effect of directing the body of the maneuver, placed in the Antilles, not at first towards the Channel entrance, but towards a point situated farther south.

It is a variation of the initial project, a sort of deviation from original intention.

The Emperor has understood that Ganteaume, strictly blockaded at Brest, would not be able to budge. He decides to leave him where he is and now to make Villeneuve the pivot of the operation. Magon, leaving Rochefort with two ships, will join

him in the Antilles. If, one month after the arrival of Magon, Villeneuve has not received other orders, he will on his return to Europe move on Ferrol, there unblockading Gourdon and the 15 Franco-Spanish vessels which are in the port, will move to Brest where he will join the 21 ships of Ganteaume. With the 50 vessels thus united, he will enter the Channel and run to a position off Boulogne.

Such are the essentials of the instructions of 14 April 1805 which, leaving Rochefort with Magon 1 May, reached Martinique with him 4 June.

Further, after despatch of these first instructions, Napoleon concludes, one knows not why, that Nelson has gone to Egypt, and on 29 April he drafts new orders for Villeneuve inviting him to undertake active operations against the British colonies. The frigate DIDON leaves Lorient 3 May with these orders, as well as with a duplicate of those entrusted to Magon, but it arrives at Martinique five days before the latter, that is to say, 30 May.

Villeneuve at last understands the general situation which is now laid before him for the first time, as well as the mission assigned to the central mass which he commands. Execution of the maneuver now falls upon him. And it must be noted in passing how the new plan again violates the principle of activity, first in imposing on Villeneuve a delay of one month after the arrival of Magon, and then in urging him to attack the British colonies and thus to launch himself into enterprises which have nothing to do with the maneuver commenced and which run the risk of greviously compromising it. In addition, in the instructions of 29 April, it seems to be assumed that the Admiral has already accomplished conquests of this nature on his own though the initial plan was absolutely mute on this point.

Villeneuve gets under way from Martinique 5 June. Literal executor of his new instructions, he takes with him troops borrowed from the colony, intending to attack the British possessions.

Nevertheless he does not stop off Dominique. He touches Gaudeloupe 6 June, embarks other detachments, continues to the North, skirts the British Island of Antigua 7 June. The next day, 8 June, he captures a convoy of 14 ships, the prisoners from which give him some very important news; the arrival at Barbados of Nelson's squadron with a strength, according to his informant, of from 12 to 14 ships and several frigates.

It is in view of this advice that Villeneuve takes the initiative, remarkable considering the mores of that epoch and the excessive centralization in decision practiced by Napoleon, to go counter to his instructions and to effect his return to Europe immediately instead of waiting until 4 July, i.e., the delay of one month after Magon's arrival.

Among the motives which he obeys there are good and bad.

He thinks the arrival of Nelson in the Antilles will bring the effective British forces in this area to 20 ships (including the 6 ships of Cochrane which are already in the region); that this forbids him any enterprise against the British colonies and leaves him as other issue but to shut himself in Martinique. Singular idea, fear of an encounter with Nelson, for the Franco-Spanish have also 20 vessels, i.e., numerical equality.

But on the other hand, Villeneuve, finally put in possession of the plan of maneuver and understanding its inspiration, judges the situation according to the general goal assigned to his forces, and he reasons here very sanely. He says in his letter of 11 June, "In that perplexity I wished to confer with Admiral Gravina. I found him wedded to his opinion to effect our return to Ferrol immediately, there to make our junction and further the principal aim of our destination." He is a thousand times right, and that initiative does him the greatest honor. In order to assure the success of the French maneuver it is necessary to seek to benefit from the diversion which has led Nelson to the Antilles, to do everything possible to shake the latter in those waters, and, having thus led him astray, to return to Europe in

all haste making a clean sweep of the inopportune delay fancied by Napoleon. This is not the moment to dally in the Antilles where his sojourn has already been only too long.

Villeneuve estimates also that even in the case that Ganteaume should succeed in getting away from Brest, his resolution for immediate return to Europe would not be bad for the British squadron as Ushant would without fail throw itself into pursuit of the French squadron, and, thanks to that supplementary diversion, the Channel entrance would from that cause even be found open.

Moreover, since 30 April Napoleon had been aware that immediate return to Europe, contrary to his plan of 14 April, was the most judicious solution. Therefore without knowing it Villeneuve had only anticipated the new decision of central direction.

Consequently 10 June Villeneuve returns the borrowed troops to the colonies in frigates, and sets course for Europe. On 2 July he sights the Azores. On the 22d he hurls himself upon Calder's squadron in the latitude of Ferrol; this is the battle of Cape Finisterre.

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Nelson, who quit Cape St. Vincent the evening of 11 May, traverses the Atlantic with a speed remarkable for that age, averaging from 5 to 6 knots. Such rapidity of movement, sustained over a long passage, is a strategic advantage of the first order. In part it corrects the serious initial delay which represented the most substantial advantage of the opening of the French maneuver. That delay, which originally amounted to thirty-five days, is no more than twenty-one days when Nelson arrives at Barbados 4 June, where he joins Cochrane and two of his ships.

In the course of the passage, Nelson loses himself in conjectures concerning the objective of the Franco-Spanish. He personally believes that it is Jamaica, but he is concerned also with other eventualities: Surinam, Trinidad, Santo Domingo, etc. . . He is still completely confused.

At Barbados he finds news, quite false, that the enemy is to attack Barbados or Trinidad. Having embarked some troops he moves towards the south, that is to say in a direction diametrically opposite to Villeneuve. Chance then serves the Franco-Spanish by once more misleading Nelson and prolonging the favorable situation in which it has been very generous to the Allies.

On 8 June Nelson learns of the attack on Diamant. He bounces back to the north. On the 9th he is informed that on the 6th of June Villeneuve passed Dominque. He thinks he will attack Antigua . . . or perhaps that he will return to Europe. In fact he commences to have doubts about this return. On 12 June he anchors at Antigua where the enemy has not appeared. He detaches the brig CURIEUX to England to bear the news there, certain from his advice, of the return of Villeneuve to Europe, and on 13 June he in his turn makes sail in that direction.

Every reservation made, and we have previously expanded on the opportuneness of Nelson's decision to run to the Antilles, one cannot but admire his attitude during his short sojourn in these waters. Faithful to his first principle to act on the offensive on the basis of movement, he runs after Villeneuve without pausing for breath, scrutinizes with fury and rage all the islands, making proof of profound offensive sense and of an implacable activity, seeking above all to recapture that initiative in operations which had been so painfully snatched from him. It is a man-hunt, conducted with passion. Nelson testifies also to a remarkable divination, detecting in good time the return of Villeneuve. He hurls himself in the same direction without losing an instant, endeavoring to give check to the enemy maneuver in the sense that he does not permit himself to be fixed in the

Antilles as the hostile plan supposed and hoped he would.

But Nelson--does he see quite clearly into that plan? Not precisely. On 12 June he thinks that the Allies have separated, that the Spanish have gone to Havana and the French to Cadiz or Toulon. And he writes at that time, "I give 'preference to the second of these points, for they are going to figure that' they will be able to go to Egypt at their ease." On 17 June he thinks for an instant that Villeneuve is heading for Ferrol, but he does not linger for long on that hypothesis. So he is taken again with his preconceived idea of a French movement towards the Levant, of which he is not able to rid himself, and that idea, misleading him anew towards the Mediterranean, is once more going to serve the enemy maneuver.

Although taking judicious measures to forewarn the British squadron blockading Ferrol of the eventual arrival of the enemy squadron, Nelson allows himself to be drawn off towards southern European waters. From 1 to 8 July he is delayed by calms in the Azores. On the 18th he sights Cape Spartel. The 19th he anchors at Gibraltar, although the important game is now going to be played out in the north. His impulsive and passionate reflexes, giving themselves free rein in movement, have again led him in a wrong direction.

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It might well be asked whether the order given to Villeneuve to return to Ferrol was most appropriate to the situation and best to assure success of the maneuver.

The enemy continued to maintain his original dispersion, in his initial fixation, as much because of the presence of those parts of our forces remaining in port as by the effect of diversion resulting from the opening of the maneuver and from the uncertainty into which it has thrown Nelson. From north to south the division of the British forces on 10 July is as follows:

Cornwallis watches Brest with 20 ships; Stirling is off Rochefort with 5 ships; Calder is engaged in blockade of Ferrol with 10 ships; Collingwood watches Cadiz with 4 ships; Nelson, with 11 ships, is on the point of arriving at Cape St. Vincent; Bickerton is off Cartagena with 4 ships. There is thus a cordon, a wire-drawn disposition which is dangerously open to attack by the allied body of maneuver returning from the Antilles. That body, freed from the surveillance of which it was the direct object, is going to perform the function of a battering-ram to bring the dicision upon any point where it may strike. That is the very essence of any maneuver of this nature. But what point of application is to be assigned to that effort? It can be directed towards the Channel, where perhaps the Franco-Spanish will pass without combat to arrive opposite Boulogne and fulfull the imposed task at the outset. Villeneuve can be directed against Brest, in view of his junction with Ganteaume; this involves a battle with Cornwallis in the lee of Ushant, which must be fought only with the forces coming from seaward and in which the blockaded forces will not be able to participate. Or Villeneuve can be pointed to Ferrol which will lead to a battle with Calder (as was done). He can be directed upon Cadiz which will bring him to grips with Collingwood and Nelson.

It so happens that as the blow is struck farther north the solution becomes increasingly favorable. In that way, on the decisive point which is the Channel entrance but a restricted part of the enemy forces will have to be dealt with, and the others, left in the south far from the principal events, will be left out of reach. The farther south the blow falls, the more prematurely will the alarm be given, and the greater the concentration that will be permitted, even in event of success, of British squadrons at the Channel entrance, and the greater the risk of final check-make when the attack is made against a concentrated block replacing the dispersed arrangement reviewed above. Evidently by first going to Ferrol, Gourdon joins, then the Rochefort squadron play

a role equally advantageous in immobilizing the British forces situated opposite them, and which it is a question of retaining in the south while the principal attack takes form in the north. Finally, the farther south, the more Nelson, who can be supposed misled by the feint in the beginning--and in fact, was, is permitted to recover and to arrive in opportune time.

It is nevertheless the solution of Ferrol which Napoleon has chosen, and which he has imposed upon Villeneuve. He has changed his idea, and dreamed of pointing at Brest, only too late however, to be able to modify the course of events.

During this time on the enemy side Napoleon's plan begins to be discerned and read from the French maneuver. In an admirable letter of 18 July, a model of divination, Collingwood shows that he has clearly grasped the purpose of the diversion in the Antilles and has foreseen the return upon Ferrol and the ultimate movement towards the north. The Admiralty, informed since 9 July by the CURIEUX (*), immediately gives Stirling orders to raise the blockade of Rochefort and to join Calder. The junction is made 15 July. Calder, advised the same day, and conforming to Corenwallis' orders dated the 11th, goes with the 15 vessels now at his disposal to a position 100 miles from Cape Finisterre there to await the shock.

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* Which, during passage, met Villeneuve at sea on his return route, as is known.

The Critical Phase (Plate IV)

On 22 July the fight off Cape Finisterre takes place between Villeneuve (20 ships) and Calder (15 ships). An indecisive encounter, blindly conducted, in the midst of intense fog. Calder is fortunate enough to capture two Spanish vessels which fell into the British lines, but on the 23d and 24th he retreats to the north before allied pursuit, and abandons his prizes on the field of battle.

After this combat Villeneuve is full of hesitation as to his destination. In the evening of 25 July, impressed by the strong wind blowing out of the northeast, the state of the sea and the damages to many of his ships, he first shows the intention of going to Vigo, thinking himself unable to reach Ferrol. He then changes his idea and turns towards Cadiz, a singular decision in the situation in which he is placed where everything calls him to the north. In the morning of the 26th, the wind having hauled to the south, he again directs his ships towards Ferrol. On the 27th, the wind having once more returned to the north, and the ships gaining very little in that direction, Villeneuve, always uneasy because of the condition of his ships, the lack of water, the presence on board of numbers of sick and wounded, returns to his idea of going to Vigo. The combined force anchors there the evening of 28 July.

This unforeseen call seriously retards the instant of junction with Gourdon, particularly urgent in view of the maneuver now set in motion. Villeneuve takes account of the necessity of regaining this lost time. He advises Gourdon that he is going to take course for Ferrol; he is watering his ships; he is landing his sick and wounded at Vigo; he is leaving in that port his worst sailors, the French ATLAS and the Spanish ESPANA and AMERICA. On 31 July Villeneuve gets underway from Vigo with the 15 ships which remain to him. On 2 August he reaches Ferrol, but an unexpected order forbidding him to enter that port, the French ships anchor at Corunna.

It is to be noted that Gourdon has taken literally the order given him to wait for Villeneuve, holding himself ready to join. He has, therefore, remained at Ferrol without budging, even when Calder has moved off to his position 100 miles off Cape Finisterre. He hasn't even moved out to Corogne, from where, with the winds prevailing, his getting underway would have been much easier. He has given proof of complete inertia, absolute lack of initiative.

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At the same moment the enemy's situation is far from being solid.

After the fight on 22 July, Calder, who retreats, is quite irresolute and still under the influence of that indecisive engagement. He knows from his prisoners that Villeneuve's destination is Ferrol. After the 26th of July he intends to reconnoitre that port to learn whether the Allies' junction has been effected. If so, since he can not remain in those waters because of the great inferiority of his forces, he will join Cornwallis under Ushant..

Calder therefore appears off Ferrol from 29 to 30 July. He establishes the fact that the situation of the ships blockaded there remains the same and that Villeneuve has not appeared. Then he forms the altogether strange resolution to detach Stirling and four ships with him, at a time and in waters where there is everything to fear from a new encounter with the enemy in the extremely probable event of Villeneuve's attempting to join Gourdon.

Also he makes no attempt to oppose that movement and after 31 July moves off to the north to join Cornwallis, leaving west of Ferrol only a small observation force with strength of two ships and three frigates, through which the British learn of Villeneuve's entrance into Corogne.

The union of Cornwallis and Calder takes place under Ushant on 13 August where Stirling has already arrived in the morning bringing news that the Rochefort squadron has gone to sea. This junction annuls the benefit which could accrue to the French manouver from the junction of Villeneuve and Gourdon. That was to be foreseen and so is brought to light the error which we previously indicated, of having directed Villeneuve to Ferrol instead of the Channel entrance. Warning has been prematurely given to the British and has permitted them to repair and consolidate their disposition in good time.

Nelson himself is going to profit from this mistake and from Villeneuve's too lengthy stop at Vigo and Corogne to rectify the position which he created for himself by his own impetuosity and imagination. On 19 July he is at Gibraltar, that is to say terribly diverted towards the south. On the 21st he goes to anchor at Tetuan for water and provisions. He leaves there the 23d, always without news, and believes that he has been once more sent in a false direction. On the 24th he is advised of the brig CURIEUX's meeting with Villeneuve's combined fleet. Now he understands that the latter is surely directed towards the Gascogne Gulf and in no wise towards the Strait of Gibraltar. His error in diagnosis is evident to him and he promptly decides to correct it. "I shall not 'lose a moment <u>in going to the north</u>," he writes on 24 July, "be it to Ferrol, 'Ireland or Ushant, according to circumstances." It is high time, and he would even be too late if it had been a question of a more active and enterprising enemy. Alone of all the British groups that of Nelson would then risk being irremediably distant from the important shocks!

But situations compromised to such a point do not re-establish themselves in a day. Nelson endures this bitter experience. On 24 July he communicates with Collingwood off Cadiz. On the 25th he is 60 miles west of Cape St. Vincent. Then in going northward along the coast of Portugal he is retarded by winds out of the north and northeast which oblige him to go farther to

sea. On 3 August he is in the latitude of Lisbon but about 16 degrees of longitude west of Greenwich. On 7 August he is far to sea, about 18 degrees of west longitude. This explains why he does not meet the enemy and receives no news. Finally, on 15 August he joins Cornwallis under Ushant.

As to Nelson's state of mind during that passage towards the north, it is exposed in a sufficiently suggestive manner by the following entries in his personal journal:

"3 August--Breeze from the north. I am much dismayed by this contrary wind, but I confide myself to Providence. . .

"12 August--Fresh northerly breeze. If that continues it will be necessary to give up going to Ireland.

"13 August--No news. Where can the combined fleet be? I am very uneasy."

How impressing is the situation in which the commander finds himself, moreover largely through his own fault! Once more the initiative of operations has been snatched from him, and contrary elements do not permit him to recapture it quickly enough for his liking. During twenty days he feels himself out of the contest, useless, impotent, thrown far from the decisive zone by a sort of centrifugal force. As fixed or misled groups must be in any parallel case, he is the principal victim of the hostile maneuver. Moral victim above all, for at the worst he must see himself outplayed and paralyzed while his comrades are at grips with superior forces.

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The movement towards the north undertaken by Nelson on his own initiative is in entire agreement with the views of the British Admiralty. In fact, the latter after receiving notice of the fight off Cape Finisterre, fully appreciates the gravity of the situation, and on 2 August expedites to Nelson an order which says, "We beg your lordship to bring your squadron to Ushant without loss of "time and to place yourself under orders of Admiral Cornwallis."

That order, never received by Nelson, was executed by him in advance, starting northward of his own accord.

Thus also had Orde acted after having been surprised off Cadiz. Likewise Calder when his situation near Ferrol became compromised. Likewise Stirling after having established that the Rochefort anchorage was empty.

In all these cases, there is initiative certainly, but in no wise tempestuous and disorderly as the first reflexes of Nelson. It is a reasoned, orderly initiative which exercises itself within the limits and within the sense of permanent instructions of superior authority, which provide for the general concentration on Ushant in case of uncertainty. There is between the central organ and its executors a perfectly united, unified doctrine. The chief subordinates know and practice intellectual discipline.

Further, as may be seen, this time the Admirality decides to adopt integrally and exclusively the offensive on geographic basis by concentrating all its forces at the entrance of the Channel. It does not admit, as in May, of variations made on the basis of an offensive of movement. That is renounced. The peril is too near, the moment is too weighty to allow of following enemy fractions across the ocean with all the hazards which accompany that line of action. The risk would be too great. They return to the simpler and surer solution.

Stirling arrives at Ushant on 12 August, Calder the 13th and Nelson the 15th. On this last date the mass placed in these waters under orders of Cornwallis reaches 40 ships, admirably trained, and it is sufficient to give check to any French attempt to penetrate into the Channel. Napoleon's maneuver has been wrecked by that concentration which was able to be completed in time. Progressing in that direction the maneuver would destroy itself against a granite wall.

But a phase of crisis nevertheless existed for the British before the arrival at Ushant of Nelson's 11 ships. If the Franco-Spanish had shown more activity they would have been able to leave Corogne the 3d of August with 29 ships -- Villeneuve's 15 and Gourdon's 14 (without counting the Rochefort squadron, of which more later). In the lee of Ushant they would have encountered Cornwallis, who, putting things in their best light, would have been able to place against them only his own 17 ships, Calder's 8 and Stirling's 4, a total of 29. There would then have been numerical equality between the two adversaries and the important losses they would have to expect as a result of the battle would have been compensated shortly afterwards by entry into the game of Ganteaume now released.

In spite of the error of making landfall at Ferrol the French maneuver would then have been able to rebound, and that by favor of Nelson's grave disengagement in the south. But, in order to profit from that fortunate circumstance, it would have been necessary to demonstrate a degree of activity to the Allies unknown.

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At the same time another interesting possibility offers to re-inforce their situation; junction with the Rochefort squadron which was operating in those waters.

That squadron had returned to the roadstead of the Isle of Aix on 20 May with Missiessy. The latter, not having been able to join Villeneuve in the Antilles, Napoleon resolves again to take up the problem of that junction by profiting from Villeneuve's return to Ferrol. Instructions dated 9 June prescribe that Captain Allemand, who has succeeded Missiessy, cruise from 4 to 9 July off the coast of Ireland; then to post

himself from 29 July to 3 August 120 miles west of Ferrol (latitude 43-32 N., longitude 13-22 W.) there to await Villeneuve; finally, if he does not meet the latter, to go to a second rendezvous situated about half way between Ferrol and Ushant (latitude 46-55 N., longitude 9-30 W.); there to wait until 13 August and, receiving no news, to go to Vigo.

Allemand gets underway from Aix 17 July, after Stirling has raised the blockade to join Calder. He has with him 5 ships, 2 frigates and 2 corvettes.

Allemand, considering that he is too late to fulfill the first part of the programme given him, gives up going to Ireland and takes course for the first rendezvous where he arrives the evening of 28 July, as foreseen, at the same time that Villeneuve reaches Vigo. He misses the latter and at the same time evades Calder without knowing it by passing north of both. On 31 July he has knowledge of Calder's presence 60 miles off Ferrol. Allemand then goes to his second rendezvous where he remains from 5 to 11 August.

Such are the dispositions and movements of the Rochefort squadron at the moment when Villeneuve is arriving on the coast of Galicia, still ignorant of the proximity of this friendly force whose joining up holds such great importance for the maneuver.

After anchoring at Corogne Villeneuve receives a letter from Napoleon and another from Décrès, both on 16 July. They confirm in the main the first plan of maneuver at the same time leaving to Villeneuve great latitude of decision, authorizing him to join the two squadrons from Brest and Rochefort, or one of the two at his choice, and even to go around the British Isles to join the Dutch squadron in the Texel. He is told that it is the intention of Napoleon that he should reach Brest without fighting, which is childish, in view of presence of great British forces in those waters. The chimerical hope that

Ganteaume will be able to participate in that battle if it takes place near Brest also is nourished. Finally, most important fact, it is indicated to Villeneuve that in case of serious hindrances preventing execution of the foreseen plan, the Emperor's intention is to unite the important forces at Cadiz, and from that it quite naturally results that Villeneuve thus submits to a first suggestion in the sense of a movement towards that point. It is to be feared in fact that these hindrances being left to his personal estimation, he prematurely and inopportunely avails himself of the port of sortie which is thus offered to him.

Two other letters from Décrès dated 18 and 20 July moreover make known to Villeneuve that the Rochefort squadron has got underway and the instructions which have been given to it, but they forget to tell him that Allemand is to set course for Vigo after 13 August. Very fortunately, from diverse indications and notes, perhaps from a new letter from the minister, Villeneuve is able to reconstruct this last detail.

On his side Gourdon receives instructions from Napoleon dated 28 July which are naturally communicated to Villeneuve. In these instructions it is prescribed that Gourdon seek Allemand following the orders which have been given to the latter; in the second place to look for Villeneuve at Cadiz if he hasn't arrived on 8 August; finally, in that case, to leave to Villeneuve at Ferrol, the advice whether to go to Cadiz. Thus the eventuality of a movement of the combined fleet upon Cadiz appears more and more accepted in high places, and it seems even to be ordered in the case where the junction with the Ferrol squadron would not have been possible. These conditional orders, issued even in view of hypothetical circumstances, can not but act anew on Villeneuve's spirit to cause him to consider as natural and perfectly acceptable the solution consisting of

assembling at least momentarily his forces at Cadiz. It is a new moral pressure which adds to the preceding. It acts in a direction in which the French admiral is already only too inclined personally and is quite opposite to the direction of the maneuver which is expected of him.

Villeneuve dispatches the frigate DIDON to the second rendezvous of Allemand on 6 August to acquaint him with his presence and hasten the junction. That frigate will, however, be captured on 10 August by the PHOENIX, a frigate belonging to the cruising force left by Calder, and it will be unable to fulfill its mission. At the same time, on 8 August, Villeneuve addresses to Vigo a letter intended to be received by Allemand on his arrival there. It prescribes that he go to Brest if junction has been impossible off Ferrol. But it adds immediately; "In the case that I find some difficulties in following that course (Brest), my definitive destination will be the port of Cadiz, where you likewise should proceed." It is felt, through these lines, that Villeneuve is already half-decided upon Cadiz; that he has but lukewarm desire to move northward; finally that he will certainly be influenced to exaggerate the "difficulties" which he would encounter on that course.

It is the critical instant of the maneuver. The pointer of the scales oscillates, uncertain of its final inclination. The imprudent suggestions of the central command, are they not the cause which is going to make the scales weigh in the wrong sense?

In addition, the mental crisis which rages within the commander with regard to the objective of the operations is redoubled by a material crisis in that which concern this subordinate problem of uniting the forces which are to figure in the principal problem.

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The Maneuver Check-mated (Plate V)

At Corogne Villeneuve has found in Gravina an echo of his own hesitations and his own anxiety. Like his French colleague the Spanish admiral estimates that the slowness of the return from the Antilles, taken together with long calls in Galician ports, has caused too much precious time to be lost, has warned the British and has permitted them considerably to re-inforce the Channel entrance. Under these conditions the plan of maneuver appears irremediably compromised to the two admirals who unite their pessimisms.

Villeneuve dreams of the decision to take after sortie from Corogne. First of all he rejects the slightly singular project of Napoleon to take the combined fleet around north of the British Isles. On 3 August he writes that his intention is either to enter Brest or to penetrate into the Channel sailing close to the English coast in order to escape the enemy. He lulls himself in each of these cases with the strange illusion of avoiding battle, a hope quite false by reason of the enemy forces which are in those waters. For the rest he adds, as already, that he will go to Cadiz if there is no means of doing otherwise.

On 6 August Villeneuve, taking his dispositions for getting underway, says, speaking of the surveillance vessels left by Calder, "They will go to join the squadrons off Brest or off Cadiz, following which I will lay course for one or the other of those ports." At the end of that letter he adds, nevertheless more categorically, "I put to sea to present myself off Brest."

From the foregoing may be seen above Villeneuve's state of mind on 8 August.

On 10 August, again undecided, he writes once more, "I am leaving. I shall go either to Brest or to Cadiz according to circumstances.

The operations for getting underway, delicate because of the separation of the Franco-Spanish ships into two groups situated at Corogne and at Ferrol, goes on in the midst of this incertitude. From 8 to 10 August the ships at Corogne accomplish their sortie; those at Ferrol except three Spanish do likewise. These three are awaited at anchor in the Bay of Ares on the 10th. Not until the 13th does a favorable wind permit them to join.

The same day at 1400 the whole combined fleet is underway. It consists of 29 ships of the line, 6 frigates and 4 corvettes.

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The 13th of August the fleet tacks on a wind from the northeast. It is observed by two ships and several enemy frigates which all belong to the surveillance division left by Calder.

On 14 August the Franco-Spanish move to the northwest. At 1400 a frigate sights eight ships in the northwest, and unfortunately verification of their nationality is not insisted upon. A mistake--for those vessels are none other than the Rochefort squadron!!

In fact Allemand has left his second rendezvous on 11 August in order to make passage to Vigo, but remaining pretty well out to sea. He also on 14 August makes out three vessels which he considers suspicious, and which from his position are certainly Villeneuve's scouts. Without any more recognition on his part either he continues his course for Vigo. Neither is he distrubed by advice from a neutral source, brought to him the next day by one of his frigates, that the combined fleet is at that moment at sea in the neighborhood of Ferrol. He persists in strictly executing his orders to go to Vigo, and in the night of 14-15 August he passes very near the combined fleet.

Thus by extraordinary ill fortune and through want of activity in investigation the union of these two groups, so near to each other, could not be made and now will never be made. The maneuver attempted by Napoleon will therefore be hampered from beginning to end by grave mistakes in effecting junction of forces. It was the usual thing at that epoch with the uncertainty of time involved in passage and even of the route, and above all by reason of non-existence of rapid communications permitting insuring permanent contact with units at sea as well as between the units themselves. That is an aspect of the question which modern means have profoundly modified. But, in these conditions of the past, it was evidently imprudent to cause a maneuver to depend upon junctions so hazardous, and to so great a degree as Napoleon did in the Antilles as well as in Europe. That was to base the combination on an altogether fragile foundation.

In the circumstances, moreover, the event has a particular importance, for it is probable that union with Allemand, bringing the allied forces to the figure of 34 ships, would have powerfully reassured Villeneuve and would perhaps have determined him to lay his course to the north.

The Admiral continues his course to the west-northwest during the 14th and 15th. The evening of the latter day, several ships are sighted, which are those of the British detachment towing and escorting the captured DIDON, but they are recognized no more than were the others. Even worse, Villeneuve accepts without verification the fantastic news given him by a neutral that those units form part of an enemy squadron of 25 ships. And he does not take advantage of it, he who has 29 ships and who can only felicitate himself for such an encounter, because his spirit, undecided for thirteen days, inclines definitely now to have the combined fleet take route for Cadiz!

His letter of 22 August written from Cadiz, reveals all his thoughts at the moment when he takes that irreparable decision.

He is demoralized by the persistence of the northeast wind, by the condition of his ships, by the concentration of force and the knowledge of his movements which he ascribes to the enemy. He has no longer "any hope of being able to fulfill the great object to which the naval armada was destined."

He has perfectly understood the inspiration of Napoleon's maneuver, and he recalls the essential lines of it, but he estimates "that this plan not having succeeded and even finding itself betrayed by the time which had elapsed and by the calculations to which the movement of the squadrons had given rise, the enemy had evidently placed himself in position to wreck it and that the combination of their forces was at that moment greater than in any of the preceding circumstances, and so great that it could oppose with superiority the combined forces of Brest and Ferrol."

And Villeneuve's conclusion follows naturally: "Foreseeing no chance of success in the circumstances, and conforming to your Excellency's despatch of 16 July, I have determined, at nightfall on 15 August, <u>to take course to Cadiz</u>.

Here may be seen the part of the responsibility in this affair which falls to the central organ which has unwisely urged the admiral in a poor direction which he had already only too great a tendency to take.

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A singular fact--and one which occurs often in war--is that at the moment when Villeneuve gives up in despair after having ascribed to the enemy an impregnable position, which in fact it is, the enemy himself is going to compromise that situation by his own action.

Cornwallis, on 15 August, has joined 40 ships under his command, but that concentration does not last very long. Hardly arrived, Nelson is immediately despatched to England with two ships. Two others, which are in need of repairs, follow that road. The total forces of Cornwallis fall to 36 ships.

Further, the next day, 16 August, Cornwallis has the singular idea to detach Calder once more towards the south with 18 ships, his mission to proceed off Ferrol and there to pick up the two ships he had left there. He gives him also the following instructions: "You will make every effort to give us information as soon as possible, to prevent the enemy from sailing (from Ferrol) or to bar his road. If, upon your arrival, you learn that a part of the enemy vessels have left, and if you are not in sufficient force to attack them, you will blockade those which have remained in Ferrol with an appropriate force and you will send the remainder of your ships to me in lee of Ushant."

On 19 August Cornwallis, advised that Villeneuve has got underway from Ferrol, persists in his first intention, and sends Calder orders "to take up pursuit of the enemy instead of going to Ferrol, and to attack him."

It is known that Napoleon, when he learned of that decision of Cornwallis, qualified it as "arrant stupidity." Since that time nevertheless several historians have taken up its justification and have advanced some arguments on the subject very difficult to admit.

It is at the instant when the action of the Admiralty, served by the initiative of its sub-commanders, is taken to establish in time under Ushant, in spite of Nelson's errors, a force sufficient to obviate the danger and to realize an effective parade on a geographical basis, it is at that instant, critical above all others, that Cornwallis embarks anew upon the adventure of a chase towards the south which dislocates the

mass grouped under his flag. That protective concentration realized at so much pains, he undoes as soon as done! The British scarcely emerge from one period of crisis when Cornwallis lightheartedly opens another by dividing his forces. While Calder will go southward with 18 ships, perhaps 20, he will remain under Ushant with 18 equally, both the one and other being exposed to receive alone the blow of the Franco-Spanish who have meanwhile united--Cornwallis knows it-- about 30 ships. What is to be thought then of the orders he gives to Calder who will have 18 ships against 29, to "bar the road" to the enemy, to "take up pursuit and attack the enemy"? He has, however, a feeling of the fragility of his system for he envisages the falling back of a part of Calder's ships upon Ushant, which in turn involves a second subdivision of forces to aggravate the first one.

Moreover this advanced detachment in no wise protects Cornwallis, for Villeneuve, if he had gone northward, would very easily have been able to miss Calder. There was even very little chance that he would not do so for prevailing winds required the one to keep well inshore and permitted the other to go direct. For good measure, it may be seen, through incidents such as those which caused failure of the junction of Villeneuve and Allemand, what dependence may be placed on the possibility of joining two naval forces operating in the immensity of the ocean.

In circumstances so critical the infraction of the famous general plan of concentration on Ushant committed by Cornwallis is quite equal to the checks Nelson had given him on his side, and it is difficult, after these two illustrious examples, to praise it with calm serenity.

Acting thus, Cornwallis played into the enemy's hands, and it is certain that the French maneuver could have rebounded a second time in spite of the time lost on the coast of Spain

if it had been confided to a more active and resolute commander, entirely by virtue of Calder's untoward detachment. Once more a favorable situation is created, resulting this time not from the maneuver but from a false movement on the part of the enemy.

Calder, going southward, commences by failing to encounter the 2 ships which were to join him, and he remains with but 18 ships. He has no news of Villeneuve. On the 21st he learns from his scouts of Allemand's squadron's getting underway from Vigo and heading northwest, a disquieting detail. At all hazard Calder decides to head for Cadiz, but he is not at all sure he is not being led in a false direction and being put completely out of things while irreparable events are supervening in the north. He is uneasy. On the 21st he writes to Cornwallis: "I go to join Collingwood off Cadiz. . . . . But if the enemy has not come south, I think Admiral Collingwood will approve my joining you under Ushant." But it will be high time then, when the ill will have been done, to rally upon that Ushant which should never have been left!

On 24 August Calder finally learns through Lisbon that the Franco-Spanish have been seen on the 21st in that vicinity heading south. He breathes again. On 26 August, near Cape St. Vincent, he receives a letter from Collingwood which informs him of the entry of the combined armada into Cadiz. He himself arrives off that port on the 30th.

On his side Cornwallis has had some misgivings. On 19 August he learns of Villeneuve's sortie from Ferrol but he does not know what direction he has taken. On 30 August he receives rather doubtful advice that the combined armada is directed upon Cadiz. On the other hand he is notified of several French ships in the vicinity of Penmarch (where Allemand did in fact remain from 20 August to 6 September)(*) and that news causes him lively

(*) Allemand then returned south, learned on 10 September that Villeneuve was blockaded in Cadiz, and gave up trying to join him. He cruised in October along the coast of Portugal, in November to the Canaries, and returned to Isle of Aix on 24 December.

alarm. Could Villeneuve have escaped Calder? It is not until 5 September that Cornwallis is definitely reassured by the annoucement of the Franco-Spanish entry into Cadiz.

In sum, in that second half of August, Cornwallis and Calder, each on his own side, should many times have taken account of the great risk which the British forces were running as a result of their untoward separation, for which the responsibility falls upon Cornwallis alone. The fact that no harm came, and which is owing entirely to the mediocre worth of the adversary, should not suffice to justify the commander of the Channel squadron for having taken a decision so dangerous and so little adapted to the situation.

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Villeneuve, having headed south the evening of 15 August, with a strong wind from the northeast, arrives at Cape St. Vincent the 17th. The British frigates which he finds there at once advise Collingwood of his presence. At daybreak of 20 August Villeneuve appears off Cadiz. Collingwood with his 4 vessels sheers off before Magon's light squadron, but the French pursuit ceases very soon and the combined armada enters Cadiz. Collingwood immediately again takes up his post of surveillance off the port.

This weak division is certainly insufficient to prevent a new sortie of the Franco-Spanish armada but it is going to be very quickly reinforced. Collingwood is joined on 22 August by Bickerton's 4 ships which have raised the blockade on Cartagena. On 30 August Calder arrives with his 18 ships bringing the total of forces under Collingwood's orders to 26.

Thus the despatch of Calder to the south, which could have compromised everything if Villeneuve had gone north as he should have, is found to the contrary very opportune and has permitted the British to lay hold of the combined armada

as soon as possible. Villeneuve, having let slip the favorable period from 20 to 30 August which would have given him opportunity once more to get to sea, in fact considers himself constrained to immobility although he has picked up the 6 Spanish ships which the lookouts report off the port. Nevertheless the balance of forces can not but improve to the profit of the British. On 28 September Nelson arrives off Cadiz with 3 other ships and a last division of 3 units is expected from England.

The concentration of British forces, which was first accomplished at Ushant, thus, thanks to the enemy's lack of activity and enterprise, very nearly succeeds in reconstituting itself off Cadiz. And while at Ushant its intervention was only defensive, preventive, eventual, here its role is offensive and aggressive with regard to the enemy which it has finally been able to seize. It blockades, it paralyzes, it immobilizes. The allied principal mass, charged with the capital part of the maneuver, is throttled and strangled without relief by a close blockade which denies it any evasion like that at Toulon, the origin of the whole affair.

This time the maneuver is dead, and thoroughly dead. Nothing can revive it.

For good measure, one month later at Trafalgar, the near destruction of that principal mass will serve better than any blockade to demolish the hopes which had been placed in it.

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The campaign of 1805, brilliant, though unfortunate example of the strategic maneuver, deserves some supplementary observations on which there is reason to insist.

First of all may be seen what difficulties can be encountered in certain cases in attempting to join forces. It is true these difficulties were aggravated by the lack of means which characterized that epoch. But the remark should nevertheless be made. One can not but be struck, for example, by the considerable obstacles which opposed junction of the French forces in the Antilles at the desired time, as by the inexorable fate which prevented that of Villeneuve and Allemand. The union of Villeneuve and Ganteaume off Brest, in the presence of the British fleet which blockaded that port, and before any encounter with that fleet, would be ruined by equally severe hindrances. First the wind which could carry Villeneuve easily and rapidly was from a direction exactly opposed that which could permit Ganteaume to sortie with little delay. Further the latter lacked a sufficiently defended area off the mouth to afford him the means of grouping and forming his ships before engaging combat. The anchorage of Bertheaume wasn't sufficiently protected so that he could remain there without being forced to fight, and the range of the coast batteries wasn't sufficiently great at that time so that their fire could deny the enemy access to the area off the mouth.

Incidentally this brings into clear view the importance to the blockaded party who wishes to maneuver and retain a certain ease of movement of a solid coast defense, pushed as far forward as possible. That remark holds for all time and is so precisely because the introduction of modern engines (long range guns, mines, submarines, aviation, etc. ...) has had the effect of pushing back the blockading force farther and farther to sea, that it has conferred by the same fact even a greater liberty of maneuver to the blockaded party.

It is equally surprising, in reading the recital of that campaign, to see how a fortunate chance has permitted the Allies to move with great facility in the presence of superior British forces. Never has example shown better the "relativity" of control of the sea upon which we have insisted in another part of this study. But this gift made to the Allies by favorable chance is altogether momentary. It is essentially revocable. Over their heads hovers the threat of the enemy fleet. No definite and decisive result can be gained as long as there has not been a victory over the organized British force to put that force out of action. Battle is the goal towards which maneuver should always be directed. Although that truth appeared clearly to Napoleon after many previous errors, it was much less alive in the spirit of his subordinates, far away, particularly Villeneuve, to direct all their efforts towards that battle and to seek to exploit every occasion they might encounter to fight the British in equal or inferior forces.

On the British side to the contrary the permanent seeking for combat is a principle resolutely accepted by all. It is satisfied either by movement or by static solution inspired by geography, but the annihilation of the organized enemy force is pursued by all means. In fact Villeneuve's escape from Toulon showed that his constrainment out of action by means of blockade was especially fragile and could reserve some disagreeable surprises. To attempt to immobilize is sometimes futile; to destroy is more certain.

Activity, by the degree to which it was practiced or neglected, played an essential role in the operations. On the Allied side failures from this point of view were constant and compromised the aim of Napoleon's maneuver from the beginning. They were sometime intended, and for that

reason are to be imputed to the central direction, as for example the delays imposed upon Villeneuve in the Antilles when he was ordered to wait there forty days for Ganteaume's arrival, or not to leave those waters until one month after the arrival of Magon. There were also fortuitous delays as when Villeneuve remained on the Galician coast from 28 July to 13 August, those fifteen previous days. These continual times of arrest acted continually to the detriment of the maneuver by preventing the Franco-Spanish from profiting from favorable situations created by the maneuver itself and sometimes also by indulgent fortune. In the face of that incurable waste of time Nelson's activity makes striking contrast. The speed of his two crossings of the Atlantic, proverbial, as well as the lively allure he has been able to impress upon operations, permitted him to return to Europe before Villeneuve and to recapture, at least in longitude, his considerable initial delay.

The initiative constantly shown by the British commanders is also to be praised, at least on the whole, with subtraction made for the two very questionable mistakes of Cornwallis and Nelson. Moreover it was easy for them to practice that initiative usefully, and without being exposed to the danger of acting against the intentions of the Admiralty, because the latter, conscious of its true role of central organ and of the limit of its possibilities as to the conduct of operations, had adopted the most judicious attitude with respect to them. It had made known to all its executors its directive idea and its essential intentions, putting them completely au courant with its thoughts, and within these large instructions, it refrained as much as possible from interfering directly in the details of execution. Thus the British commanders may be seen personally taking weighty decisions, themselves resolving problems

which are unexpectedly presented, advising each other of important happenings and of movements which they are executing, sending their information to the Admiralty, etc... Their active exchange of information, based on a sano comprehension of the situation and on a profound and singular military camaraderie is worthy of admiration. To perform that service they utilize the light ships of which they dispose with a rare mastery; frigates, corvettes, brigs, cutters, radiating in all directions with that intention.

On the French side inverse declarations are made. The initiative of subordinate commanders is generally non-existant. Ganteaume neither dares to undertake anything, nor to leave Brest without asking for orders on the subject. Gourdon, executing literally those he received, does not budge from Ferrol even when Calder has raised the blockade. Allemand, although advised of the presence of Villeneuve at sea in his immediate vicinity, persists in proceeding to Vigo as was prescribed him though he is sure of finding no one in that port. In the midst of that general passivity Villeneuve's decision to hasten his return from the Antilles constitutes a remarkable exception and it should therefore be appreciated.

The principal cause of that state of affairs rests in the deplorable method of command practiced by Napoleon, which is exactly opposite from that employed by the British Admiralty. In the first place the Emperor systematically refuses to communicate his plan of maneuver to all of his principal subordinates; he hardly reveals his projects to a single one of them. The remainder are in no wise informed, and, curdled in the punctual execution of a precise order,

can not themselves act and do not try. Further, Napoleon, without taking any account of the distances, of the changing and unforeseen situations, of the extreme slowness of communications of that time, continually interfered in the execution by detailed, imperative, rigorous orders, instead of confining himself to directing the whole known to all. Two periods are characteristic of this point of view. First that which runs from 30 April to the end of July, up to the arrival of Villeneuve in Europe, and then that which lasts from 21 August to the end of September, Villeneuve's entry into Cadiz became known after his movement towards the north had been hoped for.

These two periods are marked on the part of Napoleon by a feverish agitation, by the boiling vapor of an unchained imagination, by a complete disorder which manifests itself in a series of orders and counter-orders of which the greater part never reach their destination in time and which result in no influence on the events. It is for that reason, moreover, that we have not wished to burden the brief resume' we have made of the operations by their recital.

The system employed by the Emperor, absolutely contrary to that indicated for the conduct of naval war in that epoch, had to lead infallibly to two results. First, the orders which Napoleon sent, because of long delays in transmission, were found generally inapplicable and inoperative when they reached the subordinate commanders, the situation having been profoundly modified in the interval. In the second place, the executors, habituated to acting only under orders from higher up, had become fatally immersed in inertia and lost the feeling and the sense of initiative. In fact in this matter the chief reaps what he sows; it is only by habituating his subordinates to act of themselves that he can make of them men of action, capable, in his absence,

when an urgent decision is to be made, of substituting for him and doing what he himself would have done. Initiative is like a muscle; it is developed by exercise and it atrophies if left unused.

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A large part of the preceding observations, as of those which the reader has been able to make for himself in view of the exposure of the operations, is explained by an element which, in the first place, has but a secondary importance, but which is at bottom the key to everything, to appreciate the mediocre value of the Allies' combat units.

And here we are veritably at the heart of the question.

Villeneuve's correspondence is nothing but a long series of complaints concerning the material condition of his ships, the insufficiency of their effective numbers and inexperience of their personnel. At his very departure he is obliged to complete his crews by detachments of infantry. The paucity of training in a naval sense of the commanders, officers and crews becomes evident at the outset and still persists after two months of navigation. On 7 August, after the fight off Cape Finisterre, Villeneuve writes: "All that (the success of the plan of maneuver) had to be accomplished, I do not say with an excellent, maneuverable squadron, but even with very ordinary vessels. I encountered nineteen days of contrary winds. The Spanish division and my own accomplished each morning four leagues although the greater part of the ships passed the night without sails. Two blows from the northeast damaged us because we have poor sails, poor tackle, poor officers, poor sailors ... Not exercised in combat and squadron maneuvers, all the captains in the fog have followed no other rule than to follow their next ahead, and here we are the laughing-stock of Europe." On

10 August after anchoring in the Bay of Ares, Villeneuve again says sadly: "All the French and Spanish vessels ran foul of each other in anchoring." On departure from Corogne, in spite of several expedients taken to complete the crews, they lacked 2,000 men. On 15 August in making his decision to lay course for Cadiz, Villaneuve gives as one of his motives that he has "no confidence in the condition of the armament of the ships, in their speed, and in their ability to maneuver." At the dawn of Trafalgar, a conference of captains held on board the BUCENTAURE recognizes that "all the ships of the two allied nations are for the most part poorly armed because of the weakness of the crews, and that several of the ships have not yet been able to exercise their crews at sea."

The Spanish ships are not, in fact, in better condition than ours. Their situation is even worse.(*) Their material however is not bad, apart from certain defects in rigging. But on the contrary everything relative to personnel leaves a fearful lot to be desired. First as to quantity: the fleet required more than 100,000 men to be properly manned, and the registered sailors reached a total of but 60,000 men, from which must be deducted all those who served in merchantmen. The great deficiencies which result from that numerical disparity are filled by impressment, by forced enlistment of all vagabonds, and finally by shipping condemned men who could choose that as their lesser punishment. The whole is completed, as in France, by means of great detachments of infantry completely ignorant of the sea. The ensemble results in ships quite inferior and, as a Spanish admiral said, "herds of humans destined to fill holes and to provoke trouble."

(*) On this subject see the article of Engisn Moullec, Some Asides on Trafalgar from the Spanish Point of View, Revue Maritime, February 1928.

It would not be impossible to assimilate a large part of these heterogeneous elements, as well as other navies not so well endowed were doing it at the same time. That would be to smelt, amalgamate and cement the whole by means of intensive training. Unfortunately, since 1802 especially, the Spanish navy had just rounded out a period of total inaction, navigating little or not at all, and remaining in its arsenals. The dawn of Trafalgar many of the gunners had never seen a piece fired. Also the crews, through lack of training, even more than ours, would have a deplorable conduct in action, in spite of their considerable bravery.

As to the officers, if several particularly brilliant men like Gravina, Escano, Churruca, Galiana, models of talent, of chivalrous spirit and courage, are excepted, the mass gives rise to the same criticism as the crews. The same inexperience of the sea, of maneuver, of navigation and of military questions.

Finally, great discontent reigns in the Spanish navy because of delay in payment of wages, a consequence of the indigence of the State. Many officers and sailors are reduced to extreme poverty.

Such then is the condition, less than mediocre, of the instruments of combat themselves, the French and Spanish ships. Moreover everything contributing to their maintenance has been neglected or left wanting to the same degree. In the Antilles Villeneuve does not find the provisions necessary for his squadron. Martinique can furnish him provisions only for one month. And it is that consideration, as much as his estimate of the general strategic situation, which decides the French Admiral to sail for Europe. At Vigo, at Corogne,

and even at Ferrol, they suffer from a marked lack of provisions. At Cadiz the combined armada finds an almost empty arsenal, even in the vicinity of supplies; only biscuits, of which there is urgent need, are to be had there. The sanitary situation, a consequence of the crews' insufficient acclimatization to life at sea, causes Villeneuve the liveliest anxiety on his return to the coast of Spain. The ships have an average of from sixty to one hundred twenty sick; three of them count one hundred fifty. the ACHILLE has nearly two hundred.

Against this sad balance-sheet of the Allies must be placed the situation of the British which, though not perfect, is nevertheless infinitely better. The material is solid and has been proved. Everything concerning maintenance of naval forces is the object of constant care on the part of the State, and the arsenals and bases distant are conveniently provided. Finally and most important, the officers and crews (the latter of somewhat inferior origin) are inured and admirably trained by a permanent sojourn at sea and frequent exercises. While Napoleon fancies that they wear themselves out in this service, they actually by it acquire force and vigor, and their fighting worth, their aptitude for maneuver and shooting is kept high. By a strange, vicious circle the situation of the side which has control of the sea consolidates itself by the exercise of that very control which involves constant presence at sea, whilst the strength of the inferior side decreases from day to day from the very fact that it is shut in its harbors.

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Since that time everything is clear.

From the tactical point of view, it is permissible to admire Nelson and his combinations at Trafalgar less. Against an adversary of his own stamp his arrival in disorder

at the enemy line would perhaps have resulted in a crushing check and a severe lesson.

In the strategic order, which alone interests us here, the great inequality which exists between the worth of the units on the two sides explains things quite well and involves some important consequences.

All the calculations relative to the forces in play which Napoleon made before the events, and which we can be tempted to make a posteriori, lack foundation and signify nothing. They are completely false because of the inequality in question. A British ship is worth a ship and a half, and even sometimes two enemy ships of the same rating. One does not reckon with the same units. The same term does not have the same valuo on the two sides.

The allied commanders understand that. It is that which renders them hesitant and timid. It is that which shears them of all go, all audacity, all spirit of enterprise. It is that which annihilates in them all desire to seek battle. The slight numerical superiority which they have in certain cases does not cause them any illusion. It would have to be crushing for them to decide upon action. Only Napoleon sees the situation with optimism, through the deforming prism of pure arithmetic.

From the special point of view of maneuver, the great inequality in worth of the forces in play affects the fixation which one is tempted to realize with secondary groups while the principal group takes decisive action. This was, in numerous circumstances the favorite idea of Napoleon to oblige the British to immobilize off our ports a large part of their means in order to blockade such of our forces as happened to be there. He thus counted on realizing a fixation by devoting to it an inferior number of fixed forces. Now here we have the absolute opposite resulting. It is the blockader who fixes us by nemerically inferior means.

Cornwallis with 17 ships contains the 21 of Ganteaume; Calder, with 10, paralyzes Gourdon, who has 14, at Ferrol; Collingwood, with 4, blockades the 6 Spanish vessels at Cadiz; Bickerton likewise at Cartagena with 4 ships against the 6 of Salcedo. And that situation is further affirmed and established by precise facts. On 22 August, Ganteaume, who has just moored between Camaret and Bertheaume with 20 ships, is constrained to repass the mouth by the attack that Cornwallis threatens with but 17 ships. In the other ports, in spite of their numerical superiority, the blockades ships do not dare to risk confronting their adversaries.

By and large, on 31 July, the allies had 71 vessels in the game and the British but 54. The favorable situation appeared acquired at the outset, and their maneuver had but to propose, as often, to create that situation by surmouting a global inferiority of means. Figures alone appear to give it them. At bottom, there is nothing to it. Despite their lesser effective number of the British check the hostile maneuver and have finally the upper hand.

This inferiority in the worth of units which involved such serious consequences -- was it inevitable? In no wise, since at the same time the French ships which were operating in the Indian Ocean were distinguishing themselves by a remarkable aptitude for combat, and since they affirmed their superiority in many encounters with British ships. But those ships had the advantage of possessing a complete personnel, stable and remarkably trained by continually remaining at sea. In the same way, the deficiencies and the miscalculations made in the possibilities of revictualling and maintenance were not without remedy. The Allies' resources permitted them a better state of affairs. But to solve the one problem and the other conveniently they should have had to devote to that task all of their powers without any distraction against their continental enemies. A victory

against England was to be had only at that price. It was then, the whole problem of Napoleonic policy which was in the balance in that roundabout way.

In resume', from that adventure one lesson holds good, obvious but useful to repeat and cogitate. One cannot maneuver without possessing the appropriate instruments, and there are maneuvers which are forbidden and which one can not attempt when the proper instruments are not available. Napoleon's plan of maneuver was destined to checkmate because it was too ambitious and did not take account of the mediocrity of the means by which it was to be accomplished. The worth of means is, in fact, an elementary factor which is often lost to view in building up strategic combinations, either in reality or in pure theory. There is a temptation to admit as a postulatum that everything is perfectly satisfactory in this direction and materials supposed a priori to be excellent are used in construction. But contact with reality soon causes that gratuitous credulence to dissipate and brings attention back to "basic conditions", "original conditions". It shows that the execution of the whole plan rests on the worth of the units and the satisfaction of the requirements of maintenance. Without them, no freedom of action, no operations, and consequently, no maneuver.

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

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

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Theories Strategiques

by

Castex

Volume II

CHAPTERS V TO IX

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by

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THEORIES STRATEGIQUES

Von Spee's Division in the Pacific

by

ADMIRAL CASTEX

A study of the German operations in the Pacific during the last six months of 1914 is of special interest for the reason that the maneuvers of which they were an example have, so to speak, the character of a transition between those which we have previously examined and those which we may expect to meet with at present and in the future.

Conditions of the moment and of the period as well as local conditions make this campaign a remarkable mile stone, a significant stage in the evolution undergone by strategic maneuvers under the influence of technical progress.

Old factors, which formerly governed operations and even facilitated some of them, are here maintained practically intact. New factors, which now present the problem of maneuvering in a different form, make their appearance, but only partially.

In the Pacific, as in the course of the War of American Independence and the Campaign of 1805, we find expanse which permits of movement and unforeseen variations and, by the mere play of very great distances, intervenes to prolong the existence of a situation favorable for some and unfavorable for others. Comparatively speaking, this expanse is empty, at any rate in its center. We find there, few passers-by. The great role of neutral shipping in gleaning or spreading information is much diminished, inspite of its inherent speed and the very swift means of communication which modern technique has put at its disposal. This role does not exceed that which the same shipping formerly played in other regions where it was

Much more dense but half crippled by lack of means of communicating with the rest of the world and of spreading information. On the whole, conditions are pretty nearly equal in this respect; compensation has taken place. Finally, the absence of submarines, of mines and hostile aviation gives to any one who maneuvers under these conditions a freedom of action quite comparable to that of the past and one which would not exist in our day in any other theater of operations. To sum up, a maneuver in the Pacific in 1914 will necessarily offer many points of resemblances with the maneuvers of former times insofar as the methods of execution are concerned.

On the other hand, new elements will give these maneuvers a new aspect. Steam has furnished the units with unheard of possibilities - first, in regard to speed; but this deserves only passing mention for speed was not used in 1914, change of position having been effected at a moderate rate of speed in order to economize coal. But steam has, above all, resulted in reliability and accurate computation of the length of time required for movements and thereby has endowed maneuvering with a degree of certainty which was lacking in the past. The price paid for this advantage lies in the tremendous development of the problem of maintenance, the very basis of maneuvering, and especially in the considerable importance which the question of fuel replenishment has assumed. The Germans, even more than the Allies, were continually worried on that score. On the other hand, we see for the first time the prominence assumed in modern maneuvers by rapid means of communication, such as cables and wireless and note what a weapon they constitute in the hands of the commander-in-chief in the general direction of operations or the local commander in sending orders and receiving information. It is thanks to these means of transmission that neutral shipping was able to offset the inferiority in which it was placed

by its very feeble density in these regions, insofar as the gathering of information for either of the belligerents was concerned.

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The Initial Situation

On the Allied side, the forces in the Pacific are distributed as follows:

The British China Squadron (Vice Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram) consisting of:

1 battleship - Triumph, disarmed at Hong Kong;

2 armored cruisers - Minotaur, Hampshire;

2 light cruisers - Newcastle, Yarmouth;

8 destroyers;

3 submarines;

4 small torpedo boats;

6 despatch boats;

10 river gun boats.

On the 20th of July 1914, this squadron was at Wei-hai-Wei with the exception of the Newcastle, which was in dock at Nagasaki, one despatch boat, three destroyers, three submarines and four small torpedo boats, which lay at Hong Kong.

Admiral Jerram receives word of the political tension, also an order to concentrate his forces at Hong Kong, a movement which is immediately executed. The Triumph is armed and the river gun boats disarmed. Later on the China squadron is reinforced by passenger ships converted into auxiliary cruisers - the Empress of Asia, Empress of Japan, Empress of Russia and Himalaya.

The Australian Squadron (Rear Admiral Sir George Patey) is composed of:

1 battle cruiser - Australia;

4 light cruisers - Sydney, Melbourne, Encounter, Pioneer;

3 destroyers;

2 submarines.

The Australian squadron, placed by Australia under the orders of the Admiralty, is concentrated at Sydney with the exception of the Sydney and the three destroyers which are sent to Moreton Bay (near Brisbane).

The New Zealand division (Captain Marshall) consists of the three protected cruisers Psyche, Pyramus, Philomel and one despatch boat. This division, which remains in New Zealand, is placed under the orders of Admiral Patey.

In the Northeastern Pacific are to be found the small cruiser Rainbow of the Canadian navy, which sails from Esquimalt to cover the coast from Vancouver to the Equator, and two British despatch boats - Algerine and Shearwater which leave the coast of Mexico, as soon as the political situation becomes tense, to return to Esquimalt.

The French naval forces are likewise made up of several groups.

The Far Eastern division (Rear Admiral Huguet) consisting of the following units:

1. One armored cruiser, the Montcalm, flying the admiral's flag, which ship, having recently made a cruise to South America, left Tahiti on the 2nd of August headed for Suva (Fiji Islands). This vessel was to report at Hong Kong to be incorporated in the squadron of Jarram. As a matter of fact, she remained attached to the Australian squadron during the period we are discussing.

2. A second armored cruiser, the Dupleix, on a cruise in Japan. This vessel left Hakodate on July 29th, in view of the

political tension, to report to Hong Kong, where she arrives on the 5th of August and is placed under the orders of Admiral Jerram.

3. One despatch boat, d'Iberville.

4. One sea-going gun boat, Decidée, and four river gun boats which are disarmed on the outbreak of hostilities.

The naval division of Indo-China (Captain Boisrouvray) furnished to the active operations only the destroyers Pistolet, Fronde and Mousquet.

The despatch boat Kersaint remained at Noumea where she was disarmed, her crew assisting in the defense of that fortress.

The gun boat Zélée is at Tahiti.

Finally, we should mention the Russian cruisers Askold and Yemtchoug, both at Vladivostok.

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The German East Asiatic squadron commanded by Vice Admiral von Spee, is composed of:

2 armored cruisers - Scharnhorst, Gneisenau;

3 light cruisers - Emden, Leipzig, Nurnberg;

2 destroyers - Taku, S-90, in very bad condition;

4 sea-going gun boats, disarmed at Tsing-Tao on the outbreak of the war;

3 river gun boats, disarmed at Canton and at Nanking at the same time;

2 Hydrographic vessels - Planet and Komet.

The old station cruiser Cormoran, then undergoing major

repairs at Tsing-Tao, is attached to the German possessions of Oceania.

Austria maintains in the Far East the old Kaiserin-Elisabeth, which is based on Tsing-Tao.

Two passenger vessels armed as auxiliary cruisers subsequently leave Tsing-Tao: the Prinz-Eitel-Friedrich and the new Cormoran (ex-Russian Riasan).

Let us bear in mind that the Germans possess in the Pacific a certain number of colonies which can serve as bases of very unequal value, to-wit:

Kiaochow and its port of Tsing-Tao;

The Marianas, the Caroline and Marshall Islands;

The eastern part of New Guinea with the port of Rabaul;

The Bismarck Archipelago (New Pomerania, New Mecklenburg, etc.);

Part of the Solomon Islands;

The Pelew Islands;

The Islands of Yap and Nauru;

The Samoan Islands.

The Germans have installed high power wireless stations at Tsing-Tao, Yap, Nauru, and medium power stations at Angaur (Pelew), Rabaul and Apia (Samoa). Moreover, Yap is connected by cable with Shanghai, Guam, the Celebes Islands and Rabaul.

Starting on June 28th from Nagasaki for a cruise in the Pacific, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau arrive on July 7th at the Island of Truk (Carolines). Admiral von Spee receives orders from Berlin to remain in the Carolines because of the complications which have arisen in Europe. He leaves Truk again on July 15th and on the 17th anchors at Ponape. It is there, through telegrams from Berlin relayed to him by wireless, that he follows the evolution of the political crisis which ultimately leads to war. On the 31st of July he is advised of "a state of

danger of war", on the 2nd of August of the mobilization and on the 5th of August of the belligerency of England. He has some information concerning the enemy forces and knows that the British China squadron has left Wei-hai-Wei bound for the South.

The Emden and the destroyers remain at Tsing-Tao as well as the Kaiserin-Elisabeth. The gun boats are at different points on the coast of China.

The Nurnberg receives, at San Francisco on July 17th, a telegram from the admiral recalling her. She leaves San Francisco on July 21st, touches at Honolulu on the 27th and arrives at Ponape on August 6th where she joins the two armored cruisers.

The Leipzig receives the mobilization order on August 2nd at Mazatlan, Mexico, where she had relieved the Nurnberg. She leaves this port on August 3rd, takes on provisions at Magdalena Bay on the 4th and resumes again, on the 5th, her route towards the North in order to commence commerce destroying.

In closing, we should mention the presence in the Pacific of the small station cruiser, Geier, of the East African division. After calling at Singapore on the 29th of July she buries herself in the archipelago of the Dutch East Indies and for a long time remains unnoticed in the struggle which is about to begin.

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The German Preparation

Who is entitled to the credit for conceiving the campaign of the Pacific; the German Admiralty or von Spee; the general staff or the local commander? This is the first interesting question which must be asked.

The official history of the German navy shows that the general staff played no part in the initial orientation of the operations. It states specifically, "intervention from Berlin in a situation of which it could not make an estimate would have been a grave mistake, so far as the Eastern Asiatic theater of operations was concerned, the effect of which might have been fraught with tragic consequences." As a matter of fact, as late as July 27th we see Berlin telegraphing to Admiral von Spee, after taking up matters of secondary importance, as follows: "The rest is left to your discretion." The rest, i.e., the essential, the plan of operations itself. On the 18th of August a second telegram states again: "The use of the squadron is left to the discretion of its commander." This telegram, by the way, was never received by von Spee, nor were the last words of encouragement of the Kaiser. The official history adds that, during the entire month of August, no information was had in German as to the intentions of the admiral.

What is interesting in this document, however, is the indication it gives of the conviction held in Berlin that von Spee would not only resort to commerce destroying but would also seek opportunities for combat with the enemy forces. Reference is even made to the possible advisability of von Spee's "attacking and overcoming the British high sea forces", "of inflicting a decisive defeat on the British forces". Likewise in high official circles it was considered possible that the admiral might shift his theater of operations to regions other than the Far East; that he might even go so far as to operate in the Atlantic Ocean.

It should be noted that, if the general staff was far removed from the scene where the maneuvers were to be put into execution, it had, nevertheless, actively participated in their preparation and in their pre-war conception by means of a continual exchange of views with Admiral von Spee during the two years he was in

command, i.e., from 1912 to 1914. This collaboration resulted in two documents of great value as indicative of German thought.

The first document, a simple collection of general directives, is the plan of operations of the general staff for "ships on distant cruises in the event of a war with England or with a coalition of which England might be a member". The objective assigned to these vessels is, of course, commerce destroying. However, this general principal is laid down - that in order to reach enemy commerce one must, whenever necessary, "act offensively against naval forces equal or inferior". Endeavor should be made to create diversion for the benefit of the principal naval forces and to "assist the conduct of the war in Germany by keeping the greatest possible number of enemy forces occupied". The attention of the executants is directed to the importance of the question of coal supply. Finally, the plan deals directly with operations in the Pacific. It foresees a change in the zone of operations. "By moving rapidly into that zone, the enemy will be obliged to pursue and consequently to scatter his forces and thus an opportunity will be created to obtain tactical successes against fractions of the enemy forces". If the opportunity presents itself, recourse can be had to this mode of procedure from the outset. "If circumstances are particularly favorable for the cruiser squadron, upon the declaration of war, an immediate attack on the enemy forces might be considered in order to paralyze British commerce by conquering the mastery of the sea."

Without a doubt, although constructed for a war of commerce destroying, the German conception is based on maneuver and even on the seeking of combat between the organized forces whenever the situation is in the slightest degree favorable. Moreover, the official history informs us that Admiral von Spee, confident in the training of his forces, desired an encounter and that in a report dated January 2nd, 1913, addressed to his Admiralty, he

requested order for an immediate offensive against the British forces and, with this object in view, asked that his units be kept concentrated. It can be said, with some show of reason, that such a method would be ineffective, as the choice, in the last analysis, would rest with the superior British forces. What is more, such a course was hardly calculated to bring results in commerce destroying, which requires a dispersion of units. Looking at the matter solely from the point of view of the struggle between the organized forces in the Pacific, however, I cannot help but approve this line of thought which was ultimately crowned with success.

The second document, mentioned previously, is the "Plan of Operations of the German East Asiatic squadron", laid down by Admiral von Spee for his squadron in accordance with the foregoing general directives and in conformity with the intentions of the German Admiralty. The admiral, after studying the attitude of his adversary, wisely supposed that his opponent would take the offensive against his squadron in order to rid the scene of its presence as quickly as possible and, until this result was obtained, would not divide his forces except in such a manner that each group operating by itself would be able to cope with the united squadron of German cruisers. In view of this assumption and the distribution of the enemy forces in the beginning of 1914, von Spee concluded that, at most, three enemy groups might be formed.

His governing thought was not to let himself be locked up in Tsing-Tao but, on the contrary, to keep away from that port and by repeated attacks against the commerce of the enemy, to "deflect enough of the enemy force from Tsing-Tao that access to this port could be opened by a violent attack with all available forces". With this object in mind, operations would be undertaken in Chinese and Japanese waters and in the Straits of Malacca and, eventually, on the coasts of Australia and India.

Von Spee also planned, if permitted by particularly favorable circumstances, immediately to attack the enemy forces in the hopes of obtaining the mastery of the sea in the Far East.

In the event of war against Japan he considered shifting the scene of operations of the cruiser squadron to more distant regions.

The personnel of the sea-going and of the river gun boats, as well as that of the various secondary vessels, are to be used to man the auxiliary cruisers.

Finally, he arranges a remarkable auxiliary organization in the form of relays, that is to say, bases established in friendly or neutral ports for gathering and forwarding by steamer necessary provisions of all kinds, especially coal, as well as for collecting and disseminating information. For the scene of operations in the Pacific these relays and their commanders are as follows:

- Tsing-Tao (Lieutenant Commander Sachse, ex-commander of the gun boat Iltis);
- Japan (Lieutenant Commander von Knorr, Naval Attaché at Tokio);
- Shanghai (Lieutenant Commander Luring, ex commander of the gun boat Jaguar);
- Manila (Lieutenant von Müller, ex-commander of the gun boat Tsing-Tao);
- Batavia (Lieutenant Baeumker, ex-commander of the gun boat Tiger);
- North America;
- South America.

In conformity with the plan adopted, Admiral von Spee on starting on his cruise in the Pacific, left instructions on June 7th with the commander of the Emden, which vessel remained at Tsing-Tao, warning him that in case of political tension, the cruisers would approach Tsing-Tao (without calling there) in order

to take on provisions. The colliers are directed to gather at the island of Pagan (Marianas). The Emden is ordered to make sure of their sortie from Tsing-Tao, not to let herself be blocked in that port and then to join the main force. Admiral von Spee contemplates, therefore, a concentration at Pagan, a point which was chosen because of its remoteness from frequented regions and because of its central position, about equi-distant from the coast of Japan, the Philippines, China and the Moluccas, a situation which would give at the outset a choice of objectives in several equally promising directions. Moreover, the presence of the squadron would run less risk of being immediately revealed.

To sum up, the result of these different instructions is that the German plan, laid down more especially with a view to commerce destroying, pays great attention, nevertheless, insofar as the East Asiatic squadron is concerned, to the possibility of a conflict between organized forces. Combat shall be sought and engaged in, if circumstances are favorable. In order to obtain this, reliance is placed on the dispersion of enemy forces which is likely to result from attacks on his commerce. In the face of this dispersion, a relatively strong mass is to be concentrated, capable of standing up against most of the hostile groups likely to be encountered. Above all, care should be taken to avoid being caught at the start and blocked in Tsing-Tao and, therefore, the forces are to take position slightly outside of the zone where the principal enemy forces are normally stationed. Besides observing initial secrecy, freedom of action is to be maintained; going so far even as to change the zone of operations should circumstances so require. Careful plans for obtaining supplies in readily movable form, here and there, contribute to that freedom of action and ensure flexibility in the game to be played.

The German conception, therefore, is essentially one of maneuver.

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First Movements.

(Map VI)

At Tsing-Tao the commander of the Emden and the Military Governor prepare for mobilization as soon as the political tension increases. The colliers for the squadron are sent to points agreed upon, especially to Pagan, the gun boats disarmed, the passenger ship Prinz-Eitel-Friedrich is armed as an auxiliary cruiser. The Emden makes a short raid, from July 30th to August 6th, in the China Sea. On August 4th she captures the small Russian passenger ship Riasan which is taken into Tsing-Tao and there armed as an auxiliary cruiser and given the name of Cormoran.

On August 6th, as soon as the Nurnberg arrives, von Spee's division (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Nurnberg) leaves Ponape. It arrives at Pagan on August 11th and there is met by the supply ships despatched from Tsing-Tao, by way of Japan. On the 12th they are joined by the Emden and the Prinz-Eitel-Friedrich which left Tsing-Tao on August 6th, the Emden having been called to Pagan as far back as the 5th of August in conformity with the plan agreed upon.

On the Allied side, Admiral Jerram's squadron is at Hong Kong on the 5th of August, together with the Dupleix. The arming of the Triumph is pushed, the English and French gun boats are disarmed. The forces at Saigon are mobilized and the d'Iberville, Pistolet, Mousquet and Fronde sent to Singapore. Only the two

Russian ships Askold and Yemtchoug do not report for duty but remain at Vladivostok.

Admiral Jerram knows but little concerning the position of the main enemy group. One report, which turns out to be false, locates it near the Solomon Islands. Admiral Jerram believes that von Spee will attempt to get into Tsing-Tao and decides, therefore, to take position in front of that port. Later, relying on a report received on the 5th, which again proves to be false, that the Emden and some supply ships had left this port on that day, he comes to the conclusion that von Spee will not come back to Tsing-Tao and that his junction with the Emden will be made somewhere in the South, perhaps at Yap. He decides, therefore, to proceed toward that point in order to establish contact with the German force, as well as to destroy the wireless station on that island.

Up to this point everything is correct. The pursuit of the organized enemy force governs the decisions taken. Moreover, the destruction of the wireless station at Yap is justifiable. It is a small operation which can be easily and rapidly accomplished, and one which will be helpful in that it will tend to disorganize the German system of communications.

Moreover, the two operations, the search for the enemy and the point toward Yap, can be easily and boldly undertaken and, of course, with all forces united.

At this point Admiral Jerram is seized with the strange idea of dividing his force. A first group composed of the Minotaur, Hampshire and Newcastle, is assigned to the attack on Yap. A second group composed of the Triumph, Dupleix, Yarmouth and five destroyers is sent to operate in front of Tsing-Tao. These two groups set sail together from Hong Kong on August 6th. It is, therefore, when most exposed to encountering the concentrated force of the enemy, consisting of two large armored cruisers and

two light cruisers, that the English admiral feels called upon to scatter his forces!

The first group, under the direct orders of Admiral Jerram, proceeds toward Yap at fifteen knots. On the 11th a German collier is sunk. The Hampshire, short of coal, goes back to Hong Kong. On the 12th the wireless station is destroyed by bombardment. (It is subsequently restored by the hydrographic vessel Planet and starts functioning anew on August 22nd but with a reduced radius of five hundred miles). Admiral Jerram then proceeds toward the Yellow Sea to join forces with the second group but, having received notice that Japan was about to declare war, also (on the 11th) an order from the Admiralty directing him to send the Newcastle to the coast of North America, he starts this vessel for Esquimalt by way of Yokohama and returns to Hong Kong with only the Minotaur.

Here we have the first group divided into three parts and that at a critical time. This puts the finishing touches on the picture of dispersion.

To make matters worse the Newcastle is sent alone to cross a zone presumably hostile. It is under these conditions that on August 13th she passed within two hundred miles only of Pagan where the main German force was situated.

Coming now to the pursuit of the enemy, nothing is more instructive than an a posteriori examination of a map on which the movements of the two sides are charted. On the 6th of August one of them left Hong Kong, the other Ponape, heading almost directly for one another. On the 12th of August they had considerably reduced the distance separating them, the English are at Yap and the Germans at Pagan, and on that very day Admiral Jerram, without troubling himself to seek out the organized enemy force, turns his back on the enemy and retraces his steps after having scattered his entire command! It must be said, however, that the care he

had taken to effect his own dispersion had placed him in a position hardly fitting him to withstand an attack.

The second group heads to the North by the Straits of Formosa. The 8th of August, while to the North of that island, a report is received to the effect that the Emden had been seen on the 7th at 10 o'clock 120 miles Southeast of Tsing-Tao in company with two small ships (as a matter of fact these are the Prinz-Eitel-Friedrich and the collier Markomannia), heading to the South. As these ships were not met with on the 8th it was presumably because they had sped to the Southeast and it is in this direction that they should have been sought. The second group makes no attempt to do so and cruises in the Yellow Sea on the 9th and 10th. On the 11th it returns to the Saddle Islands, situated at the mouth of the Yang-Tse, to take on coal. The Cormoran, which left Tsing-Tao on 10th of August to join von Spee, is also allowed to slip through.

Later on, the second group undertakes a more or less effective blockade of Tsing-Tao, using the Saddle Islands as a base. Thus, owing to the initial errors committed in the British camp, the Allies have lost the first opportunity to come to close quarters with the main enemy fleet. No whole-hearted attempt was made in that direction. Von Spee has been allowed to escape from Far Eastern waters which were fraught with danger for him, just as he had been allowed to slip units out of Tsing-Tao which could have been bottled up there. He has made his get-away, the necessary essential base of his campaign.

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Von Spee's Plan of Campaign

On August 5th, before leaving Ponape, Admiral von Spee was informed by Berlin that Japan would remain neutral if the Germans refrained from attacking the British possessions in the Far East. It is then that the admiral conceives the project of abandoning these shores and of either making a campaign of commerce destroying in the Indian Ocean or attempting to get back to Germany by way of Cape Horn. He asks that coal supplies be prepared for him in Chile. In a despatch on that subject dated August 5th, Berlin advises him: "Chile neutral and well disposed", a detail which the German admiral knows better than anyone else.

During the crossing from Ponape to Pagan, on the 7th 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th of August, he receives contradictory reports concerning the future attitude of Japan. On the 13th a mutilated despatch reaches him, sent by the Tsing-Tao station. Fragmentary phrases such as "declaration of war"... "retire toward Chile as the enemy appears to be heading to the South" are deciphered.

Beginning August 12th, the wireless station at Yap remains silent. The admiral infers that this must be because it has been destroyed and consequently that enemy forces are in this region searching for the cruiser squadron. He, thereupon, makes an estimate of the situation and definitely decides to abandon the East Indian theater of operations and to choose another.

In this connection, a campaign in the Indian Ocean does not appear very attractive. To begin with, it would be necessary to get to that region without being seen, an extremely difficult task. His division accompanied by its supply ships could not pass unnoticed through the narrow straits between the islands of the Sunda. The squadron would be immediately noticed, its presence broadcasted and pursued. The advantages of secrecy and surprise would be lost. To be sure, the Indian Ocean offers some

very tempting targets in the shape of trade routes, but for that very reason von Spee is certain to find an enemy force more powerful than his division. Finally, it would be extremely difficult in that region to make sure of coal supply.

To operate along the coast of Australia would be no better. He would immediately run into the Australian squadron which includes a battle cruiser very superior to the German cruisers.

There is one solution, however, which is infinitely more promising and that is to head for the Southeastern Pacific. To begin with, in striking out diagonally across that ocean, the chances are that he could cover up his tracks as he would be crossing an unfrequented region very rarely traversed by vessels. Adopting such a course he could maintain secrecy concerning his movements and make sure of effecting a surprise in subsequent zones of operation where he would suddenly appear. The archipelago of Oceania would furnish a number of stopping places, lost in space, far from prying eyes and out of touch with the rest of the world, where his division could quietly take on supplies. By heading in this general direction his concentration of forces is assured as the Leipzig could easily join the squadron and the Dresden, which was operating in the South Atlantic, could likewise be added. This concentration is in a striking contrast with the dispersion of the enemy which the operations of the other German cruisers, at that time going full blast, is increasing and developing. Von Spee has reason to hope that he might be able suddenly to make his appearance in massed formation on some point of the immense cordon of scattered enemy forces, attack a weak opponent with his entire strength and thereby obtain at once an important success. Moreover, this region is one far distant from the bases and centers of enemy power. The latter would require much time in order to send reinforcements and reestablish the balance of power in his favor.

The Japanese vessels could not come into these waters without alarming the United States and thereby hurting the Allied cause. Moreover, would not the Japanese be maintained motionless in their present location by the uncertainty which would exist as to von Spee's movements and position? The favorable situation created by the German initiative and this sudden shifting of forces would doubtless last a considerable length of time.

Finally, on the coast of Chile, the German vessels would get the benefit of a neutrality of the most kindly sort. Taking on supplies would be greatly facilitated. Information could be had whenever wanted. Communication with Germany would be simple. The problem of upkeep, of information, of communication would be as easily handled as the military problem itself. (All this is temporary, of course; von Spee could not cherish the fond hope of remaining master of the seas unaided, in view of the crushing Allied superiority. His final doom is sealed, but we are considering only the first operations, those in the Pacific).

There are, therefore, innumerable arguments which influence von Spee to undertake a maneuver of the most promising kind and to direct it toward the Southeastern Pacific.

On the 13th of August the admiral makes up his mind. He calls, on that day, all of his commanding officers to a council on board the Scharnhorst, of which von Muller, commander of the Emden, has left an account in which he says: "The commander of the squadron set forth his views concerning the situation and the most sensible course of action which the cruiser squadron could adopt. He brought out the advantages which were to be found in keeping the enemy cruisers in the dark as long as possible concerning his movements and changes of position, as by so doing a large number of the enemy units would be immobilized.....

"Count von Spee stated that, after lengthy consideration, he had decided to begin by taking the cruiser squadron to the

West coast of America.....

"In closing, the commander of the squadron gave orders to leave Pagan that very night and to have all ships ready for sea at 17.30 o'clock".....

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Admiral von Spee, although he had arrived at a decision and made his choice of manouvers, invited his commanders to express their opinions during the conference.

Commander von Muller, who commanded the Emden, was visibly concerned, having only raiding in mind, and set forth his views in the following terms:

"I made some objection to von Spee's plans. I pointed out that the cruiser squadron would be practically inactive and not do any damage to the enemy during the months occupied in crossing the ocean."

Von Muller, full of dash and activity, immediately takes the lead:

"If the difficulties of obtaining coal were too great to permit the use of the squadron in East Asiatic, Australian and Indian waters, I asked that, nevertheless, he (von Spee) take into consideration the advisability of detaching at least one small cruiser and sending it to the Indian Ocean where circumstances would be particularly favorable for commerce destroying. The chief of staff and, if I remember correctly, one other commander supported my views. The commander of the squadron answered that he would think over the proposition of sending a small

cruiser, namely the Emden, to the Indian Ocean."

Upon reflection the suggestion was favorably acted on, as is proven by the fact that the Emden was finally detached and sent to the Indian Ocean.

The process of reasoning followed by the commander-in-chief certainly consisted in examing the proposition, not from the viewpoint of commerce destroying, but from the angle of its effect on the proposed maneuver. For the success of this maneuver, would it be better to keep the Emden with the main body or to send her to the Indian Ocean? If the Emden remained with the division she would increase that force by an appreciable but in no sense indispensable unit. On the other hand, if that unit were detached and sent to the Indian Ocean, where an intense and important enemy commerce passes to and fro, it would threaten some extremely sensitive points and would create a very effective diversion. The Emden would attract into that region a large number of the enemy's forces, quite out of proportion to her own value. She would, therefore, bring about an immobilization of the enemy of the greatest advantage to the main body, the fortunate result of which it would feel. To sum up, so employed she would be of greater utility than if she remained with the main body. Hence the decision taken.

There are, to be sure, cases where dispersion - and by that I mean intellignet dispersion adopted with the view of assisting a maneuver - brings better results than a mere brutal concentration of all forces in a single block.

Von Spee finds himself here face to face with a problem which is at the bottom of all maneuvers, that of prescribing the means to be used according to the mission assigned, of subdividing available resources between primary and secondary forces, an operation requiring so much judgment, sense of proportion and strategic coup d'oeil. The suggestion of von Muller per-

mitted him to solve this problem in a particularly happy manner, as subsequent events proved.

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Von Spee's Escape.

(Map VI)

Von Spee's division leaves Pagan on the 13th of August at 18 o'clock and heads to the East toward the desert island of Eniwetok. The division takes with it eight colliers.

On the 14th, at 7 o'clock, the Emden is detached and directed toward the Indian Ocean, laying her course to the islands of Sunda. She receives the following instructions, dated the 13th:

"I am assigning to you the steamer Markomannia and I detach you with the mission of going into the Indian Ocean and there engaging in commerce destroying, using every means at your disposal. I intend to reach the West coast of America with the rest of the squadron."

The most extraordinary tales concerning the position of the German cruisers reach the Allied camp. On the 6th of August the belief is current that they are off the coast of California. On the 8th of August rumors are heard of a fight between the Askold and the Emden. On the 9th of August the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are located at the Solomon Islands. On the 10th three cruisers of the Emden type are reported as being at Tsing-Tao. On the 15th the Gneisenau is said to be at Yap. The Allies, by the way, do nothing towards clearing up the mystery which surrounds the position of the main enemy group.

On the other hand, von Spee is advised on the night of the 18th to 19th of the exact text of the Japanese ultimatum, receiving this information from the Cormoran which left Tsing-Tao on the 10th of August.

The German division arrives at Eniwetok on the 19th of August. There the ships are coaled and leave for Majuro (Marshall Islands) on the 22nd. This point is reached on the 26th of August. On the 27th the Cormoran reports with two supply ships. The squadron takes on coal again and leaves Majuro with five colliers. The auxiliary cruisers Prinz-Eitel-Friedrich and Cormoran are left at anchor with orders to proceed to the islands of the Sunda and Australia. It is hoped that their actions in these regions will create an added diversion and assist in the task of immobilizing the enemy, upon which the safety of the principal group depends to a great degree. In this respect, it seems to me that the Indian Ocean would have been a better choice as theater of operations.

On leaving Eniwetok, the Nurnberg receives orders to proceed to Honolulu to gather news, of which von Spee has been deprived since the destruction of the wireless station at Yap. She is the bearer of a despatch from the German admiral giving information concerning the position and mission of the various ships. The admiral likewise informs the Admiralty of his progress: "I intend to carry the war of commerce destroying towards the East. I am proceeding towards Chile with 16,000 tons of coal. I expect to arrive at the Juan Fernandez Islands on the 15th of October." The Nurnberg is to order large additional quantities of coal at San Francisco and Valparaiso which are to be sent to Juan Fernandez and Port Low (West coast of Patagonia).

Coming now to the Leipzig, this vessel, after having taken on coal at Magdalena Bay on August 4th, leaves on the 5th with the intention of cruising along the Western coast of North America.

On the 8th she is at San Diego. On the 11th she passes San Francisco, continues North but comes back to San Francisco on the 17th of August to coal. She has not been able to find any of the small British ships stationed in this zone (Rainbow, Algerine, Shearwater), but her presence has paralyzed Allied traffic. The Leipzig leaves San Francisco on the 18th of August and heads for the South as the Japanese declaration of war has given her an adversary in the shape of the Izumo, which vessel is already in the neighborhood and is much more powerful than the Leipzig. On the 27th of August the Leipzig calls at Ballenas Bay (California). She leaves again on the 30th and on the 1st of September enters the Gulf of California to take on provisions.

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Coming now to the British forces in the Far East we find that the second group of Jerram's squadron (Triumph, Dupleix, Yarmouth and destroyers) continues to blockade Tsing-Tao where, by the way, no warships of importance are any longer to be found. Jerram captures some German passenger ships and freighters which had left that port because of the Japanese ultimatum. The Dupleix, acting under order from Admiral Jerram, leaves the group and reports to Hong Kong where she arrives on the 27th of August. She sails again on the 29th to take on supplies at Camraigne, on the coast of Anam, on the 31st.

How does Admiral Jerram estimate the situation and what decision does he arrive at?

The Japanese ultimatum to German (16th of August) and the Japanese entry into the war on the 23rd of August reassure him as to the safety of Chinese waters where, from now on, there is an over supply of Allied forces. The reports concerning von Spee's division are rather contradictory. Besides those we have already cited, he receives additional reports locating the squadron on the 16th at New Guinea, on the 18th at the Marshall Islands, on the 20th at Samoa, on the 21st at the Marshall Islands again, on the 25th of August the arrival of the enemy squadron at Padang (Sumatra) is reported. On the 26th of August a report (the only one which proves to be correct although, unfortunately, out of date) indicates that von Spee was taking on coal at Ponape on the 8th of August and was heading for South America. German colliers are discovered supposedly about to start for New Guinea.

The center of gravity of all these positions is always the Western Pacific, in the neighborhood of New Guinea. Admiral Jerram concludes that there is a possibility of von Spee's division breaking into the Indian Ocean through the Sunda Islands. He consequently assigns to himself the mission of protecting that ocean and the traffic which crosses it and, in addition, the Indian troop transports. He considers that, somehow, he should block the gap between the Japanese and the Australian squadrons.

This mission he conceives from a defensive point of view. On the outbreak of hostilities, to be sure, his intention was to take the offensive and seek out von Spee, but all this simmered down to a feeble gesture on his part and he never came back to the idea again. Now his only thought is to assume a defensive position in the region to be protected and to await developments. He, therefore, fixes himself geographically by turning his back on the Pacific, where the enemy is actually to be found. A general sliding off of the China squadron towards the Southwest, Singapore and the Indian Ocean is about to take place.

Admiral Jerram leaves Hong Kong on the 25th of August with the Minotaur and the Hampshire and arrives at Singapore on the 30th. The Dupleix leaves Camraigne on the 31st of August and joins him at Singapore on the 3rd of September. Other vessels follow.

The French Indo-China flotilla, which arrives at Singapore on the 10th of August, despatches, on August 15th, the d'Iberville, Pistolet and Fronde on a cruise to the Java Sea, where the Geier has been reported. These vessels return to Singapore on the 25th without having accomplished anything of moment. On the 31st, acting under orders of Admiral Jerram, the squadron is sent to patrol the region of Penang.

The Russian cruisers, Askold and Yemtchoug, at last resolve to get underweigh and leave Vladivostok on the 20th of August reaching Hong Kong on the 30th and from there continue on to Singapore.

This whole conglomeration is soon immobilized to the West of Singapore. Von Spee has nothing more to fear from it.

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On the 23rd of August Japan enters the war on receiving a promise of the German territory of Kiaochow and the German islands of Oceania situated North of the Equator.

The Japanese take the following measures:

The second Japanese squadron (three battleships, eight cruisers and one flotilla of destroyers) is assigned the task of blockading Tsing-Tao and protecting the landing of troops about to

besiege that fortress. The Triumph is attached to that squadron.

The third squadron (one cruiser and three gun boats) is given the mission of protecting commerce between Hong Kong and Shanghai.

The Izumo, which we have already mentioned, is to afford the same protection on the Western coast of North America.

The battleship Ibuki and the cruiser Chikuma are joined to Jerram's squadron. They leave Japan on the 26th of August for Singapore where they are absorbed in the geographical immobilization previously noted.

The main body of the first squadron (three battleships, four cruisers and a flotilla of destroyers) takes station to the South of Japan in order to ward off a possible offensive on the part of von Spee, an event, by the way, highly improbable. This force, which is much more powerful than its adversary, remains on the defensive and in turn becomes fixed geographically awaiting an imaginary attack.

The third division of the first squadron, (Admiral Yamaya) consisting of the battle cruiser Kongo and the armored cruisers Tsukuba and Kurama (vessels particularly well fitted for actively pursuing von Spee), is assigned an entirely different mission of quite secondary importance, that of protecting commerce between Hawaii and Japan, extending as far as the neighborhood of Midway, with orders to return before the 17th of September. On the 26th of August this division leaves Yokosuka. The Kongo lays its course for Midway. The Tsukuba takes position as a wireless relay between the Kongo and Japan, and the Kurama leaves to guard the Straits of Tsugara!

These disconcerted measures are really not very threatening for von Spee. All they do is to add immobilized units to other immobilized units.

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In the Southwestern Pacific the Montcalm, coming from Tahiti, arrives at Suva (Fiji Islands) on August 12th. She learns on the 6th of August of England's entry into the war and on the 8th of August of the general outbreak of hostilities. This vessel leaves Suva on the 13th but is called back and arrives at that port on the 15th with orders to take part in an Australian expedition against Samoa. On the 20th she arrives at Noumea and joins that expedition, being attached to the Australian squadron. This force, which originally had been concentrated at Sydney, was afterwards split up. The Melbourne was sent far off by itself to Fremantle, on the other side of the continent, the Sydney, Encounter and the destroyers scattered along the coast of Queensland. Admiral Patey decides to bring his units together again. They all sail on the 6th of August to meet in the Straits of Torres. The Pioneer is sent to Fremantle to relieve the Melbourne.

On August 6th Admiral Patey receives the false report of which we have spoken, according to which the German squadron was at the Solomon Islands on August 5th, heading to the Southeast.

After having received this very important piece of news, he does not decide to pursue the enemy (which he could have done even if he waited for the Melbourne to report), but takes an entirely different decision, namely, to destroy the wireless station at Rabaul. On the 9th he calls his commanders together in order to advise them of his intentions on that subject. At the same time he receives a despatch from the Admiralty insisting

on the completion of this destruction before any other operations are undertaken.

Admiral Patey, therefore, launches this expedition against Rabaul, heading to the North, while the main force of the enemy is heading to the Southeast, as he had been led to suppose. In passing, it should be noted that the destruction of the wireless station at Rabaul is of very slight importance as far as affecting enemy communications is concerned, inasmuch as its radius is a very short one. All this is passing strange.

At Rabaul no enemy ships are found and it is ascertained that the wireless station is situated in the interior of the island and out of order. The Australian squadron, thereupon, returns on the 15th of August to Port Moresby to take on coal.

But now we come to the obstacle which, more than any other, intervened and annihilated any intention Admiral Patey might have had to seek out the enemy force. On the night of the 12th to 13th of August he is suddenly advised by the New Zealand government that an expeditionary force is ready to leave that island for Samoa. Admiral Patey must immediately bow to what turns out to be only the beginning of a series of demands which the Dominions make for territorial conquest and the transport of troops. These operations are hardly justifiable, viewed from the point of view of the general conduct of the war, but Britain yields because of the obligations of her imperial policy and in order to satisfy, as quickly as possible, public opinion in New Zealand and Australia, which countries view with displeasure the German settlements in their neighborhood. We shall have occasion to refer to this matter again.

At the same time that New Zealand sends forth from Wellington, on August 15th, her expeditionary force to Samoa (two transports convoyed by the three cruisers of the Pyramus class), Australia insists that her own troops be allowed to attack Rabaul without delay.

Admiral Patey, therefore, finds that he has two expeditions to convoy and has to abandon all other operations. A charming situation, forsooth, in which to apply sound strategy!

The first thought of the Admiralty, in order to conduct the two operations at once, is to send the Australia alone to pick up the New Zealand expeditionary force as it passes Suva (Fiji Islands), while the Melbourne, Sydney and Encounter are to take care of the Australian troops.

However, in the face of objections by Admiral Patey, the Admiralty finally orders him to take the Australia and the Melbourne, together with the Montcalm, and join the New Zealand expedition at Noumea, not Suva, while the Sydney and Encounter are to accompany the Australians as far as Port Moresby.

The Australia and Melbourne arrive at Noumea on Ausust 21st, the Montcalm and the New Zealand expedition having arrived at that port on the day previous.

As far as news of the enemy is concerned, Patey has the false report concerning the Solomon Islands, followed by another reporting the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to be in the neighborhood of New Guinea. Finally, on the 8th of August, the Governor of the Fiji Islands informs the Montcalm that the wireless station of Suva had heard the Germans at a short distance. There are grounds for fearing, therefore, that the enemy might be in the region situated between the Solomon Islands and the Samoan Islands, i.e., not far from the route of the expedition. But this detail, of no mean importance, does not bother the Admiralty, nor Admiral Patey nor any one else. No one institutes a search for the enemy. The expedition is not deferred; on the contrary, that very moment is chosen to divide the Australian squadron into two sections!

The expedition leaves Noumea on the 23rd of August, calling at Suva on the 26th and, on the 27th, calmly continues its course,

still escorted by the Australia, Montcalm, Melbourne and the three cruisers of the Pyramus class. On the 30th of August the much coveted Apia is seized.

In view of the attitude of his opponents, Jerram, the Japanese, Patey or any one else, von Spee can continue on his course unmolested! His escape is made sure by the immense breach which remains open between the Japanese and Patey. He can be certain that nothing disagreeable will happen to him.

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The Mistakes of the Allies in September.

(Map VII)

Von Spee's division leaves Majuro (Marshall Islands) on the 30th of August with five supply ships. The same day he despatches the auxiliary cruisers Cormoran and Prinz-Eitel-Friedrich to the Dutch East Indies.

The division sets its course to the East.

The wireless station at Nauru is heard attempting in vain to communicate with Apia, which leads von Spee to believe that the latter station is out of commission.

Coming now to the Nurnberg, this ship arrives at Honolulu on September 1st, takes on coal and leaves the same evening. In the night of the 3rd to 4th of September, she telegraphs the admiral giving him the latest news. The most important items are that the battle cruiser Kongo is in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian Islands and that two Australian cruisers have been given the mission of guarding the cable between Australia, Fanning and Vancouver. The Nurnberg joins the division on September 6th at

15 o'clock.

The same day at 17 o'clock, the Nurnberg, together with the Titania, is detached and sent to Fanning Island to destroy the cable in question. This is effected on the 7th. The Nurnberg wrecks the buildings of the station while the Titania cuts the cable and the armored cruisers hold themselves in readiness at forty miles distance to support the operation. The main body of the squadron anchors on September 7th at 17.30 o'clock at Christmas Island and there takes on supplies. On the 8th at 15.30 o'clock the Nurnberg and the Titania join the main body, having come from Fanning.

The cutting of the cable creates great excitement in Australia. Before communications are severed the station has time to report the presence of a ship but, deceived by false colors, reports it as being French.

The information given by the Nurnberg, the interception of wireless messages from the Australia and the silence of the station at Apia, give Admiral von Spee strong grounds for assuming that Samoa had been captured by the enemy. He, therefore, immediately decides to attempt an attack on Apia, or at least on such Allied ships as might be there. At Christmas Island he calls together his commanders and makes known his plan. The operation seems feasible, even if the Australia is encountered, as that ship could be attacked with torpedoes. Moreover, the expedition appears an excellent thing for the morale of the crews.

If we examine this plan from the point of view of the manoeuvers in course of execution, it appears, on the contrary, to be singularly inopportune. It brings the division back towards the Western enemy from whom it had the good fortune to escape and may give him an undeserved opportunity of closing with the principal body; of immobilizing or at least seriously damaging it. The outcome of all subsequent operations might be compormised.

Moreover, the German ships are bound to be reported and the important benefits of secrecy, which lucky circumstances had permitted von Spee to keep for a month, would be lost, and all this for a very small result.

Admiral von Spee, nevertheless, lays his course for Apia. On the 9th of September he leaves the Nurnberg at Christmas Island, together with the supply ships, with orders to stay there one week and then proceed to the Marquesas.

The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau arrive before Apia on the 14th. No warships or transports are found. They are unable to land troops, as they have no means to do so, and they find nothing to bombard as there is no worthwhile target. They communicate with Germans on shore who give them details of the capture of the island by the British. Then they pass before the island of Sawai, laying a course to the Northwest at 16 o'clock and, as soon as night comes on, resume their course to the East.

The only result obtained by this expedition is that in the evening the wireless station of Apia sends the following telegram: "This morning two German cruisers before Apia heading Northwest"; a piece of news which is soon known by everybody.

After leaving Apia, Admiral von Spee calls at the island of Souvaroff, September 17th, but is unable to take on coal because of the ground swell. His intention is to attack Tahiti in order to seize the coal stored there and obtain supplies. This also is an unfortunate idea, for the same reason which should have prompted him to disapprove the operation against Apia. It is again undoing the secrecy heretofore maintained, to a lesser degree, to be sure, as Tahiti has no means of rapid communication.

On September 21st the two armored cruisers take on coal at Bora-Bora from the steamer Ahlers, which vessel they had met at Souvaroff Island. They obtain fresh food from the shore and some information concerning the defenses at Tahiti.

On September 22nd at 6 o'clock, Admiral von Spee appears before Papeete (Island of Tahiti). Lieutenant Destremau puts up a vigorous resistance and the Germans are compelled to abandon the idea of entering the harbor and of landing. They bombard the fort, firing about eighty rounds. The defenders of the port scuttle the gun boat Zélée and burn their stock of coal.

After this demonstration the two cruisers head for the Marquesas where they arrive on the morning of September 26th. There they find the Nurnberg and the supply ships which had arrived on the 24th. The division remains at the Marquesas until the 2nd of October, after seizing the food supply and the funds of the French government.

From wireless press despatches intercepted by the Nurnberg at Christmas Island, the admiral learns that the Emden has begun her operations of diversion in the Indian Ocean.

In the meantime the British passenger ship Moana arrives at Tahiti on the 24th of September and reports by wireless the attack on Papeete, thereby remedying, most opportunely, the lack of means of communication at that place. Thus we see the advantage of secrecy lost for the second time and, with Fanning, Apia and Tahiti as data, the enemy can reconstruct a section of the route taken by von Spee.

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The Leipzig remains in Conception Bay, Lower California from the 3rd to the 6th of September. She takes on coal at Guaymas on

the 7th and 8th and then immediately leaves the gulf. She receives an order from Berlin directing her to carry the war of commerce destroying toward the West coast of South America.

Proceeding in company with one collier, the Leipzig heads for the South. On the 18th of September she is at the Galapagos Islands. There she takes on coal from two steamers, one of which came out from Callao. The cruiser leaves the Galapagos Islands on the 22nd and approaches the coast of America. On the 28th she is at the island of Lobos de Afuera (Peru) and on the 30th off the port of Callao. Her position is made known by some prize s she had taken.

It is interesting to see what the ships detailed to watch her are doing.

The Newcastle arrives on the 30th of August at Esquimalt having come from Japan. On the 7th she is off San Francisco and on the 8th at San Diego. She meets the Izumo bound for the North on the 8th. The Newcastle continues to the South, reconnoiters La Paz on the 14th and takes on coal on the 15th in Magdalena Bay. She again explores the Gulf of California (Santa Rosalia, Guaymas, Mazatlan) and returns to Esquimalt on the 25th of September. There she finds the Izumo which vessel had done nothing more than patrol the coast of British Columbia.

Not having found the Leipzig, the commander of the Newcastle assumes that this vessel has sped to the South towards the Galapagos Islands and Peru, there to join the Nurnberg. She ought, therefore, to be pursued, but, by a strange contradiction the commander of the Newcastle is still haunted by the fear of seeing Von Spee turn up in this neighborhood. He, therefore, goes back to Esquimalt and even undertakes the defense of the coast of Vancouver.

It is easy to see that the Leipzig can quietly sail to the South while her adversaries immobilize themselves in the North.

It is only on the 29th of September that the commander of the Newcastle comes to the conclusion that perhaps it might be his duty to pursue the Leipzig to the South and proposes combined action to the commander of the Izumo. During this time the German has gained a respectable number of miles since he is off the coast of Peru while his pursuers are at Esquimalt.

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A new actor now appears in the Pacific, the Dresden, which vessel has arrived from the Atlantic. On the 5th and 6th of September she remains at Orange Bay, near Cape Horn, taking on supplies and overhauling her machinery. Her commander knows that formidable British forces will soon be in operation to the East of Magellan. He has, moreover, received orders from Berlin to act in concert with the Leipzig and therefore passes into the Pacific.

On the 18th of September the Dresden gives chase to the passenger ship Ortega in the Western part of the Straits of Magellan. On the 24th she is off Valdivia, and the 25th and 26th off Coronel. Two supply ships accompany her. One of them is despatched for information and ascertains that von Spee's division is expected off the coast of Chile toward the latter part of October and that the Leipzig is at the Galapagos Islands. The Dresden tries to reach the Leipzig by wireless, without success. On hearing that Admiral Cradock had passed Punta-Arenas with his division out from England, she proceeds to the Juan Fernandez

Islands, where she arrives on the 2nd of October and takes on coal.

She is now in a position to join the main body which had reached the Marquesas.

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Let us come back now to Admiral Jerram, whom we had left immobilized in the region of Singapore instead of actively seeking the enemy with all forces united and conducting, on accurate information, his operations in the Pacific.

A false report placing the Koenisberg off the Northern coast of Sumatra having reached him, Admiral Jerram sends the Hampshire to that point. When this news turns out to be incorrect, he orders this vessel to explore the Western coast of Sumatra, where by a very narrow margin she misses the Emden bound for the Gulf of Bengal.

Admiral Jerram also undertakes a reconnaissance in the Java Sea from the 3rd to 11th of September, using the Minotaur and Yarmouth, and on the 9th to 16th the Japanese vessels Ibuki and Chikuma which had arrived at Singapore on the 5th.

The Russian cruisers Askold and Yemtchoug are detailed to guard the Hong Kong to Singapore trade route.

As for the auxiliary cruisers (the three Empresses and the Himalaya), their mission consists in watching the Philippines.

A patrol, known as the "Sandakan" patrol, is organized composed of two despatch boats, Cleo and Cadmus, and five destroyers whose special duty is to protect the oil tankers coming from Borneo.

The French flotilla, d'Iberville, Pistolet, Mousquet and Fronde, undertakes on September 1st the patrolling of Penang, the usefulness of which is more than questionable. The Dupleix, which arrives at Singapore on the 3rd of September is, likewise, on the 6th, sent on that patrol.

As can be seen these tactics result in a set of groups, geographically fixed in regions where an enemy of importance may never appear again. Moreover, all units are dispersed and each group is incapable of withstanding von Spee's division. This is bound to happen whenever too much is sacrificed to geography by allowing the formation of the land to produce immobilization.

On the 9th of September news is received of the cutting of the Fanning Island cable by an isolated enemy cruiser on the 8th. On the 16th of September the situation becomes clearer. It is ascertained that the cruiser in question is the Nurnberg and that the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were at Apia on the 14th (an authentic and important item of information). Finally, news is received of the arrival of the Emden in the Gulf of Bengal and of her first depredations, all of which is most disquieting and too close for comfort.

This last development governs the fate of Admiral Jerram's command from now on. Obviously he can no longer think of von Spee, All his attention and energy are henceforth monopolized by the urgent necessity of protecting East Indian trade from the Emden. He began by immobilizing himself voluntarily; now it is the Emden who immobilizes him. This enemy cruiser is destined to detain, West of Singapore, forces which by the end of September reached a total of nine Allied cruisers, counting only large vessels. This is the highest praise that can be given to von Muller's diversion, an undertaking which enormously aided the campaign of his chief.

The Admiralty, now in possession of the information locating

von Spee at Apia on the 14th, at last begins to get nervous concerning the main enemy afloat without losing sight, however, of certain other tasks. The final result is as follows: After having made sure of the safety of the Australian expedition to New Guinea, the Admiralty decides to form a group with the object of following von Spee's division, to be composed of the Australia, Montcalm, Melbourne, Nishin (Japanese) and Chikuma. The Ibuki, Minotaur and Sydney are to escort the Australian troops from Fremantle to Aden. Only the Hampshire and Yarmouth are to be employed against the Emden.

The offensive of the campaign, that directed against von Spee, was limited, as we shall see, to a feeble attempt which gave no results. Only the defensive feature of the plan (the convoy) was put into effect, and it is in conformity with it that Admiral Jerram sends the Minotaur and Ibuki to Fremantle, where they arrive on the 29th of September.

It is to be regretted that these two powerful vessels were not allotted to the force which was supposed to be pursuing von Spee. The Melbourne and Sydney would have amply sufficed for escorting purposes as only the Emden, and perhaps the Koenisberg, were to be feared in the Indian Ocean.

Before taking leave of Jerram's squadron which plays no further part in the campaign we are studying, it is necessary to note the strange course its commander adopted which consisted in immobilizing himself from the outset in a given region in expectation of the coming of the enemy. Such a method should only be used when one is absolutely certain that the enemy will pass through the zone in question owing to the fact that his projects and the trend of his operations compel him so to do. In the case we are considering, no such motives existed; there was no certainty that von Spee would come into Malaysia. To await him there and waylay him at every cross-road, in scattered formation into the

bargain, does not constitute an offensive. It is assuming a defensive attitude stricken by immobility and is bound from the start to give no results. (This remark applies also to the much vaunted system of barrages which had, still has and always will have enthusiastic advocates. It applies also to patrolling operations in a limited area. In most cases these methods lead to immobility, to a dispersion of effort and produce a cordon feeble at all points and easy to break). It is important to avoid any possible misconception on this subject.

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Coming now to the Japanese, during the month of September, we still find the second squadron blockading Tsing-Tao and the third squadron guarding the trade routes in the Formosa Channel.

The third division (Kongo, Tsukuba, Kurama) concludes the questionable patrol operations in the North Pacific, of which we have spoken, without experiencing any excitement other than that caused by the Nurnberg appearing at Honolulu, which quickly subsided. The whole squadron returns to Yokosuka on the 12th of September.

The Japanese begin to believe that perhaps it is incumbent upon them to seek von Spee in a more direct and active fashion. They believe him to be in the Caroline or Marshall Islands.

Consequently, a (first) detachment consisting of the Kurama, Tsukuba, the armored cruiser Asama and the sixteenth flotilla of destroyers is formed under the command of Admiral Yamaya. This

detachment, very well selected in view of its mission, is accompanied by two colliers. Admiral Yamaya receives the following instructions: "The enemy squadron seems to have chosen the islands of Oceania as base of operations and constitutes a danger for commerce. As soon as you return to Yokosuka you will leave again as soon as possible with the detachment which has been sent South and you will cruise, taking Yokosuka as your base, in the region surrounding the Marianas, the Eastern and Western Caroline Islands and Marshall Archipelago, watch the enemy and make sure that navigation is safe." Here we perceive all the contradiction that lies between the first conception and the measures taken to put it into effect. It is indeed a curious notion to send someone in a so-called pursuit of an enemy and at the same time hold him in check by giving geographical limitations to his field of operations. If the foe is not at the point indicated, shall he nevertheless continue "cruising" in that neighborhood? Should he persistently "watch" for his adversary in a region where he is not to be found and to which he may never return?

Such a situation is somewhat bewildering but is, in fact, exactly what occurred. The first Japanese detachment leaves Yokosuka on the 14th and calls at the Bonin Islands. On receiving fresh instructions from Tokio, it proceeds to Jaluit, a point it occupies on the 29th. Admiral Yamaya will soon be in possession of a fairly accurate survey of the situation. At Jaluit he learns that the Germans had passed by Majuro two weeks before. He learns from the Katori, which vessel was acting as a wireless relay to Japan, that von Spee had passed Apia on the 14th of September. Finally, on the 2nd of October, he learns of the bombardment of Papeete.

Admiral Yamaya is now fully informed but does he pursue the enemy? No indeed. On receiving the news about Papeete, he turns

to the West! It would be impossible more perfectly to carry out the unsatisfactory instructions we have quoted.

The key to this dumbfounding attitude of the Japanese general staff and its admiral must evidently be sought for among political motives. Japan having been allotted in advance Tsing-Tao, the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands, had obtained everything she desired and cared little about actively participating in major operations in the Pacific. The hostilities had taken on, so far as she was concerned, the aspect of a "limited war" as Corbett would say. Japan had but slight desire to follow von Spee to Cape Horn.

Moreover, public opinion in Australia and New Zealand, always troublesome, would have viewed with displeasure the appearance of the Japanese in the Southern Hemisphere. As a matter of fact, as we shall presently see, a few days later the Japanese zone of operations was limited by mutual consent to the region situated North of the Equator (for the first detachment, East of the 140th Meridian and West of that Meridian for the second detachment). If a vigorous offensive is required, an arrangement such as this will demonstrate the disadvantages resulting from a rigid limitation of the theater of operations literally and thoughtlessly construed and aggravated, as in this case, by the unfortunate racial prejudices and mutual jealousies common to most coalitions.

These explanations are in order, otherwise it might be inferred that the conquerors of Tsushima had greatly degenerated in their strategy between 1905 and 1914.

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The Australian squadron having safely accomplished the escorting of the New Zealand expedition against Samoa, turns its attention to a second enterprise of the same nature: the Australian expedition against New Guinea.

The Australia, Montcalm and Melbourne leave Apia on the 1st of September and touch at Suva on the 2nd. The Montcalm makes a detour to Noumea where she remains from the 6th to the 10th and rejoins the squadron at Rabaul on the 15th.

The Australia and the Melbourne leave Suva on the 5th of September and on the 9th join the Sydney, Encounter, three destroyers and two submarines which had escorted from Port Moresby five colliers and the one and only transport, the Berrima, carrying the 1500 men of the Australian expedition. On the 11th the entire party arrives at Rabaul. The troops land and seize the wireless station. The German Governor, who had taken refuge in the interior of the island, capitulates on the 15th and surrenders all the German possessions in that region.

Between the 9th and 12th the Melbourne is detached to destroy the wireless station at Nauru.

Admiral Patey intends, after the termination of the Rabaul expedition, to go to Fremantle with the Australia, Melbourne and Sydney and escort in the Indian Ocean a large convoy of Australian and New Zealand troops (Anzacs) bound for Europe. He sails from Rabaul on the 15th on this mission and consequently loses all interest in von Spee.

He has hardly left Rabaul than he receives not only the news from New Zealand concerning the passage of the Germans at Apia on September 14th, but also, on the 17th, the telegram from the Admiralty, previously mentioned, addressed to him and to Jerram informing him of the reaction in London to this news. This despatch, as we have seen, contains one section contemplating an offensive against von Spee and another concerning defensive operations

(the convoying of the Anzacs).

Admiral Patey can thus measure how unfortunate was his departure from Apia, coming, as it did, just before the Germans reached that point. It was evidently in this region and not near New Guinea that lay his best chances of finding the enemy.

Be that as it may, Admiral Patey comes back to Rabaul on the 19th of September. Small territorial operations are continued. Between the 21st and 30th the Sydney destroys the wireless station at Angaur. Between the 22nd and 26th the other vessels capture the port of Friedrich-Wilhelmshaven in Gew Guinea. On the 13th the Melbourne is sent to join the Anzac convoy.

It would really seem as if it were about time to think of taking the offensive against von Spee, an operation which the Admiralty, itself very belated, had ordered as far back as the 17th of September. Admiral Patey decides that the squadron (less the Melbourne) is to sail on the 1st of October to explore the Carolines and Marshall Islands, a measure which, let it be said in passing, was not warranted by the news received on the 14th of September. It is better, however, than doing nothing.

While this was going on, Admiral Patey on October 1st, immediately after starting, learns that the Japanese are at Jaluit where they found nothing and also that the Germans had bombarded Papeete on September 22nd, a most vital piece of news.

Von Spee, after passing Apia, has evidently not waited for his enemies to catch up with him, but has sped away to the East.

It is in this direction that Admiral Patey should at once give chase in order to make up for lost time. Far from doing this he decides to come back to Rabaul and there to await orders! In the presence of this entire lack of initiative, one cannot help but think of the great dashes of Nelson.

In the meantime the pressure of frightened public opinion in New Zealand has compelled the despatching of the Minotaur and

Ibuki as far as Wellington to convoy the Anzacs instead of leaving these ships at Fremantle. The Minotaur and Ibuki are now in turn immobilized.

It is indeed a sorry spectacle to see this wretched Australian squadron paralyzed by petty geographical objectives or by purely defensive worries, all to the great detriment of the pursuit of the enemy afloat. We have been given as explanation, the obligation England felt to satisfy public opinion in the two dominions. She found herself face to face with a "servitude" both of an imperialistic and moral nature.

Let us examine this statement. A "servitude" is a necessity foreign to local strategy, to which one is compelled to yield for extremely serious reasons pertaining to the general conduct of the war. The impressive word "servitude" is easily uttered but there are limits to this line of thought. The fact that a neighboring state or even an ally makes a purely selfish demand is not a valid reason for immediately bowing and undertaking the required operation. On the contrary it is important to weigh any request not founded on naval policy and see whether it really warrants being raised to the rank of an unavoidable "servitude", whether it justifies breaking the normal chronology of operations and whether entertaining it will not, on the contrary, lead strategy on a false trail at the end of which a catastrophe is lurking. The question demands a searching examination on the part of the government and the commander-in-chief.

Should public opinion be always acceded to even when it formulates unreasonable demands replete with very serious drawbacks? Would it not be better, on the contrary, to oppose, educate and mold this opinion? That is what England should have done in regard to public opinion in Australia and New Zealand. She should have made these countries understand that the destruction of the enemy afloat came before everything else; that the conquest of

the German colonies would be only slightly delayed thereby; that the capture of Tsing-Tao, Yap and Nauru were the only one to be brought about in the beginning; that all other enterprises represented purely geographical objectives in their most harmful form.

It seems to me that no real effort was made in this direction. In view of the great degree of independence of the Dominions, the situation was really one involving a coalition rather than a problem of internal politics and national morale.

No matter how viewed, the excuse "servitude" is inacceptible, in so far as the territorial conquests in the Southern Pacific are concerned. These enterprises were and still are unjustifiable.

A map showing the movements of the two adversaries during the month of September and their positions on the 1st of October is peculiarly suggestive. I do not know of a more impressive document. The Allies appear dispersed, scattered, immobilized, trapped in their positions, whether voluntarily or not, paralyzed by worries concerning matters of defense, by their geographical objectives, the Anzac convoy, etc., and totally neglecting the principal organized force of the enemy. On the other hand, the Germans quietly pursue their maneuver; their blunders at Apia and Tahiti, thanks to allied inertia, have no serious results, at least not immediately. The concentration of forces takes shape, from now on it is certain. A storm is brewing, the clouds are gathering.

Someone among the Allies is bound to pay the penalty for this maneuver which is bringing a concentrated force against one point of their over-extended and weak formation. Who? That is not yet known but a smash is inevitable. Disaster is hovering in the air.

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The Mistakes of the Allies in October.

(Map VIII)

On the 2nd of October von Spee's division leaves the Marquesas Islands with two supply ships, heads to the North then, on the 3rd towards nightfall, toward Easter Island.

From this date on the Dresden is heard, apparently communicating by wireless with the Leipzig, but it is only in the night of the 5th to 6th that the Scharnhorst can establish direct radio communication with the Dresden.

This ship, which had left the Juan Fernandez Islands on the 4th of October, gives her position and states that she is heading for Easter Island, hoping to arrive there on the 10th. She adds that the Leipzig had left Saint-Nicolas (Peru) on October 4th and is likewise heading for Easter Island. Coming now to the enemy, the Dresden informs von Spee that the Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow and Otranto passed Puenta Arenas on the 28th of September, heading to the West.

On October 9th wireless communication is established between the Scharnhorst and Leipzig.

On October 12th von Spee's group anchors at Easter Island, the Dresden having first made a reconnaissance of the bays of that island. This cruiser, together with the supply ship accompanying her, reports immediately thereafter. The division takes on coal with great difficulty owing to the ground swell. Supplies are also taken on board.

On the 14th the Leipzig and three supply ships arrive.

The reunion of forces, the first stage of the maneuver, is practically accomplished.

Thought must now be given to combat which is to crown this maneuver and seems to be near at hand, owing to the presence of four British ships on the West coast of South America. Von Spee

thinks of this, needless to say. He first considers going direct to Port Low on the coast of Patagonia (alongside of the bay of Vallenar). On thinking matters over, however, he decides to take on supplies at the Juan Fernandez Islands so that his vessels will have their full quota of stores when battle appears imminent.

The engagement, moreover, presents itself under very favorable conditions considering the number and strength of the units opposing each other, and the general situation resulting from the dispersion of the enemy. Admiral Von Spee calls his commders to a conference to expose his views as to the mode of conducting the approaching encounter.

The organization for securing news and supplies had previously been perfected along the coast of Peru and Chile by the Leipzig and Dresden, in conformity with the orders sent by von Spee from Honolulu.

On the 18th of October at 17 o'clock, von Spee's division leaves Easter Island and heads towards the Juan Fernandez Islands at 10 knots. Numerous drills are held during this crossing.

Von Spee is advised that the Allied group on the West Coast of the United States appears to be headed towards the Chile and that the Australia is along the coast of Central America; both of which reports are false.

On the 24th the Leipzig is sent ahead to reconnoiter Mas a Fuera (Juan Fernandez Islands) and to locate the supply ships and the enemy.

On the 26th of October the division reaches Mas a Fuera (Juan Fernandez Islands). On the 26th and 27th supplies are taken on board. On the 27th the Leipzig reports, also the Prinz-Eitel-Freidrich which vessel had returned from her useless raid in the archipelago of the Sunda. The arrival of this ship completes the reunion of forces.

The division leaves Mas a Fuera on October 27th at 20.30 and heads for Valparaiso. The convoy does the same, inclining its course slightly more to the South. Admiral von Spee has some news of the enemy. The Good Hope is reported near Cape Horn, the Cornwall and Bristol in the Eastern part of the Straits of Magellan; one battleship (the Canopus) is said to have come through the straits on the 27th, heading to the West. For these reasons Port-Low no longer appears to be a suitable place to take on supplies.

On October 30th, the division and the supply ships which had drawn near to Valparaiso seeking for the collier Santa Isabel, heaves-to for the entire day at 70 miles from the coast. On the 31st the admiral sends the Prinz-Eitel-Friedrich to Valparaiso to take on supplies. From the Santa Isabel he learns that the detached vessel Newcastle has apparently gone up to Esquimalt.

Admiral von Spee had intended at first going to Port Low to coal. The reports he receives concerning the supply ships, however, lead him to fear that those coming from San Francisco are very much behind time. He, therefore, puts off going South and spends the day of the 31st of October cruising off Valparaiso. His plan is to do some commerce destroying in this neighborhood and especially to surprise the British cruisers, which believing him to be far away, have scattered in order to protect their commerce. In the evening he heads to the South to seek the enemy and to make sure of that battle which he awaits and for three months has been hoping for.

We left Admiral Patey at Rabaul where he had returned to await orders after hearing of von Spee's call at Tahiti. In view of this information he comes to the perfectly proper conclusion that the Germans are heading for the American coast and that their objective may be to raid Allied commerce or to attack British Columbia or to pass into the Atlantic. To parry these movements, Admiral Patey thereupon makes the following propositions to the Admiralty: The first Japanese detachment is to cross the Pacific (this is quite logical), the Australia and Melbourne are to stay quietly on the coast of Australia, and the second Japanese detachment (of which we shall speak again) is to guard the East coast of Borneo! Certainly these measures are not likely to hamper von Spee greatly.

The Admiralty takes a different view of the situation and on the 3rd of October sends to Admiral Patey the following telegram: "It is probable that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau will repeat attacks similar to the one on Papeete. We must therefore expect their return to Samoa, Fiji or even New Zealand. Make Suva your headquarters and search for these cruisers in those regions. One cruiser accompanied by a collier has been reported near Tutuila (Samoa) on the morning of September 20th."

This probably refers to the Prinz-Eitel-Friedrich, the pointing of which vessel toward Samoa had been useful in adding to the confusion of the British high command.

But what can we say about this idea of seeking the enemy in "regions" previously determined? We have already seen the Japanese make such an attempt. Such a procedure is permissable for light forces to which has been assigned a rapid reconnaissance in a given region with a view of promptly bringing back a positive or a negative report. It is indefensible for a combat force which should pursue the enemy and not delay in one place or another. Geographical fixation of the most unfortunate kind

can only result from such a method.

Having received this bizarre order, Admiral Patey leaves Rabaul on October 3rd with the Australia, Montcalm and Sydney and arrives at Suva on the 12th. On the 15th he is joined by the Encounter, three destroyers, one submarine and the supply ships.

We now come to something even more strange. On October 4th, the wireless stations at Suva and Wellington intercept a message from the Scharnhorst to the Dresden as follows: "Scharnhorst is proceeding from the Marquesas to Easter Island." This is a capital item of information which throws light on the situation for everybody concerned. (We should note here the appearance of a new factor in intelligence work, the intercepting and deciphering of wireless messages). It is only fair to say that Admiral Patey, as soon as he arrived at Suva, pleaded with the Admiralty to be allowed to pursue the enemy to the East. The Admiralty does not even answer! Better still, the Admiralty decides October 10th, on a proposal by Admiral Jerram, that the zone of the Pacific situated East of 140° East of Greenwich be intrusted, North of the Equator to the Japanese detachment and South of the Equator to the Australian squadron which is also to protect the French islands. In the last analysis this amounts to riveting these two groups definitely in their positions. This is the incredible result of the information gathered on October 4th.

As a matter of fact we find the Australian squadron immobilized from the 17th to the 23rd in a patrol of no interest between the Fiji Islands and Samoa, and South of the Fiji Islands from the 26th to the 31st. Moreover, on the 16th the Sydney leaves to join the Melbourne in escorting the Anzac convoy. One man, however, had long seen the situation clearly and that man was a Frenchman. Admiral Huguet, whose flagship is the Montcalm, had, as far back as September 6th, said to the Governor of New

Caledonia: "We do not possess the mastery of the Pacific as long as the German division is neither destroyed nor blockaded. The situation is just the same as it was at the beginning of the war." On October 2nd Admiral Huguet telegraphed the Ministry of Marine: "It is necessary to insist that the enemy be sought out if he is still in the Pacific. We have lost too much time in secondary objectives undertaken to please public opinion in Australia." To Admiral Patey he states: "If, starting from Samoa in the beginning of September, we had made a round of the Marshall Islands we would have found the Germans and the whole matter would have been settled, the raid on Tahiti would have been prevented and everybody would now have freedom of action."

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Coming now to the Japanese, as we have seen, their first detachment leaves Jaluit on the 2nd of October and heads to the West (i.e. in the opposite direction of von Spee) as soon as it receives news of Tahiti. Upon orders of its government, the detachment comes back to Jaluit on the 3rd and occupies that point. The same operation takes place at Kusaie on the 5th, at Ponape on the 7th, at Truk on the 12th. The Katori seizes the Mariana Islands.

The second Japanese detachment composed of the ~~battleship~~ Satsuma and the light cruisers Hirato and Yahagi cruises to the West of the 140th Meridian, seizing Yap, the Pelew Islands and Angaur.

The armored cruisers Nishin, Tokiwa and Yakumo are sent to

reinforce Admiral Jerram.

The battleship Hizen and the armored cruiser Asama go to Honolulu to watch the Geier.

The Japanese are new completely outside the circuit of interesting events in the Pacific.

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The group in the Northeastern Pacific hardly deserves mention. On September 28th the Newcastele had some vague notion of pursuing the Leipzig to the South which becomes more definite when, on October 1st, it becomes known that this vessel has already proceeded to Peru. After the Newcastle and Izumo meet and their commanders exchange views that project is abandoned. The Newcastle explores the Mexican coast and the Izumo the coast of the United States. They return to Esquimalt on the 21st and 22nd respectively. In spite of all the information they possess, they are now hypnotized by the possibility of von Spee appearing in the neighborhood of Vancouver. They immobilize themselves definitely in this neighborhood and wait to be reinforced by the Japanese battleship Hizen.

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Last Mistakes and Expiation

(MapoVIII

In the Atlantic Admiral Cradock commanding the 4th squadron of cruisers, which was at first stationed in the Antilles, arrives on the coast of Brazil in the beginning of September. The gathering of numerous German steamers in the region of Magellan leads him to believe that all the German cruisers intend to proceed there. He wanss the Admiralty which by that time, it is interesting to note, had the intuition that Admiral von Spee was heading towards South America. The supplies collected in Chile had made the Admiralty suspect as much. Orders are therefore given to Admiral Cradock to take command of the South American Station (Atlantic side).

This flag officer has with him the following vessels:

Three armored cruisers: Good Hope, Monmouth, Cornwall.

Two light cruisers: Glasgow, Bristol.

One auxiliary cruiser: Otranto.

On September 14th these units are gathered together at Santa Catharina (coast of Brazil).

The same day Admiral Cradock receives from the Admiralty the following telegram:

"The arrival of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in the Straits of Magellan or on the West coast of South America is most likely.

"Leave enough forces to face Dresden and Karlsruhe (which vessels the Admiralty still supposed to be in the Atlantic). Concentrate a squadron strong enough to meet Scharnhorst and Gneisena making Falkland Islands your (coaling) base...

"Canopus (battleship) is now heading toward Abrolhos (coast of Brazil). Defense (armored cruiser) coming from Mediterranean to join you. Until she joins keep at least Canopus and one (cruiser of the) County class (armored cruiser) with your flagship

(Good Hope). As soon as you have a superior force, search the Straits of Magellan with your squadron, always remaining prepared to return and protect La Plata, or, according to information search as far as Valparaiso northward. Break up German trade and destroy the German cruisers."

The plan is correct at least in its general outline. The destruction of the organized enemy force is interfered with, however, by attaching the same importance to the destruction of enemy commerce.

Moreover, the force which Admiral Cradock has at his disposal at this moment is insufficient to perform the two objectives, offence and defense, assigned to him simultaneously, especially if the mediocre value of some of his ships, recently mobilized, hastily armed and not yet in condition, be taken into account. The old battleship Canopus is much too slow. The situation will only become possible when the armored cruiser Defense reports.

Meanwhile Admiral Cradock leaves the Bristol and Cornwall on the coast of Brazil with the Canopus to guard the base in the Abrolhos Islands, and proceeds to the South with the Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow and Otranto. He, therefore, has not obeyed the order of the Admiralty regarding the disposition of his forces and deprives himself of the Canopus.

On the 17th of September, while off La Plata, his orders are countermanded. The Admiralty is in possession of news from Apia indicating that von Spee has left that point and is heading to the Northwest and infers that he will not come to South America. Admiral Cradock is told that it is no longer necessary for him to concentrate his forces and that it will be sufficient for him to attack German commerce in the region between Valparaiso and Magellan with two cruisers and one auxliary cruiser. Finally, the

Defense is halted at Malta.

Admiral Cradock leaves Montevideo on September 22nd and continues his cruise to the South with his four ships. From the passenger ship Ortega he learns that the Dresden has entered the Pacific. Cradock's division arrives at Punta Arenas on September 28th and makes a fruitless search of Orange Bay (near Cape Horn). The Otranto is left in the Straits of Magellan and the other ships return to the Falkland Islands to coal.

They concentrate again on October 6th near Cape Horn to explore the Lhermite Islands. After this the Good Hope reconnoitters Orange Bay again and returns to the Falkland Islands. Admiral Cradock, on October 7th, orders the Glasgow, Monmouth and Otranto to continue their cruise as far North as Valparaiso. The detaching of these units is really most imprudent, but the admiral is acting on the optimistic information which London furnished him on September 17th.

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Thereafter the Admiralty receives, on September 28th, the information concerning Tahiti and, on the 4th of October, a report indicating that von Spee was heading from the Marquesas toward Easter Island. It should have been obvious that Cradock's situation had suddenly become more serious.

How does the Admiralty react?

On October 5th the Admiralty sends Cradock a despatch which he receives on the 7th. It contains the second item of information above referred to and adds: "You must be prepared to meet

Scharnhorst and Gneisenau together with Dresden. Canopus should accompany Glasgow, Monmouth and Otranto. The ships to search and protect trade in combination." In addition he receives orders to leave the Monmouth on the East coast should he desire to participate in that operation with the Good Hope.

The reasoning of the Admiralty at this point commences to go astray. At the very moment a powerful enemy is approaching Cradock, the Admiralty again proceeds to mingle the search for the enemy with the protection of commerce and suggests to its subordinate to divide and diminish his forces by leaving a very powerful vessel on the East coast. It would be difficult to pay less attention to the organized enemy force.

Admiral Cradock now realizes the gravity of the situation and the incoherence of the last order received. On the 8th he telegraphs to the Admiralty as follows:

"information concerning the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst received. Indications show possibility of Dresden, Leipzig and Nurnberg joining Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. Have ordered Canopus to Falkland Islands where I intend to concentrate and avoid division of forces. Have ordered Glasgow, Monmouth and Otranto not to go North of Valparaiso... I, therefore, suggest that Essex (armored cruiser) be detached (from the Antilles) and relieve Cornwall (armored cruiser). Former could remain as flagship (of the Brazilian patrol) and Cornwall proceed South. Referring to telegram No. 74 of Admiralty, I inquire does Defense join my command?"

This despatch and the request for reenforcements it contains (Cornwall, Defense) brings out clearly Admiral Cradock's anxiety concerning the approaching encounter with the enemy under conditions which appear perilous, owing to the insufficiency of the British forces and the state of dispersion resulting from the orders received. A simple computation of distances and speed

would indicate that von Spee might arrive on the coast of Chile towards the 25th of October.

Admiral Cradock also insists, on that same day, (October 8th) upon the likelihood of a sudden dash of von Spee into the Atlantic in the event that he should succeed in rounding Cape Horn without having been met. "Without being alarmed (?) I nevertheless respectfully suggest that in the event the enemy cruisers (armored cruisers or others) should concentrate on the West coast it would be necessary to have on each of the two coasts a British force strong enough to compel them to accept combat."

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The Admiralty now is in possession of all the facts concerning the situation and should easily realize that the enemy which Cradock is likely to run into consists of two armored cruisers and three light cruisers, all of them excellent ships.

The second of the two telegrams from Admiral Cradock arrives in London on October 11th and the first telegram on October 12th. The latter is immediately annotated by Mr. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, as follows:

"Under the circumstances it would be better for the British ships to remain within supporting distance of each other within the straits or near the Falkland Islands and to postpone the cruise on the West coast until the present uncertainty concerning the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau shall have been cleared up. It is these vessels and not the enemy commerce that constitute our

objective for the time being. Above all we must not miss them."

The reasoning this time is perfect. One can only bestow on it the highest praise.

Two days elapse before any answer is sent to Cradock, a strange procedure in view of the gravity of the situation.

On October 14th Mr. Churchill sends to the First Sea Lord (Admiral Fisher) a note in which he says:

"I understand the dispositions which you propose to adopt for the Southern Pacific and the Southern Atlantic are as follows:

"1. Cradock is to concentrate at the Falkland Islands the Canopus, Monmouth, Good Hope and Otranto.

"2. The Glasgow is to be sent to seek and attack the Leipzig and to protect commerce on the West coast.

"3. The Defense is to join the Carnarvon, thus forming a new combat squadron on the main commercial route leaving Rio."

"These dispositions have my entire approval.

"If Admiral Cradock is not strong enough to attack the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau he is to do everything he can to watch them and await the arrival of reenforcements."

The reasoning of this note is not as sound as the annotation of October 13th. To begin with the Glasgow is sent ahead in the face of the enemy. As for reenforcements the only force from which they can be taken is the division patrolling the coast of Brazil which is far too distant to be able to intervene in time.

The result of all this exchanging of notes is that the following telegram is sent Admiral Cradock on October 14th:

"We agree with you concerning the concentration of Canopus, Good Hope, Glasgow, Monmouth and Otranto for combined operations.

"We have sent Stoddart with Carnarvon to Montevideo to take command of region North of that port.

"We have ordered Defense to join the Carnarvon.

"Stoddart will also have under his orders Cornwall, Bristol, Orama and Macedonia.

"The Essex is to be kept in the Antilles."

We see, therfore, that Admiral Cradock does not get any of the reenforcements he had asked for - neither the Defense nor the Cornwall. The forces remain divided into two divisions; Cradock's in the region of Cape Horn and Stoddart's to the North of Montevideo. The former is too feeble to attack the concentrated forces of the enemy and is too far removed from the latter to be easily supported by it.

Moreover, Admiral Cradock is no longer ordered to concentrate at the Falkland Islands. He is not forbidden to run up the West coast. Mention is continually made of "combined operations" that is to say, the search for the enemy and the protection of commerce. Cradock will thus find himself heading in a dangerous direction, towards the enemy, with insufficient forces and drawing away from the only reenforcements that could assist him.

At this point the Admiralty has no excuse to offer. By sheer luck it happened that von Spee's maneuver completely lost the advantage of surprise owing to the ill-timed demonstrations of the Germans at Apia and Tahiti and to the interception of the wireless message on October 4th as well. The problem is to meet the German division on the coast of Chile in good fashion, since that division was clumsily missed on the other side of the Pacific. The Admiralty seems vaguely to understand the importance of so doing but, as a matter of fact, takes none of the required steps in regard to Cradock's division.

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After having left Cradock on October 7th, the Glasgow, Monmouth and Otranto proceed up the West coast. The Otranto remains at Vallenar Bay. The two others continue to the North and call at Valparaiso on October 15th. The Good Hope remains at the Falkland Islands. On this date we find Cradock's division, although much too weak, divided into three sections and in the danger zone at that. Although his forces are completely dispersed, Admiral Cradock does not recall his cruisers after receiving the Admiralty despatch of October 7th.

The Glasgow and Monmouth return to Vallenar Bay on October 20th. The Canopus at last arrives at the Falkland Islands on October 18th, leaves again on the 23rd for the Straits of Magellan and arrives at Vallenar Bay October 30th. The Good Hope, which vessel left the Falkland Islands on the 22nd, arrives at the same port on the 26th.

Admiral Cradock again comes to the conclusion, and quite properly so, that his force even when concentrated are insufficient to face those that are going to swoop down upon him. In his anxiety he sends another telegram to the Admiralty on the 26th as follows:

"With reference to orders contained in Admiralty telegram received October 7th to search for enemy and our great desire for early success consider it impracticable on account of Canopus' slow speed to find and destroy the enemy squadron. Consequently, have ordered Defense to join me after stopping at Montevideo for messages. Canopus will be employed on necessary convoy of colliers. After experience of August 6th, respectfully suggest we should not expose ourselves to raids by Karlsruhe."

Admiral Cradock comes back to the charge as to the need of being reenforced by a fast vessel, namely the Defense. He has even taken it upon himself to order this cruiser to join him. It is apparently only after the arrival of this vessel that he

proposes to allow the Canopus to convoy the colliers. It would be a blunder to do so any sooner. To keep the Canopus with the rest of the division would slow it down, thereby incurring the risk of missing the enemy. This is not so serious. On the other hand, separating the Canopus from the cruisers might involve the destruction of the latter which is infinitely more serious.

Unfortunately Cradock has committed this very blunder.

Finally, in speaking of the Karlsruhe, which vessel is operating in the Atlantic, Cradock has put his finger on the sore spot. As a matter of fact, it is the fear of this German cruiser which is menacing the trade routes of the Atlantic that prevents the Admiralty from reenforcing Cradock. The Admiralty does not wish to diminish Stoddart's division, not even by a single ship. The operations of the Karlsruhe keep up and encourage the British dispersion. Von Spee, therefore, was not mistaken in gambling on the effect of this diversion as likely to assist his maneuver.

On October 28th the Admiralty answers Admiral Cradock as follows:

"Defense must stay on East coast under orders of Stoddart. This will leave sufficient forces on each coast in event enemy cruisers should appear on trade routes. There is no available ship near Cape Horn. Japanese battleship Hizen is expected shortly on the coast of North America. This vessel will join Izumo (Japanese) and Newcastle and will head South towards Galapagos Islands."

We see, therefore, that the Admiralty has again refused to send the Defense. Cradock and Stoddart are considered as each being sufficiently strong. The Admiralty has exaggerated confidence in the Anglo-Japanese group to the North. On October 29th Admiral Oliver, Naval Secretary, writes to the First Lord of the Admiralty as follows: "The situation on the West coast appears to be safe."

On October 30th, Admiral Cradock leaves Vallenar Bay with the Good Hope and Monmouth and heads to the North. On the 27th he had detached the Glasgow to Coronel to secure information. This vessel enters that port on the 31st and rejoins the admiral on the 1st of November, West of this point. On the 28th the Otranto is sent to reconnoiter Puerto Montt and returns on the 31st. Finally, the Canopus arrives at Vallenar Bay on the 30th with two colliers. There she receives orders to remain for twenty-four hours to repair an accident to her machinery, then to leave on the morning of the 31st and to convoy the colliers to the islands of Saint-Felix and Saint-Ambrose (Chile).

On November 1st at 16 o'clock, the brave but unfortunate Admiral Cradock runs into von Spee's division off Coronel. That same evening the British force is annihilated. The Good Hope and Monmouth are sunk; the Glasgow and Otranto manage to escape.

The drama is over. The unavoidable has happened. Matters could not have ended otherwise. Accumulated blunders and errors must be paid for sooner or later.

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To sum up, if a study of the operations in the Pacific in 1914 does not teach us any new lessons in strategic maneuvering, is emphasizes and reenforces certain established principles which cannot be pondered over too carefully.

On the Allied side we see an immobilized belligerent. This is brought about partly by the action of isolated German cruisers (Emden, Karlsruhe, Koenigsberg, etc), and to an even greater

degree by the belligerent's own acts and his own conceptions. He is immobilized by numerous defensive worries relating chiefly to the protection of his commercial communications or his military convoys. He is too much governed by the fetish of geography, the exaggeration and faulty interpretation of a factor the importance of which has limits, thereby paralyzing his offensive movements beyond all measure. Finally, a passive submission to the demands of public opinion, accepted without discernment, leads him too frequently to the pursuit of geographical objectives in their most reprehensible form. (The attack of geographical positions likewise produces on the assailant a certain degree of fixation which may increase that brought about by mobile forces. A maneuver can make good use of this peculiarity).

To be sure, some of these strategic impediments were caused by the value, the great number and the world-wide ramification of British interests which furnished a corresponding number of sensitive points requiring protection more or less direct. The Allies, however, of their own free will, created many others. Besides the inevitable, real servitudes, there were some that could have been avoided entirely.

One can readily see how the movements of the Germans were facilitated by this immobility of the Allies. If a maneuver necessarily requires the fixation of certain parts of the enemy formation, this condition becomes particularly easy to realize when the enemy voluntarily immobilizes himself, as in the present case.

An immobilization which was both defensive and geographic, engendered, as a natural result dispersion and scattering of forces. This dispersion was passive, dominated and dictated by events and had nothing in common with a premeditated dispersion adopted to conceal a secret maneuver. This situation continued even when information had been received concerning the movements

of the enemy which should have torn the veil that masked his intentions. At no time were the Allies able to concentrate a force capable of stopping and defeating him. The sad case of Cradock's division is the most striking example of this fact.

Most important of all, one can note among the Allies (except at the very end) a rather too systematic contempt of the main organized force. No serious offensive is undertaken against that force. It is neglected. A catastrophe follows naturally. It is an old lesson to which one must always revert.

Nevertheless the English strategist Corbett, has tried, as we know, to set up against the so-called continental doctrine of the destruction of the organized force (a doctrine unbearable to him) another theory which he considers essentially British, namely, the protection of lines of communications. He has even tried in his "Naval Operations" while recording the history of the events we are describing, to find a confirmation of his favorite theme. This work is well thought out in certain respects and we have used it with profit in treating of the practical chronology of the operations, but the reaction which results from pushing this theory to its limit is extremely dangerous in that it reverts once again to under-rating organized forces. Corbett and the British of 1914, his disciples, have not always been able to avoid this dangerous reef, to which we have already called the attention of the reader.

On the German side we see, on the contrary, a real maneuver evolved in the Pacific. That maneuver relied on the transfer of forces and the use of empty areas for seeking and making sure of secrecy and surprise (with the exception of two bad blunders) and aimed at a joining of resources and the action of a concentrated group against one point of the scattered enemy formation. The result could not be in doubt.

After examining the operations which terminated in the engagement off Coronel, it would be particularly interesting to study the

next phase of events. We would then see the Allies, and especially the British, made wiser by a cruel lesson, face the facts and endeavor to react by adopting the very principles which they had trodden under foot during the first period. Now the organized enemy force is kept in mind; everything is sacrificed for that objective. As quickly as possible that body must be brought to account, the necessary concentration of forces is made: the South Atlantic force, with Admiral Sturdee and the battle cruisers sent out from England; that of the Antilles which includes another battle cruiser; that of Central America; the Anglo-Japanese with Admiral Patey and the Australia, which force finally crosses the Pacific; that of the Japanese who, a little late in the day, have pushed forward as far as the Fiji Islands and finally that of the Cape of Good Hope. (At this time little heed is paid to the sensitiveness of the Americans, Australians or New Zealanders. Necessity knows no law!) All of the foregoing forces are devoted to the offensive without, however, neglecting necessary measures of defense.

The reward of this sound and classic method is quick in coming. On the 8th of December, von Spee's division is destroyed at the Falkland Islands.

Let us in passing, as an instructive detail, note that the favorable situation created by von Spee's initial maneuver in the South American region lasted a little over a month.

A study of this second phase of the operations would doubtless be as fascinating from the military point of view as that of the first. Unfortunately it would take us far afield and our space is limited. Moreover, as the setting remains the same as in the previous case, the second phase would not teach us anything new concerning the conditions in which a strategic manouver may find itself placed. The problem would be absolutely the same.

In order to find something really new and to draw close to the normal conditions of our times, it is necessary to enter a new theater of operations having dimensions and an organization more closely resembling those which most belligerents in the future will have to face.

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THÉORIES STRATÉGIQUES

(Volume II, Chapter VI)

The German Operations in the North Sea (1914-1916)

by

ADMIRAL CASTEX

The Theater of Operations.

The Pacific of 1914 has shown us conditions halfway between those of a distant past and those of the present, insofar as strategic maneuvering is concerned. The North Sea between 1914 and 1916 offers a geographic and technical setting for these maneuvers more closely approaching that which will henceforth be found in most regions where important naval conflicts may take place.

In passing from the first to the second of these theaters of operations one cannot help being forcibly impressed by the change in the landscape.

The dimensions of the arena are very much reduced. Compared with the Pacific, the North Sea is an insignificant body of water about 480 miles long (North to South) and about 306 miles wide (East to West) on the Rosyth parallel at which point it reaches its greatest lateral dimension. The space involved is, therefore, meagre. The same is true of the possibilities which it affords for movements and the resulting opportunities for maneuvering. The groups of belligerents at sea at the same time will never be very far apart and, owing to the speed of modern units, favorable situations are most ephemeral. What is more, it is impossible to ask of space a duration, however slight, of those situations unless the enemy be fixed.

Owing to the narrowness of the basin in which the adversaries

are engaged, units with a limited radius of action, such as aircraft can intervene frequently. Others, such as submarines, which demand a reasonable probability of meeting the enemy and in this respect adapt themselves poorly to vast ocean spaces, are destined to produce greatly increased results. These two devices are about to give an entirely new aspect to operations.

Geography here confers upon Great Britain an undeniable advantage over Germany in that the former country blocks the latter physically, so to speak, by the conformation of the coast lines. This fact had already been noticed in the 17th Century at the time of the Anglo-Dutch wars. This geographical superiority, however, would not be of much value if it were not reenforced by a superiority of the mobile force on the British side. Geographic advantage does not influence the outcome except insofar as it helps the action of that force. Moreover, now as formerly, it chiefly affects maritime communications. It plays but a feeble part in the maneuvers of the organized forces which find themselves in approximately the same situation with the exception of this one feature.

The British fleet will have at its disposal when the necessary arrangements are concluded several bases, Scapa Flow (Orkney Islands), Cromarty (Scotland), Rosyth (near Leith), the estuary of the Humber, Harwich and Sheerness (Thames). As a matter of fact, the defensive problems of anchorages and the question of fleet maintenance will only be solved progressively. Moreover, some of these bases (Harwich) are accessible for small vessels only and none of the others, except Scapa Flow, can contain the entire British fleet. Scapa Flow, which has great advantages, is unfortunately too far distant from the Southern portion of the North Sea, the region of the interesting operations. The organization, therefore, is not perfect. Nevertheless, it presents this remarkable feature in that when maneuvering

it provides the British forces with several directions for advance and for retreat.

The German fleet is less fortunately situated. The Danish Straits being closed, it can only rely on a restricted system of bases formed by the estuaries of the Elbe, the Jade and the Ems, which are difficult to navigate at certain tides. The German fleet is necessarily compelled to go out from, and return to, these bases and can only maneuver in one direction. As Admiral Scheer has said, "All our undertakings could start from one point only, at the extremity of that sea. It is only there that our fleet could make a sortie and it is only there that it could return. Every sortie on our part towards the coast of England exposed us to flank attacks whereas England, in approaching our coast, had no threat to fear except from the front." As a result the Germans on each occasion had to provide for their safety in many directions.

The North Sea presents an uninterrupted body of water practically void of islands. In its Southern portion navigation is treacherous because of the presence of numerous banks through which one cannot pass except with the aid of artificial markings. The shores of this region are difficult of approach especially those of the German Bay.

The depths of the North Sea are slight. It is only on the parallel of Skagerrak that the one hundred meter ledge is reached. This peculiarity is very favorable for submarines which in many places can rest on the bottom, but what is even more important it permits of an intensive use of mines. Owing to the fact that they are planted both by the British and the Germans, the German Bay, in particular, soon finds itself surrounded by a large zone of mine fields extending from Terschelling to Horn's Reef. This condition is useful to the Germans not only defensively in that it furnishes a protecting shelter but also offensively in that

this cover allows exit through three large channels continually kept open, namely, the Horn's Reef, the Northwest and the Friesland coast channels.

At the same time the mine fields are promptly extended to the high seas. Both adversaries scatter them freely in the theater of operations. The British place two very large ones, one at the Eastern end of the Straits of Dover and another in the mouth of the Thames. The Germans do the same in the mouth of the Thames, the Humber, the Tyne, the Forth, Cromarty, etc., in addition to the defensive obstructions installed by the British on the same coast. At sea, the Dogger Bank is mined by the Germans as well as the center of the North Sea, at parallel 56. All these mine fields, naturally, are two-edged swords, that is to say, they are just as annoying for friends as for foes. They end by making the Southern part of the North Sea one vast trap, a tricky terrain, into which the British fleet soon hesitates to venture.

To sum up, submarines and mines are destined seriously to restrict the liberty of action of both adversaries and consequently to weigh heavily on their maneuvers. This new restriction on their freedom of movements constitutes one of the real innovations of modern conditions which offsets to a great degree that formerly resulting from calms or contrary winds. Although relieved of the latter, the contestants are, nevertheless, hampered by the former.

It should be, moreover, noted that the slight radius of action of the German destroyers, which vessels can only hold the sea forty-eight hours, also contributes to limiting freedom of maneuver on their side.

In the upper latitudes of the North Sea the seasons constitute a factor very important in operations, first, as regards the weather and secondly, because of the very great difference

between the length of the days and nights according to the time of year. Daylight is very long in Summer and very short in Winter; as a result the execution of a given mission presents a more or less favorable aspect according to the season and the nature of the enterprise, the execution of which is to a very high degree influenced by, and the choice of time closely dependent on, astronomical factors.

The North Sea, in spite of its Northern position, is always free of ice, which is not the case in the Baltic.

Visibility is generally poor in the North Sea. Statistics are available to show that during three hundred days of the year it is limited to eight or ten nautical miles. It is therefore hardly equal to the maximum range of heavy artillery. In this region fog is frequent, especially in the Summer and in the beginning of Autumn. Horizons closed by rain and snow are frequently to be met with. Owing to these meteorological factors, strategic and tactical surprises are common phenomena in the North Sea against which it is not always possible to take precautions by exploration or scouting, since poor conditions of visibility can render them completely inoperative. Because of this, maneuvers must always face serious risks and sudden, unforeseen situations.

Wireless telegraphy, even as it was in 1914, can easily cover the entire North Sea, thanks to a complete organization of shore stations. This new means of communication intervenes at all times to facilitate the task of the commander-in-chief, a development which would not hold good for the Pacific as a whole at that time. Moreover, methods unknown up to then, based on the general use of wireless will be used by both sides for obtaining information, thereby contributing to safety and to freedom of action. Cases in point are the interception of messages, deciphering, and radio triangulation.

To sum up, geographical and technical conditions practically unheard of heretofore, characterized especially by short dimensions, by the appearance of submarines, aircraft, mines, wireless and its derivatives, in other words, a greater reaction of land upon sea, this is the setting which the North Sea offers to strategic maneuvering.

The two adversaries, moreover, are fully informed of these details. As was proper, they had studied in advance, and very conscientiously, the terrain of the future struggle. To be convinced of this it is sufficient, for instance, to examine on the German side an article published in 1911 in the "Marine Rundschau", which examined thoroughly the characteristics of the North Sea above mentioned and, curiously enough, pointed out the value of Rosyth as a central point and the importance of Scapa Flow as a position which could assist in barring the Northern issues of the North Sea. On the British side, Admiral Fisher, at that time First Sea Lord, in a study made in 1904 of his theater of operations in an event of an Anglo-German conflict, made the same discoveries "while playing with a compass", as he put it. The British are induced to hasten the works at Rosyth begun in 1903 and to select Scapa Flow and Cromarty as war bases for their fleet. The maneuvers of 1910 and 1911 complete the elucidation of the question and result in the war orders (plan of operations) of 1912 which foresaw the distant blockade of the German fleet by the maintenance of the British fleet in these bases. The first fleet or Grand Fleet is maintained with its main force at Scapa Flow; the second fleet or Channel Fleet remains in the Straits of Dover and on the Southern coast of England. The third fleet is used as reserve and for local defense. Patrol flotillas take charge of coast guard work. The Grand Fleet is employed for effecting the blockade and is to make its action felt by sorties undertaken at irregular intervals and limited, on the South, by

Paralled 57. The light forces are to descend to the parallel of the Island of Heligoland (54°). Below this parallel the wart watch is entrusted to the Harwich force.

This is the formation which the Germans have to contend with and from now on we shall live through the vicissitudes of their plan of maneuver by remaining in their camp from the beginning to the end.

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The Initial Situation.

We have seen the terrain, now for the forces.

If we omit, on the British side, the second and the third fleets and all secondary vessels, and on the German side the 4th, 5th and 6th squadrons composed of old battleships relatively valuless, the balance of power on August ist, 1914 is as follows:

A. British Forces.

1. Grand Fleet:

28 battleships (of which 20 are dreadnaughts)
4 battle cruisers
8 armored cruisers
11 light cruisers
41 destroyers.

2. Harwich Force:

3 light cruisers
36 destroyers
17 submarines.

B. German Forces (High Seas Fleet).

23 battleships (of which 15 are dreadnaughts)
3 battle cruisers
1 armored cruiser
14 light cruisers
88 destroyers
28 submarines.

Based on these figures the Germans have a rather marked inferiority in large combat ships which, however, is not crushing and have a slight superiority in destroyers and submarines. This is due to the fact that the British, by withdrawing their second and third fleets and some of their patrolling units from their first line forces, have deprived themselves of more vessels than the Germans have in withdrawing their 4th, 5th and 6th squadrons of battleships and their Baltic forces. We find, moreover, in the British patrol force three light cruisers and forty-eight destroyers still very dependable as well as three flotillas of old submarines, and the second British fleet includes some battleships and armored cruisers that are fairly serviceable. In addition, the battle cruisers and the armored cruisers of the Mediterranean soon arrive as reenforcements.

The balance of power is, therefore, more favorable for the British than would appear from the foregoing figures without, however, being sufficient completely to paralyze the Germans.

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The Germans are persuaded from the outset of their impotence

in the face of the British navy. As far back as 1911, at the time of the Agadir, the heads of the German navy had expressed that opinion. They maintained it on various occasions during the month of July 1914 at the time of the political tension which preceded the war. This opinion is reenforced at the outbreak of hostilities when it is realized that the British navy is now increased by the French and Russian naval forces. Tirpitz writes in his memoirs: "Our naval forces in 1914 were already very formidable but not yet sufficiently developed." In a letter dated August 2nd 1914, he says: "We of the navy can do very little and that makes our situation a very painful one." The general staff of the army is resigned to the thought that England will completely dominate the sea.

At the same time a strange notion becomes apparent among some Germans, a notion more political than military, to the effect that by proper handling it might be possible to avoid active war and decisive engagements with the British naval forces, at least in the present conflict. On August 19th, while the Germans armies were marching through Belgium with the irresistible force of a tidal wave and when everything seemed to point to the annihiliation of France in the near future, Admirals Pohl and Tirpitz explained to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg their cunning combination. On land, France and Russia will be promptly conquered and important slices of territory acquired for bargaining purposes which will largely offset the British mastery of the sea and their conquest of German colonies. A large portion of the French channel coast will be in German hands, while Turkey will seriously threaten the Suez Canal. All of the foregoing should finally exert on England a pressure which would compel her to consent to a negotiation with Germany in which some important concessions might be made in order to obtain peace. These are the traits of what Germans called "the first Punic war". In a second or third war modern Carthage

would be definitely laid low after all obstacles have been methodically overcome, one after the other.

Be that as it may, the Germans were still living on the famous theory of the "risk" formulated in 1900, which in peace time was the guiding thought in the construction of their naval power. According to their way of thinking, this naval power is destined, not to conquer the British power directly but to paralyze it by fear of the risk of losses which would result from a war with Germany, losses which would cause England to take second place among military powers. The theory was a childish one and did not take into account British powers of construction and reconstruction, but it was a theory which, nevertheless, haunted many German minds.

These are the main ideas governing German naval circles on the eve of the outbreak of the war in 1914. To be sure the notions of "negotiations" and of "risk" are not adhered to by them to the point of causing the German fleet to remain passive and entirely inactive. They were only considered incidentally. On the other hand, the conviction of their impotence, at least for the present, as regards the British fleet, clearly dominated all minds, even that of the Emperor, and it is under this influence that the initial plan of German operations was laid down, under date of July 31st, 1914, for forces operating in the North Sea. This document is worded as follows:

"His Majesty the Emperor has ordered for the conduct of the war in the North Sea:

"1. The object of the war must be <u>the causing of damage to the British fleet</u> by offensive points against the forces patrolling or blockading the German Bay and, at the same time, by an energetic offensive by means of <u>mines</u> and, if possible, <u>submarines</u>, pushed as far as the British coast.

"2. After <u>equalization of forces</u> shall have been obtained

by this method of warfare, our fleet, after having prepared and assembled all its forces, should try to engage in battle under favorable conditions. If favorable conditions for combat present themselves sooner the opportunity should be made use of.

"3. The war of commerce destroying shall be conducted according to the prize laws. The commander of the High Seas Fleet shall issue orders as to the extent it is to be waged in metropolitan waters. The ships designated for carrying the war of commerce destroying to waters outside of metropolitan waters are to set forth as soon as possible."

Besides this plan of operations, several special orders concerning the conduct of the war are sent to the commander of the High Seas Fleet. History does not know their tenor except that on September 25th, 1914, this general officer speaks of "the expressions of the will of the Kaiser, transmitted on several occasions by the chief of staff, insisting that the High Seas Fleet should not be engaged." Moreover, in his private correspondence the chief of staff (Admiral von Pohl) calls to the attention of the commander of the High Seas Fleet (Admiral von Ingenohl) the importance, for political reasons, of preserving the force which he commands so that it will be intact on the day of peace. The Chancellor also is strongly of the same opinion.

The plan of operations, we see from the foregoing, is a defensive one, as is proper for a belligerent who believes himself to be much feebler than his adversary. However, it contemplates a temporary defensive only. Battle is merely deferred. It is to be considered later, at least in theory and for the sake of form, as such a notion is decidedly in contradiction with the documents drawn up subsequent to the plan. For this battle favorable conditions of time, place and especially of forces will, of course, be sought.

How can they be obtained? As regards forces, by an operatic

which is to be material, arithmetical, mechanical, so to speak; by the simple process of "equalization"; by the sum of the losses inflicted on the enemy as previously described. Then "all forces" are to be opposed to the British forces thus reduced and brought down to a total approximately equal to the united High Seas Fleet. Until this situation shall have been brought about nothing further is to be done except to seize the "opportunity" if it should present itself; that is to say, reliance is placed entirely upon chance to produce a conjunction of fortunate circumstances.

Arithmetic or chance, but no maneuvers. This is the essential trait of the plan which is practically devoid of any thought of maneuvering. Slight traces are found in two places only. First, as concerns the blows to be dealt the British force maintaining the blockade of the German Bay. Here we perceive an intention to set upon a fraction only of the enemy fleet with a superior force. It should be noted, however, that the Germans intend to wait until the enemy, of his own free will, shall have created that favorable situation by obligingly coming into the German Bay and offering himself in sacrifice. This condition, however, is not to be brought about by the party desiring it, as usually happens when there is a real maneuver. Secondly, a war of commerce destroying is provided for, as was proper, if only to harm the British. This mode of attack, as we know, is likely to have a pronounced effect on their system of dividing forces and to contribute effectively to improving the German chances in the war against organized forces, but this recognized link, between these two forms of combat, being based entirely on maneuvering, is not even hinted at.

The program of equalization set forth in the first paragraph of the plan is not easy to realize. In the first place it does not take into account the reenforcements of new ships

which the Grand Fleet continually receives as a result of the vigorous impulse given to naval construction. These reinforcements can more than offset the losses sustained. Again the British have no intention of maintaining a blockade close to Heligoland Bight, as the Germans had hoped. They confine themselves to the distant blockade foreseen in 1912 and only venture forth cautiously in the North Sea from time to time, resorting to rapid sorties made at times chosen by them and leave no trace of their passage. Under such conditions it is very difficult to reach any important ships even on the British coast, if submarines and mines be the only means of action.

To sum up, the combination on which the German plan rests is destined to fail from the outset of the war. This plan will crumble for the reasons above set forth and also because it does not contain any other element based on maneuvering or on a direct offensive, although the relative strength of the first line forces on either side does not absolutely prohibit such an offensive.

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First Operations (August-September 1914)

THE PLAN OF MANEUVER TAKES SHAPE

The first part of the plan relative to equalization is put into effect at the outbreak of hostilities.

The auxiliary mine-laying vessel Koenigin-Luise on August 5th, without any support, plants mines in the mouth of the Thames She is promptly sunk by a flotilla of British destroyers.

Almost at the same time the Germans, believing the main

body of the British fleet to be near the center of the North Sea supporting the blockade which they had hoped would be a close one, attempt to seek out and attack this main body by means of a screen of ten submarines sweeping the North Sea (North to South) from the 6th to 11th of August. This screen on its way back meets the Grand Fleet without being able to attack it or to bring back any information concerning it. Two submarines are destroyed, one being rammed by a British light cruiser.

The transporting of British troops bound for France begins on August 9th. The Germans are advised on the 7th of August that this movement is to commence in the near future. The general staff of the army does not consider it dangerous and advises the navy chiefs not to trouble themselves about it. Nevertheless on August 8th, the Emperor gives orders to the navy to attack the British transports without, however, engaging the High Seas Fleet. The German Admiralty confides this operation to four submarines who are to act separately with the mission not to attack the transports but the warships covering the movement, in order to contribute to the equalization sought for. These submarines leave Heligoland on August 6th. Two of them return without having reached the supposed line of coverage. The third does not sight anything and the fourth sees only one cruiser and some British destroyers and is not able to attack any of them.

Meanwhile the Grand Fleet, as we have seen, is at sea and its cruisers approach within one hundred miles of Heligoland without sighting anything and without being attacked, although by so doing they placed themselves in the position desired by the Germans.

The latter indefatigably continue their attemps at achieving equality by means of the submarine, this time going as far as the English coast. Application of the agreed program is persevered in. Three submarines make a reconnaissance, between the 14th and 21st

of August, of the Firth of Moray, the Firth of Forth and the Humber. They are stopped by protective works and do not meet any British forces.

These repeated failures of their submarines seem to the German high command to be due to the distance separating them from the British surface forces which obstinately remain out of range. In order to induce them to draw close and thus secure good opportunities for attacking them, it seems necessary to resort to raids against the English coast to be executed by surface forces (cruisers and destroyers). Here we see actually a rudimentary notion of maneuver but it will be noticed at once that it concerns only the problem of equalization and the necessity, in order to solve it successfully, of inducing the British forces to come within range of the German Bay. The favorable situation to be created in no way involves the respective positions of the main German fleet or the main British fleet. Only a maneuver on a very small scale is contemplated, but it bears a seed which will blossom later on.

It is with this thought in mind that two cruisers, the Stralsund and the Strasburg, are sent on August 17th by themselves, rather imprudently, to attack British troop ships. The Stralsund encounters some of the light units of Harwich but succeeds in escaping. The two cruisers withdraw without being pursued and without succeeding in attracting the enemy Eastward. The only effect of this raid is to cause the British to station henceforth several cruisers, of which two are battle cruisers, in the Humber. This result is of some importance as it is the beginning of British dispersion, a subject to which we will have occasion to refer again.

On August 31st a group of light units composed of the Rostock, Stralsund and a flotilla of destroyers, supported in the rear by the cruisers Mainz and Hamburg and three submarines, make

a point against the Dogger Bank and there sink some British trawlers.

In the night of the 25th to 26th of August, the mine laying vessels Albatross and Nautilus, each escorted by a light cruiser and half a flotilla of destroyers, plant mines in the mouth of the Tyne and the Humber. The latter mine field is discovered in time and the two battle cruisers based on this point are sent North to the Firth of Forth.

These various operations, however, still do not bring about the desired equalization. Moreover, they are soon to be interrupted by a disagreeable thrust of the enemy.

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On August 28th, 1914, at 6 o'clock in the morning, the British suddenly break through the German protective works in the Heligoland Bight in pursuance of a plan agreed upon several days before, at the suggestion of the Harwich force, by the chief of this force, the Admiralty and the commander-in-chief of the Grand Fleet. The British engage in this affair the battle cruisers of Admiral Beatty, the eight cruisers of the first light squadron (Commodore Goodenough) as well as two light cruisers, thirty-three destroyers and eight submarines of the Harwich force. The Germans are completely surprised, their light cruisers come up in support one at a time, being hampered by poor visibility. Their larger vessels are paralyzed until noon by the tide and the lack of water on the bar of the Jade. After vicissitudes, which need not be recounted here, the Germans lose

three light cruisers (Köln, Mainz and Ariadne) as well as the destroyer V-187. The British disappear thereafter as quickly as they had come.

They have approached the German Bay and no mistake, but not at all under the conditions wished for by the Germans! Whereas they had imagined that they would find the British motionless in this place, stagnant, crystalized and offering a target to their shots, the latter made their appearance but remained mobile, active, agile and difficult to seize, whereas, on the contrary, the German formation was a fixed one. The Germans had claimed that they could choose the hour but it is the British who have done so. The enemy had the initiative of the operation. It is he who manouvered, created a favorable situation and surprised the Germans.

Admiral von Ingenohl, commander of the High Seas Fleet, had issued, on August 14th, a general order to his crews with a view of calming their impatience in which he set forth the advantages that would result from "equalization". He added, moreover, referring to the initiative in giving battle: "from the attitude of the enemy we must conclude that he intends to avoid the losses which we could cause him and to attract our combat ships to his coast there to be victims of his mines and submarines."

"We will not give our adversary this pleasure. He must come and finally he will come. Then accounts will be settled. That day we will be in line with all our combat ships.

"As soon as he comes within reach he will find us in the arena. But we do not intend to let him impose on us either the place or the hour of meeting. We intend to choose both of them and to accept battle only under conditions that will offer us complete success."

Comparison of these lines with the events of August 28th is not without a certain grim humor. Here we see a prophecy but the parts are inverted. The coming of the enemy occurred as the

admiral predicted but not in the manner he had hoped for. By not maneuvering - and this is indeed the grave defect in the initial German plan - he incurred the risk of seeing the enemy take the initiative and thereby impose his will.

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The battle of Heligoland naturally created a profound impression among Germans and caused the prompt adoption of certain measures and some searching reflection. Technical opinion at first manifests a certain dissatisfaction towards Admiral Tirpitz, the creator of the fleet, when the insufficiency of the artillery of the light cruisers and destroyers as compared to their British adversaries and the inferiority of the heating power of coal as compared to fuel oil became apparent; but this is merely a detail. More important are the modifications made in the arrangements adopted for the protection of the German Bay. These are radically transformed. It is decided in future not to station any forces out of range of the guns of Heligoland and in the place of an advance line of destroyers, to plant a barrage of mines and to make frequent reconnaissances by means of aircraft, submarines and destroyers. It is at this time (September 9th) that the planting of the large mine fields which soon entirely cover the German Bay is begun.

At the same time the Germans prepare for a new affair of the same nature as that of the 28th of August. The defeat suffered on that occasion seems to them to be due mainly to the failure of the line forces to come to the support of the light vessels. It

will, therefore, be necessary on the next occasion to permit the engagement of the High Seas Fleet.

In the fleet every man appears to be impatient for action. Admiral von Ingenohl conveys their desire to grand headquarters. He proposes to modify the initial plan and to allow more initiative to the fleet.

In high circles this suggestion appears inopportune. The Emperor considers that the engagement off Heligoland is another proof of the impotence of the German navy in the face of the British navy. He considers, moreover, the political and military effect produced by the existence of the High Seas Fleet, its influence on the neutrality of the Scandinavians and on the mastery of the Baltic. He had been worried from the beginning by the thought of preserving this force intact in order to put it into play at the time of the peace negotiation which, owing to the victorious march of the land operations, he hopes for in the near future. On August 30th, 1914, he thus expresses his opinion to Admiral von Pohl: "The fleet has become over-confident as the result of the inactivity of the British who have made good use of atmospheric conditions. Such surprises must not occur again." He advises for the conduct of the High Seas Fleet that "it be reserved for the decisive battle." He closes by saying: "His Majesty advises that due caution be used in the face of enemy forces clearly superior so as not to compromise, by premature losses, the object of our operations which is the assembling of all our forces for the decisive battle." We see, therefore, that the original plan is in nowise changed.

The events of August 28th, however, arouses among the German chiefs doubts as to the value of this plan and causes them to consider projects for the better utilization of their forces. The Chancellor, for political reasons, takes the same view of the situation as the Emperor and recommends that the High Seas Fleet

maintain a temporizing attitude. General von Falkenhayn, Minister of War, is also of the opinion that the High Seas Fleet should not be engaged unless an opportunity in all respects favorable be found.

In the opposing camp we find the German naval staff. This body, which remained in Berlin, is indignant over the inaction of the fleet, also Tirpitz who assumes the role of spokesman for all the malcontents. Probably because he is affected by the criticisms made of his materiel, he becomes bitter and suddenly urges decisive action, forgetting, all of a sudden, everything he had written a few days previously concerning the so-called impotence of the High Seas Fleet.

Admiral von Pohl (chief of the general naval staff) who is attached to grand headquarters is torn between the two factions.

In the High Seas Fleet the same discussions between the partisans of the statu quo and the advocates of activity take place. It is there that a solution will be reached. The German officers who favor an offensive attitude for the fleet point out that the combat of the 28th of August, contrary to what had originally been expected, demonstrated that a battle in the neighborhood of the German Bay does not offer favorable conditions. Far from it, for the reason that there the Germans will never have the initiative in the operations and the adversary is sure to be encountered on the alert and in force, whereas, in taking the initiative themselves by a sortie on the high seas, much better results are obtainable.

Urged on by the opinion of his officers, Admiral von Ingenohl proposes to the Emperor to make a point towards Skagerrak with the battle cruisers on September 20th. A few days later he talks of having them supported by the entire High Seas Fleet. On September 19th, Admiral von Pohl, acting on his own responsibility, declines this last proposition. As a matter of fact the projected

operation is immediately abandoned on receiving news that the Grand Fleet had weighed anchor.

In a more complete and better prepared memoir, dated September 25th, Admiral von Ingenohl comes back to the charge. He emphasizes the necessity of modifying the first plan of operations and of giving more freedom of action to the High Seas Fleet. He calls attention to the fact that a battle in the favorable circumstances set forth in the plan of operations can never be had if the British fleet is to be engaged when coming into the German Bay on its own initiative. As for the so-called equalization to be obtained by a war of mines and submarines, no reliance should be placed on it. On the other hand, it might be perfectly possible, by taking the initiative and making a sortie with united forces, to obtain successes against portions of the British fleet even outside of the German Bay, as for instance, by operating in the vicinity of Skagerrak.

There we see the genesis of an idea of maneuver. Before this we had only glimpses of it through minor operations in the German Bay undertaken with equalization in view. Now maneuvering on a grand scale is contemplated in order to solve the problem of creating a favorable situation for the main German force as regards the main British force. The plan is, to be sure, somewhat lacking in form, a mere sketch without precise details as to the mode of execution but it constitutes, nevertheless, an immense step forward as compared to the former void.

The leaders of the war, however, show little enthusiasm. On October 2nd, the Emperor renews his order that "the fleet shall be kept, for the time being, in its present state and is not to be placed in a situation where it can be forced into battle against superior forces." The projected operation is definitely abandoned

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In the meantime, on October 6th, after much discussion between the leaders of the German navy, imperial directives appear, containing "an expression of the wish of the Emperor". These really constitute a plan of operations in the true sense of the word and take the place of that of July 31st. They represent the real intentions of those directing the war at this stage of the conflict.

This document insists, in the first place, upon the part the mere existence of the High Seas Fleet plays in the defense of the coast of the Empire and the mastery of the Baltic as well as in the maintenance of communications with the Scandinavian countries. It points out that even after a victory in battle these advantages would disappear as the result of the losses suffered and that the attitude of neutrals would be affected.

As a result the following decisions are taken:

"His Majesty orders that the fleet shall stay in reserve and avoid actions which might lead to severe losses.

"This is not to exclude inflicting damage on the enemy. In conformity with the plan of operations (of July 31st) prescribed by His Majesty, favorable situations should be utilized.

"The use of the fleet outside of the German Bay is not to be construed as falling within the favorable situations mentioned in the plan of operations.

"The intentions of His Majesty will not be complied with by accepting battle in the German Bay in the event of an advance by the enemy in force, as in that event, as has likewise been pointed out by the commander of the High Seas Fleet, losses from submarines must certainly be expected.

"His Majesty the Emperor reserves the final decision as to the time when the fleet shall be engaged. That time has not yet come, in view of the general political situation.

"On the other hand, His Majesty orders that a war by means

of submarines, destroyers and mines be energetically waged. An advance by the battle cruisers with a view of causing damage to the enemy likewise meets with the approval of His Majesty."

We see, therefore, that the Emperor, or to be more exact, his counsellors von Pohl and von Muller (chief of the naval cabinet who have thought out and prepared this document, hardly modify the first conception. They decide that the main body of the High Seas Fleet, (unless contrary orders are issued, which is unlikely) shall remain at its base and more than ever refrain from any action on the high seas. They cling tenaciously to the mirage of obtaining equalization by submarine methods and do nothing but speak about the "damage" to be inflicted upon the enemy.

Nevertheless, this plan, in spite of everything, retains some of von Ingenohl's suggestions. A battle in the German Bay is no longer considered an ideal possibility; the engagement off Heligoland has opened their eyes. The possibility of a sortie of the battle cruisers by themselves is contemplated, which is already a step forward.

The Emperor, Pohl and Muller, however, have not grasped Ingenohl's rudimentary idea of maneuvering. They do not admit that from the combined actions of the main fleet and the battle cruisers, under certain conditions, a favorable situation might result. For the time being they remain obdurate as far as the creative intentions manifested by the commander of the High Seas Fleet are concerned and only give their consent later on when faced with facts which they consider encouraging.

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First Attempts at Maneuvering.

(November 1914 to January 1915)

In September and October occur several events of a nature to give confidence to the partisans of equalization by means of petty warfare. On September 22nd, the three armored cruisers Aboukir, Hogue and Cressy, steaming to the East of the Thames at a slow rate of speed and without taking precautions, are torpedoed by the submarine U-9. On October 15th in the Northern part of the North Sea, the same thing occurs to the armored cruiser Hawke. Since the anchorage at Scapa Flow had not as yet been organized defensively the Grand Fleet takes shelter at Lough-Swilly, on the Northern coast of Ireland.

At the same time the auxiliary mine layer Berlin leaves Germany on October 16th with the mission of mining the entrance of the Clyde and then to engage in commerce destroying in the Atlantic. On October 22nd she is off the North coast of Ireland and, as the spot seems to be sufficiently frequented, decides to plant her mines. On October 27th the British battleship Audacious, one of their most modern vessels, is sunk by one of these mines.

At the same time, however, other operations of the same nature are less successful.

On October 17th the Nautilus, escorted by the cruiser Kolberg, attempts to plant mines at the mouth of the Forth and is driven back by British light forces.

The same day the 7th German half-flotilla composed of four destroyers, while engaged in a similar mission in the region of the Thames, is completely destroyed by a British cruiser and four destroyers.

The commander of the High Seas Fleet thereupon reports that mine plantings on the English coast cannot be attempted any longer unless the vessels undertaking this work be supported by a strong

force capable of dominating and repelling the British light units. On October 29th he wires to grand headquarters requesting permission to plant a mine field near Yarmouth. The mine laying vessels are to be supported by the battle cruisers, a squadron of light cruisers and a flotilla of destroyers. The main body of the High Seas Fleet is to hold itself in readiness to support, at 40 miles to the North of Terschelling. As we see, Ingenohl, who at first had been rebuffed by general headquafters, revives his plan of maneuver, nevertheless, and urges action by means of mines

Strange as it may seem, in spite of the restrictive orders contained in the instructions of October 6th, the Emperor approves this plan the very same evening (with only one limitation and that is that the High Seas Fleet shall not go more than 120 miles from Heligoland) but at the same time strongly recommends a thoroughgoing scouting operation to the North to be effected by all available means, including aircraft.

This looks like the opening move of an offensive, which is not surprising, for whenever some units become engaged they must either be abandoned to their fate or supported by others. The underlying thought is logical even from the point of view of equalization alone. Experience has shown, and sound reason would indicate, that in order to induce the British ships to expose themselves to mines and submarines, it will be necessary to tempt them with the bait of the German surface ships and, one thing leading to another, this implies a sortie by the High Seas Fleet.

Does this project of sortie contain any plan of maneuver on a large scale? It would not seem so, unless Admiral von Ingenohl, in order to avoid a refusal, purposely concealed a secret thought of this nature behind what seemed to be merely a commonplace mine planting operation. In his proposal no mention is made of any attempt to reach an isolated portion of the British forces.

Be that as it may, the Germans never had a more favorable

opportunity to measure themselves, without too great disadvantage, against the united British forces or to encounter them separately and defeat them piecemeal.

At the end of October the situation of the Grand Fleet, as far as large combat ships are concerned, had become extremely serious. Among the battleships the Audacious had been sunk; the Iron Duke and the Ajax are incapacitated by trouble with their condensers; the Orion is having her turbines overhauled at Greenock; the Erin and Agincourt have just joined the fleet and have not had time to complete their training. The battle cruiser New Zealand is undergoing repairs at Cromarty.

The Grand Fleet at that moment consisted of only 17 dreadnaughts, 5 battle cruisers and 42 destroyers, whereas the Germans had 15 dreadnaughts, 4 battle cruisers and 80 destroyers. (It is at this time that serious thought is given to the advisability of bringing from the Mediterranean four French dreadnaughts).

In the beginning of November the defeat off Coronel induces the British to detach from the Grand Fleet the battle cruisers Invincible, Inflexible and Princess Royal and to send them to the Falkland Islands and to the Antilles. The arrival of the Tiger only partially replaces these detachments.

The British, moreover, choose this time to put into effect certain very questionable decisions concerning the allocation of their forces. In October the government and the British high command were haunted, as has often happened in the history of England, by the terror of an invasion. In the present case this fear was unreasonable, unjustifiable and even absurd, as can easily be demonstrated. Nevertheless, it is perceived that the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow is very far off in the event of a German attempt at landing and the stationing of certain fractions of that fleet along the coast is considered in order better to meet any such enterprise. The new plan is determined upon on November 12th

The third squadron of the line (8 battleships of the King Edward type) and the third cruiser squadron (8 armored cruisers of the Antrim type) are withdrawn from Scapa Flow and based on Rosyth. This movement is effected on the 20th of November. In the South, the fifth squadron of the line (old battleships of the Formidable type) is based on Sheerness. In this region the flotillas of Harwich and of the Nore are likewise stationed. The British, moreover, refused to consider the Harwich force as a necessary adjunct of the Grand Fleet and the Admiralty keeps that force under its orders, reserving the right of using it independently.

To sum up, a dangerous dispersion between Scapa Flow, Cromarty, Rosyth, Harwich and Sheerness is about to begin. If to this dispersion be added the state of depletion of the Grand Fleet at this time, one cannot help but notice that circumstances most favorable for the German plan of maneuver offer the opportunity sought for.

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On November 3rd the raid against Yarmouth, effected by the battle cruisers and some light cruisers, take place as planned. The mine planting is performed without any incident except that an error is made in its location. The coast is bombarded with insignificant results.

In the meantime the main body of the High Seas Fleet holds itself in readiness in the neighborhood of Terschelling. Only some light British units are seen. The Germans then withdraw without any important event intervening.

The British battle cruisers leave Cromarty too late to reach the enemy.

Everything went off smoothly, but the operation is, to be sure, a small one.

Everybody in the German camp is now encouraged to continue along the same lines.

On November the 16th, Admiral von Ingenohl sends to German headquarters a plan for the bombardment of Hartlepool and Scarborough. These operations are to be supported by the High Seas Fleet which, this time, is to proceed 130 miles to sea. On November 19th the requested permission is granted. Pohl, Muller, Tirpitz and the Emperor himself now hope that the High Seas Fleet may obtain successes over detached portions of the Grand Fleet. They are less opposed at present to the plan of maneuver first suggested by Ingenohl, although on this occasion he is just as guarded in his proposal as he had been before the sortie of November 3rd. It is known, moreover, that the British have been weakened by the absence of vessels sent against von Spee. Only the Admiralty in Berlin continues to limit its ambition to mine plantings.

The operation, postponed from day to day, finally taking place on December 16th, 1914. This extraordinary adventure is well known. It is a succession of situations begun and resolved by mere chance.

First act and first chance occurrence.- On the morning of December 16th the British and German groups become entangled without intending to or knowing that they were so doing. Towards midnight Hipper, who is in the van with his battle cruisers, passes a few miles in front of the British squadrons of Beatty (battle cruisers) and Warrender (second squadron of battleships). Towards 5 o'clock these two squadrons are caught, alone and without support, between Hipper and Ingenohl who is following with the main body of the German fleet. Here indeed is the opportunity long sought for by Ingenohl in his project of setting upon a fraction of the Grand

Fleet with superior forces! The situation is a magnificent one for the Germans.

Second act.- From 5:15 to 6 o'clock the light forces of Ingenohl (destroyer V-155 and the cruiser Hamburg) encounter the destroyers of Warrender. A cannonade takes place. Ingenohl, believing that he has the entire Grand Fleet before him, is seized by fear and at 5:42 causes the High Seas Fleet to execute a complete turning movement and directs it on a homeward course towards the German Bay. As luck would have it he has just lost, without knowing it, the opportunity within his grasp which will never present itself again in the entire war. Moreover, he forgets to warn Hipper of his turning movement until 10:45. Hipper is, therefore, left in the air and finds himself face to face with the united forces of Beatty and Warrender. The German situation, from having been a splendid one, suddenly becomes tragic.

Third act.- Beatty and Warrender steaming Westward have left between their forces a gap of 18 miles. The three light cruisers and destroyers of Hipper on their return East, by a miracle, pass through this gap between 11:30 and 12:15. Aided by poor visibility and by a misunderstanding which had arisen among the British light cruisers, thanks also to the use of false recognition signals, they manage to escape. As for Hipper's battle cruisers, they speed towards the North at 12:45, but this detour would not have saved them if Beatty had not changed his course, thereby preventing an otherwise unavoidable meeting between the two. Here we see that luck for the third time has extricated Hipper from a situation which prior movements had rendered desperate.

On the other hand, it can be said that the British Admiralty on this occasion did everything necessary to create a dispersion favorable to the projected German maneuver. Relying on the fact that its intelligence service only reported a sortie of battle cruisers and light German vessels, the Admiralty limited its

movements to the following forces:

1. The second squadron of ships of the line and the first light squadron (Scapa Flow).

2. The first squadron of battle cruisers and the available destroyers (Cromarty).

3. The third squadron of cruisers (Rosyth).

On December 15th, at 3 o'clock, the Admiralty only calls upon the third squadron of ships of the line (Rosyth) and the fifth squadron of ships of the line (Sheerness) and the Harwich force. The Harwich force is kept in front of Yarmouth.

Result: On December 16th, at the time when the affair was at its height, the first group is the only one at sea (Warrender and Beatty). The Harwich force does not proceed North until 8:40 upon hearing that Scarborough was being bombarded. The third squadron of the line does not leave Rosyth until 10 o'clock and the rest of the Grand Fleet does not leave Scapa Flow until 12:15. These detachments, like the police, soon come back to their anchorage as the Germans are by that time far away.

It would be difficult to give a better illustration of sending ships into action in scattered sections unable to give each other mutual support.

In spite of these exceptionally favorable conditions the German maneuver failed, although it was being directed by one who had been its prime instigator and, so to speak, it most eminent god father.

Admiral von Ingenohl attempts to defend his conduct and to justify himself for having missed an excellent opportunity. He alleges reasons which are more or less valid. He gives as excuse the insufficiency of the scouting service, also his fear of an attack by British destroyers which might have occurred during the following night. He even goes so far, in order to justify his about-face, as to say that the support which he could have given

Hipper by joining him would have been contrary to the instructions of October 6th. As a matter of fact these instructions had been annulled in the present case by the despatch of the High Seas Fleet in support of Hipper. The argument is, therefore, hardly valid.

The truth is much more simple. Ingenohl would have done much better had he stated it frankly instead of seeking poor excuses, as the truth could not have resulted in any unfavorable judgment affecting either his attitude or his reputation.

The facts are that the execution of a maneuver such as the one contemplated is subject to immense hazards in a theatre of operations such as the North Sea. This theatre is limited geographically, the various forces are never far apart and positions vary rapidly. Moreover, poor visibility frequently complicates the problem and brings with it all the risks that a surprise involves.

Something looms up. What is it? Is it an isolated fraction? Is it the main force of the enemy? Is the sought for opportunity within grasp, or, on the other hand, is the situation one replete with danger? If it is an isolated fraction of the enemy force, where is the main body? Nearby? Far off? All these are terrifying questions which assail the responsible leader and plunge his soul into doubt and anxiety, especially when his forces, as a whole, are inferior in number to those of the enemy. Even if, when setting forth, he had confidence in his plan of maneuver, he now feels less sure of himself. He sees perils which were not apparent when action was distant and if the horizon is not absolutely clear, he starts on his homeward journey..... if he can. All this is quite understandable.

In order to be successful in such a mission it is essential that unusual conditions favor its execution. It is especially necessary that scouting operations be faultlessly carried out. Maneuvering in such a case is, above everything else, a question

of information. Accurate intelligence work is indispensable. The Germans had no such service. Their espionage in England had been disorganized by wholesale arrests made at the outbreak of the war. They never had but the vaguest information concerning the Grand Fleet, the position of its different subdivisions and the kind of blockade it had adopted. The British are in a much better position as their secret service works smoothly. Their knowledge of the German codes, copies of which were seized at the time of the wrecking of the Magdeburg in the Baltic, permits the prompt deciphering of enemy radio messages and the development of a chain of radio triangulation stations does the rest. Beginning with November 1914 they can easily make out the game of their adversary.

In the meantime at German grand headquarters it is finally ascertained that the High Seas Fleet on December 16th had before it only a portion of the Grand Fleet and consequently that the opportunity aimed for by the German maneuvers had been missed. Thereupon, and this is the humorous side of the affair, all the recent converts to the idea of maneuvering, the Emperor, Pohl, Muller and Tirpitz are furious with Ingenohl, the father of the plan. They, who had not gone through agony on the scene of action, now exceed him in their belligerent attitude and, on December 23rd, a note is sent to the chief of the High Seas Fleet stating that "His Majesty has specifically stated that the efforts to preserve the fleet or certain parts of it must not under any circumstances go so far as to prevent making use of opportunities favorable for success, under pretext that such utilization would imply the possibility of losses. When the success obtainable warrants the engaging of the forces then the favorable situation must be used fully and to the greatest extent possible without considering any side issues." Unfortunately it is rather difficult to know if the situation is really favorable!

In the meantime the removal of Ingenohl as head of the High Seas Fleet is practically decided upon.

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We now come to the imperial instructions of January 9th, 1915, which, like those of October 6th, 1914, really constitute a new plan of operations.

These instructions comprise all classes of units and all means of action. What has occasioned them, as a matter of fact, is the necessity of taking a stand concerning the blockade of England by means of submarines, a project which Germany had been cherishing for two months past.

As concerns this project it is decided that the submarine war against shipping shall merely be prepared and not put into execution until the Emperor so decides.

Coming now to dirigibles, it is interesting to note that as a matter of principle their first and main use is to be scouting for the high seas forces. Attacks against military establishments in London and on the Thames are to take second place only. Favorable weather conditions in January and February shall be made use of for these operations. London itself is not to be bombarded until new orders are received.

Detailed instructions are sent to the High Seas Fleet worded as follows:

"The commander of the High Seas Fleet is given power to undertake more frequently, according to his best judgment, offensive points in the North Sea in order to cut off advanced enemy forces

and to attack them with superior forces. As far as possible he is to avoid in these operations meeting greatly superior enemy forces as an unfavorable outcome in battle would weigh very heavily on the general situation for the time being, a situation in which the High Seas Fleet is acquiring an ever increasing importance as a political instrument. Offensive points on a large scale leading as far as the enemy coast are not to be undertaken without notifying His Majesty."

These instructions undoubtedly constitute a great advance over those of October 6th, 1914. The idea of maneuver for once is admitted and clearly expressed. It has won its way with those directing the war who, undoubtedly, are still influenced by the lost opportunity of December 16th.

Admiral von Ingenohl claims to be very well satisfied with the result and with the greater latitude thus allowed him. Nevertheless it should be noted he no longer is as headstrong as formerly. Doubts seem to assail him. He points out that one cannot be certain whether other British forces were not behind those encountered on December 16th, and that it would be very difficult, unless the enemy committed a very clumsy blunder, to bring about a meeting between the German fleet and a fraction only of the Grand Fleet. Conscious of the risks involved in that affair he is more reserved, more lukewarm. His ardor is weakening. December 16th seems to have produced upon him the opposite effect it did upon grand headquarters where the neophyte maneuverers take a very rosy view of everything.

It becomes apparent later on that what befell Ingenohl, far from being an isolated case, will occur again to other German leaders confronted by similar conditions.

Immediately thereafter the battle of Dogger Bank takes place (January 24th, 1915). Hipper, sent forward with his battle cruisers and his light units, is decisively stopped by Beatty and in his retreat loses the armored cruiser Blucher.

The Germans are wholly to blame for this result. To begin with, of their own volition, they choose as the time for sending Hipper to the Dogger Bank the very moment when they do not have their entire force at their disposal. On January 21st the third squadron of the line (their most modern ships) is sent to the Baltic on a practice cruise together with a certain number of destroyers. The rest of the High Seas Fleet is lying at anchor and some important vessels are undergoing repairs. It is under these conditions that Hipper is sent forth alone, without support, on January 24th. By his telegrams the Germans know that from 7:47 on he is fighting a fairly powerful enemy and can accurately follow the alarming evolution of the situation (8:05, 8:37, 8:57, 9:23, 9:55). Nevertheless, it is only at 10:03 that Ingenohl announces that the main body of the High Seas Fleet, or what remains of it, is about to put to sea with the flotillas. Of course it can be said that Hipper did not ask for help in so many words until 9:23 but this excuse is inadmissable. Hipper was not supported as he should have been. The inevitable followed. It is December 16th over again, minus the luck.

The Germans by their actions have voluntarily placed themselves in the very situation they hoped to place the British. The whole thing is inconceivable. It is maneuvering the wrong way about and Ingenohl, the instigator of the policy of maneuver, had done it!

To make matters worse this phenomenon occurs at the exact moment when the enemy by his own acts is about to offer once more an excellent opportunity for the Germans to find the precise state of facts they claim to be looking for. The British, who had been warned on January 14th of the approaching activity of the German fleet, had positive information on the morning of January 23rd, derived from the deciphering of the wireless messages of their enemy, concerning the date of the approaching sortie (January 23rd

in the evening) and the units that were to take part. The Admiralty immediately sends orders to its subordinates and by January 24th at 7 o'clock their projected order of battle is completed. We find at that time:

1. At the Dogger Bank, the battle cruisers of Admiral Beatty and the cruisers and destroyers of the Harwich force.

2. Thirty miles to the North, the third squadron of the line and the third squadron of cruisers.

3. Halfway between Aberdeen and Jutland, the balance of the Grand Fleet with Admiral Jellicoe.

In other words, we have as usual the same astonishing and unfortunate dispersion. Let us suppose that the British had been opposed not by Hipper alone but by the entire High Seas Fleet coming up to the Dogger Bank on January 24th, what would have happened? Did not the British order of battle rely too blindly on the information received?

Be that as it may, facts alone count and they result in the retirement of von Ingenohl and his chief of staff, Admiral Eckermann. Admiral von Pohl, head of the general naval staff attached to grand headquarters, takes command of the High Seas Fleet on February 4th, 1915.

The same day the submarine blockade of the English coast is announced. This marks the beginning of the real submarine war.

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One Year of Waiting (1915).

Admiral Bachmann, maritime prefect of Kiel, replaces Admiral von Pohl as head of the general naval staff at grand headquarters. Immediately tension results between him and his predecessor. On February 18th the new commander of the High Seas Fleet informs Admiral Bachmann that he does not intend to take orders from the general naval staff and that, in his opinion and in accordance with the instructions of January 9th, it is incumbent upon him, Pohl, to determine the actions of the fleet for the reason that he is on the scene and the only one in a position to estimate the needs of the military situation. On March 1st in a report prepared for the Emperor, concerning a movement of naval forces, he reverts again to this question of principle and the Emperor supports him. Pohl, therefore, from this time on enjoys a much greater freedom of action than his predecessor had and this marks the beginning of the semi-independence of the High Seas Fleet.

Bachmann's ideas concerning operations are, to be sure, not very new. He believes in sorties of the entire German fleet with a view of attempting to surprise isolated parts of the Grand Fleet. He thinks that the commercial blockade effected by submarines together with the despatching of British ships to the Dardanelles will bring about the desired opportunities. It is the same old plan of maneuver. Bachmann is not an inventor.

Pohl, while at grand headquarters, had also been an advocate of these ideals. Strange to relate, they seem less promising to him now that he commands the High Seas Fleet and has become solely responsible for their execution. The same mental process has taken place in his mind as in that of Ingenohl after December 16th. In a memoir addressed on March 23rd to the Emperor and delivered to him directly by Lieutenant Commander Prince Adalbert, who is about to go on leave, he says:

"I do not know the position of the enemy naval forces. My scouting forces are too feeble to enable me to ascertain when I encounter weak enemy forces whether the main enemy body is in the vicinity. I may, therefore, find myself engaged, against my will, in a naval battle which I should avoid. A contradiction, consequently, exists between the two avowed aims. Concerning the actual military situation I believe, therefore, that offensive points should be very short and limited to demonstrating that we dominate the German Bay."

The neophyte maneuverer, who had found so much fault with Ingenohl for having failed to win on December 16th, is now completely cooled off. The Emperor approves his views. On March 30th he sends him an order in which he leaves the admiral complete freedom of action but at the same time recommends prudence, a recommendation which, by the way, is in no danger of being transgressed.

During the whole of 1915 the High Seas Fleet completely refrains from active operations and does not even execute any short cruiser raids which might require support by the main body. Only sorties of short duration, not extending beyond the limits of the German Bay, are effected. The Germans revert to the chimera of equalization to be obtained by means of petty warfare, submarine actions and mine plantings. They are, moreover, most hopeful because of the submarine warfare against commerce which had just begun.

Mine plantings made in the neighborhood of Dogger Bank give no results as the British resort successfully to sweeping operations. Moreover, these plantings being very dangerous for Germany's own submarines are abandoned toward the end of the year. On the English coast, mine plantings are now made by German submarines but the enemy reacts and keeps channels open along his coast. The same thing occurs with the mine field placed off Cromarty by the mine laying vessel Meteor in the night of 7th to 8th of August 1915.

This vessel, left without any support, is attacked by the British and sunk off Horn's Reef. All these operations, however, cause only inconsequental losses to the enemy.

Coming now to submarine warfare, it should be noted that the German High Seas Fleet had been practically stripped of submarines, thereby depriving the fleet of a weapon it could have made good use of if these units had been willing to maneuver. On the other hand, this submarine warfare obliges the British, in spite of the fact that their patrol flotillas were not as yet sufficiently developed, to withdraw from the Grand Fleet and the Harwich force a large number of destroyers and light vessels for the offensive and defensive actions required to protect communications against this unexpected enemy. Unquestionably this resulted in a fixation which could have been made use of in maneuvering, thereby offsetting the drawbacks presented by this mode of action.

Aerial operations are limited to a few zeppelin raids of no interest.

If the year 1915, however, is for German maneuvers a period of marking time and waiting it is also a period of preparation for the active renewal of operations which begins in 1916 and it is for this reason that we cannot pass it by in silence.

On the German side, 1915 is characterized by an increase in the number and efficiency of their means of combat. The High Seas Fleet is reenforced by four new battleships (Koenig, Grosser-Kurfurst, Markgraf and Kronprinz), by two battle cruisers (Derflinger and Lutzow) and three light cruisers. During the entire year the Germans work actively carrying out certain improvements in their materiel which had been found necessary, especially some affecting their artillery. The range of the guns is increased, new fire control stations are installed. The pieces of 100 are replaced by one of 152 and, finally, increased protection is given to magazines and ammunition hoists.

The High Seas Fleet improves the training of its crews by intensive and tenacious efforts. Gunnery schools for long range firing and the use of torpedoes, which formerly required the despatching of the ships to the Baltic, can now be held around Heligoland owing to the shelter afforded by the mine fields.

The number of submarines is augmented in spite of losses. They are increased during the year from 41 to 55. Although they are, for the time being, exclusively used in the war against commerce, they can be assigned to military operation whenever wanted.

Aerial scouting is made possible by the end of 1915 by ten well trained dirigibles.

To sum up, all of these improvements which must be put down to the credit of the Germans are destined to give their maneuvers in 1916 means of action very superior to those at their disposal in 1914. Admiral Scheer will get the benefit of this and, as it is not possible to execute any maneuver without the necessary equipment, these improvements are valuable.

Unfortunately certain things must be put down to the debit of the Germans, a sort of differential so to speak, as the British have not remained inactive in their preparations to match the High Seas Fleet. In 1915 the Grand Fleet is reenforced by the new dreadnaughts Queen Elizabeth, Barnham, Canada and Warspite, and the battle cruisers Australia, Inflexible and Indefatigable, also eight light cruisers and twenty-two destroyers. British superiority over the German fleet is considerably increased, although this superiority may be lessened by the fact that the Germans can choose the time for the meeting and can await the hour when they have all their means of action concentrated. (The fact that the initiative of operations devolves upon the belligerent who adopts defensive-offensive tactics is one of the peculiarities of naval warfare).

The British, on the other hand, keep steadily at the training of their fleet. After the completion of the works at Scapa Flow they indulge in sub-calibre practice, night firing and torpedo

practice. Gunnery schools for long range firing are held, using the rocks on the West coast of Scotland at first and later on targets towed in Cromarty Bay which is protected by mine fields. Finally, British morale is maintained by navigation and the frequent sorties on the high seas which British forces resort to in spite of a legend to the contrary. On the other hand, the German morale naturally droops owing to the interminable periods during which they remain at anchor. If the training of the High Seas Fleet in the handling of their weapons remains good the same cannot be said of their psychological condition, for the reason that its maintenance absolutely requires some exterior manifestation of activity and contact with the sea.

As regard intelligence work the British maintain and even increase their advantage. Their organization in this respect becomes more perfect day by day. If the deciphering of wireless messages becomes more difficult since the Germans have learned how to protect themselves better in this department, if the British submarines are of little use in scouting work owing to the fact that they are still provided with insufficient means of transmission, on the other hand, radio triangulation makes very rapid strides. The British now have forty stations scattered along their coast between the Orkney Islands and Dover, all connected with the Admiralty. The formation of the British coast is, moreover, very favorable for the installation of such a network. From now on the High Seas Fleet can be easily detected and its movements followed by the enemy as soon as it weighs anchor, owing to the fact that, being split up into fractions, it cannot operate without using wireless.

These are the factors, favorable and unfavorable, which in 1916 will affect the Germans when they come to renew their maneuvers.

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THÉORIES STRATÉGIQUES

(Volume II, Chapter VII)

The German Operations in the North Sea (1914-1916)

(Continued)

by

ADMIRAL CASTEX

Renewal of Attempts at Maneuvering.

For various reasons the year 1916 is destined to bring about a renewal of operations in the North Sea.

The progress of the war in general has brought the Central Powers to a position far from that which their leaders had hoped for. On land the anticipated decisions have not been obtained. The offensive against Verdun, begun early in the war, appears to be at a standstill. Russia, although very hard pressed by the severe shock of 1915 is, nevertheless, not hors de combat; she is rallying and is about to resume a vigorous attack in June 1916. The Balkan front is becoming stabilized and is being reenforced by the reentry of the Serbian army on the scene of action. The value of the Austro-Hungarian army is lessening. Finally, as was admitted by the Germans after the war, the economic position of Germany is beginning to cause anxiety and is resulting in widespread pessimism. Those directing German policies are coming to the conclusion that it is useless to hope that an understanding with England might be reached and that, on the contrary, it will be necessary to proceed against her more vigorously than had been done up to this time.

Admiral von Pohl, being very ill, is obliged, on January 9th, 1916, to relenquish command of the High Seas Fleet. (He died in Berlin on February 23rd). On January 24th the command devolves

upon Admiral Scheer, who, since December 28th, 1914, had been in command of the third squadron. He takes as his chief of staff, Captain von Trotha.

Admiral Scheer is an extremely energetic man not afraid of assuming heavy responsibilities. He is a believer in vigorous action against England and has keenly felt the inaction of the High Seas Fleet during the year 1915. He decides to react and to inaugurate a complete change of method. His strong personality renders it easy for him, from the first day of his command, to relegate to second place all the chiefs at German headquarters whose control and directions he does not accept. He imposes his ideas and it can be said that, from 1916 on, it is the commander of the High Seas Fleet who alone directs the operations in the North Sea and even, in more ways than one, German naval policies in general. From now on it is Scheer who gives the impulse.

(He will be even more absolute when he is named chief of the general naval staff in August 1918. To be sure, this date marks the beginning of the final decline of Germany in maritime warfare).

He expects to resume the attempts at maneuvering outlined in 1914 and condenses his views in a memoir prepared in the beginning of February entitled: "Directives for the conduct of operations in the North Sea."

In this document he appears determined to obtain and maintain the initiative in operations, the necessity of which he sets forth in the following language: "The disparity between forces at present prevents us from seeking a decisive engagement with the united British forces. Our conduct of operations should therefore aim at preventing this decisive battle being imposed upon us by the enemy. The many ways we have of attacking our enemy gives us the advantage, even with our inferior forces, <u>of being always the aggressor</u>." The initiative in operations is indeed especially necessary for the weaker party.

As means of execution Scheer stresses "a constant and methodical pressure against the enemy" which will oblige him "to abandon the reserve he has maintained until now and to send against us forces which will give us excellent opportunities for attack." This pressure is to be effected by submarine warfare on commerce, mine plantings, commerce destroying in the North, aerial warfare and, lastly, more active sorties by the High Seas Fleet.

These operations, according to Admiral Scheer, should be carefully combined. He says specifically: "Warfare by means of mines, commerce destroying and sorties by the High Seas Fleet are closely interrelated and the more carefully they are combined in the same program of operations the better chance they have of being successful."

With this object in mind the admiral lays out a comprehensive plan of operations based on this correlation. Thus we see that aerial attacks are hereafter to be supported by a group of light units or even by the entire High Seas Fleet. Bombardments of the English coast are expected to furnish opportunities for the fleet to engage British groups that may resist such attacks. At the same time extended scouting operations executed by dirigibles are to be undertaken in order to avoid disagreeable surprises similar to those which had previously occurred.

The official history of the German navy, speaking of this plan, says: "The engaging of a fraction of the enemy force is hereafter to be the hope and aim of all operations."

This analysis is interesting but partly erroneous. The word "hereafter" is superfluous. The plan of maneuver in question is the same as that of 1914. It has not been changed. It had been mulled over for eighteen months past. Scheer has contributed nothing new to the subject but he has by his energy and intelligence undoubtedly brought about coordination and imparted the passionate ardor with which he pursues the realization of his

plans. The real novelty, however, consists in a better execution, carried out in an unusual manner, with the use of such weapons as submarines and aircraft in combination with surface units.

The various secondary means resorted to in the hopes of bringing about a meeting under favorable conditions have not all the same value by any means. If the bombardments of the coast and commerce destroying (attack of communications) can effectively assist his maneuver, action by means of mines and aircraft (aerial bombardments in the interior of England), on the other hand, gives but mediocre results. As to the submarine warfare against commerce this, as we have seen, is a two edged sword, as it both assists and impedes maneuvering.

The Emperor, while visiting the High Seas Fleet on February 23rd, approves the plan proposed by Admiral Scheer and gives him full liberty of action to put it into execution.

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The measures necessary for execution are immediately adopted.

The works for the protection of the German Bay are revamped. A system of air patrols is inaugurated and surface patrols by three flotillas (North Sea, Ems and Harbors) are organized. The clearing of the channels is performed by search divisions and by groups of sweepers. Destroyers are stationed as outposts in echelon order. An alarm system comprising about one-half of the High Seas Fleet is established. This force is stationed in a convenient location and kept ready to put to sea within a space of three-quarters of an hour.

Finally, by planting new mine fields far out to sea in opposition to those planted by the enemy and by taking up the former fields, a zone formerly inaccessible, extending now from Heligoland to the Terschelling-Horn's Reef line, is made available for the deployment and the practice of the High Seas Fleet. This fleet now has at its disposal a large drill ground from which it can sally forth through the three channels above referred to.

Secondary operations are undertaken as provided for in the Scheer plan.

Submarine warfare, which we have examined above, is maintained at the relatively moderate pace then prevailing and with a reduced number of submarines. It encounters obstacles of a political nature which at that time were still being heeded. Mine planting operations are conducted by submarines mainly but yield no important results.

Commerce destroying takes on an ephemeral activity with the attempts of the Moeve and the Greif. The first of these vessels leaves Germany during the last days of 1915 and plants some mines North of Scotland, one of which sinks the battleship King Edward-VII, then cruises for a while in the Atlantic and returns to Germany on March 5th. She has obtained appreciable results against enemy commerce, which is taken by surprise. The Greif is sunk in the North Sea by the tenth squadron of British cruisers. To sum up, this renewal of commerce destroying is of too short duration and too lacking in intensity to have any influence on the conditions in which the organized forces are to maneuver.

Aerial warfare is very active during the first month of 1915 and is interspersed, now and then, by British counter attacks against German aviation centres.

On January 18th the Harwich force tries to attack the hangars at Emden but is prevented from so doing by fog.

On January 23rd German airplanes bombard the harbor of the Dunes.

On January 29th a new British attempt against the hangars at Emden takes place but is not vigorously pressed.

On January 31st nine dirigibles raid England. Birmingham, Derby, Nottingham and Liverpool are bombarded. On the way home the dirigible L-19 is wrecked in the sea off Grimsby.

On March 4th three dirigibles bombard Hull. This expedition coincides with a sortie by the High Seas Fleet.

On March 25th the British make an airplane attack on the hangars at Tondern. The operation is carried out by an airplane carrier escorted by the Harwich force, which for this purpose ventures as far as the neighborhood of Horn's Reef. The attack is a failure; three planes out of five are captured by the Germans. The destroyer Medusa collides and sinks and the light cruiser Undaunted is seriously damaged. The Germans in turn lose two destroyers and two trawlers.

The battle cruisers of Admiral Beatty cover the Harwich force and both retire northward during the night. On March 26th at daybreak they return to Horn's Reef. At the same moment Admiral Scheer, who had been warned by his aircraft, sends the High Seas Fleet to sea in the direction of the enemy but at 6.30, the weather being very stormy, he retraces his steps. Without knowing it, he thereby loses a magnificent opportunity to engage the enemy piecemeal, an opportunity which the British, so to speak, presented him with. The British are, as usual, badly scattered and the Grand Fleet is far off to the North.

From the 1st to the 5th of April six zeppelin raids take place in succession. A number of important centres in England are reached, such as London, Sunderland, Leith, Edinburgh, Yarmouth and Whitby. The L-15 is destroyed by anti-aircraft artillery.

In the beginning of May two other aerial attacks occur. During the second the L-20 is obliged to land in Norway where she is interned.

It is not easy, at first sight, to perceive any real connecting link between these aerial operations and the maneuver proposed by Admiral Scheer in his plan of operations. Such a connection would have been actual and useful only if the dirigibles had been used for attacking British naval and air forces or their bases or had been employed in scouting for the German fleet. Some of the expressions used by the Germans in their order of operations and in their official history are hard to explain. Mention is frequently made in dealing with operations of surface forces in conjunction with zeppelins of "supporting the action" or "protecting the return" of the latter. The possibility of vessels intervening in the air is difficult to conceive of. The underlying thought probably is to offset certain measures taken by the British who had equipped some of their vessels with pursuit planes, particularly the sixth squadron of light cruisers based on the Humber. Maybe the Germans expected that these vessels would put to sea in order to act against the zeppelins on their homeward flight and that the desired engagement with a fraction of the British forces might thus take place. In that event there would be a remote connection between the action of the dirigibles and the maneuver in course of execution.

On the other hand, this historic precedent permits a fairly accurate analysis of the scope of such operations, a subject so frequently discussed nowadays. The zeppelins were very good bombarders at night time. They had a large radius of action and could carry a heavy load of bombs. They were numerous. It is doubtful whether we could do very much better with airplanes at the present time. The results, nevertheless, were very mediocre and had no effect on the general conduct of the war. They caused some losses and panic among the civilian population, the output of the factories of war material felt some slight effects and it became necessary to mobilize, on British soil, large anti-aircraft

equipment. The material damage, however, was trifling and British naval power was in no way diminished. Whenever a course is adopted which, with the exception of special cases, contributes but slightly to arriving at a decision, the result will usually be the same.

The Germans, partly for this reason and partly because of the shortening of the nights, abandon almost entirely these operations in the month of April and employ their dirigibles principally on scouting work for the High Seas Fleet, i.e. for the needs of information and, consequently, for maneuvering.

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First Major Operations.

Admiral Scheer promptly attempts to put into execution his plan of maneuver.

In the beginning of April he considers a project, set for the 8th of April, which consists in executing, under cover of scouting protection by the dirigibles, a sort of triangular sweep of the North Sea as far as the Grand Fisher Bank and the Dogger Bank, in the hopes of meeting isolated enemy forces. Bad weather conditions do not permit him to carry out this plan during the new moon, a period particularly favorable for night attacks by destroyers.

Another plan, set for the 13th of April, takes its place. Scheer proposes to avail himself of the full moon to bring the German fleet into the Skagerrak. The prospect of an attack by the British fleet in the German Bay compels the abandonment of this project. The necessary measures are taken to meet this attack; the German fleet is kept in readiness; the outposts, should it become necessary, are to keep contact with the enemy and launch

a destroyer attack while awaiting the intervention of the main body. The expected event, however, does not occur and Admiral Scheer, after having again placed his outposts in their normal positions, comes back to his project of an operation against the English coast which he intends to launch in the region of Lowestoft on the 23rd to 24th of April.

This enterprise, moreover, is directly connected with the uprising which is to start in Ireland on Easter Sunday. The Irish insurgents have requested that their insurrection be supported by a shipment of arms and munitions (which the steamer Libau, captured by the British, had made a vain attempt to land) and by the landing of their principal leader (Casement, who was put on shore on April 21st by submarine U-19 in the bay of Tralee). They also request a vigorous action by the High Seas Fleet and dirigibles on the East coast of England.

Once more the preparation of this operation is interrupted, on April 21st, by the fear of a British offensive which, according to intercepted telegrams, appears to be at hand. Admiral Scheer decides to answer by a counter-offensive. On the same day he puts to sea with all his forces through the Horn's Reef channel. On the 22nd at 16.40 o'clock, the dirigibles which had been sent ahead not having discovered anything, the High Seas Fleet executes an about-face and heads for its base. No encounter has taken place as the British are too far North and barely have time to discontinue the action they contemplated, not against the German Bay, as Admiral Scheer had supposed, but in the direction of Skagerrak.

The Germans can thereupon take up again their projected operation against Lowestoft.

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The enterprise is carried out on April 25th, 1916.

The governing thought is still the same as the one found in the plan conceived by Admiral Scheer in February. The maneuver consists of subjecting the enemy to a powerful pressure, such as the bombardment of the towns of Lowestoft and Yarmouth, in order to compel the British forces to come out, most probably in divided formation, and thus offer the Germans an opportunity of falling upon an isolated fraction.

The bombardment is to be made by the battle cruisers. The main body is to occupy a position of support off the Texel, ready to intervene and make use of any opportunity for maneuvering.

The submarines of Flanders are to take part in the affair by sending seven U-C boats to plant mines along the English coast, four U-B boats to maintain a barrage in front of Southwold and, finally, two U-B boats which are to serve as landmarks for the cruisers entrusted with the bombarding.

The participation of the dirigibles is even more interesting. Six dirigibles, L-11, L-13, L-16, L-17, L-20 and L-23, are to bombard England in the night of the 24th to 25th of April and on their return to assist in scouting for the High Seas Fleet. In addition, three other zeppelins, L-6, L-7 and L-9, are assigned to the scouting work proper. For the first time information for maneuvering is to be secured by the use of air forces on a large scale.

Admiral Scheer believes, from the intelligence reports received, that the outlook is promising. On the morning of April 24th the naval district of Flanders advises that a large number of light British vessels are off the Belgian coast. (By a strange coincidence this is due to a British mine barrage which is being placed along that coast.) Moreover, information received from Norway indicates that the British fleet had been seen on the 23rd off Cape Lindesness. Admiral Scheer, therefore, concludes that

the British forces are very dispersed and that it will be possible to reach those situated to the South, between the English and Dutch coasts. This force is supposed to include some important vessels.

The affair of Lowestoft need not be related in detail here. A discussion of this operation can be found in the historical works published heretofore. Let us simply note that the German program was carried out according to plan. The different subdivisions of the High Seas Fleet leave the Jade and Elbe at 14 o'clock on April 24th without any incident other than the putting hors de combat of the battle cruiser Seydlitz by a mine. On April 25th the German battle cruisers bombard Lowestoft from 4.11 to 4.20 and Yarmouth from 4.30 to 4.43, then engage the Harwich forces, consisting of three light cruisers and eighteen destroyers, this body, under command of Commodore Tyrwhitt, having come up from the South. At 4.55 the German cruisers retire to join the main body. The Harwich force, although roughly handled, manages to maintain contact until about 9 o'clock.

Admiral Scheer orders the main body of the High Seas Fleet to start on its homeward journey at 9.30. This decision was brought about by two facts.

First, Scheer had just received information from the naval district of Flanders that the British had ordered their ships to evacuate the Belgian coast. This order, which had been intercepted and deciphered, together with the disappearance of the Harwich force about 9 o'clock, would seem to indicate that the enemy would not take any counter action on the day of April 25th.

Secondly, Admiral Scheer had, a short time previously, given orders to the scouting dirigibles to return (L-6, L-7, L-9 and three others sent as reenforcements at daybreak). He is, therefore, deprived of his aerial scouting service and without any means of acting intelligently.

This latter detail inclines him to be prudent, for which he cannot be blamed. Maneuvering in the North Sea being essentially a question of information, as we have already seen, it is natural that Admiral Scheer should abandon operations when that service is seriously handicapped.

Nevertheless, in so doing he has once again lost an excellent opportunity.

The British, on April 24th, were in possession of information which would indicate that a sortie by the Germans was imminent. They put their forces under steaming orders although they had come in that very morning from a cruise to the Skagerrak. By intercepting and deciphering numerous wireless messages, exchanged at the time of the accident to the Seydlitz, the British are informed on the 24th at 16 o'clock that the High Seas Fleet had gone to sea and are given a fairly accurate estimate of the positions of its various divisions. The British forces leave their bases on the following night in the following order:

1. The fifth squadron of the line(fast battleships) leaves Scapa Flow at midnight on the 24th to reenforce the battle cruisers, and the main body of the Grand Fleet leaves at 1 o'clock on the 25th.

2. The first squadron of the line and the seventh squadron of cruisers leave Cromarty at 23 o'clock on the 24th.

3. The battle cruisers and the first, second and third light cruiser squadrons leave Rosyth at 21 o'clock on the 24th; the third squadron of the line and the third squadron of cruisers at 2.45 on the 25th.

Only the main body of the fleet and the Cromarty group effect their junction (on the 25th at 7o'clock.)

The result is that at 12 o'clock on the 25th the British forces are divided into five fractions situated as follows:

1. The main body of the Grand Fleet, 100 miles off the Forth.

2. To the Southeast 35 miles ahead of the Grand Fleet, the third squadron of the line and the third squadron of cruisers,

3. Thirty-five miles ahead of this last named group, the fifth squadron of the line,

4. One hundred and ten miles ahead of this squadron, the battle cruisers and their accompanying light cruisers.

5. In the extreme South on the Yarmouth parallel, the Harwich force.

The British, therefore, would have met the enemy in this state of complete dispersion if the Germans had not turned around at 9.30.

The battle cruisers especially would have been dangerously exposed, as they were isolated and far from any immediate help. At noon, in spite of the German about-face, they were only 45 miles from the corresponding German units which were closing the procession at that time heading for the German Bay.

Admiral Scheer, therefore, without knowing it, missed the imminently favorable situation which his maneuver had been trying for.

A subsequent examination of the routes taken shows that, if the air scouts had remained in their positions, the L-6 (whose position was to the Southwest of the Dogger Bank) would have detected, shortly after 10 o'clock. the battle cruisers heading for the German main body and would have ascertained thereafter that no British force was following them even at a distance. These facts would have been relayed to Admiral Scheer and it is to be supposed that these favorable circumstances would have promptly been made use of. The failure of the maneuver can, therefore, be imputed to the disappearance of the air scouting force and to the failure of information which resulted therefrom.

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In all the major operations which took place in the North Sea the dispersion of the British forces had been constant. This dispersion went so far as to constitute a real strategic weakness.

This was partly due to the distribution of these forces along the coast of Great Britain.

We have seen how the affair of December 16th, 1914, had resulted in bringing the battle cruisers of Admiral Beatty from Cromarty down to Rosyth (in the Forth) where they joined the third squadron of cruisers. It will be remembered that farther to the South were stationed the Harwich force and the fifth squadron of the line based on Sheerness. This allocation of forces was maintained throughout the year 1915. During this period there were, to be sure, two steps tending to concentration. Unfortunately they worked at cross purposes. The Admiralty would have liked to bring the entire Grand Fleet from Scapa Flow down to the Forth. On the other hand, Admiral Jellicoe wanted to bring the battle cruisers up from the Forth to Cromarty. The Admiralty was chiefly concerned with improving the protection of the English coast which could be obtained by transferring forces to the South. Admiral Jellicoe, on the other hand, was more interested in grouping his units so that he might have them well in hand, even though by so doing defensive operations in the South would suffer somewhat.

Nothing having come of these plans, due mainly to the lack of facilities at Rosyth to receive so large a fleet, the Grand Fleet in 1915 remained divided into two bodies (Scapa Flow and Rosyth) rather distant one from the other.

The question of the division of forces is again discussed in April 1916. The Admiralty comes back to its plan of placing the Grand Fleet further to the South at Rosyth, or even in the Humber and suggests, as a temporary solution, detaching to the Forth the new fifth squadron of the line, composed of new fast

battleships, and incorporating that squadron in the fleet of battle cruisers. Admiral Jellicoe, who wants to keep this squadron with his force as a mass capable of rapid maneuvering, shows no enthusiasm for this suggestion and turns a deaf ear. The proposed transfer of forces is postponed until a later date.

While this is going on, the bombardment of Lowestoft takes place. British public opinion is much excited and Mr. Balfour, the First Lord of the Admiralty, promises the Mayors of Lowestoft and Yarmouth that the British forces will be regrouped in such a way as to avoid the reoccurrence of events of this nature. Owing to the insistence of the Admiralty, Admiral Jellicoe consents to send the third squadron of the line and the third squadron of cruisers from Rosyth to Sheerness. They arrive there on May 2nd. At a conference held on May 12th, at Rosyth, it is decided to push the works on the Forth and in the Humber. As to the subdivision of the Grand Fleet, each side maintains its position. Admiral Jellicoe considers the sending of the fifth squadron of the line to Rosyth a temporary measure only, and not a permanent incorporation of that squadron in the fleet of battle cruisers. This transfer of forces takes place shortly thereafter. The third squadron of battle cruisers (three vessels of the Invincible Class) comes to Scapa Flow for drills and is temporarily replaced in the fleet of battle cruisers by the fifth squadron of the line.

To sum up, on the eve of the battle of Jutland we find the principal British forces divided as follows:

1. At Scapa Flow, the main body of the Grand Fleet (less the fifth squadron of the line) plus the third squadron of battle cruisers.

2. At Cromarty, the second squadron of the line.

3. At Rosyth, the battle cruiser fleet (less the third squadron) plus the fifth squadron of the line.

4. At Harwich, the usual flotillas.

5. At Sheerness, the third squadron of the line and the third squadron of cruisers.

The previous dispersion is, therefore, aggravated by this last detachment of forces to the South and it is well known that on the day of the battle of Jutland the Admiralty by strict orders maintained on the South coast of England the Harwich force and that of Sheerness.

It is certain that this distribution of forces and the resulting difficulty in bringing them together helped the German maneuver to a very marked degree.

The effect on the allocation of enemy forces brought about by demonstrations such as coast bombardments can be clearly seen. Operations of this kind produce but mediocre material results but their moral repercussion can exert pressure of great consequence as regards diversion, fixation and, consequently, maneuvering, to say nothing of the opportunities they offer of obtaining combat.

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The series of major operations preliminary to the battle of Jutland closes with the air raids attempted by the British against the dirigible hangars at Tondern on May 4th, 1916.

This affair was undertaken by the first squadron of light cruisers and sixteen destroyers escorting two airplane carriers, the Vindex and the Engadine. With it is combined a mine planting operation in the West and North German channels, also an ambuscade of submarines. The entire Grand Fleet and its battle cruisers remain in support 60 miles off the coast of Jutland.

The air attack proper does not succeed as only one plane is able to take part.

The German resistance is incomplete and poor. To begin with - and this is important to note - their adversaries have the initiative in the maneuver and this leadership in activity absolutely prevents the Germans from leisurely engineering one of their favorite combinations. They are surprised and forestalled. Moreover, they have not all their units at their disposal, as their third squadron is on a practice cruise in the Baltic. Finally, their air scouting service fails them. The airplanes do not succeed in detecting the main enemy body. Two dirigibles are sent in exploration; one does not see anything and the other, the L-7, is destroyed so rapidly that she has not time to report the presence of the enemy.

The Germans limit themselves to attempting a destroyer attack in the night of the 4th to 5th of May. Nothing comes of it as the British fleet had started for its bases twelve hours before.

Even had they been on the alert and warned in time and even had they had at their disposal all of their forces, the Germans would not, on this occasion, have been able to put their basic plan of maneuver into execution. This plan required as a condition precedent the dispersion of the different subdivisions of the Grand Fleet and the latter, for once, was entirely concentrated.

The riposte is, therefore, deferred until such time as it will be possible to act having the initiative of operations and after having quietly thought out means of creating a favorable situation.

Moreover, the Germans will soon have at their disposal for this maneuver a new arm, the submarine. Admiral Scheer, on the very day of his return from his raid against Lowestoft, is advised by general headquarters that submarine warfare against commerce, which had been renewed during the previous month, would hereafter be conducted in conformity with the rules of international law,

i.e. only after search and providing for the safety of the crews in case a vessel is destroyed. These changes are the result of the protests made by the United States after the torpedoing of the Sussex (March 24th, 1916). On receipt of these new orders, which he considers will nullify submarine warfare, Admiral Scheer answers advising general headquarters that he is discontinuing this mode of warfare and is recalling all submarines at present at sea.

Submarines hereafter can operate in the North Sea with the High Seas Fleet both in scouting and in combat and their participation in the maneuvers comes as a real novelty.

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Jutland

In May Admiral Scheer reverts to his usual conception of maneuvering and in order to put it into execution elaborates the following plan:

Supposing (which is not far from the truth) that the British are divided between the Scotch ports, the Humber and the channel bases, he proposes to bring his battle cruisers and his fastest destroyers before Sunderland, suddenly at daybreak and to bombard this place in order to oblige the enemy forces to come out. In the meantime the main body of the High Seas Fleet is to remain in support between the Dogger Bank and Flamborough Head ready to attack any isolated enemy force. At the urgent request of its commander, he finally decides to take with him the second squadron composed of old vessels although he had originally intended to leave it in port.

The dirigibles are to take part in the operation and to scout in the direction from whence he expects to see the British forces appear, namely in the direction of the Forth, the Humber, the Thames and the Skagerrak.

The role assigned to the submarines is particularly interesting to study.

On a proposal made by their commander and approved by Admiral Scheer, nine of these boats leave on May 15th and take position in the Northern part of the North Sea, from the 17th to 23rd of May. They occupy a square measuring about 150 miles on each side and are given the mission of watching for enemy forces and of reporting their presence if need be. On May 23rd they are ordered to proceed to the British coast, two before Scapa Flow and the other seven in front of the Forth where they are to remain ten days and then return.

On May 20th one other submarine is sent to the Forth with instructions to come home after fourteen days.

One submarine is directed to stay on guard off Sunderland during the night of 21st to 22nd of May and thereafter in the region of Peterhead until June 2nd.

Three submarines are to plant mines in the Forth, off Cromarty and West of the Orkneys.

Two submarines leave on May 21st to observe the Humber. They are to station themselves for ten days off that estuary, beginning on the 23rd.

Two submarines are posted on May 22nd near Terschelling.

We should note the time limit assigned to these different cruises, a limitation which is more or less obligatory in view of the mission assigned to the submarines. These boats are to discontinue their operations about the 2nd of June and this detail is to have very important consequences.

As a result the Germans will find themselves struggling with serious handicaps to their freedom of action. This freedom, which

is an essential condition of all maneuvering, depends, as we have previously stated, on many different factors.

To begin with, the projected operation which had been set for the 17th of May has to be postponed until the 23rd as the result of damage to the condensers of some of the vessels in the third squadron. Again, a poorly made repair to the battle cruiser Seydlitz compels another postponement until the 29th. Here we recognize the well known problem of the readiness for action of units.

On the other hand, the time limit given to the submarines necessitates undertaking the operation on May 31st at the latest. These boats had been sent out ahead of time. They govern the entire combination and automatically compel the despatching of the other forces.

Scouting by the dirigibles is obligatory unless one is willing to take a chance but unfortunately - third contre-temps - atmospheric conditions are unfavorable on the 30th.

Should fair weather be awaited in order to permit using the dirigibles (which involves being deprived of the use of the submarines) or, on the contrary, should the expedition put to sea at once in order to employ the submarines even if the services of the dirigibles have to be dispensed with? Tis a cruel alternative.

On May 28th Admiral Scheer chooses the second solution and in accordance with it provides a variation of his plan of maneuver. The operation against Sunderland is abandoned and in its place another is undertaken in the direction of the Skagerrak. As aerial scouting is lacking, the operation relies for safety mainly on the remoteness of the enemy and partially on the proximity of the Danish coast. The maneuver is a second class one, infinitely less brilliant than, and only an eleventh hour makeshift for the original one. It is impossible, however, to do any better, unless the whole operation be abandoned.

Admiral Hipper, with the first and second scouting groups (battle cruisers and light cruisers) and three flotillas of destroyers, is ordered to sail early on the morning of the 31st of May and to appear off the coast of Norway before night fall. If, on that day or on the succeeding day, he meets any of the British forces which are frequently reported in that neighborhood he is to attempt to destroy them or, should they prove to be superior, to attract them towards the main body of the High Seas Fleet which is to follow and will be approximately 45 miles South of Cape Lindesness on June 1st at about 4 o'clock.

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By a singular coincidence the British at the same time conceive a plan similar to that of the Germans. They, who up to that time, had almost invariably allowed events to be forced upon them, are now suddenly about to attempt taking the initiative and forcing the German fleet to combat and what is more, to do so by acting according to a plan of maneuver.

Two squadrons of light cruisers are to be off Cape Skagen on June 2nd at daybreak and to advance from there towards the Cattegat and as far as the Danish Straits in order to induce the Germans to send large forces to the North. The squadrons of the line and the battle cruisers of the Grand Fleet are to attempt to intercept the main German body by previously taking a position near Horn's Reef. In addition a mine field a d a barrage of submarines are to be placed in the German channel which ends near this point.

This plan was not put into execution owing to information

received by the British on the morning of May 30th announcing that the German High Seas Fleet was about to sail. At 11 o'clock it was known that this fleet would most probably put to sea on the morning of the 31st and at 17 o'clock it is learned that it had an important operation in view for the same day. At 17.40 o'clock the movement was executed some hours ahead of the German movement.

Undoubtedly the Germans, entirely by accident be it said, have the initiative of operations in this affair in the sense that their maneuver is imposed on the enemy to the point of obliging him to abandon the movement he had prepared on his side. The German maneuver has taken precedence over the other but the British have largely made up for this inferiority, thanks to the excellence of their information service, which has permitted them to be ready before their adversary. While the Germans believe their opponents to be still in port compelled to proceed in their usual fashion, that is to say with a certain amount of delay and disorder, the British, as a matter of fact, have already put to sea and are about to come unexpectedly on the battlefield of Jutland. On the other hand, in accordance with their unsound methods, the British have deliberately divided their forces into two groups 70 miles apart. This incorrigible dispersion may place them in an oncomfortable position, as Admiral Scheer has decided this time to have the main body of the fleet sail immediately after the cruisers of Admiral Hipper.

As for Admiral Scheer, does he realize the risk he is running and the hazards to which his maneuver is exposed? Has he made sure of his information?

He cannot count upon his dirigibles for scouting as they are unable to come out. Everything, therefore, depends upon what the submarines will notice and report. The U-32, which has taken station off the Forth, sees at 4.10 and at 5.37 signals two large warships, two cruisers and several destroyers, 60 miles East of the Forth, heading South. (These are the battle cruisers of

Beatty.) The U-66 one hour later advises that at 5 o'clock she had sighted eight large warships, some light cruisers and some destroyers, 60 miles East of Peterhead, heading Northeast. (This is the second squadron of the line coming from Cromarty.) The other submarines observe nothing.

Judging from the makeup of the enemy groups and the divergence of their courses, as well as the advance of these movements over the German movements, Admiral Scheer comes to the conclusion that these changes in location have no connection with the German operation in course of execution. A deciphering made by the cryptographic station of Neumunster announcing a sailing from Scapa Flow does not arouse Admiral Scheer's suspicions; on the contrary, he expects that the dispersion of the enemy forces will furnish the opportunity sought for by his maneuver.

Thus, without any other intelligence concerning the enemy, he is about to come upon him suddenly on the battlefield of Jutland and will have the very disagreeable surprise of finding himself face to face with the entire Grand Fleet without having had any warning.

On the German side, therefore, there has once again been a complete crumpling up of their information service and from this will result the greatest danger that any fleet has ever run while in the throes of maneuvering with the balance of forces against it.

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The battle of Jutland is too well known that its vicissitudes need be recounted here. Moreover, this work does not

pretend to study tactical questions. I shall therefore limit myself to considering this battle from the point of view of strategic maneuvering and of the conditions in which the party initiating this maneuver found itself.

In this respect Jutland presents a curious dove-tailing of situations entirely opposed, radically dissimilar and not connected by any gradual evolution. We pass from one to the other without transition; chance alone governs. For somewhat more than twelve hours each adversary unconsciously is tossed about by a kind of blind fatality and finds himself, now in a magnificent position and in the next moment in a disastrous one, now at one pole of wonderful good luck, now at the other extreme pole of darkest ill luck.

First Act. - On May 31st, 1916, shortly before making contact Beatty, situated by himself some 70 miles to the South of Jellicoe, is heading about due East, owing to British miscalculations. If he continues in this direction he will thrust himself straight into the gap existing between Hipper and Scheer, about 40 miles from the former and 20 miles from the latter. He is about to be caught in the vise formed by the German battle cruisers on one side and the battleships on the other. The favorable situation coveted by Admiral Scheer and sought for by his maneuver is at hand; at last he will be able to seize an isolated British fraction and crush it with his superior forces. Dame Fortune showers her favors on the Germans.

Second Act. - Sudden change of situation! At 14.15 o'clock Admiral Beatty lays his course to the North, not because he had scented the pit into which he was about to hurl himself headfirst but simply because it was time to join Jellicoe. Mere luck. Suddenly the favorable situation, the beautiful situation of the Germans takes wing and disappears in smoke. Stranger yet, Hipper with eyes blindfolded is now rushing toward Jellicoe while Beatty is about to effect his junction with the latter. It is Hipper

who will find himself grappling alone with the entire united British force. The German situation from having been magnificent is suddenly on the verge of becoming disastrous.

Third Act. - This disaster will not take place, however, for at 14.20 o'clock the scouting forces of Beatty and Hipper come into contact: the Galatea and the Phaeton on one side, the Elbing and two destroyers on the other. Again it is a matter of mere luck. Beatty and Hipper open the engagement but at the same time incline to the South, toward Scheer and the main German body. Every minute that goes by aggravates the danger of Beatty's position. Thus by this simple change of course we come back instantly and without transition to situation number one. In a short time the British will find themselves caught in the trap which the German maneuver has been preparing for them for months past. It is Beatty's turn to head once more toward a catastrophe.

Fourth Act. - This catastrophe will be avoided. At 16.40 o'clock Beatty sights the main German body, turns North again and thus succeeds in avoiding the terrible shock of a meeting with the united forces of Hipper and Scheer. The march to the North, toward Jellicoe, is resumed by all. The prospect, at first radiant for the Germans, suddenly darkens. Although not as gloomy as that of the second act, since Hipper has now joined forces with Scheer and is not exposed to meeting the entire British force unsupported, their position is, nevertheless, far from brilliant. Events are heading towards a general battle between the two massed forces, British and German, a battle which Scheer does not desire and one his entire plan had aimed at avoiding.

Fifth Act. - Jellicoe is met. The fatal encounter dreaded by the Germans takes place. The High Seas Fleet is engaged in a mortal struggle. This time its end is near and certain.... No! nothing comes of it. Fate, this time favorable, intervenes once again. The hesitations of Admiral Jellicoe, his formation so

slow in deploying, his turn away, the desperate dash of Scheer, poor visibility, in short the well known series of disasters and successes enables the German fleet at last to break off the combat.

Sixth Act. - This escape, however, can only be temporary. The Germans have no reason to expect that the British will lose contact with them during the few hours of that Summer night, surely too short to suit them. They only have one general direction of retreat and the enemy knows it. It is certain, therefore, that this enemy will be found again at daybreak and that the doom of the High Seas Fleet is irrevocably sealed. Nothing of the sort! Chance, if one sees fit to give this name to the errors committed by Admiral Jellicoe in interpreting the information he had received, chance would have it that the British head for the Northwest channel of the German Bay whereas the Germans head for the Horn's Reef channel. At daybreak on June 1st the Germans find that no British force is in sight. Saved! The maneuver has failed but they get back to port and avoid a complete catastrophe.

To sum up, Jutland appears to us a strategic drama in six acts, the recital of which, if one places ones self a posteriori in the place of the German actor with full knowledge of the attending circumstances, gives the impression of a sort of Scotch douche (alternately hot and cold).

Admiral Scheer's plan of maneuver was certainly alluring. It was on the verge of succeeding more than once and if a favorable situation had been created only a few hours sooner it would have succeeded. The final failure, therefore, does not justify summarily condemning the plan. The facts, however, clearly show the risks involved and the grave hazards attending it. In such a theatre of operations, in view of the distances, the speeds, the forces confronting each other, the visibility more or less good, very great difficulties attended the carrying out of Admiral Scheer's intentions. He risked everything on one throw of the dice. Under such circumstances maneuvering undoubtedly assumes

an unstable and fragile character.

We find here once more the lessons previously derived from the affair of December 16th, 1914, which, be it said, are as obvious to the Germans as to ourselves.

As we have seen, the execution of such a maneuver necessarily requires that the intelligence service function thoroughly and satisfactorily. It is essential to have, if not positive information, in the strictest sense of the word, concerning the main enemy body one is seeking to avoid, at least adequate information concerning all the hostile groups. Is it a question of scouting and exploration? Certainly yes. But how can a numerically inferior party (not very solidly in the saddle as it is) about to maneuver expect to obtain this information from a detached light surface force even more exposed than the main body? It is almost impossible and it is easy to understand why under these circumstances the Germans, whose surface scouting forces were notably inferior to those of the British, conceived the very interesting idea of seeking this information from other arms such as submarines and aircraft. These forces run but insignificant risks compared to those run by surface scouts and are always more or less free to make good their escape.

If the submarines had given better information and if Admiral Scheer had been able with the help of fair weather to bring his dirigibles with him it is very probable that he would not have found himself, on May 31st, in such dire straits. On the other hand, if, on that same day, the hydroplanes of the Engadine had better understood their mission and had pushed their scouting operations farther to the Southeast the British would have known the position of the main German body much sooner and would have been able to govern themselves accordingly. It is not surprising, therefore, that later on Admiral Jellicoe should have taken pains to see that the Grand Fleet be given the assistance of dirigibles.

These are developments, derived from experience, which up to

this time had only been vaguely outlined. They will fully manifest themselves during the last German attempt which takes place October 16th, 1916.

Submarines are lacking in speed and cannot cruise far, especially if events compel them to remain long submerged. Aircraft have only a limited radius of action and cannot keep aloft very long. If information is to be secured by these means, if both are to be in place at a given time it is absolutely necessary to have the initiative of operations as well as of maneuver and thus be able to impose upon the enemy a pre-arranged system. This remark is of outstanding importance so far as the maneuvers we are discussing are concerned.

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August 19th, 1916.

In what atmosphere, both technical and moral, is this new maneuver of August 19th being prepared in the German camp?

As far as their morale was concerned the Germans, in spite of their affected cries of victory, are perfectly well aware that they had a close call on the day of the battle of Jutland and that only extraordinary luck permitted them to come out safely from this terrible adventure. In view of this fact it is to be regretted that Admiral Scheer, who has real claims to our high esteem and even to our admiration, should have compromised the excellent reputation he is entitled to by giving way, later on, to bragging in poor taste concerning the state of mind prevalent in the German fleet on the morning of June 1st while it was heading post-haste for port in order finally to escape the British fleet. ("Just as dawn was about to break on this historic day, June 1st,

everybody expected to see the rising sun reveal the British line of battle deployed ready to renew the combat. This hope (?) was not to be realized.") Lieutenant Commander von Hase in the account he gives of the battle is more truthful. He describes to us very frankly the unspeakable feeling of relief that the Germans felt at daybreak on June 1st when they discovered that no British force was in sight. This feeling, this lowering of morale and the let-down that resulted from it are really what made the battle of Jutland a German defeat, incomplete, to be sure, but, nevertheless, a defeat in spite of all discussions concerning the material damage done which have been indulged in later.

On the German side, therefore, we see that the dominant note is a retrospective fear and a loss of confidence in any new enterprise of the same nature. What proves this is the sudden interest and enthusiasm that Admiral Scheer manifests for submarine war against commerce. On June 5th, while the Emperor was visiting the fleet, Scheer expounds to him that "circumstances are favorable for the renewal of economic warfare conducted with the utmost rigor". In his memoirs he lays great stress on this thought at that time (June 1916). He writes to general headquarters that "the essence of naval warfare lies in the annihilation of the enemy's maritime commerce". On June 20th he again recommends a submarine war without restriction and proposes to abandon the use of this class of vessel for military purposes so as to permit their use for commerce destroying. On June 30th he again praises submarine warfare to the Chancellor who has come to visit the fleet.

(In his report on the battle of Jutland addressed to the Emperor on July 4th, 1916, Admiral Scheer expresses himself thus: "There can be no doubt that even a most fortunate result obtained in a naval battle would not compel England to conclude peace. The military disadvantages of our geographical situation compared to that of the island empire, the enormous material superiority of the enemy, our fleet cannot neutralize even if the submarines are

wholly devoted to military purposes. A victorious conclusion of the war in a reasonably near future can only be obtained by ruining British economic life, a result that cannot be secured except by devoting the submarine arm to the struggle against British trade.")

Admiral Scheer, however, must know that submarines play an essential part in the maneuver which he had contemplated until then as he had assigned to them a most important role. Consequently he must be aware that devoting these vessels to commerce destroying is equivalent to eliminating all combined action between them and the High Seas Fleet and that he is thereby depriving his maneuver of an important trump card which may even necessitate discontinuing that maneuver. This sudden enthusiasm for submarine warfare surely implies a lack of faith in his plan and the abandonment of the hope heretofore place in it. Submarine warfare is now the order of the day; it has become the one panacea. This marks the decline of all maneuvering conceptions. Scheer, who has burned his fingers just as Ingenohl did in 1914, even more so, now in turn changes his tune. His illusions are shattered by contact with the facts.

This explains the weakness of the attempted maneuver of August 19th which was the last to be undertaken, be it said.

This maneuver is prepared, nevertheless, but the Germans cannot immediately resume their projects as they are momentarily paralyzed by the work necessary to repair the damage sustained in the battle of Jutland. This work is completed by the middle of August except that on the battle cruisers Seydlitz and Derflinger which are not ready even by that time.

Although not prepared with any great conviction, the sortie of August 19th shows, nevertheless, great progress of a technical nature in the use of the different arms and their combination in maneuvering.

The submarines are not to be placed as lookouts before the

British bases as was done at the time of the sortie before Jutland. That system proved to have serious drawbacks. The results are mediocre in spite of the arduous efforts made and heavy risks incurred. Moreover, the action of the submarines is spent ahead of time and fixed geographically. They can no longer be taken in hand and made to operate in an unforeseen direction. To put the matter tersely, they can no longer maneuver. In future submarines are to be arranged in several mobile barrages organized in line of column thereby rendering them easy to shift as circumstances may demand and permitting their use in conjunction with the High Seas Fleet itself. They are to be assigned, above all things, the mission of attacking and destroying but they can eventually cooperate in scouting operations and send information concerning what they see. As a matter of fact that is what happened.

Admiral Scheer is more than ever resolved to entrust his scouting work to aircraft, especially to the dirigibles. He has perhaps too great confidence in this arm, a confidence increased by their raids in England, operations which after all have no connection with exploring and scouting at sea. He overestimates the extent of the field of vision of each isolated dirigible. As he proposes for his next maneuver a bombardment of the English coast at Sunderland, he assumes a priori that the Grand Fleet will not stir until it has been aroused by that bombardment and that it will still be at Scapa Flow on that morning. Under these conditions, in order to be warned in time of its arrival, it will suffice to place a line of dirigibles off Peterhead sometime during the forenoon. Events are destined to show how dangerous this unwarranted assumption was.

Admiral Scheer proposes to bombard Sunderland not at the beginning but at the end of the day. This will permit his getting underweigh from the German Bay at night when the chances of being seen are slight and will give him the benefit of the scouting by the submarines and dirigibles on the day preceding his arrival

off the English coast.

Strict secrecy is to be maintained. Wireless is to be used as little as possible. On sailing the usual wave lengths and the key of the cipher are to be changed.

The advance guard, now deprived of two battle cruisers which are undergoing repairs and another sunk at Jutland, is to be reinforced by three fast battleships. Moreover, the distance separating it from the main body is to be reduced to only twenty miles in order to lessen the risks made apparent by the events at Jutland.

Finally, this time the old second squadron is to remain in port.

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On August 19th, the day of the German raid against Sunderland, (undertaken in conformity with the usual plan of maneuver) the extensive scouting arrangements provided for by Admiral Scheer are in position. They comprise:

1. Off Peterhead (Scotland) a large barrage of dirigibles extending East to West so as to cover the Northern exit of the North Sea is maintained by zeppelins L-30, L-32, L-24 and L-22.

2. Along the British coast other dirigibles, namely the L-31 in front of the Forth, the L-11 off the Tyne, the L-21 off the Humber and the L-13 in the Southern part of the North Sea.

3. Four barrages of submarines, two placed perpendicularly along the English coast from the Tyne to Flamborough Head approximately, and two other on either side of the mine field situated to the Northwest of Terschelling. (During this sortie these barrages,especially the two latter, were considerably shifted as required by events.)

This protecting network, larger than any attempted up to then, makes excellent use of the fitness of submarines and aircraft for the task assigned to them. A dirigible, thanks to its speed, can explore and scout and in addition can just as easily remain on guard since it has the means, not possessed by an airplane, of remaining fairly long on the same spot.

Behind this arrangement Admiral Scheer considers that he can with perfect safety carry out his plan which consists of seizing a fraction of the British forces and that at the same time he will be protected by timely warning from any intervention of the main enemy body. He expects, therefore, to have the benefit of the maximum protection possible, which had been notably lacking on the day of Jutland.

Nevertheless, this security, which seemed to have been faultlessly provided for, will crumble in the hour of need.

Admiral Scheer assumes that the Grand Fleet will not leave Scapa Flow until sometime during the day of August 19th when his movements are revealed and that the Northern barrage of zeppelins will be able to give warning of the approach of this fleet if placed in position during the forenoon. For this reason the barrage is not entirely posted until 10 o'clock. At that moment the Grand Fleet, being on the alert, had already left Scapa Flow on the evening of the 18th and was South of the barrage. The zeppelins not knowing this unwittingly remained in a position where they were no longer serving any purpose. Meanwhile Admiral Scheer, relying on this Northern barrage and the excellent visibility, is unaware of the great danger threatening him.

Information received thereafter contains nothing alarming.

Shortly after 6 o'clock the L-13, situated to the South, signals the presence of flotillas of destroyers and light cruisers heading Southwest and later Northeast.

Towards 8 o'clock the wireless station at Neumunster advises that the British forces are probably at sea but does not give their position.

At 10 o'clock the L-31 signals that at 9 she had seen "large forces" on the parallel of the Forth but gives neither their route nor their speed. Shortly thereafter she reports that at 9.50 she has seen the "principal force" of the enemy in a position considerably at variance with that first reported. This latter report is, by the way, inaccurate by 60 miles. These forces are said to be heading Northeast. This information is erroneous as the Grand Fleet has been heading South since 9 o'clock.

At 10 o'clock the Mounmster wireless station again radios that the Grand Fleet is at sea but again fails to report its position.

Here the submarines come upon the scene.

At 10.10 o'clock the U-53 advises that at 8.10 o'clock she had sighted "three large vessels and four light cruisers heading North", in a position which is about that given by the first report of the L-31.

At 11.40 o'clock the U-52 signals that she had met, at 7 o'clock, four light cruisers heading North, that he had sunk one of them (Nottingham).

We should note that between 11 o'clock and noon the L-11 sighted British forces but did not report them.

To sum up, owing to all these reports Admiral Scheer, toward noon, has a completely mistaken view of the situation. He believes that he has South of him two light squadrons, which is not far from the truth, and that to the North numerous forces are to be found. The latter appear to be separated and on divergent courses heading generally Northward. He concludes that they are only executing ordinary patrols and are apparently unaware of his arrival. (This is a repetition of the effect produced by the reports received from submarines on the morning of the battle of Jutland.) As a matter of fact these forces have been steaming to the South (i.e. towards him) since 9 o'clock. Admiral Scheer, completely in the dark, continues on his course getting farther and farther into the trap.

Towards noon numerous British wireless messages are heard. Admiral Scheer supposes that the submarine which that morning had torpedoed the Westfalen had signalled the German sortie and that the British reaction is only just beginning. At that moment he is terribly behindhand as to the real facts.

These are the results given by this magnificent system of information so carefully worked out in advance. No matter how well arranged it may have been it is not sufficient to save Scheer from the pit into which he is about to throw himself or his maneuver from complete ruin.

Strange as it may seem Scheer, who is on a fair way to being lost by false information, is about to be saved by another false report!

At 12.22 he receives a telegram from the L-13, which is still to the South, advising him "large naval force about thirty units heading North". Shortly thereafter a second telegram gives further details and states: "Thirty units including sixteen destroyers, large and small cruisers and battleships heading towards you in the neighborhood of Swarte Bank between 11.30 and noon." As a matter of fact it is only the Harwich force which was proceeding North at that time and that force never included any battleships.

On receiving the first of these two telegrams Admiral Scheer reverses his course at 12.23. At 12.45 he again heads West to join his outposts. At 13.15 having joined them he turns East-Southeast and at 14 o'clock Southeast.

This sudden about-face has created much discussion which has not ceased at the present time. Some claim that it was a simple retreat brought about by the fact that Scheer realized the difficulty of his position and did not care to renew the experience he went through at Jutland. I am rather inclined to admit this hypothesis as the instantaneousness of his reaction makes it appear very plausible. On the other hand, the Admiral, in his memoirs, says that he concluded from information received from the L-13

that a rather large but inferior force was South of him and that he turned Southeast in the hopes of seizing it, even sending a flotilla of destroyers to scout in that direction. In that event he would have been following out his ordinary plan of maneuver but would have been chasing a shadow as the result of a failure or an auto-suggestion on the part of his aerial scouting service.

Be that as it may, while he is hastening Southeast Admiral Scheer receives other reports.

At 14.15 the U-53 signals that the Grand Fleet at 13.15 o'clock was 75 miles East of Hartlepool heading South. The position given, by the way, is wrong by 23 miles. Shortly afterwards the same submarine reports that the main enemy body only consists of ten battleships, which is also incorrect.

At 14.20 the L-11 reports that at 14.15 she had observed in the same region an isolated enemy force heading South.

Admiral Scheer has now every reason to believe that the Grand Fleet, which he assumes to be divided, is to the North proceeding towards him and becoming increasingly threatening. At 15.15, not being able to reach the group he fancies he is pursuing, he turns East-Northeast and definitely takes the homeward road for the German Bay while the Harwich force keeps contact with him at a respectful distance.

We know now that he was saved by two unexpected incidents. First, the false information given by the L-13 causing him to make a providential about-face. Secondly, the Grand Fleet could not have helped but meet him if on the 19th of August at daybreak it had continued on it course. At 7 o'clock, however, it suddenly turned around to North-Northeast having been alarmed by the torpedoing of the Nottingham and only resumed its Southerly course at 9 o'clock. This unfortunate detour handicapped it by causing a delay which could not be made up. Moreover, the Grand Fleet only received at 10.10 information from the British submarine E-23, which had torpedoed the Westfalen, advising the sortie of the

German fleet but giving a mistaken position of this fleet, very much short of its real progress. The Grand Fleet, therefore, came to the conclusion that there was no need to hurry and the desire of Admiral Jellicoe to meet the enemy from that time on began to diminish.

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The German maneuver has come to naught again. On the other hand, a catastrophe has once more been avoided in spite of the break-down of the information service and, strange to say, because of this very break-down. (False report of the L-13.) Admiral Scheer has, nevertheless, on this occasion taken a very broad point of view. He felt, and rightly so, that everything depended on his intelligence service, but in spite of everything it went to pieces. The barrage of zeppelins was put out of touch at once. The scouts sent incomplete or false reports. Errors in estimating positions went as far as 23 miles for the submarines and 45 to 60 miles for the dirigibles. On other occasions the scouts signalled a wrong course for the enemy or else gave neither course nor speed (L-31). Sometimes they forgot to give the positions of the units reported (U-52). Others made no report at all of what they had seen (L-11). Finally, the L-13 really displayed an exuberant imagination. Thus Admiral Scheer until noon, in spite of the precautions he had taken, was existing in a frame of mind dangerously distant from the truth.

Taken as a whole the maneuver, for these various reasons, proved to be too fragile and risky, although to a much lesser degree than on the day of Jutland. Progress had been made towards

strengthening his sense of certainty and assurance, but this progress still fell short of what was required.

The Germans were undoubtedly assisted by having the initiative of operations, a factor which had always been fundamental in their plan of maneuver. This initiative permitted a proper placing, carefully thought out in advance, of submarine and aerial units whose mission it was to spread a protecting screen around the main operation. This screen was not very fortunate in carrying out its scouting mission but was more so in its combat mission. Two light cruisers, the Nottingham and the Falmouth were torpedoed by submarines. This torpedoing made a profound impression on the mind of Admiral Jellicoe. After August 19th he announced his firm determination to refrain in future from any ventures by the Grand Fleet South of Dogger Bank because of the submarines and to limit his field of action to the Northern part of the North Sea, leaving the protection of the English coast South of Sunderland to the local defensive works and to the flotillas. The Southern region seems to him to be completely contaminated. This was brought about (to a lesser degree, however, than Admiral Jellicoe imagined) only by the fact that the Germans had taken the initiative of the operations and had placed their submarines according to their plan. The British could, four days later, have come into the same zone and not have met a single one of those boats. That zone was, therefore, not completely barred. Finally, if the British submarines had no success on August 19th, should it not be attributed to the fact that their side had not taken the initiative and was being subjected to the enemy maneuver?

If the operations of August 19th are compared with those of August 28th, 1914, (battle of Heligoland) or May 4th, 1916, (British raid against Tondern) it will be noted to what an extent the German action was favored or impeded by the existence or the absence of the initiative in operations.

Fortunately for the British, however, at the very moment when

the thought of abandoning the initiative was becoming apparent in their camp, the 19th of August occurred and brought about the final twilight of German maneuvering. A renewal of submarine warfare against commerce is decided upon about the middle of October and the High Seas Fleet sees itself deprived, with the entire assent of Admiral Scheer be it said, of all the submarines it possessed. This amputation of an essential means of maneuver brought about its entire abandonment. As a matter of fact the High Seas Fleet is destined to undertake only one more small sortie on October 19th, 1916. On that date the fleet sails at midnight and is discovered at 8 o'clock, 70 miles Northwest of Terschelling. It returns at 20 o'clock. The British submarine E-38 torpedoes the München. The Grand Fleet does nothing more than get up steam without weighing anchor.

As we shall see hereafter, the activities of the High Seas Fleet is about to be directed entirely to the Baltic, beginning with the year 1917. The Germans do not give any further thought to the North Sea until the end of the war when they plan one last sortie in that region, set for October 28th, 1918, but which, as a matter of fact, never took place.

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What are we to think of the German attempts at maneuvering undertaken in the North Sea from 1914 to 1916, and especially those so actively conducted by Admiral Scheer in the last named year?

Their actual material result was about nil. The German fleet,

to be sure, inflicted some losses on the British fleet but did not do much to break its grip and much toward taking away from its adversary the control of maritime communications or even partially reestablishing these communications with Germany. In order to do this it would have been necessary to put the enemy force (i.e. the Grand Fleet) out of action by battle. This was attempted hesitatingly, indirectly by means of maneuvering in the hope of beating the enemy piecemeal, but it was unsuccessful. All the excitement which we have witnessed should, therefore, not deceive us by hiding the essential fact.

The British riposte was inoperative on December 16th, 1914, on April 25th, 1916, and on August 19th, 1916. It met with partial success at the Dogger Bank and at Jutland. In this last named battle it was very inferior to what was to be expected of it.

On the other hand, the German maneuver always failed. We hasten to add, however, that the conditions in which it was undertaken were most unpropitious owing to the peculiar atmospheric and geographical conditions of the North Sea, the speed of the two adversaries, the fleeting and rapid evolutions of the situations, the difficulty in making sure of information and the superiority of the British intelligence service.

The attempts at maneuvering, in spite of the lack of success, are, nevertheless, interesting to study and contain many lessons.

To begin with, the setting in which these maneuvers occurred closely resembles that which will be met with in modern times in many theatres of operations and especially in European waters where maneuvering will no longer find the favorable conditions of olden days. In this respect the events which occurred in the North Sea during the last war can be well used as a basis for a prudent and rational process of elimination.

Finally, Admiral Scheer has demonstrated - and this must not be forgotten - how a belligerent inferior in surface forces and

compelled to remain on the defensive can, by combining the action of new engines of warfare, attempt to maneuver in spite of the obstacles confronting him on all sides. He has proven that even in such a case one must not "throw up the sponge" and abandon all operations of that nauture because of a discouraging state of facts. Above everything he has taught us how it is possible to give to defensive warfare a relatively offensive character by using all available means. He has shown us how to avoid under such circumstances disheartening inactivity and absolute stagnation, and in spite of everything, however unfavorable the situation may be, how to maintain to the end the initiative of operations and save at least the moral factors which, in the last analysis, constitute the main reserve for the future.

We have here more than sufficient reasons to justify us in giving full credit to this persistently tenacious maneuverer.

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VOLUME II, PART I

CHAPTER VIII

STRATEGY IN THE BALTIC*

Although German operations in the Baltic were of secondary importance, it is none the less necessary to mention them, viewing them in their relation to those in the North Sea. In effect this relation evinces an idea of strategy which manifested itself in the continual transfer of forces from one theatre to the other.

In the Baltic Germany profited by a particularly favorable geographical situation, an exact opposite to that which she suffered in the North Sea. Because of this situation which made it impossible for British surface forces to act in the closed basin, the Germans were to the last day able to possess command of the Baltic. Plainly it is unnecessary to exaggerate that advantage. It was entirely local, powerless to compensate for the considerable inferiority of Germany on other seas, and it could result in nothing decisive. Nevertheless it admitted of important benefits. Germany prevented all easy communication between her eastern and western enemies; she maintained Russia in a situation of semi-isolation. Mistress of the Baltic, she kept the way open to the supplies which came to her from the Scandinavian countries, and she maintained over those states a notable political influence. Under the form of combined operations she was able to give appreciable and advantageous support by sea to whichever of her armies on the eastern front had a flank resting on the coast.

The Germans plainly appreciated the advantage to themselves in remaining masters of the Baltic. Very prominently, in the background of the efforts they took from the very beginning to

*For a detailed history of facts see the study of Commander Abrial, "Les operations navales en Baltique, Service Historique de la Marine, 1925.

conserve their fleet, was the necessity of keeping it intact in order to continue to dominate that sea which geography predisposed to be, and to remain, a German lake. And one would be at loss to understand, a posteriori, the role and usefulness of that fleet without taking full account of the Baltic problem.

The German forces permanently attached to the Baltic, and placed under orders of Prince Henry of Prussia, comprised only the flotilla for defense of the port of Kiel, and that called the "Division for Defense of the Baltic Coasts" composed of six old, small cruisers and the new cruisers MADGEBURG and AUGSBURG. These units were re-enforced, as will be seen later, by others impressed from the High Seas Fleet whenever events indicated more energetic action in the Baltic. Before hostilities, when the Germans did not forsee the entry of England into the war, the 2nd and 3rd squadrons of the High Seas Fleet were in the Baltic. But fears, or at least doubts, with regard to the attitude of the British growing, on 23 July, 1914, the 3rd squadron received orders to proceed into the North Sea. On 31 July it was the turn of the 2nd squadron. Thus the expected British pressure, and the prospect of serious operations in the west, had resulted in disengaging the Baltic and accentuating the economy of forces which the Germans normally counted on effecting there, as a general rule, to the advantage of the North Sea.

As to the program of operations to be undertaken in the Baltic, it is contained in instructions addressed by the German Chief of the General Staff to Prince Henry of Prussia on 21 July, 1914, instructions sent at the same time as those destined for the North Sea Fleet which we have previously analyzed.

These instructions, a simple general directive, are couched as follows:

"His Majesty orders for the conduct of operations in the Baltic:- 1. The principal objective of the conduct of operations s to trouble the Russian offensives as much as possible. Further, the security of Kiel Bight is to be assured against

the British and Russian forces, and damage is to be inflicted on the enemy commerce.

2. Mining operations against the Russian coast are to be undertaken as soon as possible after the opening of hostilities.

3. Secret dispatch of a part of the High Seas Forces to strike at the Russian fleet remains subject to developments of the war.

4. War on commerce is to be conducted in conformance with prize orders."

The plan, one sees, is very modest, entirely stipped of ambition, as befitting a theatre which, although important, is secondary in the eyes of the Germans. The document has a general defensive appearance. The only aggressive proceedings of which it makes mention are planting mines and guerre de course, which belong to the classification of minor attacks and which do not at all imply a generally offensive attitude. The latter is seen only as an occasional role, and that it may be thus adopted, the possibility of occasionally sending into the Baltic forces drafted from the High Seas Fleet is reserved.

And precisely, it is in this transfer of forces that the strategy is going to consist.

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In order to avoid any counter thrust and any analogous movement on the part of the British, it was evidently necessary to close to them the openings by which they could penetrate into the Baltic, that is to say, the Danish straits.

After 1845, 4 August, 1914, although war was not officially declared, Prince Henry of Prussia, fearing an erruption of British ships into the Belts, gave orders to mine the southern mouths of these two passages, and that without awaiting the result of the negotiations entered into with Denmark. The operation was effected the morning of 5 August. The same day, in reply to the

German note, Denmark declared her neutrality, and barred with mine fields the northern entrance to the Grand and Little Belts, also the Danish part of the Sound. On the contrary Sweden declared the Sound free, and refused to mine that part of the Sound along her border.

Entry of British surface craft into the Baltic was thus rendered very improbable. Not so with submarines, and the Germans received some very disquieting information on this point at the end of September. They strengthened the obstructions and the surveillance of the Belts, then of the Sound. Some torpedo boats were permanently detailed to watch this last passage. Conversations were entered into with Sweden with a view to removal of navigation marks and extinction of lights, but this diplomatic action had but partial success.

In spite of the precautions taken the British submarines E-1 and E-9 succeeded in passing the Sound, the first in the night of 17-18 October, 1914, the second in the night of 19-20 October. The E-11 failed to get through. The Germans took new measures for surveillance of the western Baltic. They redoubled their efforts with Denmark and Sweden to induce those countries to deny their territorial waters to British submarines. Sweden accorded them some satisfaction with regard to lights and buoyage.

In July, 1915, the idea was momentarily considered of sending French submarines into the Baltic, but the project was never put into execution.

It was always British submarines which entered that region. The E-8 and E-13 traversed the Sound during the night of 18-19 August, 1915. The E-8 succeeded in getting through. The E-13 went aground southeast of the island of Saltholm and was destroyed by German torpedo-boats.

In the first fortnight of September, 1915, the E-18 and E-19 also arrived in the Baltic. The Germans then decided to plant a minefield at the southern mouth of the Sound; this field occu-

pied nearly all the space between Danish and Swedish territorial waters. In February, 1916, they placed a second field farther south, off the southwest extremity of the Swedish coast.

Thenceforwafd these obstructions almost completely closed the passage from the Sound to submarines. So, in the course of time, the Allies were constrained to send these boats into the Baltic by Arkangel and the river routes, previously taking them to pieces. Four C-type British submarines took this road in August and September, 1916. Six submarines of 250 tons came from America, transported by boats and railroads.

It is well known that the British submarines arriving in the Baltic did their best to remedy the inertia of the Russian fleet and to trouble German communications in that sea.

They acted with energy against the particularly active traffic moving at that time between Sweden and Germany. After the first of October, 1915, they sank without notice all enemy merchantmen they encountered; in the course of that month they sank ten, and gravely damaged three others. Men-of-war equally payed tribute. The cruisers PRINZ ADALBERT and UNDINE were sunk by them (23 October and 8 November, 1915); the battleship POMMERN and the battle cruiser MOLTKE damaged (2 July and 19 August).

But such an activity, vigorously carried out as it was, and despite the agitation caused by its results, could not snatch command of the Baltic from the Germans. In that sea there was lacking to the British submarines the necessary support of a surface force; the British fleet could not make its influence felt there, and the Russian fleet was wrapped in nearly total inaction. As we have already noted, the British carried on their submarine warfare in the Baltic in the habitual German manner, that is, with the same lack of liason with other arms. The situation obtaining for the Allies in other seas was here, to their disadvantage, completely reversed. Their submarine enterprise could annoy the Germans, but could no more lead to a decision than could their enemy's hope to do so by the same means otherwhere.

It was condemned to impotence by natural and artificial obstacles which denied passage of the Danish straits to the British surface forces, and therein consisted in part the real and considerable importance of the obstructions set up in that region.

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Under protection of this closure of the Belts and Sound the Germans were able to maneuver by throwing from time to time the weight of a part of their forces from the North Sea into the Baltic.

To characterize their proceeding, may the term "Interior lines" be used, as is sometimes done? Not in the exact sense of the word, because that supposes, properly speaking, that the adversary possesses "exterior lines", and that he can at least attempt to defend himself by movements of the same general nature, albeit slower because they take place on the periphery. Nothing of the sort here! The Allies are handicapped by the Germans, who have made the Baltic a closed lake, denying it to the British, and reserving to themselves the possibility of entering it by the Kiel Canal. In truth, there are no "interior lines". Nevertheless it is convenient to be not too puristic; the expression, which is useful and which defines the situation <u>grosso modo</u>, may be retained.

The Germans early had recourse to shifts of force towards the Baltic. On 26 August, 1914, after the grounding and loss of the cruiser MADGEBURG under the Russian light of Odensholm, the Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet, Admiral Ingenohl, placed at the disposal of Prince Henry of Prussia the old 4th Squadron of the Line, the armored cruisers ROON and PRINZ ADALBERT, the cruisers MUNCHEN and DANZIG, as well as the 4th Flotilla of torpedo boats, to support activity in the Eastern Baltic. All this was accomplished by direct agreement between the two commanders-in-chief. General Headquarters having received definite information of the loss of the MADGEBURG, soon afterwards ordered

the return of these forces to Admiral Ingenohl.

In fact at the beginning German General Headquarters was rather lukewarm about sending important forces into the Baltic. It had no wish to strip the North Sea, which it considered the principal theatre, all the more so because the battle of Helgoland, 28 August, 1914, had just indicated that serious attacks on the part of the British were to be expected. Such, at least, was the belief of Admiral von Pohl. But at the same time there was the contrary opinion of Admiral von Tirpitz who, precisely for the purpose of effacing the impression produced by the Helgoland affair, urged offensive action in the Baltic, and who proposed nothing less than to devote to it the 3rd Squadron of the Line, composed of recent dreadnaughts, and even a division of the 1st Squadron. Ths discussions pro and con were lively, and when on 3 September, Prince Henry of Prussia requested the cooperation of the 5th Squadron and of the two armored cruisers ROON and PRINZ ADALBERT, these last two were refused him, and the first allowed him only on the condition that they go no farther than Memel, and that they be held in readiness to return to the North Sea at the first signal. Nevertheless it was conceded, albeit unwillingly, to increase these forces by the BLUCHER, the STRASBURG, and the 2nd and 4th Torpedo Boat Flotillas.

It was with these means that Prince Henry of Prussia operated in the Baltic from 3 to 9 September, 1914, and advanced as far as the entrance of the Gulf of Finland without being in the least hindered by the Russians, which testified to their total passivity. On 8 September the Commander-in-Chief in the Baltic received orders to send the forces detached from the High Seas Fleet back to the North Sea immediately, this at the instance of the commander of that force, who feared an important British operation in the other theatre. It is obvious how British pressure in the North Sea, real or imagined, reacted on German projects with respect to disposition of forces and movements in the Baltic.

On 20 September, 1914, to effect a feint at landing at Windau and to contain the Russian fleet at a pinch, the 4th and 5th Squadrons composed of old battleships, the cruiser BLUCHER, the light cruisers GRAUDENZ and STRALSUND, and also two flotillas of torpedo boats and a division of sweepers, were placed at the disposal of Prince Henry of Prussia, all these belonging to the High Seas Fleet.

It is recalled how the operation against Windau was interrupted 24 September by the announcement of the entry of the British fleet into the Baltic. Although false, that news provoked at once a lively reaction from the Germans directed principally towards reenforcement of their forces in the east. At 2300 on 24 September the Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet received from the Naval Staff in Berlin, as well as from its chief, Admiral von Pohl, who was at General Headquarters, orders to send into the Baltic the greatest possible number of cruisers, torpedo boats, and submarines, also the 2nd Squadron, and to prepare for the same movement of the 1st and 3rd Squadrons and the battle cruisers. All of the High Seas Fleet was therefore to pass into the Baltic. At 0225, 25 September the fleet commander reported the measures he had taken. The ROON, the PRINZ ALALBERT, six small cruisers, two flotillas of torpedo boats and all available submarines had appeared at Kiel Canal. The 2nd Squadron was in the Elbe, and would be ready to transit the canal at 0430. The 1st and 4th Squadrons and the battle cruisers would follow later.

At 1330, news of arrival of the British in the Baltic having been ascertained to be untrue, General Headquarters sent a telegram to the commander of the High Seas Fleet prescribing that he recall almost all of his ships to the North Sea.

But the movement had commenced. By 1500 the small cruisers and the submarines arrived at Kiel. By 2000 it was the turn of the ROON and PRINZ ALALBERT and of the 1st and 3rd flotillas. At the moment of receipt of the counter-order, the 2nd squadron

of the Line had not yet entered the canal.

The 1st and 3rd Squadrons of the Line and the battle cruisers had not moved from Wilhelmshaven. In effect the commander of the High Seas Fleet had indicated that they would not be ready to appear before four or five days, obliged as they were to be lightened by unloading a part of their coal and munitions. Up to November, 1914, the Kiel Canal permitted passage only to ships having less than 8 meters 80 draft; it wasn't until later that this limiting depth was increased to 9 meters.

For the Germans therefore access to the Baltic was not as easy as was commonly believed. This subservience to depth of water is particularly exasperating in cases of urgency, and more than ever so since it affects that part of the forces possessing the greatest military value. Maneuver by "interior lines" here does not operate with entire freedom of action.

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In July, 1915, the German 2nd Squadron participated in operations in the Baltic which were active enough during that year.

The German navy cooperated in the offensive enterprise undertaken by the army against Courland, and notably at the taking of Windau on 15 July. It was active during August in the Gulf of Riga. For that purpose the High Seas Fleet sent four battle cruisers, four battleships of the 1st Squadron (OLDENBURG class), some light cruisers (4th Scouting Group) and some torpedo boats (8th Flotilla) from the North Sea.

The year 1916 was a period of relative calm for the Baltic. First, from the naval point of view, the Germans directed all their efforts at that time towards the North Sea, where Admiral Scheer conducted his great strategical attempts of Lowestoft, of Jutland, and of 19 August. Then also, on land, the German armies took the western front for their objectives where they

were stopped by the battles of Verdun and the Somme. They undertook no action on the eastern front except of a defensive nature, in particular to spike, in June, the disturbing attack of Broussiloff, and to assist the Austrians. The northern part of the eastern front resting on the Gulf of Riga was the object of no active operation and consequently required no assistance from the Navy.

The single important enterprise which might be noted in the course of this year, and which involved the participation of units of the High Seas Fleet, was the raid effected the 9th and 10th of November against Port Baltic by the 10th Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Moreover this was an unfortunate affair, seven out of eleven of these boats, the best and most recent, having come to grief on mines.

In 1917 the situation was reversed. The Germans, as has been seen, renounced their projects of attack in the North Sea and returned to absolute submarine warfare. They had therefore a free hand for action in the Baltic. Precisely at the same time their armies again took up their offensive on the eastern front, notably in Latvia where Riga and Dunamunde were taken, 3 and 4 September. The assistance of the navy became necessary to extend this success by a flank operation designed to conquer the islands of Dago and Oesel situated to the north of the Gulf of Riga. That action was set for October. In order to proceed with it, it was necessary to group some important forces, baptized with the name Special Naval Force, placed under command of Vice Admiral Erhardt Schmidt. To make up this force the High Seas Fleet again had to be placed under contribution, and furnished on this occasion the battle cruiser MOLTKE, the 3rd and 4th Squadrons of the Line,* the 2nd Scouting Group and several flotillas of torpedo boats, all coming from the North Sea.

In 1918 it was equally the High Seas Fleet which furnished the units necessary for occupation of the Aland Islands (5 March)

*The new 4th Squadron was composed of five new battleships in 1917.

and for operations against Finland (April).

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The connection between incidents taking place at the same time during the last war, in the North Sea and in the Baltic, places in full light, not only the constant interdependence of two neighboring theatres of operations, but also the conditions really encountered in operating practically on interior lines.

This last principle is seductive. It is often represented as the peak of art, and it has been much admired in belligerents of the past. But when one is placed in a similar situation it is not always possible to have recourse to it effectively. In effect the maneuver along interior lines is, first of all, a function of the worth and activity of the adversaries to whom one is opposed. These elements provide the first commander with possibilities of movement and flexibility of forces which are at bottom the essential factors of a situation of this kind.

Concerning possibilities of movement, it is seen, in 1914 the Germans, afraid of an attack by the British, recalled the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons to the North Sea and rejected the idea of involving themselves seriously in the Baltic. They did not wish to strip the North Sea, where, in the absence of suitable protection for the German Gulf, they did not feel themselves very secure. In 1916 they acted in the same manner but for another reason. Wrapped in their idea of maneuvering against the British, they could not consider the Baltic. At that time they were enchained by their own offensive fancies in the neighboring region.*

*Admiral Scheer very correctly says in speaking of the operations in the Baltic in 1917: "The fact of having detached several important fractions of the fleet far into the east, and of having left them there more than a week, ought to show us decidedly whether the British fleet would be sensible of the need to trouble our plans or to profit by the absence of our ships to strike a heavy blow in the North Sea. In this case it would have been necessary to repel an attack with the only forces which remained available to us there... If on the contrary the British fleet attempted a demonstration in the Baltic and employed there considerable force, it would oblige us either to give up our operations in the west or to go to meet it in the western basin of the Baltic in numerical inferiority."(Memoirs,p.347).

Conversely it is certain that an active and agressive attitude on the part of the Russians would have obliged the Germans constantly to maintain in the Baltic three or four times the force habitually left under orders of Prince Henry of Prussia, and thus to strip permanently the North Sea. In this case what would have become of the offensive projects of Admiral Scheer in 1916? It is well, in effect, to recall that the Russian fleet comprised 8 battleships of which 4 were dreadnaughts of 23,000 tons, 5 armored cruisers, 5 light cruisers, half a hundred torpedo boats, and 8 submarines. Directed by energetic and intelligent chiefs it would have been able to accomplish much, and it would certainly have immobilized nearly half of the German forces. But the legendary passivity and the lack of maritime experience of those Slavs combined to reduce to nought the use of the important forces at their disposal. In the Baltic, even with numerical inferiority, the Germans constantly kept the initiative in operations, when the simultaneous activity of their two adversaries would have snatched it from them, not only there, but also in the North Sea.

Flexibility and quantity of forces were of no less importance to the Germans in enabling them to execute their plans. It is evident that if the British had succeeded in inflicting a decisive defeat on the High Seas Fleet in the North Sea, and had caused it serious losses, that fleet would not then have been able to make its influence felt in the Baltic, where the situation would have been changed. This is an aspect of the question which must not be lost sight of when, for example, one wishes to judge the Battle of Jutland completely and sanely. Thus one will better appreciate what failure to win that battle meant to the British. Nevertheless in England there was little thought taken of the Baltic with respect to that incident, and one of those least interested was Mr. Churchill, to whom precisely the usefullness of radical sanction in the North Sea had, as will be

seen, been evident since 1914.*

Let us now pass to the examination of possibilities of counter-maneuver on the part of the British, reduced to operating on "exterior lines" in order to act in the Baltic. Difficult as that operation was for them, they had none-the-less considered it, without allowing themselves to be bolked by the closure of the Danish Straits. They had considered forcing the obstacle. After 19 August, 1914, Mr. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, had written to Grand Duke Nicholas to propose to him cooperation with the British navy in the Baltic. Lord Fisher who became First Sea Lord in November, 1914, was a warm partisan of that idea. He recalled that in the course of the Seven Years War in 1761 the Russians had landed on the Prussian coast, had seized Kolberg, had occupied Pomerania, and had only retired voluntarily. He dreamed of publishing this precedent anew and had six hundred twelve ships reserved for coastal operations put under construction.

At the meeting of the War Council, 28 January, 1915, Mr. Churchill again revealed that "the ultimate object of the British fleet is to obtain free access to the Baltic." As to the means, it seemed clear to all that the first condition for that operation was absolute command of the North Sea. And here advices differed. Admiral Fisher would have wished to obtain that command by sowing the region with such a quantity of mines that naval operations would have become impossible. To this system, not very defensible, Mr. Churchill opposed that of landing in Schleswig to cut the Kiel Canal, then the preliminary conquest of an island off the German coast, Borkum for instance, in order either to inclose the High Seas Fleet or make it come out to fight.**

*In the autumn of 1918 Mr.Churchill wrote several articles in the London Magazine in which this opinion is expressed: "The English had no need to seek that battle (Jutland)... Even without a Trafalgar the entire consequence of a Trafalgar have taken effect and persisted."

**See his letter of 29 December, 1915, to Mr. Asquith, then Prime Minister.

But everything was dependent on the state of the project.

In 1915 the Russian Captain von Schultz, liaison officer with the Grand Fleet, insisted anew on action in the Baltic.* Mr. Balfour, who had replaced Mr. Churchill as First Lord, offered him as objection the risk of seeing Germany occupy the Danish Islands during that time and so cutting off the retreat of the British fleet. Further, the Admiralty estimated, and Schultz was of its mind, that it was impossible to undertake anything serious in the Baltic without having previously placed the German fleet out of action in the North Sea. The War Council of 17 February, 1916, was of the advice to attempt nothing and to bury everything, the Fisher method as well as the Churchill process, thus renouncing a plan dear to those two predecessors.**

But here as otherwhere one finds neatly expressed for this concrete case under consideration the necessity of knowing how to destroy or definitely blockade the High Seas Fleet in the North Sea in order to make a thrust by exterior lines. If the problem was not solved, it was none the less clearly stated, and from that time the singular notions of Mr. Churchill on the Battle of Jutland, made public in 1918, remained unexplained by that gentleman who four years earlier had had so correct a view of the question.

Let us remark that the preliminary condition indicated did not result from the existence of the Danish Straits, but from the geographical conformation of the two juxtaposed theaters of operations. If one imagine the Islands of Fyen, Sjaelland and Laaland removed; if one suppose the Baltic provided with a large and easy entrance, it is certain the British fleet will hesitate

*Captain von Schultz, With the Grand Fleet (1915-1918), Paris, Payot, 1929.

**Russia requested a last time the intervention of the British fleet in the Baltic at the end of October, 1917, under Minister Kerensky, after the occupation of the "Baltes" islands by the Germans. (See the memoirs of Sir George Buchanan, former British Ambassador to Petrograd. Payot, 1925, p.258).

just the same before engaging itself deeply in that direction. First, it will find there an unfavorable terrain, more or less artificially tricked with mine fields, propitious for the activity of submarines and aerial machines of the enemy, sufficiently reassembling the German Gulf. Then, if it seriously menaces the essential communications of the adversary, on the other hand it exposes its own, and will abandon to the attack of that adversary during that time, the English coasts, the Pas-de-Calais and the Channel. As Admiral Fisher said with truth: "We would thus even be submitted to menace of a counter attack which might in one instant force us to retire from the Baltic." To be undisturbed in the course of an operation in that basin, even in this hypothetical geographical case, it would still have been necessary to have completely annihilated the enemy forces in the North Sea. This would have been surer than to count on drawing them and fixing them in the Baltic by menace directed against the interests of their country, communications, or coasts.

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VOLUME II, PART I

CHAPTER IX

THE STRATEGIC MANEUVER IN OUR TIME

Even the most recent among the foregoing considerations, which are of historical origin, would have but a platonic value if they were not completed by casting a brief glance upon the strategic maneuver as it appears in our own time, and upon how it may develop in the immediate future, to whatever extent that future may be foreseen in prudent and reasonable speculation.

What is new at the present time to the subject of strategy? In what manner is its field of execution modified?

It has been changed, one may say, from both the external and internal point of view, for its evolution has borne on the field of operations itself, and simultaneously on whatever acts thereon. It embraces at the same time the geographical area and the new elements which have made their appearance, that is to say submarines, mines, aviation, the speed of surface vessels and rapid communications.

Geographically the fields of struggle to be envisaged at the fatal hour, or at least their parts of interest, probably will be of rather limited extent, less in any case than the extensive areas formerly permitted, or imposed on belligerents. Study of the possible eventualities of conflict between maritime powers indicates that this will doubtless be so. Such study determines with sufficient precision the regions where contacts and shocks will be probable, and it shows them to be rather strictly circumscribed. Even if the adversaries are separated by large ocean spaces, the theatre of operations will have a tendency to become fixed at one side or the other, and to contract, as a result of many considerations dealing with the necessity for bases, radius of action of surface units, aerial possibilities, etc... all factors which formerly did not intervene. This truth

may be easily perceived by examining, for example, the concrete case of a war between England and the United States, or between the United States and Japan.

It is therefore not exaggeration to speak only of theatres of operations which on the whole are contracted in absolute value, in linear dimensions. The benefit which strategy derived formerly from great distances, and all the play which it had built up on those distances, so to speak no longer exists. Space has diminished considerably, as well as the possibilities of movement which it offered to him who wished to maneuver. Notably, if one does not possess sufficient force to fix an enemy, he should not count too much on space itself to assure that fixation. Confidence placed there could receive some disagreeable surprises.

From a number of internal factors the speed of surface ships has been moved higher. Nevertheless by the definite relation of speed with space it is intimately linked with external factors. Thus increase in speed also has entailed a reducing of distances over a determined theatre, if these distances be expressed in endurance. All this takes effect, in resumé, as if the limits of the struggle were contracted a second time; i.e. contracted in time after having already been contracted in linear dimensions.

Further, modern speed brings to both adversaries the advantage of this rapidity of transit just as, in a more general fashion, the adoption of motive power independent of the wind brought them the advantage, equally bilateral, of certainty of no interruption in transit.

Great speed of surface units, very high speed of aerial elements, infinite speed, so to speak, of communications, all work now towards diminution of time and precipitation of events. Strategy thus finds itself thrown into the turbulence which prevails in all things in our time; it evolves towards acceleration, rapidity, trepidance. The strategic film turns more quickly now where it formerly unrolled leisurely. And we find ourselves grappling

with difficulties which our predecessors had not known.

One of the direct consequences of this condition of things is the lessening of the duration of time during which the favorable situation, at which all strategy aims, may obtain. At present the enemy has the power to come very quickly to disturb that situation. It is transitory, ephemeral. It requires active exploitation and rapid decision.

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As to internal factors, represented by the submarine, the airplane, mines and communications, in order to measure their influence on the strategic maneuver it suffices to examine the role which they play in the principal and secondary theatres, on our side as on the enemy's side, according to whether these instruments are employed for tasks of combat or of security.

If there is but one theatre of operations which was the case, for example, of the Germans in the North Sea, there will nevertheless be a principal direction in which one wishes to strike, and secondary directions in which one wishes to be secure, or, equally, a principal objective and secondary objectives.

All these terms awaken ideas along the same lines.

Let us submit the behavior of the submarine to a test of this sort.

In the principal theatre, or with regard to the principal objective, the submarine can, on our side, contribute very usefully to strategy acting as an instrument of combat. It is advantageous to have it participate; the process conforms to the principles of liaison of arms and masses. The submarine can render great service there. Of course it requires special handling, and we believe that it lends itself particularly well, in an indirect manner, to action of a basically organized scope in conjunction with surface units. Something approaching the German system of 19 August. In the principal theatre it will always be best to immobilize submarines off ports or in barriers as little as possible,

following fixed systems, and to devote them as much as possible to the maneuver. It is necessary always to seek to maneuver with the submarine as with other instruments. The use of the submarine will evidently be facilitated by the existence of any bait calculated to draw the enemy and to impose upon him known avenues of approach and retreat. This condition is introduced when a maneuver is made to threaten a point on the enemy coast or to protect a friendly convoy.* Consequently, one sees how the action of the submarine is favored by the initiative in operations.

As an instrument of security in the principal theatre it is of secondary importance. In effect, security itself, although it always possesses an appreciable value, is here in no way primordial, and activity, offensive, initiative, which are with us, contribute powerfully to it.

In the hands of the enemy, and always in the principal theatre, the submarine is naturally dangerous for us, but not as much so as one might believe. Incontestably it will oblige us to take multiple and constant precautions, but since there is nothing better adapted to parry its blows than speed, activity, initiative in movements, and since these qualities of action are precisely those required by the maneuver itself, one will find himself thus more or less automatically guaranteed by the very fact that he does maneuver and that he does use the initiative.

The enemy submarine will perhaps be more troublesome for us as an element of security because even if it has not been able to attack our principal force, it will be able at least to signal its passage and its approach, and thus cause it to lose the essential benefit of surprise, all this while remaining itself unperceived. For that reason we might fail entirely.

*There is therefore, in our day, a supplementary advantage in this type of offensive on a geographical or pseudo geographical basis. But it is necessary to note that, if it contributes to lead the combat and to lead it in an approximately determined direction, it does not create forcibly, of itself, a favorable situation from the point of view of strategy, for the enemy is able to appear with all his forces on the point where he is thus solicited.

Let us pass now to the secondary theatres, to secondary objectives.

Our submarines can here be very useful to us, as much so as when acting as engines of combat, because they are difficult to parry, because they do not themselves run great risks, and because they are good workers for tasks of fixation, at least for those intended to immobilize numerous light surface or aerial elements. The results attained by the submarine are here most important. The diversions which it can make against coasts or communications of the enemy, whether it be question of a submarine gunboat or great tonnage or an ordinary submarine, can contribute greatly to the projected maneuver. In the division made of submarines between principal and secondary objectives account should be taken of this characteristic. With respect to these boats it will lead to an economy of forces which without doubt will be sensibly different from that realized by units of other types.

As an element of security our submarine has equally great value. It is well adapted to give the alert in sectors dangerous for us, in those secondary directions from which disturbing actions can appear and of which it behooves us to be forewarned in time. If the submarine can hardly be asked to perform this service by means of exploration or scouting, at least it can cooperate therein by acting under the form of surveillance which is compatible with its mediocre properties of movement. These information posts, placed on the probable route of enemy elements, can well avoid unfortunate events.

On the other hand, in the hands of the adversary the submarine is here less effective for we have no intention of engaging ourselves against secondary objectives except with limited forces of a particular nature whose activity will not be seriously opposed by the submarine operating as an instrument of combat or of security. Limited forces offer it little to cope with in the first place, and in the second, it is indifferent to them whether their presence be signalled.

In sum, as far as concerns the maneuver, the appearance of the submarine has brought with it only certain difficulties, certain impossibilities, in a word, certain negative characteristics. It has also some positives of which it behooves us to know the use on occasion.

But on the whole the submarine has not brought any major obstacles to the maneuver. It has sensibly modified the process of execution of that maneuver, but it has not greatly changed its general appearance. The cause of this rests perhaps in the lack of speed of this type. It is convenient to note in effect that in that evolution towards rapidity, which affects all instruments, and in which we indicated, the submarine is behind; as though it were handicapped.* The mine is immobile, and the submarine suffers from demi-immobility with relation to other tools of war. It is like the ox-cart faced with the modern automobile movement. After having aroused so much discussion, after having appeared for an instant to be the definite panacea, it has now a tendency to pass to a position of secondary importance. Its star pales, however little, to the special point of view of the maneuver in spite of the contribution it has brought to that maneuver.

That statement, of necessity made, does not detract from its other great qualities of which the use remains indispensable in missions regulated to its aptitudes.

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Les us now examine the case of aviation.

On the principal theatre, or with regard to the principal objective, its participation in our maneuver is entirely indicated and infinitely desirable. Question of liaison of arms and mass. The great properties of movement of the aerial arm permit important possibilities of joining forces and of rapid and massive con-

*Speed of submarines on surface has been sensibly increased in these last years, thanks to increase in their displacement. But it remains very far from that of new surface vessels. Moreover, and above all, their speed submerged has made but insignificant progress.

centrations under certain conditions of distance and, consequently, of geography. The speed of aviation is considerable; its range increases every day, but nevertheless it is limited enough. Finally, the duration of time during which the airplane is able to keep the air remains slight with regard to that of an important operation. In order that aviation contribute surely to the latter it is necessary that we restrict its action to sufficiently narrow limits of time. Its intervention therefore does not have serious opportunities to arrive at the designated point, as we wish it, unless we have the initiative in the operations, and unless we are able to draw the scenario to our pattern. It is necessary not to forget, in effect, that one will never be able to carry but a restricted quantity of airplanes by aircraft carriers, and that a powerful aerial action always requires the cooperation of aviation based on land.

Aviation will give us the means of preventing the enemy on the surface from completely frustrating our maneuver by shutting himself up in port, as formerly. We shall be able to follow him and reach him there, at least to a certain degree.

As an instrument of security aviation interests us less on the principal theatre for there security is not primordial. The same remark as was made with regard to the submarine.

Conversely, on the same theatre, we can be faced with enemy aviation. His combat aviation is dangerous to us. It results, for our surface vessels, in new risks added to the others, of whic we have spoken at length otherwhere.* But though we may suffer some losses on this account, the maneuver for all that will not be arrested and doomed to impotence for that single reason. Nevertheless it is incontestable that aviation introduces a new factor into the question in the sense that the rapidity of its defensive reaction, with regard to enterprises of surface ships, seems to diminish for the latter the advantage which they formerly derived from the initiative in operations. But it is necessary to

*See Volume I, 3rd part, Chapter VII.

add, as corrective, that we are not entirely deprived of means of defense in the face of enemy aviation, and that the best of these is the acquisition of aerial superiority over the important point; superiority which requires precisely, as we have just seen, that same initiative in operation. Initiative therefore retains its entire value.

On the same principal theatre enemy aviation is a much more redoubtable adversary as an instrument of security. Its potent and extended investigations can permit the enemy to see clearly into our play, to be advised of our approach and of the blow which we wish to carry to him. The inquisitive regard of a single airplane will suffice, perhaps, to cause our maneuvering combination entirely to collapse.

On secondary theatres the situation is identical but with the two partners reversed.

Our combat aviation will have a role of secondary importance here for we will not know how to count on it to stop enemy forces. On the contrary our aerial machines will be extremely useful to us as scouting and exploration instruments because our security in these directions is absolutely essential and to a great extent the task of assuring that security will be the duty of the airplane.

Enemy combat aviation can resist our operations on secondary theatres with some efficacy, but such an eventuality will hardly disturb or displease us for we have conceived and engaged in these operations precisely with the desire of immobilizing on these theatres as many as possible of the enemy forces, and notably his aerial forces. As to the security which these can furnish to our adversary, it will scarcely be of great value to him, for our principal attack is not directed to that side.

For each of these cases considered above it is convenient to make reservations once for all as to the results aviation can attain in missions of security. Theoretically it excells therein. It should furnish a clear picture of conditions to two adversaries, for its use is bilateral, and without effective opposition.

It will penetrate the most involved situations. It seems that it ought to render impossible hazards, surprises, as they appear at Jutland, or equally, on 16 December, 1914. Such are its promises. In practice they must be somewhat humbled, as demonstrated by the example of 19 August, 1916. Aviation is not reliable for use in all circumstances. Bad weather can paralyze it. It can run foul of bad visibility, due to obscured horizon, to rain or snow, to fog. It cannot pierce the curtain of night. Even if it see clearly it will sometimes send in false information, either as to the forces seen or as to their position, for the airplane itself is not very sure of its own (position). It cannot send information of everything, that is evident. Finally, in addition to its own technical weaknesses, the shortcomings of communications can compromise the result of its search.

It would therefore be imprudent to depend entirely upon aviation for the task of assuring security. Other means should not be neglected. In particular it will be well not to pin blind faith to negative information from aerial sources, and to admit such reports only after substantiating with others.

Inversely, one is not entirely disarmed in the face of enemy aerial investigations. Unfavorable conditions can interdict them. Notably it is necessary to recall that the great speed of modern surface units permits making good in one night a distance which may be as much as 250 to 300 miles. This leaves a sufficiently appreciable margin for surprise, despite a security assured by aviation. Actual conditions therefore do not indicate the end and the interdiction of all maneuver. Moreover there are cases where the objective of that maneuver, prepared in force, may be attained despite enemy scouting aviation; the adversary, inferior, will be unable to oppose it even though he be completely informed, and "au courant" with our movements.

From this rapid review of the influence of two new instruments on actual maneuver some conclusions may now be developed.

First, in a general fashion, one may say that the submarine

and the airplane are of concern to us who wish to maneuver chiefly because of their possibilities for combat on the principal theatre or against the principal objective, and their possibilities in security on secondary theatres or against secondary objectives. It is the reverse for the enemy against whom the maneuver is directed.

Attainment of full results by the airplane and the submarine, from the point of view of the maneuver, imperatively requires initiative in operations, as proved, for example, by the facts of 19 August, 1916. Our faith in this principle of the initiative, very foundation of the maneuver, cannot but be reenforced thereby. And it will be all the more necessary to find inspiration in it if one be weak and will have to do more in order to bring about a favorable situation.

The conditions of the maneuver in a modern theatre of operations endow the idea of security with a degree of first importance now much more than in the past. Now it happens, most fortunately, that the new instruments like the submarine and the airplane offer supplementary and powerful resources to assure that security, and that they permit very interesting combinations in this field. There is compensation therefore to a certain degree between the increase of exigencies and the increase in the means destined to meet them. Nevertheless there are two shadows in the picture. In the first place, security is strengthened not only for us but also for our enemy. Evidently no one has the monopoly on amelioration of technique or an improvement in armament, but we shall do well to remember when increase of security will operate against us. In the second place, absolute security is not imperative when it acts in our favor, as we have previously remarked, and we shall be equally well advised not to forget this on occasion.

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Rapid communications, represented by cables, wires, and above all by radio, now offer either of two adversaries a most ef-

ficient means of effecting movements of elements at distances greatly removed from the direct impulsion of his command. They furnish him the possibility of sending or of centralizing very quickly notices or information obtained from diverse sources, as much from the peculiarly military organs of security as from investigating antennas represented by agents in neutral states, the press, the secret service, etc... It results that each belligerent now has infinitely greater facilities than formerly to grasp promptly reconnaissance of an area, and of whatever moves therein, even if this reconnaissance possess exactitude as doubtful as in the past.

Generally in the course of the maneuver one has that factor in his favor when he seeks to prevent reaction of secondary theatres on the principal theatre, that is to say in the negative part of the affair. He will have it opposed to him in whatever he himself undertakes, that is to say in the principal attack and in diversions.

The role of neutral navigation in the propagation of news is naturally magnified by the new process of transmission placed at its disposal. As if cables were not enough, it now possesses means of instantly making known by radio whatever it sees or whatever it has learned. A common cargo vessel encountered, will be able to make known at its next port of call the composition, position and route of the naval force which found itself in its path even if it does not do so beforehand by radio as soon as it has put a sufficient number of miles between itself and that force. Much of interest may be learned in that way; on the other hand the presence of a vessel so indiscreet in the trajectory of the principal attack risks being extremely unfortunate.

In these actual and future conditions what remains then of the process of fixation, so often employed formerly, which consisted in misleading the enemy in an eccentric direction by means of false information? Certainly not a great deal, generally speaking at least. The effect of such deceit will not be ephemeral and

limited. One will not long be deluded. Numerous informations, quickly transmitted, will promptly dissipate the errors of the enemy and aid him easily to redress a defective line of action. Here again is a factor which acts to reduce the duration of favorable situations.

On the other hand the contribution of radio, organ of rapid transmission, to diffusion of information and to security, comports in the opposite way, that of furnishing through its indiscretion, arms for the enemy's security. The latter is going to seize information by interception, by deciphering, by radiogoniometry.* We thus risk losing the benefit of secrecy and surprise, for, in spite of the desire to do so, it is seldom that one is able to abstain completely from radio transmission during the course of an operation. Here again it is true that the use of new processes is not unilateral and that we also can participate in them.

It is of the greatest interest that the maneuver may defend itself against these investigations of a new nature, which particularly affect the principal attack and which can prematurely divulge it. This shows the immense value of all technical combinations which are able to remove the radio-telegraphic emissions beyond reach of adverse curiosity, that of ultra rapid messages, of directed waves, and in particular, for these last, transmitters using short or ultra short waves (parabolic mirrors, dephased multiple antennae, curtain antennae, etc. . .).

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The strategic maneuver suffers in our day from grave obstacles which certain innovations have brought to freedom of action. We have already indicated those which the submarine educes, the airplane and the mine, by reason of the risks which surface ships run because of their existence. We shall not return to that.

*Nevertheless radiogoniometric revelations present anomalies which sometimes render determination of the position of the emitter very uncertain.

Nevertheless it is convenient to note that the influence of mines in this regard depends essentially on the theatre of operations considered. In certain regions, as in the North Sea during the last war, the lack of depth which will permit their being placed throughout the area will cause mines to be feared above all else. In others, notably in the Mediterranean, mine fields will cover only certain zones restricted and well enough known, so that one will shun them once for all, or will venture into them only with customary precautions. Freedom of movement will not be gravely compromised.* At present it is at all times necessary to take account of the technical improvements which result in permitting mooring of mines in greater and greater depths, and consequently in increasing the extent of dangerous zones. Also serious difficulties may be encountered in dragging or self-protection with mines of certain special types, as the English magnetic mine, or the same American mine with floating antennae.

More important still is the restriction in freedom of action which in our time results from the necessity of refueling and from the limitation of traversable distances. And this is a question of a permanent and constant obstacle which has been severe in all times and all places.

Formerly there has generally been a tendency to under-rate radius of action a little. This modest but indispensable servitor has been considered rather encumberinb by reason of the sacrifices of weight which it necessitates and which involve reductions in speed. One was brought to treat it as a poor relation, but none the less dared not go too far in that direction because there always remained the eventuality of operations in distant seas, impossible to ward off.

That the conditions of actual or future wars entailed narrow-

*The total minable surface depends only on the quantity of mines of which the adversary may dispose. It is therefore independent of the theatre of operations. But the distribution of this stock of mines and consequently the extent of suspicious zones depends therefore on the depths of the considered region.

That the conditions of actual or future wars entailed narrowing of the field of hostilities has been a gratification. In the balance of characteristics in a ship at last it was going to be possible to economize on the part of the weight affected by radius of action, and this economy was to be in favor of other elements. The narrowness of theatres of operations of the future was welcome. Reflection has shown that a gain on that score was too hastily reckoned. If the distances to be traversed have diminished, in return, for well recognized reasons of security they are nearly always traversed at great speed, and thus is lost on one side that which has been gained on the other. Moreover that security demands protection by torpedo boats or small ships; the radius of action of the force to move finds itself finally to be that of the torpedo boats, just as shown by British and German experience during the last war. Of course the radius of action of torpedo boats has recently made great progress, progress in part intentional such as installation of more economical engines which have replaced the first turbines, veritable abysses for fuel, progress in part automatic and involuntary such as increase of tonnage which in these last ten years has passed from 800 to 1500 tons. But in last analysis this radius of action is all the same sufficiently limited and consequently so also, by repercussion, is that of the large units. At the end of two or three days at sea it is necessary to think about refueling and thereby is the maneuver painfully enslaved.

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What difficulties the conditions of our time create for the strategic maneuver may thus be seen in résumé. Very fortunately, on the other hand, new means come in the nick of time to reestablish equilibrium, to permit us to strive, to defend ourselves. The maneuver can therefore, and ought always, to be attempted in order to aim at great results, to retain the initiative and to avoid being led by the enemy. The duration of favorable situations

has evidently much diminished, but it can be sufficient for the objective in view. With modern arms a short lapse of time suffices for arriving at the goal of a naval force. In the same way a slight delay suffices to have an important convoy pass, to effect certain operations against the enemy coast etc. . . If this requirement for rapid decision is met, one can content himself with a brief duration of the favorable situation, and the maneuver is to be the adviser as to the rigor admissible for its exploitation. But there is herein a real obligation which that maneuver should not lose from view. It should not aim too high and aspire to a favorable situation which is to be of a length incompatible with today's conditions.

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There exist a procedure which permits rendering a net account of the evolution undergone in course of ages by the technique of execution relative to a determined act of war; it consists of taking out of the past a situation of this nature and of examining how the actors of that epoch would act were they to reappear on that terrain faced with the same situation, having the instruments of today at their disposal.

This method is well known, I invent nothing in evoking it. Unfortunately and mistakenly it is little practiced, for it carries important benefits for the military with regard to their instruction and to formation of their professional esprit.

Let us apply it to the strategic maneuver and let us ask, for example, how, on the whole, the campaign of Bruix in the Mediterranean would unfold if it has occurred in 1930, with the instruments of this epoch substituted for those of 1799.*

First let us represent the initial position of the two adversaries. In April, 1930, Bridport blockades Bruix in Brest, but in the modern manner. He has established his force at Ply-

*See Chapter III and sketches II and III.

mouth and he has entrusted his close blockade to light surface vessels and to submarines posted at the mouth of the Four, the Iroise and the Raz-de-Sein. A sufficiently great number of mine fields, British as well as French, encompass the place, traversed by the defense's lanes of security. The British aviation, based on the other side of the Channel, periodically scouts the roadstead of Brest and the ships there. From time to time it bombs them. The French aviation renders a like courtesy to the enemy.

From Gibraltar Keith blockades Mazarredo in Cadiz by the same process.*

Duckworth and Nelson are placed as in 1799, the one at Minorca and the other at Palermo.

Effective forces are the same as in 1799, except that the vessels are replaced, as far as units of the line, by 10,000 ton cruisers.

On 26 April, 1930, Bruix goes out of Brest profiting by obscure weather and the very bad visibility with which we are familiar. His scouts drive off a light British vessel which is patrolling at the opening of the Iroise (the NYMPH of today) which loses contact. During this time the force takes the dragged channel which follows the passage of Toulinguet, rounds the Tas-de-Pois and shapes its course for Cape de la Chevre towards Raz-de-Sein. At 1500 Bruix traverses the Raz. He then takes course to the southwest, preceded by his sweepers which he sends back as soon as he considers himself outside the mined zone.

The only British submarine which finds itself on surveillance south of Raz-de-Sein, very harrassed by surface patrols particularly active since morning, has to remain submerged, and bad atmospheric conditions prevent it from seeing anything of the enemy sortie which passes too far from it.

Let us remark that this breaking of the blockade by Bruix, which was considered an extraordinary event in 1799, is much less

*Supposing, pure fiction, that Gibraltar be utilizable as a base in case of Anglo-Spanish war, which obviously does not at all correspond with fact.

than in 1930 by reason of the manner in which blockades will necessarily be kept in our days. Of old it was singular that Bruix did not have the enemy force itself on his hands from the first hours of the sortie; at present nothing astonishing in that, because that force keeps very open blockade from Plymouth. On the contrary that which is at present just as unusual as formerly, that which constitutes exceptional luck for Bruix, is the fact that his sortie has not been signaled and contact maintained. But this was due to the bad visibility of the day. Human eyes cannot pierce fog today any better than formerly.

Also, because of the weather, the British aerial reconnaissances have not taken place as ordinarily during 26 April. They have been resumed only in the morning of the 27th and have established that the roadstead of Brest was empty.

On Bridport this news has produced the impression that one may imagine. At noon the 27th he sailed from Plymouth. Ceding to his opinion of the situation he has at once taken course for Ireland, as in 1799, moving at a mean speed of 20 knots, deduction made for zig-zags. He has taken the dragged coast channel which passes across the Sorlingues. At 2000 the 27th he is half-way to Ireland. At 0000 the 28th he is off Cape Clear.

In the afternoon of 27 April, British aerial reconnaissances out of Cornwall and Ireland have explored everywhere without finding a trace of Bruix.

The latter is already far away. He is making way to the southwest at a mean speed of 20 knots. At noon the 27th he is at his first rendezvous 90 miles west of Cape Finisterre. He takes course to the south, always at the same speed. The enemy is completely fooled.

The latter, very fortunately for him, is going to be able to recover very quickly.

First, the Danish merchantman which encountered Bruix in 1799 is now a cargo vessel of 12 knots which, arriving at Southampton at 2000 the 27th, makes known that he has met the French fleet 90

miles southwest of Raz-de-Sein making way to the southwest at 2000 the 26th. Notice of this is forthwith given to London.

Next, the frigate SUCCESS is now an English cruiser which has fallen in with Bruix about 1900 the 27th at nightfall, a little south of the parallel of Oporto. The night has permitted him to evade the chase he has sustained and he has at once made Keith and Jervis acquainted by radio with the position and the course of the enemy. Jervis has re-transmitted this notice without delay to London, to Luckworth, to Nelson, to Sydney Smith. London has received it about 0000 of 28 April.

Further, about 2000 the 27th Bruix has used his radio to forewarn Mazarredo of his arrival and to give him rendezvous for the morrow. That unfortunate transmission has been triangulated which operation places Bruix in the neighborhood of Berlingues on the coast of Portugal.

A last piece of information confirms these preceding. It is that given by a Portuguese cargo vessel coming from America which has encountered the French at 1600 the 27th, and which, having arrived at Leixoes (Portugal) at 0000 the 28th, has at once forewarned the British consul in that city who has telegraphed to London with urgency.

The result is that on 28 April, a little after 0000, the Admiralty is in possession of a sheaf of very important information which permits it to see clearly into the situation and to be no longer duped by false reports diffused by the French as to a pretended expedition against Ireland. It is absolutely certain that Bruix is going to the Mediterranean.

The Admiralty immediately notifies Bridport ordering him urgently to detach Cotton to the Mediterranean with twelve units. Bridport, west of Valentia (Ireland) receives that order at 0400 the 28th and executes it forthwith.

Thus the fixation of the English on the coast of Ireland, which in 1799 lasted more than a month, has not lasted twenty-four hours in 1930 so much has redressing a defective direction

been accelerated by improvements in transmission.

Cotton is grosso modo forty-eight hours behind Bruix. Consequently the duration of the favorable situation in the Mediterranean acquired by the maneuver, which was thirty-three days in 1799, is here no more than two days. What remains at present of a security which reposes solely on space and on false news may thus be seen.

Be it as it may, Bruix newly arrived 90 miles west of Cape St. Vincent at 0600 28 April has turned towards the southeast. Mazerredo, advised by him since 2000 the day before, has got underway from Cadiz at midnight and has joined Bruix at noon the 28th about 40 miles south of Capt St. Vincent with infinitely more ease than in the days of sail.

Mazerredo has left Cadiz as easily as Bruix has sortied from Brest, even more easily, for the movement took place at night. A British submarine has nevertheless seen something, and has warned Keith. Aerial reconnaissances sent by the latter at dawn the 28th have made known Mazarredo's getting underway. Connecting this departure with information received the day before as to Bruix, Keith deduces that the French and Spanish have now effected their meeting. They have there in all 42 units (24 and 18) against the 16 of Keith. The latter is therefore unable to take the offensive in any manner. All he can do is to shut himself up in Gibraltar in order to give check at the first opportunity to the adverse maneuver which aims directly at him.

On the other hand, Keith is going to mobilize all the submarines at his disposal to attack the Franco-Spanish when they traverse the Strait of Gibraltar.

Also Bruix and Mazarredo having neared the Moroccan coast, in the vicinity of Larache, where they find themselves at 2000 the 28th, pass the strait at night at 25 knots. They are off Gibraltar towards midnight, and at Cape de Gate at 0600 29 April.

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But at that moment it becomes necessary to be concerned with

refueling. A mean speed of 20 knots has been maintained since Brest, and bunkers are three-quarters empty. There is a check unknown in 1799. In 1930 Bruix and Mazarredo take a route towards Carthagena, not far away, where they enter at 1000, 29 April.

Cotton, detached by Bridport and proceeding on his side at 20 knots, arrives at Gibraltar with his 12 units at 1200, 30 April and there joins Keith. He equally is obliged to stop for a time in order to refuel, for his ships have been at sea three days, having left Plymouth with Bridport, and having participated in the swing to Ireland. He is at the end of his fuel.

Supposing that the means of the two ports of Carthagena and Gibraltar permit a sufficiently rapid refueling,* Bruix and Mazarredo sail again from the first port at 0000, 1 May, and Cotton and Keith, reunited under the command of Jervis, quit the second at 1200, 2 May. Account being taken of the distance between the two points, the Franco-Spanish retain always their lead of two days which represents the duration of the favorable situation they have acquired by their maneuver.

The use which they are going to make of it remains to be seen.

They have missed Keith in the waters of Gibraltar. They now direct themselves towards the Balearics at 15 knots to attempt to seize Duckworth and his four ships of which they would make but one mouthful. But aerial reconnaissances which they have sent over Minorca since reaching the vicinity of Formentera using planes from the carriers, reveal that Duckworth, apparently advised, has taken refuge at Port Mahon (Minorca), and that there is no chance of reaching him.

Also from the environs of Minorca where they are at 2000, 1 May, Bruix and Mazarredo spur on to San Pietro, to the southwest

*And also that these ports be capable of containing, the first, 24 plus 18 equals 42 10,000 ton cruisers, and the second, 12 plus 16 equals 28 of the same units. We are here in full fiction. But it is perfectly admissable for the kind of study which we have in view.

of Sardinia. It is there that they join at 0500, 2 May the great convoy destined for the supply of Malta and Egypt, which has left Marsailles at 0000, 1 May at the same time that they themselves weighed from Carthagena, and which has ranged along the coast of Sardinia during the night. Conduct of this convoy to its destination is, one recalls, the principal reason for sending Bruix into the Mediterranean. Modern steam navigation confers on this convoy a rapidity and surety of movement formerly unknown, as well as certitude of prompt and precise meeting with the force destined to protect it.

Once joined, the ensemble takes course towards Cape Bon at 12 knots to traverse the Channel of Sicily.

Thanks to Duckworth's aerial reconnaissances the British know that Bruix and Mazarredo were in the latitude of Minorca heading generally towards the northwest at 2000, 1 May. Nevertheless they are not very fixed in their intensions. Nelson, warned by radio, has no idea, in view of the weakness of his forces (nine units), of moving to station himself at Maritimo as in 1799. He has believed it more prudent to barricade himself in Palermo, his favorite base. None the less, in order to acquit his conscience, he has sent aerial reconnaissances into into the west, and it is these which discover the light Franco-Spanish forces near Esquerquis Bank about 1600, 3 May and the rest of that armada which would be the convoy and forces of the line, north of Bizerta. The enemy's objective is precise; it is evidently Malta. Nelson gives notice of it to Captain Ball, who is blockading that point, and orders him to fall back on Messina. He likewise endeavors to dispose his submarines in order to have them attack the enemy on his passage of the Channel of Sicily. But it's a little late to perform that operation conveniently.

On his side, Bruix desires to be informed of the position of Nelson and the possibility of meeting him, which would be very desirable in view of the crushing superiority of the means

at his disposal. At 1200, 2 May at the time the former was south of Sardinia, an aerial exploration was sent towards Sicily, and two hours later it recognized the presence of Nelson's squadron at Palermo. In order not to let the latter escape as did the squadrons of Keith and Duckworth, the light forces escorting the three allied carriers (two French and one Spanish) have been detached towards Maritimo, and in the waters of Esquerquis two bombing squadrons have taken off for Palermo. They have attacked Nelson's squadron at the end of the afternoon and have rather seriously damaged two of his ships.

During this time Jervis, grouping under his orders the forces of Keith and Cotton (28 units), has left Gibraltar 1200, 2 May as we have seen. Informed by the notices emanating from Duckworth and Nelson, he has taken course for Sicily along the Algerian coast. Off Algiers Jervis has been joined by Duckworth (4 units) coming from Minorca. He has continued his course at 20 knots, and he has arrived at Palermo at 2200, 4 May. There he joins Nelson who has but twelve disposable units. Jervis decides not to leave Palermo until after twenty-four hours, in order to permit the ships coming from Gibraltar time to refuel.

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The last act has the eastern Mediterranean for theatre.

The Franco-Spanish have succeeded in traversing the Channel of Sicily during the night without being attacked. Newly arrived at 1000, 3 May south of Malta, which finds its blockade lifted by their mere presence, that part of the convoy destined there enters, then they continue their course towards Egypt with the rest.

The duration of the favorable situation acquired by their maneuver was two days after their entrance into the Mediterranean. It would promptly have fallen to zero as a result of the enemy's reaction if they had remained in the western part of that sea. But by reason of their movement directed towards the

eastern Mediterranean, the opposite of their pursuers', the favorable situation has a tendency to survive, retaining its value at each of the points where they arrive.

Evidently since Bruix and Mazarredo have effected their junction with the convoy, they proceed only at 12 knots, and Jervis hastens along their track at 20 knots. But the latter's stop for a day at Palermo reestablishes the equilibrium.

With the result that the combined fleet, after having traversed the 810 miles which separate Malta and Alexandria, will arrive without hindrance off this last port at 1500, 6 May, and there will put ashore the reenforcements and the provisions destined for the army of Egypt. Obviously Sydney Smith will hasten to break his contact and to take refuge in some part of Turkey.

But then? The Franco-Spanish must first think of refueling, which is impossible except on the condition of having joined to the great convoy from France the number of colliers and oilers necessary to their own needs. The allies, in effect, have no base in the eastern Mediterranean which they can use; Corfu, beseiged, is impossible. The British, on the contrary, can make use of Sicily. As long as southern Italy and Tarento remain unconquered, which the appearance of the land operations indicates will be a long time, the conditions of the struggle in the eastern Mediterranean will remain precarious for the allies. And it may be seen how that situation, which appeared grave to Bruix in 1799, is much more so in our time because of the problem of replenishment in fuel. The question of bases, and consequently the geographic consideration on which it partly rests, has, in our days, an infinitely greater importance than otherwhen.

As to the proportion of forces, it is, after these several movements, very nearly unity. Jervis, having reunited at Palermo the 39 units of Cotton, Keith, Luckworth and Nelson, can now face Bruix and Mazarredo who muster 42 ships. The favorable situation of the latter has come to an end.

What results have they obtained by their maneuver? Very

little with respect to the organized force of the enemy. They have missed Keith, Duckworth and Sydney Smith who have withdrawn beyond their reach, a situation which often obtains in naval war and which will obtain more frequently nowadays with an adversary who can be advised by radio. They have touched Nelson a little by means of aerial attack, a proceeding which at present permits the evasion of the antagonist's force to be mitigated in a certain degree. The effect produced has nevertheless been rather moderate. On the other hand the services foreign to naval war, that is to say the supply of Malta and the army of Egypt, have been fully satisfied. The duration of the favorable situation (two days) was slight, but it sufficed for the operation contemplated which the actual means at hand permitted to be conducted with rapidity, assuring a coordination and a synchronism of movements formerly unknown. An essential condition of the maneuver in our time thus finds itself realized.

It is seen, in definitive comment, how, by the concrete case of 1799 transposed into the atmosphere of 1930, we are able to render ourselves account of the evolution undergone by the strategic maneuver in that period which embraces more than a century. Although done simply, omitting many details, it illuminates the changes in processes of execution and the repercussion which those changes must have on the conception and the possibilities of the modern maneuver.



CROQUIS VI

La division VON SPEE dans le Pacifique

(Extrait de l'ouvrage du Capitaine de frégate CHACK "La Guerre des Croiseurs")

Gravé par A. Hausermann

Société d'Éditions Géographiques, Maritimes et Coloniales



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Is Orcades
Scapa Flow
C. Duncansby
Firth of Moray
Cromarty
Cromarty Firth
C. Kinnaird
Peterhead
Aberdeen
Long Forties
Dundee
Perth
Rosyth
Leith
Firth of Forth
EDIMBOURG
Blyth
Newcastle
Tyne
Sunderland
Hartlepool
Whitby
Scarborough
C. Flamborough
Hull
Grimsby
Humber
Wash
Yarmouth
Lowestoft
Southwold
Harwich
LONDRES
Tamise
Sherness
Grand Fisher Bank
Petit Fisher Bank
Banc du Jutland
Dogger Bank
Swarte Bank
Baie allemande
Horn's Reef
Esbierg
Sylt
Amrun
Helgoland
Elbe
Jade
Borkum
Wilhemshafen
Emden
Ems
Weser
Bremerhafen
Terschilling
Frise
Texel
Harlingen
AMSTERDAM
La Haye
Rotterdam
Skager Rak
Lindesness
Christiansand
NORVÈGE
DANEMARK
ALLEMAGNE
PAYS BAS
ÉCOSSE
ANGLETERRE
MER DU NORD
CROQUIS IX
La Mer du Nord

THEORIES STRATEGIQUES

Castex

Volume III.

Coalitions

Public Opinion

Harbor Facilities

Translated from the French by:

Willis McD. Chapin, Major, C.A.C.

Stenciled and printed

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CHAPTER I

COALITIONS

Archduke Charles, one of the most important adversaries of Napoleon, made a statement about coalitions which will always be applicable. He said, "The idea of a common advantage, a reciprocal confidence based upon an identity of sentiments, causes coalitions to arise. Differences of viewpoint as to the ways and means of attaining the objective sought soon cause divisions. These increase when the events of the war alter the point of view, deceive the hopes and change the objectives. They become very dangerous when independent forces have to operate for a long time together. Great results from the cooperation of allied forces can be expected only in the situation where necessity forces sovereigns and peoples to take up arms to free themselves from an insufferable oppression. Moreover, it is essential that the decision be obtained rather quickly before enthusiasm has time to cool. The hope of attaining success may also be realized when one state, by its preponderant influence, takes unto itself the right to make its opinion prevail and to bend its allies to its wish." (The Campaign of 1799 in Switzerland, Vol. 2, page 286).

These lines are as true of naval coalitions as they are of terrestrial alliances. The element of chance is really, in either case, solely man himself and it is all the same whether he is to conduct his operations on land or sea. In addition, man changes little with the ages, which gives to the preceding observations a semi-permanent value.

From a tactical point of view the blunders made by naval coalitions are notorious and well known to everyone. During the war with Holland, in the battles of Solebay and Texel, the coordination between the French and English was so poorly arranged, or, rather, so cleverly opposed by the Hollanders, that the Duke of York complained later of being abandoned by the French commander, d'Estrees. Somewhat later in the same war it was the Hollanders' turn to recriminate very justly against the Spaniards

whose allies they had become during the Sicilian campaign. In the battle of Agosta Don Francisco de la Carda let Ruyter become engaged all alone against d'Almeras. During the war of the League of Augsburg there was so little cohesion between the Hollanders and the English in the battle of Beveziers that the Hollanders, placed in the advance guard and rather roughly handled by the enemy, pretended to have been deserted by their allies. Two years later at La Hougue they returned the compliment by abandoning Ashby and Rooke who were engaged with the French in order to rejoin Russell who had drifted away. After the battle of Toulon (1744) the Spaniards had the same complaint against the French which the somewhat disconnected nature of the combat seemed to justify.

Examples of this type might be multiplied indefinitely. Here is one reason why the results of these collaborations are in general unsatisfactory. On sea tactical coordination runs into great difficulties because of the precariousness of communications. While on land this situation can be improved by taking personal action, directly or verbally, toward the ally of whom more vigorous action or better directed action is being asked, on the sea only signals or radio can be used. Even radio does not constitute as great a forward step as it might seem as its appearance was simultaneous with a development of the phases of battle infinitely more rapid than was formerly the case. Under these conditions it is difficult enough to assure coordination of action between groups of the same nationality. The battle of Jutland, among others, is proof enough on this subject. It is conceivable that the same objective might be less easy to attain when it is a question of detachments belonging to different navies, each of which has its own method of maneuver and of fighting, each its particular processes, reflexes, traditions and mentality. In consequence , the manifestations of these are particularly to be feared.

Let us leave, however, this purely tactical aspect of the question which is outside the scope of this study and return to strategy. We find in the strategy of coalition the same exigencies, the same necessity of obtaining parallelism of the components of the forces which each nation throws in to the common resultant, in order to prevent their divergence and therefore their opposition. This brings up two problems. Who shall originate, create, initiate these efforts? Who shall coordinate them? Who shall the chiefs, or better, who shall be the single chief? A question of the constitution of the command. A problem of organization. In what manner, in what direction shall these efforts be directed to arrive at the desired result? A question of the conduct of hostilities. A problem of operations. In all coalitions and in maritime coalitions as well as in the others we encounter these two fundamental terms upon which everything depends, regulated well or poorly and usually poorly rather than well.

Naval examples of the past, although very suggestive, do not occur, however, in very great number, if we confine ourselves, as is essential, to the coalitions which have united naval forces of comparable strength and in which one of these forces has not had a material preponderance and an overwhelming influence. Corresponding to this condition we can find scarcely any except:

1. The western coalitions directed against the Turks in the 16th Century.

2. The coalitions two by two of England, France and Holland in the 17th Century.

3. The French - Spanish coalitions of the War of American Independence and the wars of the Revolution and of the Empire.

4. Several coalitions of a restricted importance in the 19th Century (Greek Independence, Crimea, China).

5. Finally the coalition of 1914, particularly interesting on account of its duration and the means used.

The Coalitions of the 16th and 17th Centuries.

The two campaigns conducted in the Mediterranean in 1570 and 1571 by the western nations were marked by classical incidents of coalitions. In 1570, one year before the memorable battle of Lepanto, the Genoese and the Venetians were divided by a constant lack of cooperation. Unity of command did not exist; the slightest decision called for the assembling of a council of war. Thus, the allies lay at anchor off the coast of Asia Minor deliberating instead of attacking the Turks who were beseiging Cyprus. When the Genoese had retired the Venetian commander, Quirini, took up at once a vigorous offensive against the Turks.

The same thing happened in 1571, even during the campaign of Lepanto. No unity of command at all. Everything depended upon friendly relations being maintained between Don Juan of Austria, who, in theory commanded all contingents, but in practice, only the Spanish force, Veniero who commanded the Venetians and Mark-Antony Colonna who directed the galleys of the Pope. This is only mentioning the commanders of first rank. Accordingly, from Messina to Corfu and from Corfu to Lepanto, the Christian fleet went from council of war to council of war and it was only right at the end that Don Juan of Austria succeeded in making them fight. While anchored off Gomenitza, five days before Lepanto, grave dissensions arose between the Spanish and the Venetians, with quarrels between the crews. In the same way, the absence of pursuit after the battle was due to the profound differences which manifested themselves among the allies after the victory was won.

In this celebrated historical example is seen a state of affairs which other examples fully verify. When unity of command does not exist in the primary degree in a coalition, so far as the executing forces are concerned the local decisions of a strategic character come about through councils of war, those ancestors of modern interallied conferences. They proceed like a stock company. As to the general decisions relative to the direction of the war

and the conduct of operations, they are made by the governments themselves, each commander being obliged to refer to his government whenever any difficulty at all serious arises. From being a military plan it soon becomes a governmental plan. (The governments are thus led to mix in more or less in the operations which does not help the situation any). There also, in the secondary degree, unity of command may exist or not according to whether or not one of the governments is preeminent.

During the second English - Dutch war (1666-1667), France was, for a short time, the ally of Holland. The squadron of Beaufort, arriving from the Mediterranean, was so slow in its movements that it did not succeed in joining the Dutch before the Four Day Battle. As a matter of fact, it went no further than Brest.

The third English - Dutch war was marked by continual hostilities between the Duke of York and d'Estrees, which were not confined to the battles. Later Ruyter inherited the same handicap when he joined his fortunes with that of the Spaniards. Disgusted with the war he finally made his way without them toward Sicily.

The English - Dutch coalitions during the League of Augsburg and the war of the Spanish Succession do not seem to have had the same difficulties. It is true that on land there were several difficulties. Beveziers and la Hougue prove that. In the conduct of the strategic operations there were none of the hesitations which ordinarily characterize alliances. The political and military conditions of the moment were the cause of this. The two governments of England and Holland were really one, centered in the person of William of Orange. If it may be said that at this time Holland was a small boat in the wake of a vessel it may also be said that the Dutch William the Third had confiscated the throne of England to his own profit. So long as he lived, the general directing of the war, on land and on sea was solidly centralized in his hands. After his death the all-power-

ful Marlborough continued the tradition. In short, unity of command in the English - Dutch alliance was almost completely realized and the military commanders of the two nations had but to execute its orders. Considering the governmental plans, their differences were arbitrated by a single head.

The French - Spanish Coalitions.

Entirely different were the majority of the series of French - Spanish coalitions which began with the War of American Independence. In this conflict the commanders of the allied forces were simply operating near each other and kept their real liberty of action under the nominal authority of one of them. In the superior echelon the governments kept their mutual independence and worked on a basis of reciprocal equality. Everything was done by agreement and mutual consent. It took three months of negotiations between the courts of Spain and of France to arrive at the agreement of April 12, 1779, which set up the plan of campaign of that year in the Channel. The two commanders of the combined force of seventy ships commanded distinct groups which sailed together but remained as distinct entities. D'Orvilliers had to contend constantly with the objections and the opposition of Cordoba. It was a council of war which decided, on April 25th, on the attitude to be taken during the final stages of the Channel patrol. It was another council of war, on October 3, after the return to Brest, which announced the dissolution of the naval combined force and the cessation of hostilities.

The campaign of 1781 in European waters was affected by the same impotence. This time, it was Cordoba who had the nominal command, with Guichen as the subordinate. The combined force proceeded once again up the Channel, where chance presented it, at Torbay, with a magnificent opportunity to force into combat and destroy, the English fleet of Darby which was very inferior

in numbers. Once again, on this occasion, a council of war (now historic) was assembled, which gave up the battle on the recommendation of a French squadron commander, de Beausset, who declared that the allied fleet "ought to devote all its effort toward the end, easy of attainment, as well as important, of intercepting the British merchant fleet coming back from the Antilles to London". Upon this stupefying statement the allies abstained from taking advantage of the decisive victory which was offered to them and Cordoba sent part of his imposing force back to Brest and part back to Cadiz, paralyzed by his lack of authority. The campaign of 1782, still with Cordoba and Guichen, was characterized by the same negative progress. The combined force, although it was at anchor at Algeciras was not able to prevent the supplying of Gibraltar by Howe who was much inferior in strength.

The principal thing which negatived the efforts put out during this war by the French-Spanish coalition was that which occurs so often in similar cases, namely, a total divergence in the choice of objectives. France dreamed of territorial conquests in the Antilles, of a war on the open sea and in an indirect way, of the invasion of England. Spain wanted above everything else to retake Gibraltar and Minorca by more direct means, immobilizing near the straits of Gibraltar considerable forces which she consented to let sail into the Channel only under protest. The Americans, on their side, were thinking only of their independence. Nobody understood that putting the English squadrons out of the combat would assure all these benefits at once. Only a unified command would have been able (making allowance for the erroneous ideas of the period) to get the proper view of the situation and of the general interest of the coalition.

The French - Spanish coalitions of the Revolution and of the Empire present analogous inferences. During the campaign of Bruix in the Mediterranean (1799) which we have previously described (Volume II, Chapter 3) we find Bruix and Mazarredo side by side on a footing of the most perfect equality, everything depending upon an accord which experienced, in spite of the loyalty of the Spanish Admiral, rather difficult moments. Moreover, the Directory and the Court of Spain, each free and independent so far as the other was concerned, were proceeding by mutual consent and an understanding which the clumsy bursts of assumed authority of the Directory frequently disturbed. Each had an entirely different objective. There was no unity of command in the proper meaning of the term, although the French government usually succeeded in converting the Spanish government to its ideas.

Right from the beginning, there were sharp difficulties reference the armament of the Spanish ships, their movements, their destination and especially the plan of campaign itself, which the Directory guarded jealously as a secret, refusing to confide anything to its ally who it knew was opposed to an operation in the Mediterranean. In the course of these negotiations directed mainly by the Directory, the relations between our ambassador, Guillemardet, and the cabinet in Madrid, reached an unimaginable tension, resulting in a situation which no allied government would tolerate at the present time.

Then the Directory sent Admiral Lacrosse to Cadiz to inspect and expedite the arming of the Spanish squadron which was in that port, which brought on more than one conflict between that importunate delegate and the local authorities. After the entry of Bruix into the Mediterranean, Lacrosse had a difficult time persuading Mazarredo to equip and repair to Carthagena. The Spanish admiral resisted and gave in only upon the order of his own government.

A little later, a serious difficulty arose between the Spanish government and the Directory with reference to the squadron of Melgarejo, then at Rochefort, which the cabinet at Madrid wanted to recall to Spain and the French government wanted to send to Brest. In the face of the formal refusal of the Spanish ministers the Directory made appeal directly to the King of Spain over their heads and succeeded by adopting, it is true, for once, the tone of an equal and not a superior and by toning down its usual imperious injunctions.

After the joining of the fleets of Bruix and Mazarredo at Carthagena on June 22, 1798, there began between the two leaders interminable discussions as to the operations to be undertaken. These arguments lasted a week but the best of personal relations were maintained between the leaders. The divergence in objectives manifested itself clearly. Mazarredo favored returning into the Atlantic and to Cadiz while admitting as a desirable action in the Mediterranean only an attack on Minorca. Bruix wanted to attempt something in the Mediterranean where they would have, according to his opinion, an opportunity to find the British separated and defeat them in detail. At the most he would accept an action in the Atlantic in the nature of a simple feint to be followed by a return into the Mediterranean. As for the Spanish government it held out more than ever for the attack on Minorca which was to be followed by an operation against Ireland. Presently, it made known its firm intention of drawing its forces back on Cadiz and Bruix was obliged to conform in order to keep from being separated from the Spanish, "The mere fact of my junction with the Spanish," he wrote to the Ministry of Marine, "has taken away from me the direction of my force."

At Cadiz Mazarredo showed his intention of not leaving that port in spite of the orders of his government which ordered him to accompany Bruix into the Atlantic. He opposed the force of inertia to the equipping projects of Bruix. The latter had no

other resource than to force his hand by hastening the departure of the French ships and Mazarredo, accordingly, was constrained to imitate the maneuver. Bruix actually could do nothing but try to convince him and to drag him along. He gave no orders. "The Spanish chief commands his squadron and I command mine," he said. Such a condition lacked much of being effective and the two squadrons thus combined fell short of the power which they would have had under a single commander. "I tremble to think that it depends entirely upon Mazarredo to utilize or paralyze one of the finest fleets which has ever been seen."

Certainly, the failure of the campaign of 1799 was not due solely to the fact that the operations were conducted by a coalition in which, in all degrees, in the plan for the naval forces as well as in the governmental plans, unity of command was lacking. Plenty of errors were committed, notably by Bruix right at first when he was alone and had the free disposition of his forces. These circumstances, however, this control by an alliance where nothing could be decided without discussion and mutual agreement, certainly contributed a great deal to reduce to nothing the net result of the combination.

During the Napoleonic epoch things went in an entirely different manner between France and Spain. The campaign of 1805 shows this clearly. At that time, so far as the governments were concerned, unity of command was an actuality. Napoleon concentrated in himself, on the French side, the direction of the war on all fronts and in particular the conduct of the naval operations. So far as he was concerned the Spanish government did not exist. The Emperor carried it along in his wake; he gave orders and the Spanish government obeyed. The campaign of Trafalgar in conception and in execution was the work of a single mind. France and Spain found themselves in the same situation, but even more closely united, as did England and Holland during the war of the League of Augsburg. Even better than had William of Orange, Napoleon made free use of the navies of the two allied forces, of

the Spanish navy as well as of our own. The wife of a Spanish officer of the time summed up the state of affairs in a picturesque manner by saying, "One gets married in order to live with one's husband and when it is least expected a dispatch arrives which sends him to Patagonia or Japan or even to Hell. Leave for Toulon, for Brest, for Naples, here or there according to the fantasy of this great scoundrel, the First Consul." (Ensign Moullec - Some Asides on Trafalgar from the Spanish Point of View, Revue Maritime, February, 1928).

In the executing forces there was a duplication of commanders in Villeneuve and Gravina but the consequences were limited because it was never more than a question of coordinating secondary points concerning the carrying out of the single will which emanated from above and which fixed the essential lines of the conduct of operations. There was nothing to be argued. Minister Godoy had ordered Gravina to conform at all times to the movements of the French fleet. It is true such an imposition of the will is not always for the best. It leaves no initiative to subordinates. It may make use of undesirable methods of command. Nevertheless, it is clear cut and vigorous and one cannot help being inclined thereto. The best of understanding was consistently maintained between Villeneuve and the loyal and chivalrous Gravina. They were generally in accord in the decisions which they made themselves in the course of the expedition whether to the Antilles or to Corogne. Only at Cadiz did this union have a difficult moment when it was a question of solving the problem of the opportunity for the sortie which preceded the battle of Trafalgar. There was as usual a grand French - Spanish council of war which announced a decision on October 8. It was marked by a heated discussion between Magon on one side and Escano and Galiano on the other. Gravina cut this short by demanding that it be put to a vote. This resulted in an unanimous decision for a minor sortie on a favorable occasion which was imprudently made on October 21. In short, the coalition of 1805 operated from the

command point of view under infinitely more favorable conditions than any of those which preceded it or followed it. It benefited from the unity of command and its mishaps were due to the numerous but entirely different causes which we have examined previously. (Volume II, Chapter 4).

The Coalition of Navarin

The war of the Greek Independence was from a military point of view a very small affair. The Turkish - Egyptian fleet did not amount to much when compared to the combination of the three fleets of England, France and Russia. From the point of view of the general conduct of the war and the objective of the operations this problem of coalition was, however, filled with serious difficulties which were constantly coming up. There was not the slightest unity of command. The three admirals, Codrington, de Rigny and Heyden, each acting in full independence, did not always agree. As to the governments, which were even more independent in their relations to each other, they did not agree at all and their political views which were distinctly at variance, rendered a coherent and accomplished naval policy impossible.

The combination of de Rigny and Heyden was unfortunate. Misunderstandings arose between them in consequence of the ardent and impetuous character of the former. Codrington had to interfere frequently between them to keep peace and to put an end to a reciprocal distrust which treatened to extend itself into the fleets of the two nations.

These disagreements ended while the battle of Navarin was in progress and the most cordial emulation reigned during the day but they started up again immediately after. Nesselrode several times sent instructions to Heyden which were in disaccord with the attitude which Russia had officially adopted. He was aiming at an alliance with Greece in the course of the war which Russia had just declared against Turkey and he figured

that the Greeks would thus be in a position, when peace was declared, to obtain frontiers which should be fixed without regard for the views of England, France and Austria. Russian diplomacy played a double role. On his side, Admiral de Rigny received directives which indicated an action entirely different than that of Russia. At Cape Istria he carried on in an anti-Russian manner, urging Greece to make peace with Turkey, which would permit the latter, in consequence, to dispose all of her forces against Russia. The same diversity of ideas with regard to the depredations of the Greek privateers. The English and French wanted to put an end to them, while Russia admitted them as entering into her scheme of war against Turkey. At the same time Heyden maintained all alone the blockade against Crete which the allies had raised in consideration of this island continuing to belong to Turkey. This initiative on his part embarrassed England deeply as did the Russian declaration of war against Turkey.

Matters came to such a pass that Heyden foresaw the possibility of a break between Russia and England and he took appropriate measures with his fleet for such an eventuality. He had transferred to the island of Paros the stocks of supplies up to then stored for his fleet at Malta and he conditioned certain ports of Crete and Rhodes as bases. The coalition of Navarin ended in this unforeseen manner.

The Crimean Coalition

The Crimean War was a four-sided alliance, or rather a two-sided alliance, France and England, if we limit ourselves to the naval side, Turkey counting very little from this point of view and the Kingdom of Sardinia not at all.

The staying away of the Russian fleet aiding, it all reduced itself for the two navies to combined operations: debarkations, bombardments, run-bys, etc. Fleets exist only for the armies; they are indispensable auxiliaries, but nevertheless, satellites. On the French side, the navy was in strict subordination to the army; its commander (Admiral Hamelin, then Admiral Bruat) was under the orders of the commanding general on shore (Saint-Arnaud, then Canrobert, then Pelissier). On the English side, the admiral (Dundas, then Lyons) was independent with regard to Lord Raglan, the commander of the British army. As free as it was, it acted only to aid the land forces and satisfy their needs.

It results from this point of view of the war and the condition of affairs as to authority, that the vicissitudes of the naval command are, from the point of view of operations, exactly the same as those of the land forces and that it will suffice to study these latter in order to have a correct idea of the others and of the entire ensemble.

The allied generals, French, English and Turk, were entirely independent. There was no unified command. France tried hard at the beginning of the war to get England to agree that the French general should command in battle, agreeing to place, on her side the French admiral under the orders of the British admiral on similar occasions. England refused to subscribe to this original combination. Likewise the independence of the French and English commanders with reference to the Turkish command was clearly laid down in the treaty of alliance signed at Constantinople on March 12, 1854, which also respected the entire liberty of the Ottoman commander. The allied generals were invited to operate under reciprocal agreement and everything depended for the most part on this agreement right to the end.

In this situation the large decisions ought naturally to have been made or suggested by the governments themselves, that is to say, almost entirely by the governments of France and England. With reference to each other they were on a footing of complete equality and each kept its own opinion as to the conduct of the war and the ends to be secured. They were at considerable variance. For Napoleon III the war in the east was a matter of dynastic prestige, of exterior influence, without immediate interest which marked the beginning of the ventures of the Second Empire. For England, it was essentially a utilitarian question; she sought to put out of the running her old enemy, Russia, in the near East and to keep her off the route to India by the consolidation of Turkey. Thus she had political ends to be gained. In spite of these diversities of ideas the relations between the two governments remained cordial. On the other hand things moved with a deplorable slowness. Paris or London proposed or suggested, the other ally discussed, made objections and things were finally arranged after much loss of time.

The absence of unity of command in the theater of operations, among the executing forces, caused, as is to be expected, the intervention of the governments in the operations. Napoleon III interfered without restraint; he believed himself a great strategist, built up plans of campaign and wanted to conduct everything from a distance until finally Pelissier threw off violently this yoke. The English government, on the contrary, confined itself to general directives, simple and clear and did not interfere with the execution.

Finally, to complete this expose of the interallied situation it may not be amiss to recall that the two ambassadors at Constantinople, General Baraguey d'Hilliers and Lord Stratford of Redcliffe were not in accord and were on rather bad terms. Such was the system with which the conduct of operations had to contend.

A few words of explanation with reference to the conduct of operations. The conduct of operations presents in all wars monotonous phases, with nothing special happening, where everything goes on by routine from force of habit, under a strategic form for which the catchword "stabilization" has recently been invented. The examination of these phases offers little of interest for the matter with which we are concerned. Then, from time to time to brighten the drab march of events, there occur in the conduct of operations sudden moves, "turning points", constructive acts destined to disrupt the equilibrium, to start things moving, to bring on the decision. It is at these turning points when new maneuvers, original, thought to be decisive are worked out that, in a coalition the divergencies, frictions and misunderstandings arise. These are the phenomena which we will examine here.

During the war in the East, the most notable were the concentration at Varna, the transfer of hostilities to the Crimea, the actions in the Sea of Azov against Kertch and against Kinburn.

As soon as the facts, to say nothing of simple good sense, indicated that the first debarkation which took place at Gallipoli, was not going to amount to anything, the allied generals cast about for another point better adapted for the offensive and where they would be in better liaison with the Turks who were fighting on the lower Danube, with little progress, against the Russians, Saint-Arnaud first had the idea, but he had to get the agreement of his English and Turkish colleagues. On May 19, 1854 a council of war was held at Varna between the three generals and all agreed that they would bring to that port, first, two divisions, then all of the French-English forces. The numerical insufficiency of the French army necessitated that the movement be deferred somewhat, to the annoyance of the English, but the principal decision was retained and the important subject was decided on the spot by

direct agreement among the executing forces.

As for the transfer of the war into the Crimea the governments had different ideas. Napoleon III had had the idea in the back of his mind for a long time but in an unformed shape. He showed himself as hesitant. On the other hand, the intentions of the English government were particularly clear and distinct. It desired, with its traditional sense of what should be done, to destroy Russian naval power in the Black Sea. On June 29, 1854, it gave orders to Lord Raglan to undertake the siege of Sebastopol, anticipating the French government whose formal consent had not been obtained.

In the theater of operations, the principal subordinates showed dissimilar ideas. Lord Raglan bowed before the instructions from the cabinet in London although he had little confidence in the chances of success of the enterprise. Saint-Arnaud, who at first had thought of the Crimea recoiled later before the difficulties of an attack against this region. The Emperor delegated to him the making of the decision on the question but he saw no solution. The decision was made, as always, by a council of war which sat at Varna on July 18 and in which the allied generals and admirals participated. It decided unanimously for the Crimea. A reconnaissance was made and a new council of war which assembled at Baltchik on August 19 confirmed the first decision. "The resolution to make a descent on the shores of the Crimea was adopted", said Lord Raglan, "out of deference to the views of the British government and with the thoroughly understood consent of the Emperor Louis Napoleon." In short, after this crisis of uncertainty as to the direction the operations should take, it was the preeminent part taken by the British government which made the coalition succeed and gave the indispensable impulse.

In the initial execution of the Crimean offensive the antagonism of opinion showed itself. The French wanted to debark at Katcha in spite of the presence of the Russians; the English wanted to land at Eupatoria. It took no less than four councils of war either on the flagship of Saint-Arnaud or of Lord Raglan, as well as a supplementary reconnaissance, to decide on a landing place which was not very suitable - the debarkation at Old Fort, an intermediate point between Katcha and Eupatoria. The inactivity of the Russians fortunately permitted a successful outcome to this decision which would have been disastrous against another adversary.

After the death of Saint-Arnaud, his successor, Canrobert, maintained excellent relations with Lord Raglan. It is true that this was facilitated by a certain atmosphere of inaction or at least the absence of large enterprises. The siege of Sebastopol continued along routine lines without the use of any decided blows to hasten events. Councils of war tend to condone temporization and postpone the final assault.

It was during this period that the interference by the French government in the operations was the most marked. Napoleon III in Paris reorganized the army of the East according to his own ideas. He had it inspected by his confidential agents (General Niel, Major Fave) who were personal emissaries whose attitude and role were more or less regular. But there is always something of good in everything evil. They were one step nearer unity of command in the person of the Emperor himself. He obtained this from the English in the course of a trip to London, by a convention signed at Buckingham Palace on April 21, 1854. He soon gave up his idea of going himself to the Crimea but he persisted in trying to direct the military affairs from France.

In the theater of operations, the question arose of trying to get out of the stabilized situation before Sebastopol in order to strike a more serious blow at the enemy. One particularly interesting objective presented itself, the Sea of Azov. The occupation of this sea by the allied fleets, after the conquest of the Straits of Kertch, would hinder greatly the supply of the Russian army and would permit the allied forces to operate on its flank and against its communications by combined operations. To seize this opportunity and operate in this manner it was a question of getting two to agree, counting only the admirals, or four, including the generals, or six, if the governments were taken into consideration.

The establishment of this accord underwent many vicissitudes. Admiral Bruat conceived the idea of this operation in January, 1855. He broached the matter to the minister and to his colleague, Admiral Lyons, who fortunately was his friend and admirer. Convinced, Admiral Lyons won over Lord Raglan. The latter obtained the approval of the English government without difficulty because these amphibious operations, exploiting the mastery of the sea fit in perfectly with the British tradition. Then the generals and admirals undertook to get Canrobert on their side. This was accomplished in March after a certain number of interviews and conferences. It was agreed that 12,000 men would be devoted to the attack of Kertch in April. However, the effort decided upon against Sebastopol the 9th of April caused the postponement of this attack. After the repulse, the plans were taken up again. Canrobert approved them on April 26, somewhat half-heartedly, on the strong insistence of Lord Raglan. On April 30, the details were fixed after the examination of the results of a reconnaissance. On May 3, the expedition against Kertch started out.

They had figured without the French government. Rightly or wrongly, it did not approve. It ordered Canrobert by

telegram to reunite all his forces for a grand effort against Sebastopol. Canrobert in compliance with this order recalled the Kertch expedition at once, in spite of the protests of Lord Raglan. The English were much put out by this reversal and from it resulted the greatest bruise which the coalition suffered.

With Pelissier who relieved Canrobert a complete change came about in the attitude of the commander in chief. From the first Pelissier, a man of character, energetic and full of will power fought against the shackles which the French government had hampered Canrobert. He wanted to command and to have his liberty of action. He did not want to be held "on the paralyzing extremity of an electric wire". He achieved a reasonable degree of independence by means of the exchange of letters and telegrams which were rude at times and which legend has only slightly amplified.

Pelissier reestablished at once good relations with the English by taking up again the operation against Kertch, which had been previously interrupted. He did this not only to please his allies but also because he realized the importance and usefulness of this enterprise which extended the field of our strategic combinations by making available all the fruits of our mastery of the sea. Kertch was taken on May 24, the Strait of Ienakalch was forced and the Sea of Azov opened to the action of our ships. Nothing remained to be done to make our relations with the English excellent. Pelissier maintained them so by mixing equal doses of diplomacy and energy, cleverness and firmness. He obtained thus from his allies complete acquiescence to his principal idea which was to push to a successful conclusion the siege of Sebastopol. He established in this manner by the force of his personality his complete ascendance over Lord Raglan who appreciated in him his loyalty, his military capacity, his devotion to the common cause and his good comradeship. He followed without protesting and thus was established, although it was not so called, a sort of unity of command which simplified many things. Good feeling underwent perhaps somewhat of an eclipse with General Simpson, the successor to Lord Raglan, who, however, let himself be dragged into the general assault of September 8, which took Sebastopol. The complete and unreserved union was reestablished with General Codrington, who succeeded Simpson. And that is how it happened that there was confided to Pelissier, in spite of his brutality and even coarseness an unexpected mission as ambassador to London.

Pelissier maintained equally perfect relations, marked by the same cordial character, persuasiveness and authority with General La Marmora, commander of the Piedmont contingent. He was on poor terms only with the Russian Omer-Pasha, whose troops had played only a momentary and unimportant role in the

Crimea between their arrival from the Danube and their departure for Asia Minor.

The case of Pelissier is really the principal lesson to be gained from the Crimean war so far as our subject is concerned. When, in a coalition unity of command does not exist "in the primary degree", that is to say, among the combatant forces, it frequently happens that it will come about by itself due to the ascendancy and worth of one of the leaders, if the allies have the good fortune to have such a man. Unity of direction is thus practically realized in fact if not in theory, without any written agreement. "Experience proves that despite the governmental susceptibilities therefor a military authority will preempt the directing. Which one? That one which is under the leader who has the firmest character, with the best developed intellectual aptitudes and with the greatest prestige. Before such a general who stands out through his personal qualities the others tacitly efface themselves, especially when the danger is great or the responsibilities weigh heavily. In periods of crisis, troops, like mobs, rally to him whom they instinctively feel possesses the greatest moral strength, founded not only on technical worthiness but even more on character". (Lieutenant-Colonel Revol, the Vice of Coalitions, Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1923).

Inversely, when a coalition does not possess such a man, recognized by all, it will never realize these advantages by the aid of any written agreements. The unity of command thus erected will show itself inoperative in practice and dissensions will be more manifest than ever at the first serious circumstance.

It was under these much improved conditions that the allies had to make their last important decision on the conduct of operations, that which ended with the attack on Kinburn, the last turning point in the conduct of the war. The atmosphere

in which the allies were operating with respect to each other was much clarified by the preponderance of Pelissier and also - too much cannot be said for this - by the grand success of the recent taking of Sebastopol. If it is difficult to come to agreements in moments of uncertainty or adversity, it is equally true that victory puts everything in a better light, re-establishes good humor, optimism and inclines toward concessions.

After the taking of Sebastopol, the French and English governments wanted to exploit this advantage without delay by other operations. They desired, by common consent, to conquer the Crimea to the Isthmus of Perekop. The armies, however, were exhausted and Pelissier thought it impossible to demand this effort of them. Accordingly, London and Paris turned again to combined operations looking toward the Sea of Azov, the south coast of Crimea, Odessa, Kinburn and the Dnieper. The English inclined toward the bombardment of Odessa. Napoleon did not want to inflict attacks on private property on the Russians and leaned toward the attack of Kinburn and the blockade of the Dnieper which Admiral Bruat favored.

Bruat took into consideration the effect which would result from menacing the communications of the Russians in the Crimea from this side just as they were being menaced on the other side from the Sea of Azov. Strategically the idea was excellent. It had the approval of Pelissier and the English government let itself be persuaded easily. On September 26, eighteen days after the taking of Sebastopol, definite orders were issued in Paris. On October 17, Kinburn was taken. As slow as the reflexes of the coalition appear in this circumstance, there was nevertheless an evident progress by comparison with precedents of this type. Serious antagonisms had almost disappeared and the alliance ended with mutual relations much happier and more productive of results than they were when the alliance started.

The Coalition of 1914

1. Local Command.

Before the war of 1914, the Allies had made an undeniable effort to suitably regulate the question of naval command in a certain number of zones. It was logical and obligatory by reason of the nature of maritime war which causes forces belonging to different nations to cooperate in the same region.

The conventions agreed upon on this occasion between the allies were really new in more than one detail. They steadfastly envisioned a unity of command whereas theretofore arrangements of the same sort had always taken pains to specify clearly the absolute independence of the leaders who were collaborating. They were established for the most part some time in advance while usually they had not been drawn up until the moment of need. They had a defensive character in the final analysis, like the alliance which they represented, but which, in part at least, had not yet been formed. They were tied in to events of which the peoples concerned were not the masters. In many former cases, on the contrary, they corresponded to an initial offensive of these peoples directed toward the creation of desired circumstances. Finally they were subordinated to the alliance itself. The military contract became valid only if political accord was realized between the governments. (This was the case with England in regard to France and Russia.)

Let us review briefly these conventions. That of April 9, 1912, between France and Russia, treated of their future naval collaboration with the exception of waters of the Far East. It said nothing about the problem of command.

The French-English convention of January 23, 1913, regulated the defense of the Pas-de-Calais. The English navy was to supply 20 to 24 destroyers, 2 flotillas of submarines based on Dover and 4 small cruisers. The French navy was to furnish 2 flotillas of submarines based on Calais and Boulogne as well as some torpedo boats. Command was to be by the English.

The convention of February 10, 1913, between the same nations treated of the defense of the eastern Channel. France was to maintain in this sector, 6 armored cruisers, 2 protected cruisers, some auxiliary cruisers, 3 squadrons of destroyers, a squadron of torpedo boats, 3 squadrons of submarines. England was to aid these forces with 4 protected cruisers. The French were to have command.

In the China Sea, Admirals Jerram and Huguet signed an agreement on February 6, 1914 which, within the limits of the Far East, looked toward the joining of the two French armored cruisers with the English squadron, the commander to be the chief of the latter.

For the Mediterranean a project of naval cooperation was signed on March 31, 1913.

The 6th of August, 1914, upon the entry of England into the war, a last and important convention was concluded between England and France. It specified that the English should have the command and the direction of operations in all the seas other than the Mediterranean (exception being made in the eastern Channel whose status had been previously fixed). In the Mediterranean, command was to lie with the French (the commander in chief of the French naval force). The French forces were authorized to utilize Malta and Gibraltar as bases. They were to assure protection in all parts of the Mediterranean for French and English commerce. The commander in chief of the French forces was to have under his orders English forces to consist of 1 or 2 armored cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 16 destroyers and the mobile defenses of Malta and Gibraltar. Such were the solutions to the problem of interallied command which are always so delicate. They were to be submitted to the test of actual action.

In the distant seas, everything went on without friction or complications from the command point of view. The authority

of the English was admitted without argument. Everything facilitated its exercise. First, the French forces were but of little importance, numerically speaking, when compared to the British element, and command by the British naturally followed. Moreover, it facilitated the task of our ships by making available to them the entire system of installations of bases, supply facilities, repair utilities, information service and communications which the British had at their disposal. Finally, the enemy showed himself little in these theaters. Operations showed little activity except during the campaign against the German cruisers which took place during the latter half of 1914. Later, the cruisers Moewe, Wolf and Seeadler brought a little animation into these regions as did the enterprises of the submersible cruisers in the Atlantic. On account of all these exceptionally favorable reasons the interallied relations experienced only insignificant shadows and unity of action, although its results were not always happy, was constantly assured.

In the Pas de Calais region French subordination to the English command brought on no difficulty.

In the eastern part of the Channel the system already planned began to function along the lines defined by the agreement of February 10, 1913, the patrol being maintained by the navies of the two nations under a French commander. For diverse reasons pertaining to the general operations this patrol presently had to be made up only of light cruisers and at certain times, it was impossible to keep it up to the strength planned at the beginning. In October, 1914, the line of surveillance was divided, the two halves, English and French, becoming independent of each other, although both of them were under French command. This authority was so little respected that it was noticed in July, 1915, that the English ships had ceased holding the portion of the line which had been assigned to them. The agreement of 1913 had thus become vitiated by the action

of our allies. In this sector the unity of command had lasted scarcely a year.

A little later, on November 2, 1915, the necessities of submarine warfare required the sending of 12 torpedo boats and 33 French trawlers into the Mediterranean and the weakness of our forces in the North led us to ask England to extend its zone of surveillance in the Channel and consequently its area of command. A new agreement was concluded with England on December 15, 1915. What remained of light French elements, constituting the "fleet of the Eastern Channel and the North Sea" was placed under a French commander. This latter was naturally a subordinate of the English Admiral at Dover (commandant of the Dover Patrol), because the English abandoned in no way their privilege of command in the Pas de Calais, which they retained from the convention of January 23, 1913, and which extended geographically from Dunkirk to Cape Gris-Nez.

To sum up, the English found themselves emancipated by the march of events from their subordination in the only sector outside the Mediterranean where French command had been instituted by mutual consent.

It was to be the same thing in the Mediterranean. In this theater the British attitude was partly the cause of the progressive crumbling of the authority originally conceded to France by the agreement of August 6, 1914. It brought about continual inconveniences for us.

We saw above the terms of the arrangement between the allies which gave the sole command in the Mediterranean to the commander of the French naval force. The text was somewhat ambiguous because, while it put certain light English forces under the orders of this admiral, it reserved the real independence of the British battle cruisers operating along the shores, which should have been required to act in concert. (For details see: Lieutenant Thierry d'Argenlieu, Organization

of the Command in the Mediterranean, Naval War College, 1921). In the month of November, 1914, matters were complicated by the entry of Turkey into the War, which created unforeseen theaters of operations: the Dardanelles, Syria and Egypt. The French navy wanted to create for these, subordinate commands, some French, some English, but always subordinate to the French commander in chief. However, the British Admiralty, which undertook in January 1915 a great effort at the Dardanelles, demanded that the command in this sector should be confided to a British vice-admiral. (Letter of January 27, 1915). It was made to appear by a sophistical artifice that the agreement of August 6, 1914, did not foresee the war with Turkey and that now it was a new situation. France accepted. She also agreed that the Egyptian sector should be under an independent English vice-admiral. She kept only the command of the coast of Syria. Finally, in February, 1915, three new sectors were created: the Dardanelles, Syria, Egypt, and two of them were practically outside the authority of the French commander in chief, although the English, by a sort of platonic fiction, continued to regard him as the director general of operations in the Mediterranean.

Next, Italy entered the coalition in May, 1915. The English-French-Italian agreement of May 10 decided upon the creation of a "First Allied Fleet" (the Italian fleet reenforced with French and British elements) based on Brindisi and Tarento, the ranking French Admiral commanding only the "Second Allied Fleet". Furthermore, a very important arrangement, the Italian commander in chief had complete control of the operations in the Adriatic. Accordingly, then, there was created a new theater of operations, entirely withdrawn from the French commander in chief. This latter saw successively removed, either in fact or in theory, the Dardanelles, Egypt, the Adriatic. There remained to him only the protection of the communications in the Mediterranean and a role practically of commander of the

reserve (the French forces) in case of a sortie by the Austrians out of the Adriatic.

By the agreement of July 13, 1915, the English fleet of the Dardanelles, now become the Aegean Fleet, extended its zone of operations to the line: Samos-Nikaria-Euboea under the command of the British vice admiral Robeck. In May 1916 the Ministry of Marine retaliated by withdrawing from this sector the Third French Squadron which up to then had been under the orders of the English admiral.

Serious frictions began to appear. Our commander in chief announced his right to command what was left of his functions, that is to say, the protection of the communications (patrols against submarines). He did not want to recognize the independence of the subordinate allied admirals in this domain. The conference of the admirals at Malta (2-9 March, 1916) of the type of the good old fashioned councils of war worked up an agreement painfully. At the same time difficulties arose with the Italians with reference to the removing of the French torpedo boats for the escorts to Salonika, then the evacuation of the Serbs on Corfu, which caused the intervention of French ships in the Adriatic. These difficulties came up again on the subject of transporting the Serbian army from Corfu to Salonika, of pursuing an enemy submarine, of blocking Otranto, etc.

The increase of intensity of the submarine warfare caused another conference among the allied admirals, that of Corfu (April 28, 1917). From this there resulted, so far as our subject is concerned, the creation of a "general direction of the Mediterranean routes" which was confied to Vice Admiral Calthorpe, who commanded the British forces in that sea. He was to exercise a complete centralization on all questions of the protection of traffic against submarines, which up to that time had been left too much to the executing forces of the

various nations. Theoretically, Admiral Calthorpe was subordinate to the French commander; practically, he enjoyed a semi-independence.

The commander in chief had undergone one more amputation; he now commanded only the main body of the French forces stationed at Corfu. As a matter of fact, unity of command no longer existed; it had disappeared little by little. Matters came to such a pass that in May, 1918, the English proposed to their allies, in order to cut short the French-Italian difficulties, the nomination of an "admiralissimo" for the Mediterranean. It is sufficient to say that the former one had disappeared. The British cabinet proposed the name of Jellicoe. The choice was fortunate. It was thought that "the man" indispensable as always, had been found. Admiral Jellicoe was the perfect gentleman, loyal, in good standing with everyone, in spite of the fact that his professional reputation had been somewhat diminished and tarnished by his failing to win the battle of Jutland. France accepted the proposition, which filled the cup of her renunciations to overflowing. On the other hand, Italy refused to submit in the Adriatic to the English and the matter rested there.

Our commander in chief had only one satisfaction which came somewhat later: the constitution at Moudros in June 1918, of an interallied squadron designed to oppose the sortie of a Turkish-Russian fleet which was thought to be under German command. This squadron was placed under the command of a French vice-admiral. We regained the command in the Aegean Sea.

It was this situation, however, which gave rise to our final humiliation. On October 9, 1918, the British admiralty sent Admiral Calthorpe, the commander of the English forces in the Mediterranean to Moudros, to negotiate an armistice with Turkey and to proceed with final operations from this direction. It claimed for him the command in this sector, contrary to the

situation defined in June for the Aegean Sea, but all the while acknowledging his nominal subordination to the French commander in chief. The French government after a slight resistance gave in again. The French admiral commanding the squadron of Moudros received the order to recognize Admiral Calthorpe as his superior commander. Admiral Calthorpe took over the command in the Aegean Sea, absorbed the French forces as subordinates and regulated by himself the armistice with the Turks and their return to Constantinople. At this time, by a bitter and involuntary irony, the Minister of Marine telegraphed to our pretended commander in chief, "It is well understood that in your capacity as commander in chief of the allied forces in the Mediterranean, you will exercise the direction of operations in all Mediterranean waters with the exception of the Adriatic". This is, briefly summed up, the sad story of the French command in the Mediterranean and its setbacks, which we have collected.

As a matter of fact, it is quite the rule that such disagreements should arise in a coaltion, especially since it is rare to find a member of as good a disposition as was France in the present case. The organization of command touches too close to politics, to the special interests of the various peoples and to national susceptibilities for matters to be otherwise. It is just as Proudhon wrote: "By virtue of the laws of force, every power is by nature hostile to others and in a state of war with them. Association, like subjection, is repugnant. The interior organization is opposed to encroachment; it tends with all its force toward absolute independence and shows all the more jealousy of its autonomy according as its relations with its neighbors are numerous and frequent." (Proudhon, War and Peace, 1861, Vol. III Chapter IX.)

Moreover, the French command owed to its own poor organization the fact that it was beaten down and ruined by its allies from the point of view of unity of command. The French commander

in chief was actually the commander of our naval forces and not, as he should have been, the commander of the Mediterranean theater of operations, planning for all the coalition commanders, including our own principal combat group. His functions as the commander of our naval force, of an essentially tactical character, absorbed him completely and did not leave him time to see the ensemble, to consider and regulate the many problems which arose from Gibraltar to Port Said and the Dardanelles. That was his misfortune and the reason why the distant sectors escaped from him. We will come back later to this important question.

The Coalition of 1914

2. Central Command

All which has been discussed before - negotiations, agreements, conventions, actual practice - concerns only the local command in the various theaters. Much more grave and vital, naturally, was the organization of the central command destined to actuate the forces of the coalition in the different regions and to unite into a common impulse the directing heads of the allied fleets.

What were these heads, the principal ones, at any rate? On the English side it was the Admiralty, the soul of operations, very strongly made up, very much centralized, too much so, in fact; in a word, a vigorous mind .

On the French side we find the Ministry of Marine, which took over, or rather, took over again, the direction of operations in the various theaters. It exercised this direction only nominally because its general staff was poorly organized for the purpose. This staffin practice left the conduct of hostilities, properly speaking, to the executing forces; it limited itself to the transmission of information and to preparing the necessary means. Furthermore, beginning in 1917, the creation of the "Direction of the Submarine Warfare",

administered by an undersecretary, brought in a two-headed arrangement, a duplication of chiefs of staff, charged respectively with surface warfare and submarine warfare, and both of them practicing through operating by delegation the same absentee methods in the matter of operations. Before insisting on unity of command for the coalition they should have practiced it at home! (On this dualism see my article "Staff Questions" Vol. I, pp 241-244).

On the Italian side, the high command was exercised according to rule by the chief of the navy general staff. Actually, at first, during a large part of the war, it was the Duke of Abruzzi, then later by the chief of the general staff, Admiral Thaon di Revel.

Among these three heads there was no bond of subordination. A central unity of command did not exist.

We come back, then, to the well-known system of councils of war, these including this time the directing heads in place of the executing commanders. They were at first occasional reunions known under the new name of interallied conferences. Later, from 1917 on, the group was called "The Interallied Naval Council". We shall examine successively by bringing out in relation to their subjects the organization of the command function and the operations ordered by these Aulic councils.

The Paris conference (December 7, 1915) inaugurated the series of central interallied conferences. It decided upon the division of the Mediterranean into zones of surveillance, the arming of commercial shipping and navigation only upon recommended routes.

The London conference (May 6, 1916) decreed the surveillance of the Atlantic against raiders, the division of the French forces, the liaison of the French and English patrols and the reenforcement of the blockade of Otranto.

The London conference (January 23, 1917) took up the division of the allied tonnage and the affairs in the Mediterranean. In this sea it revised the zones of surveillance; it tried out various systems of lines of communication; it reenforced the blockade of Otranto; it withdrew from Tarentum the four English cruisers which were there.

The Paris conference (July 24, 1917) was a continuation of the conference held by the admirals at Corfu described above. The Americans who had recently entered the war figured for the first time on the side of the allies. This meeting concerned itself once more with the blockade of Otranto. It authorized the creation of a general direction of the routes in the Mediterranean, decided upon the organization of a center of operations at Gibraltar against submarines and for the protection of the American convoys in European waters.

The London conference (September 4, 1917) looked into the method of employment of the American forces. It decided upon a generalization of the system of convoys. It foresaw the possibility of offensive action against submarine bases. The English admitted that there were some in the North Sea; the Italians refused to believe that there were any in the Adriatic.

The Rome conference (November 20, 1917) was motivated by a request for supplementary maritime assistance on the part of Italy, which after the defeat of Caporetto and the retreat on the Piave, was afraid of a landing on the coast of Rimini. Some reenforcements were given Italy.

The conference of Paris (November 29, 1917) was notable for closing the series of interallied conferences, properly speaking, and for instituting to replace them a permanent institution - The Interallied Naval Council (C.N.I.)(Conseil Naval Interallie).

I was present at this conference as a modest sloop captain, at a little table in a corner with three comrades, secretaries

like myself, and I can see those present as though they were still before my eyes.

The first session was held November 29 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. Most of the time was devoted to setting up the Inter-allied Naval Council. Then in a single hour there was gone over with a disconcerting speed and superficiality five other very important questions concerning the situation of the submarine warfare, the arming of commercial shipping, the coal crisis, the blockade and the division of the tonnage which had not been sunk. Even though each of these should have had several sessions for its consideration and study, the conference only touched on them in the most casual way.

As for the blockade, the French chief of staff propounded the bizarre question, "Are the Allies resolved to intensify the blockade measures?" The others raised their heads, then acquiesced apparently. Oh, yes, they wanted to intensify it. And that was about all.

The next day, November 30, from 11:45 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. the time was passed in reading and composing in great detail the communication which was to be made to the press relative to the creation of the C.N.I. Then the conferees interrupted the proceedings to attend the luncheon tendered them by the Minister of Marine which was the only substantial outcome of the session.

In the afternoon from 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., having taken on new life, the delegates returned to work and took up with the same rapidity as the day before the last four questions brought up for discussion. These were the patrolling of the Atlantic, the possibilities of a sortie by the German cruisers, the duration of the rotation of commercial ships and the protection of the convoys.

I was stupified by the lack of result of these deliberations in the course of which no interesting idea, no clear view

relative to the conduct of the war was evolved. No decision was made; they were no further advanced than before and the whole thing from one end to the other was an ineffectual exchange of words from which there resulted little. It was the first interallied conference I had ever seen and I was somewhat embarrassed by it.

However, it did produce one result; the creation of the Interallied Naval Council, an organization which assured from then on the permanence and regularity of contacts of this sort and it only remained to hope that they would be less sterile.

The C.N.I., formed of allied admirals, was, according to its constituting act, "to watch over the conduct of naval warfare and coordinate the action on the sea". It did not have any authority to make decisions as to operations. The projects which it prepared and which required the unanimous vote of the members were to be submitted for the approval of the governments who alone had the right to take positive action. The Council was to be simply "informed" of the execution of the plans if they were approved by the cabinets. Also, the general staffs and the commanders in chief of each navy were responsible for the conduct of operations, not to the Council but to their respective governments. The C.N.I. was accordingly only a caricature of unity of command; it lacked everything which made for one head and one chief.

The first C.N.I. was held in London January 22 and 23, 1918. It examined the possibility of the utilization by the Germans of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. It took up the question of submarine warfare, of the protection of convoys in the Atlantic against the German submersible cruisers, of the blockade of Otranto, of the reconstitution of tonnage by salvage, of the repair and construction of commercial shipping. A conference arising from this C.N.I. met at Rome on February 8 and 9 to study the Mediterranean questions. At this conference Italy

produced a memorandum showing the danger of an action by cruisers in the Adriatic and asking for the reenforcement of its light vessels by American and Japanese ships.

The second C.N.I. also took place in London the 12, 13 and 14 of March, 1918. It took up again the question of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. It considered the corollary questions of submarine warfare, the use by submarines of neutral waters, the employment of the American submarine chasers, the reconstitution of the tonnage of the merchant marine. On this last point it considered the possibility of requisitioning idle Dutch shipping for the use of the United States. The council ruled also on various requests of Italy as to light ships and supplies. It became interested for the first time in the propositions made by the Americans in view of new operations to be undertaken to push the war. We will speak of these later. Finally, the Council established an efficacious liaison with the "Superior Interallied Council of War" which had been going on at Versailles since December, 1917. From all of this there resulted a vague coordination of land and naval operations which, taken all in all, had considerable value.

The third C.N.I. took place in Paris on April 26 and 27, 1918. There was more worry than ever over the Russian fleet from the Black Sea being re-outfitted by the Germans and put into action in the Mediterranean. It decided to reenforce the Aegean Sea squadron with six French cruisers. But, as it indicated the desire to replace these six cruisers at Corfu with Italian cruisers from Tarentum, this idea brought about difficulties with Italy. The latter acquiesced only in principle with the proposed movement; it refused to agree to sending a French force into the Aegean; it suggested that the reenforcements to be sent into the Mediterranean should be furnished by England or the United States. The admiral, Thaon de Revel, did not want his cruisers to go out of Tarentum nor did he want them

used in an operation against the German-Turkish force. Before this incomprehensible opposition the C.N.I. could not arrive at any agreement. The matter was continued and there was an attempt to treat with the governments. On April 29 the French minister of marine requested the president of the council to use his good offices with the cabinet at Rome so that Italian cruisers might be despatched to Corfu at once. On May 8, Signor Orlando approved with certain restrictions as to the command. May 20, Admiral Thaon de Revel refused once more. On May 21 our ambassador at Rome tried in vain to overcome this strange resistance of the Quirinal. Tired of the bickering, the struggle was abandoned and the French cruisers went into the Aegean Sea without being replaced at Corfu.

At the same time, Italy would not consider putting into common use all the Mediterranean arsenals of the allies which were capable of repair work. In short, Italy wanted to limit her risks, did not want to participate in operations outside her habitual sector, nor admit either command or control, allied or interallied, etc. These were the conceptions and ideas which resulted finally in the idea of confiding to a British admiral the functions of the admiralissimo in the Mediterranean.

The fourth C.N.I. took place in London June 11 and 12. It originated the project of an expedition to Murmansk and one to Archangel to assure the defense of these points against a general German-Finnish attack. Then it returned to the question of the sortie of the German fleet out of the Black Sea. Italy continued to maintain its point of view as to the despatch of cruisers to Corfu. She consented grudgingly to the taking of ten French destroyers from the blockade of Otranto to reenforce the squadron in the Aegean Sea and consented only then on consideration that it was a loan. She objected to the French chief calling upon the light English forces at Otranto in case of necessity. She vetoed absolutely any interallied

control of the shipyards. On the contrary she insisted that a larger proportion of merchant tonnage should be alloted her. The attitude of the Italians was such that Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty, gathered together after the conference was over, the English, American and French members to examine the situation which might result and to ask themto request the intervention of their governments with the Italian government. He addressed a note on this subject to the Prime Minister of England.

Accordingly, on account of this unfavorable attitude, the C.N.I. did not assemble again for three months. We find it again in Paris, gathered together for the fifth time the 13th and 14th of September, 1918. It took up again although to a lesser degree than before the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and the defense of Murmansk and Archangel. Then it passed to the operations of the enemy submarines in Spanish waters, to the assignment of the American submarine chasers, to the establishment of a mine sweeping service in Brazil, to questions of tonnage, to the situation in Albania, to the transport of American troops in the Mediterranean in 1919, etc. There is nothing remarkable to be noted in its activity.

The sixth C.N.I. took place in Paris and Versailles from the 28th of October to the 4th of November, 1918. It deliberated the naval clauses of the armistice to be imposed on the Central Powers. Its proposals were later reduced by the Superior Council of War which wanted them less rigorous and which desired especially that the enemy vessels turned over should be interned in a neutral port. It was only at the seventh and last meeting of the C.N.I. in London the 13th of November, that, upon the proposal of the British Admiralty, it was decided to intern the German ships at Scapa Flow.

The C.N.I. was dissolved May 18, 1919.

It rendered its services. Lacking a central unity of command, it maintained among the Allies, even as the Interallied Conferences which preceded it, a necessary contact. It obliged the various members of the coalition to consider and study together certain eventualities and possibilities of the future. Without the individualistic tendencies of Italy and her special strategic views, it would have brought the nations of the Entente into a comparative agreement of opinion. On the other hand, its procedure, like all analagous organizations was desperately long. A unanimous vote being necessary to adopt a resolution, an understanding was rarely possible. It was necessary all the time to refer to the governments. Finally, the C.N.I. had no power of decision. It was only a consulting organ, a sort of technical councillor which left the naval commander of each nation, central and local, responsible to its government and not to the C.N.I., for the conduct of the operations which were imposed upon him. The coordination of efforts was very imperfectly assured.

What is particularly striking when we examine the deliberations of the C.N.I. or the Interallied Conferences is the negative and passive pace which they impressed on the conduct of operations. Aside from the proposals of the United States, to which we will refer again, there was nothing positive, active, energetic or creative which came out of these discussions. On the sea, the coalition submitted. It defended itself. It parried the blows, after a fashion, never going beyond the protective measures of the antisubmarine warfare and the safeguarding of its merchant marine.

In general during the greatest part of the war it completely lost the initiative of operations. Every act outside of ordinary routine and leading to a decisive effort requires, in the absence of a unified command, a unanimous accord which does not exist and it is just this lack of power to imagine, to create, to carry through which constitutes the congenital vice of alliances.

The Coalition of 1914

3. Positive Decisions

The coalition, however, experienced crises, outbursts of energy, attempts to gain the initiative, efforts to break down the equilibrium, to start things going again, to gain the decision or at least to contribute vigorously to that end. Along this line there may be cited as touching more or less on naval matters: the Dardanelles expedition, the offensives of the British in Palestine and Mesopotamia, the bottling up of Zeebrugge and Ostend and finally the great American projects of 1918. (Later on we will touch, in much detail, in connection with the strategy of combined operations, on the Dardanelles, Salonika, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. They are considered at this point only from the coalition point of view.)

The idea of the attack on the Dardanelles was the product of the British government. The Admiralty itself was the principal progenitor. In the Admiralty, one man ran everything in his own way, according to his own views and gave the attack the form which was dear to him - Mr. Winston Churchill. He was a strong personality. Impetuous character, indomitable will, energy and unlimited imagination, he had, morally, everything which goes to make up a man of war. Unfortunately he lacked that military and technical knowledge without which these psychological virtues are useless and even dangerous. At any rate, he cannot be accused of sitting complacently by in the period of inaction which the coalition underwent for so many long months and doing nothing to break it up. Just the reverse might be said of him; his brain was bubbling with too many original ideas, too many

"wild cat plans" as Kitchener put it.

He was considering at the same moment the project of an offensive in the Baltic, to which the taking of the island of Borkum was to be a prelude, a decisive action off the coast of Belgium and finally a complete action in the Orient. He dreamed of an attack on the Dardanelles. At the War Council on November 25, 1914 he developed his plan and ran against Kitchener who wanted to debark at Alexandretta, attempting only a surprise attack. The insistence of Mr. Churchill began to win over the English directing authorities to a combined operation in the eastern Mediterranean. Sir Maurice Hankey, the secretary of the war council on December 28 proposed an attack on Turkey. Mr. Lloyd George on January 1, 1915 showed by a memorandum the necessity for action in Serbia. The entire British government was presently convinced of the impossibility of a decision on the western front and wanted to attempt the decision on the eastern front.

There remained, however, much resistance to be overcome. Kitchener was agreeable to an attack on the Dardanelles but only in the form of a simple naval demonstration; he said that no troops could be spared for it. Admiral Fisher was of the opinion that a complete combined operation should be tried there with both troops and naval vessels. On the contrary, Mr. Churchill persisted in his own personal idea that a naval attack by itself would overcome the Turkish defenses. He disregarded the opposition which he encountered in his nearby collaborators and by telegrams expressing his own inclinations exercised in his favorite way a pressure on Admiral Carden who was in command before the Dardanelles. On

the other hand, the allied generals on the western front looked with disfavor upon an attempt being considered in the east. Marshal French disapproved it formally. General Joffre found it premature. (January 9) At last the War Council on January 8, 1915, declared itself as opposed, for the moment at least, to any operation of this sort.

This seemed, then, to be the end of the projects of Mr. Churchill. He did not consider himself beaten, however, and returned to the battle. January 13, he had the satisfaction of inducing the War Council to sanction the preparation of the naval attack. He converted the French Minister of Marine, M. Augagneur, to his idea, in the course of a visit which the latter made to London. Without exactly asking any help, Mr. Churchill let it be known that the participation of the French forces which were in that vicinity would be agreeable to him and that he would welcome them cordially. He was less fortunate with reference to the Russians who declined the invitation for the time being.

Still all the opposition in the English navy was not yet overcome. Admirals Jellicoe and Fisher, better cognizant of the limits of the powers of naval vessels, criticized the purely naval attack. Mr. Churchill replied to their arguments on January 27. At the War Council on January 28, in spite of the disapproving attitude of Admiral Fisher and somewhat of a scene created by him, Mr. Churchill maneuvered skillfully during the recess, obtained the support of all the members for a naval attack and came off victorious.

A little later, however, he allowed himself to be converted by Admirals Jellicoe and Fisher of the necessity of supporting this naval attack with troops, these having

the secondary role of occupation of points already covered by the fire of the ships. He obtained the division of General d'Amade from the French government. He persuaded the War Council to assign him the 29th British division but had a struggle to get Kitchener to actually despatch the division whose orders were issued, suspended, but finally carried out.

There was the same personal action by Mr. Churchill at the time of the final crisis. He made use of his personal authority to hurry Admiral Carden into action. He ordered him not to wait for the arrival of the troops. After the severe set-back of March 18 he still pushed Admiral de Robeck, successor to Carden, to renew the naval attack.

Thus from one end to the other, the Dardanelles affair demonstrates, in the series of the decisions of the coalition as to the conduct of operations, the preeminence of the British government over the other allies, and, from an interior British point of view, the preeminence of the Admiralty and to go further, the ascendancy of a single man, Mr. Churchill, over the other members or instruments of the British government. He accomplished in this case, to a certain degree, an actual unity of command both central and local at the same time. It was, however, the product of an isolated initiative on the part of one of the allies - a sort of coup on his part, a proceeding which might bring about in itself very grave inconveniences. Accordingly, from the middle of 1915, thought was given to establishing the necessary cooperation to avoid these by means of political and military interallied conferences. Besides, in 1916, the War Council was

replaced by the War Cabinet, where the influence of the Admiralty was less exclusive and less preponderant. The functioning of this little coalition, purely British, was improved as was the functioning of the larger coalition.

The Salonika campaign, in which the navy became so deeply involved by the creation of an important line of communications, was, on the other hand, the result of personal conceptions of the French government. The original idea of the maneuver was that of a diversion to the Dardanelles affair by means of an action to be undertaken on the coast of Asia. The government put this question up to General Joffre at the end of April, 1915 and he replied (letters of July 29 and August 3) that this desirable operation could not be undertakon without a preliminary reconnaissance and until the completion of the offensive in France planned for September. Then the government appointed General Sarrail the independent chief of the eastern army and urged General Joffre to furnish him the necessary forces up to four divisions. After several discussions with the commander in chief on the French front the government persisted in its resolution to operate in the East with the effectives and in the manner planned. It was necessary to obtain the support of the British high command and government. This was the object of the Calais conference, September 11, 1915. The British agreed, but half-heartedly.

On September 14, the French government reissued its orders to General Joffre which brought out from him the strong reservations which he expressed in his letters of September 20 and 26.

However, on account of the entry of Bulgaria into the war on the enemy side, the enterprise planned for the Dardanelles changed suddenly. There were debarked at Salonika, as a start, two divisioms, one French and the other British, taken from the Gallipoli peninsula. This was not enough and it was necessary to bring the effectives up to 150,000 men, a number equal to that which Serbia, according to its treaty with Greece, was to place alongside the Greek troops against Bulgaria. Here is where the difficulties commenced. General Joffre declared on October 4 that he could furnish only two divisions of infantry and two of cavalry and he advised that the complement of the expeditionary corps should be requested of England. The latter, impressed by its defeat at the Dardanelles, did not want to become engaged in the east again; England wanted to withdraw from the affair and persuade the French government to renounce it. To induce England to change its opinion it was necessary for the French Minister of War, M. Millerant to go to London (October 18). General Joffre, on his side, worked on Marshal French and General Murray who had come to confer with him (October 25).

It was impossible to arrive at an agreement. Moreover, the disaster of the Serbs, who were thrown back for the most part toward the coast of Albania and cut off from Salonika, darkened the picture. The English government still thought that there was nothing to be gained at Salonika.

General Joffre had to go to London and lay out energetically before the War Council on October 29 the necessity for English cooperation. The meeting was stormy. New efforts had to be made in the course of

the month of November. Twice, November 6 and 17, British ministers came to Paris and indicated their hesitation and their desire to stop the proceedings. Our government had to inspire them, comfort them and convince them. It ended up by assuring the debarkation at Salonika of four new British divisions, with certain limitations as to the operations to be undertaken.

Was the British support definite? Not yet. On December 4 at the Calais conference, the members of the British government declared again that the "maintenance at Salonika of an expeditionary corps was useless and dangerous." They asked an evacuation, which, if not immediate, should be in the near future and they insisted that a decision along this line should be taken. The military representatives of England at the conference of commanders at Chantilly (December 6, 7 and 8) upheld this same point of view and they consented, provisionally, only to the organization of an entrenched camp at Salonika. On December 9, the British ministers who had come to Paris to confirm the decisions made at Chantilly announced the same idea, abandoned their demand for evacuation and accepted the temporary maintenance of the allied forces at Salonika behind fortified positions. Later, the difficulties were to arise again from 1916 to 1918, when it was a question of taking up active operations outside the fortifications.

The affair of Salonika - which we have not fully discussed as yet - belongs to the type of positive resolutions, taken in the hope of great results on the initiative of only one of the allied governments which achieves only by a hard struggle the consent and collaboration of its allies to initiate the expedition and then to push it. In this case there is

unity of impulsion if not of command. The French government adopted in this circumstance toward the British government the attitude which the latter had had toward France in the matter of the Dardanelles. In both cases one of the allied nations was the aggressor and led the other along.

The Palestine offensive which was commenced by the British in 1916 and which obtained decisive results as it proceeded does not come quite within the preceding category. Here, in effect, the British government had a free hand. It operated in its personal sector. The question of coalition did not arise or arose only indirectly in those instances where the allies of England thought that the effort might be more profitable elsewhere. (This divergence of views actually occurred only among the English themselves. Mr. Lloyd George was an ardent advocate of the offensive in Palestine and the general staff of the British army advised strongly against it. Reference this see the work of Marshal Robertson: "General Conduct of the War" Chapter XI. French translation by Payot, 1929). In Palestine, the British acted with their own means and did not have need of any help. Far from desiring our help (given them in very feeble strength) they tolerated it with poor enough grace so as not to run contrary to our views concerning Syria and to maintain in appearance the moral unity of the alliance.

The same observation may be made with reference to the offensive in Mesopotamia, started in November, 1914, on the instigation of the government of India and the Minister for India (India Office) and pursued with

unrelenting tenacity until 1917. There was a detached sector, essentially English, which scarcely interested the rest of the coalition at all and where only British effectives were engaged.

This characteristic was amplified again when it comes to this other creative stroke which consisted of the attacks of Zeebrugge and Ostend. In this case, not only was the British government at complete liberty but the Admiralty itself was free as far as the government was concerned, and the conception and execution of the affair were conducted by it alone. The operation was actually solely naval; it required only maritime means; it was not a combined operation in the usual meaning of the term because it did not require land forces. The coalition did not enter into this operation and this is certainly one of the reasons why the enterprise was conducted with such vigor.

The influence of the United States in the councils of the coalition in 1918 is worthy of the highest interest. The United States intervened more and more energetically in the conduct of operations, aided the allies, converted them to the idea of large and audacious enterprises, and, in a word, took the lead in the domain of imagination and conception.

At the second C.N.I. (March 12, 13, 14, 1918) the Americans proposed some singularly hardy resolutions.

Their Memorandum 48 proposed the reenforcement of the Grand Fleet with Japanese and American ships, the attack of enemy bases, a considerable extension of the mine barrages, by taking if necessary, in the North Sea, a base in Norway. Memorandum 49 had to do with the Adriatic. It indicated the necessity of isolating Cattaro, by

occupying a Dalmatian island between Curzola and Sabioncello and then attacking this port by surprise from the sea. It offered cruisers and a landing force of Americans to put the affair through.

The C.N.I., astonished, and little accustomed to such language approved in principle.

In March England began the planting of the immense mine field in the North Sea. Beginning with July the United States took part in this. The attacks on Zeebrugge and Ostend took place in April.

The military councillors of the Superior War Council declared (April 8) that it was impossible for the moment to devote any troops to the Cattaro operation but that it would continue to study the project. The fourth C.N.I. (June 11 and 12, 1918) examined the preliminary report of one of its commissions relative to the occupation of a Dalmatian island but decided to defer the operation.

At the meeting of delegates of the C.N.I. at London July 23, the Americans brought up the question of the fight against submarines in the Mediterranean and proposed squarely to reduce them to impotence by the installation of gigantic mine barrages. The first was to be laid across the Straits of Otranto from the Italian coast to Corfu; the second would complete the obstructions of the Dardanelles; the third was to be established across the Aegean Sea, from the Island of Eubea to the Island of Samos; the fourth would interdict the passage between Cape Bon and Sicily. There was even talk of barring the Straits of Gibraltar. These barrages, 450 meters wide, were to be put in place by the United States, which, for this purpose would equip a base in the Mediterranean.

The C.N.I. in September, 1918 adopted these propositions with trifling variations.

On October 16, the United States chose Bizerta as a base and started its installation. However, on November 8, as a result of the armistice with Austria following those concluded with Bulgaria and Turkey, the Americans suspended mine planting in the Mediterranean, which was then useless, and concentrated their efforts on the North Sea.

The great project of the United States was therefore not carried through; it is probable that its execution would have almost completely paralyzed the enemy submarines in the Mediterranean. The problem would have been solved in conformity to the offensive views developed by the Americans at the second C.N.I. and finally imposed upon their allies. The latter, in fact, did not have the material resources to carry through such a plan, and even if they had had them, it is doubtful if their ambition would have been raised to such a height. The measures planned give an idea of the vast extent of the American conceptions, of their creative power and of the influence which the United States ended up by taking in the naval councils of the coalition.

These diverse facts show, as a whole, that unity of command in an alliance, when it is not defined along hard and fast lines has a tendency to establish itself to a certain extent anyway, when, as Archduke Charles has said, "one state by its preponderant influence arrogates unto itself the right to make its opinion prevail and to bend its allies to its will".

When the different members of the coalition are of approximately the same importance this phenomenon does not generally occur except at intervals. It occurs

principally in the making of important positive decisions from which vast changes in the course of events are hoped for. This is what happened for the most part in the Entente from 1914 to 1918.

When one of the nations is much superior to its associates in number, in military power, economically or financially, or in military aptitude, its preponderance becomes semi-permanent. Thus Germany continuously practically directed the destiny of the enemy coalition during the war, subordinating right to the final break-up, in spite of frequent disagreements, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey.

It is for this reason that the fact of alliance with a much stronger nation includes besides the evident advantages, some material inconveniences. The weaker nation is never sure of not seeing some of its interests sacrificed during the conduct of the war and the peace negotiations and of not being swamped and absorbed in the wash of its overpowering ally.

It is not safe to live too near a colossus.

The United States, which in 1918, was beginning to give a personal impulsion to the naval warfare, was also in line at this time to take over a preeminent place in the land warfare. Thrown into the conflict with a ferocious energy, they had made their dispositions to put into the line, in 1919, a minimum of 100 divisions. Moreover, their human, economic and financial power arrived at the right time to relieve the fatigue of the coalition, very comprehensible after four years of hard struggle. The Americans appeared first as saviours and then as masters. Thanks to them, success was sure but it threatened to be entirely their affair with all the con-

sequences which this would entail. In 1918, the victory might still be an allied victory; in 1919 it would have been an American victory with numerous and troubling corollaries. If President Wilson was slightly embarrassing to the Peace Conference of 1919, what would he have been in 1920? Thus is explained the point of view of his allies on this subject. Mr. Wickham Steed has even stated that the French military authorities, worried about the future, accorded the armistice somewhat prematurely to the Germans in order to avoid ending up in 1919 in a situation full of grave dangers. I doubt this strongly because the decision, at this time, would have been secured with a short delay and this danger avoided. But I have heard said from some one who was an intimate collaborator of Marshal Foch during this period that the generalissimo pushed the battle of France with particular energy in order to secure success before the end of 1918 on account of the reasons developed above. This version, much more likely, goes back to the same idea and shows the same train of thought.

In like manner, if Russia had been properly prepared for war and well directed, it is probable that the immense resources which she had at her disposal would have given her great successes right from the beginning of the war, successes which would have brought victory about in 1915 or 1916. The Muscovite giant would have perhaps reached to Berlin and Vienna, and, in the peace negotiations it would not have been easy to dislodge her. If, in the course of time, the Russian social cataclysm had occurred we might perhaps today see all of Central Europe and part of our continent subjugated to Asiatic domination and converted to communism, with the rest waiting their

turn to be contaminated and devoured. Can this picture be imagined? The objection might be raised doubtless that the revolutions of February and October, 1917 were the results of the defeat and that victory would probably have averted them. But, with the Russians, you never can tell.

On the contrary, the Russians after having played a very useful role for three years in fixing and wearing down the German forces could disappear advantageously and without damage to us, replaced as they were by the United States. These latter, in their turn, aided us powerfully without having had the time to acquire an exaggerated influence.

The two colossuses were used, then discarded at the right moment, at the instant when they would have become annoying and dangerous.

As for us western Europeans, we escaped the yoke of Berlin, but better still, we escaped that of Moscow and that of Washington. Let us bless Providence, meditate on Its warnings and profit by the respite which It gave us.

Reflections

It is entirely banal to declare that coalitions are generally impotent because of the lack of a directing head. Likewise, it is stating an axiom to vaunt the merits of unity of command.

It is no less indisputable to say:

"1. The force of coalitions rests on their moral discipline.

2. Every coalition has need of a head.

3. The operations of each nation should fit into the plan for the ensemble.

4. National interest should give way before the common interest.

5. The solidarity of the allied nations will remain effective only if each of the nations scrupulously observes the terms of the allianco" (Colonel Oehmichen, Essay on the War Doctrine of Coalitions, Berger-Levrault, 1927)

All this is evident. We already know it. What we ought also to recognize is that the reality never corresponds to these ideal aspirations, which in consequence are only Platonic vows. It is, accordingly, vain and dangerous to entertain any illusions on this point.

Practical experience teaches us that it is extremely difficult to achieve unity of command even under conditions of well determined ideas (land, sea, etc.) It may be accomplished only if certain conditions occur together.

It is first necessary that the coalition should find itself face to face with an extreme peril. Then, in the face of the imminent catastrophe, the national differences of aim are willing to take second place and be subordinated to the authority of a single chief. As is the case with the human race the remedy appears only when an evil becomes unbearable. Such was the case with the coalition of 1914. It was necessary that it should be at the edge of the abyss of March and April, as a consequence of the first German offensive, before they would confide the command of their armies to General Foch.

Let us recall, very briefly, the steps in the realization of unity of command on land in 1918, which have been fully described by the actors in these events.

7 November, 1917 - The Pact of Rapallo. The creation of a Superior Interallied Council of War, which was to dictate (Resolution of December 7) a general plan of operation for the mass of the coalition forces.

2 February, 1918. The Allies constituted an Interallied Reserve and an Executive Committee, presided over by Gen-

eral Foch, charged with the maneuver of this reserve. This was made up of the Franco-English forces of Italy and such Italian forces as were available, in accordance with the discussions with the French and English commanders in chief.

26 March, 1918. Meeting at Doullens. General Foch was charged with coordinating the action of the allied armies on the French front, by understanding with the French and English commanders in chief.

1 April, 1918. A letter from General Foch to the President of the French Council, requesting a unified command.

3 April, 1918. The mission of coordination of General Foch is transformed into a strategical direction of operations (with the consent of the Americans)

14 April, 1918. General Foch took the title of Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies in France.

2 May, 1918. The Executive Committee of the Superior Interallied Council of War was suppressed and the Italian front came under the orders of General Foch.

In conclusion, this question of unity of command had been periodically agitated since 1915. It was due only to tragic circumstances that it was finally brought about.

On the other hand, from a maritime point of view, the coalition did not proceed through analagous stages, except perhaps in the spring of 1917, as a result of the unrestricted submarine warfare. Although much worried, the Allies thought to come through this difficult phase by means of coordinated measures which were to be taken separately by each nation. They did not experience, as they did a year later on land, the imperious need for having one chief only on the sea.

The next requirement is having one man, one whose authority will be accepted without question by all of the allies because of his strength, because of the cooperation which he will inspire, by the ascendency which he will hold over the allies by his personal magnetism. Such a man is infinitely rare. When he is found such a man establishes at once, without any written convention, by the simple power of his personality, a sort of practical unity of command. The examples of Pelissier in the Crimea, of General Foch on the Flanders front with the British and Belgians, are illustrations of this truth. On the contrary if the coalition does not possess a man of this caliber, it tries in vain to impose some other by an agreement of some sort; it will create a direction in name only and only deceive itself.

That is not all there is to it. It is necessary that this man accepted by all know how to produce obedience from the subordinates belonging to the different nations, each having its own mentality, point of view and ideas. For this it is essential that he have "the manner" of commanding in a coalition, which is not at all the same as that used when the command consists only of subordinates of the same nation. Any brusque or overbearing attitude will give deplorable results and will ruin in a short time the hierarchic structure so painstakingly erected.

Marshal Foch has given informally in his private writings the authoritative and complete formula for the method to be employed in such circumstances and we can profit by his experience. "You have to know how to lead the allies", he says. "You do not command them. You cannot work with one as you do with another. The English are the English; the Americans are another matter and the Belgians and the Italians each something else again. With the allied

generals I could not give them orders brusquely. That was not the system for them at all. Nobody knows what might have happened. They had to be listened to, otherwise they would have flown off the handle. Accordingly, when it was a question of important decision I went to see them or asked them to come to see me. I presented a solution to them, but I did not impose it upon them. I tried to convince them. I did not always succeed. Otherwise they would have chafed against their chains, if I had made them feel the weight of them too much. That is what unity of command is. You do not give orders, you suggest, you talk, you discuss, you persuade, but you do not give any orders". (Major Bugnet-Listening to Marshal Foch, Grasset, 1929)

Furthermore, the question of the personal relationships between the allied chiefs has a capital importance. The personality of liaison officers also.

Let us note that it is necessary to obtain a workable unity of command that the three conditions mentioned above should all be present at the same time. Each of them is necessary but is not in itself sufficient. There must be at one and the same time the tragic circumstances, the man and the method of command. Needless to say, this combination is extremely rare. Thus it is explained why the cases in which unity of direction has been assured may be counted century by century. They will not reproduce themselves again in the near future after the example of 1918. That must be considered.

Furthermore, having thus established a unity of impulsion for a determined set of circumstances, can it be counted on that a unity of command has been organized in the complete sense of the term? Not at all, because the next set of circumstances has not been affected at all by the measure already taken.

This may be proved by going from one military situation to another. If, for example, Marshal Foch had wanted - an unlikely hypothesis for a number of reasons - to hasten the decision on the French front by debarking troops on the coast of Germany, he would have had to have the cooperation of the French navy and even the allied navies. In the first case there would have had to be conferences and an understanding, etc. This is even more true in the second case. In both cases the intervention of the French government and several other governments would have been necessary. Marshal Foch, then, did not have a unity of command. He controlled only a part of the allied forces. This simple example demonstrates the point.

Such is the case with combined operations in general. They are coalitions on a small scale in which the question of command is where the stumbling block arises. It has never been solved and I do not know that it ever will be. In addition, the pleasant conception of an army in the air complicates the problem still more. Everything nowadays is becoming a combined operation and there are three liaisons to be assured in place of one.

Very few are those who have exercised simultaneously unity of command on land and on sea. The sovereigns of the ancient monarchies had it in part, but usually in a nominal manner only; most of the time they had rather the direction of the war as a whole than the actual conduct of operations. So far as effective command is concerned we can only cite William of Orange, Frederick II, Napoleon and a few others. They are the only ones who actually commanded, at the same time, armies and fleets, directing them according to their personal ideas of strategy.

There is still more. War does not demand only military actions. It is necessary also to fight in the realm of diplomacy, economics, finance, morale, etc. This is "the Nation at War". The word is new but the conception is very old. In the violent crises of the past, war has always been the nation at war. Accordingly, does the military command, even though unified, even if it extends to the land, sea and air forces, have any authority over these neighboring domains? Certainly not, at least in the vast majority of cases. The invading Ludendorff, for example, complained bitterly because he could not issue orders as he wanted to in the sectors under his influence; he fought for this with no other result than to bring disorder into the German direction. For those who proceed along more normal lines - and that includes practically everyone - the coordination of the military, diplomatic, economic, etc., actions can only be assured in any given nation, by the government itself, or a war committee deriving its powers from the government, that is to say, by a collection of various heads, by a syndicate, in a word, by a coalition.

Only a few autocrats of the past, Napoleon, for example, have been able to concentrate in their own heads the conduct of a war in all its phases and escape the general rule. It is only for them that national unity of command has not been an empty phrase.

If several nations are working in a common cause the situation is still worse. Unity of command being obtained, to state the matter in its best light, only in the military affairs, everything which concerns the other branches

has to be arranged by understanding between the governments, which implies negotiations, collective deliberations as an administrative council. It may be, of course, that one of these governments will be strong enough to bend the others to its wishes. Such was the advantage which Napoleon, William of Orange and several others equally fortunate, had. We have just seen several examples, less well defined, it is true, in the war of 1914. These circumstances are very infrequent; in general each nation conserves its sovereign liberty of evaluation.

Finally, without trying to find the exceptional and critical conditions of war time, do we not find analagous situations in the prosaic direction of affairs in time of peace which are not regulated always according to the idea of a single person and which often require the collaboration and consent of a certain number of minds?

For example, when the ordinary daily administration brings up a problem which interests several ministers it is necessary for them to come to an agreement and coordinate their views. What, then, is an interministerial understanding but a coalition in miniature?

In these, also, a sort of unity of command has been sought, at least for questions of national defense. In order to hasten the solution and pursue the investigation under better conditions, they have been removed, for the first step from the deliberations of the government which is too numerous and poorly equipped for the task. They have been confided to the Superior Council of National Defense, especially created for this purpose. This operates as a relatively small committee but still with a number of people. All the interested parties, frequently in disagreement are represented. It is the council of war, the syndicate still, a reduced edition of the coalition which it represents. No matter how the system may be amended, it is still imperfect. As to the Minister of National Defense,

he is confronted with the uncertain conceptions of the future; moreover, he touches only on the properly military part of this problem of unity of command.

Another case. Suppose some minister or other wants to effect a reform through legislative channels, by way of the budget, for example. First, he has to convert the Minister of Finance to his cause - a hard task among his others. Then he has to convince the person who is to present the budget to the Chamber, his particular commission, then the Finance Commission of that body. This done, he has to work with the analagous personalities and organs of the Senate and convert them to his views. In brief, success implies the consent and connivance of ten or twelve notable persons at least, without counting the vote of the parliament itself, and it may be ruined by the opposition of any one of them. What is this momentous collection if it is not the pure image of a coalition? Where is the will which commands in its sovereign strength?

Suppose the Navy wants to convince an international disarmament conference of its ideas and needs. Is it free to present them and defend them itself, strong as it is in its knowledge of the subject and its heavy responsibility? Not at all. It has to obtain the support of Foreign Affairs, considered as the indispensable lawyer, and the approval of the entire government, often at the price of bitter debates and sharp exchanges of views before the Superior Council of National Defense. In the course of this preliminary period, the Navy has to use diplomacy, skill, make allies, play the game carefully, Before attacking the main issue it has to operate as it would in a coalition of which it formed a part. In the last analysis it decides nothing. It does not command.

And so forth and so on.

To sum up, in the affairs of this world, we are always more or less in a state of coalition. The coalition regime is the rule for any great enterprise.

Unity of command, in the absolute sense of the term is almost always, nowadays at least, an imaginary state of affairs, a myth, a seductive creation of the mind without connection with actuality. For the most part, it is as unrealizable in practice as it is desirable in theory.

Certain dictators, alone, have created it. The governments by individual dictators, at least, such as that of Napoleon or of his modern imitator, Mussolini. It is not true of the collective dictatorships such as that of the Council of Ten, the Committee of Public Safety or the Russian Soviets. As for these latter, the council of commissars of the people resembles more a coalition, frequently in disagreement, than it does an impelling force from a single mind.

Unity of command is an asymptote, of which the perfect type is the Napoleonic asymptote. It may approach to a greater or less distance, it will never touch.

However, let us not be discouraged by this pessimistic conclusion and by the difficulties inherent in the nature of the problem. Let us tend with all our force, in a future coalition toward this ideal asymptote, even if our efforts do not meet with complete success.

But we should not be surprised either if we do not attain our goal and if we do not find an immediate solution to this squaring of the circle. Without losing courage, let us not entertain any false hopes. And finally - this conclusion may be unexpected - let us not think too badly in advance of conferences or interallied councils. Lacking unity of command, it

is an unavoidable evil, but which is worth something and may render service. Let us seek to overcome its deficiencies by our intelligence, our character, our understanding of affairs, our loyalty to the common cause. It should be a reunion of great minds and great hearts.

Translation by:

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